DS507 - Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations

Status: SSG-9, Rev.1

Veröffentlichung  2022

Revision von SSG-9  (Ex DS422)

Beteiligte IAEO-Komitees: NUSSC, WASSC

Specific Safety Guide

STEP 13    
STEP 12 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 12
STEP 11 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 11
STEP 8 Kommentare der Mitgliedsstaaten
und IAEO-Bewertung
IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 8
STEP 7 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 7
STEP 4 Kommentare der SSCs  
STEP 3 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 3

Document Preparation Profile "DPP"

Zurück zu „IAEO Safety Standards Series“ (Übersicht aller derzeit gültigen Sicherheitsstandards)

Background Information

The document (SSG-9) was first published in 2010.

The current revision (DS507) was initiated to

  • Ensure consistency with applicable requirements for site evaluation (SSR-1, revision of NS-R-3 Rev.1, Ex. DS484)
  • Ensure coherency and consistency with the other relevant IAEA Safety Standards (e.g. SF-1, SSR-2/1, GSR Part 2 and 4),
  • Incorporate the lessons learned and address challenges highlighted IAEA Report on Fukushima-Daiichi NPP Accident.
     

New information in DS507 includes

  • Newly developed methods of data collection
  • Addressing issues related to multi-unit sites (consistent with SSR-1)
  • guidance on hazard/design interface with site response.
     

Other Changes

  • More detail of capable faults and fault displacement hazard analysis for new and existing nuclear installations
  • Combination of seismic hazards (surface faulting and ground motion) and relevant geological, hydrological and geotechnical hazards.
     

Implications arising from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident

  • highlighted issues of uncertainties in the assessment of seismic hazards
  • natural hazard assessment has to be sufficiently conservative
  • historical data in the establishment of the design basis of nuclear power plants is not sufficient to characterize the risks of extreme natural hazards
  • re-evaluated on a periodic basis to consider advances in knowledge, and necessary corrective actions or compensatory measures