COMMENTS BY REVIEWER					RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: F	3. De Boeck /	P. De Gelder / Tchien Minh Tang	Page 1of 2					
Country/Or;	ganization: B	elgium / Bel V	Date: 16/05/2017					
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection	
1	§ 2	To add in the last paragraph: "Additionally, in response to the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident and in the framework of the risk and safety assessments (ENSREG EU Stress Tests), the assessment of the seismic hazard and design basis and the evaluation of the seismic margins was performed on all EU nuclear power plants."	To add a paragraph summarizing the work performed in Europe (by the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group Working Group (ENSREG)), besides the work already mentioned in USA and Japan.				This paragraph is relevant to fault displacement hazard but not to the vibratory ground motion	
2	§ 4	 To add to the third bullet of this paragraph the following aspects: Provide detailed guidance on sensitivity analysis on parameters Provide acceptance criteria and acceptance tests for the selection of the hazard engines used for the calculations Provide criteria for the definition of a seismogenic structure 	For further specification of the objectives of the revision		 Sensitivity analysis will be discussed in the paragraph of uncertainties The testing was explicitly specified at the end of third bullet. Specified seismogenic structure in the first bullet 			

DS507 - Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations

3	§ 7	This §7 explains that the table of	For keeping the two	Need to provide
		content of the revised SSG-9 will be	approaches separate in	guidance of
		kept similar to the present version.	different chapters.	complementation
		However, there is a difference with		between
		the actual table of content of the		probabilistic and
		SSG-9 where there are two different		deterministic
		chapters for the hazard analysis:		approach in a
		chapter 6 for probabilistic and		certain chapter.
		chapter 7 for deterministic hazard		Two schemes
		analysis. We consider that it is more		were assigned as
		appropriate to keep the two		subchapters:
		approaches separately.		6.1 Probabilistic
				Seismic Hazard
				Analysis
				<u>6.2 Deterministic</u>
				Seismic Hazard
				Analysis

4	East first	In minus of the first dualt me mould	Anticipation on the first		
4	FOT HISt	In view of the first draft, we would	Anucipation on the first	inese are	
	draft	like to indicate already a few points	draft	expressing kind	
		that might be of interest to be		comments for the	
		considered:		draft. We will	
		- As it is asked to use both		definitively	
		deterministic and probabilistic		consider them.	
		approaches (without preference			
		for one of the other), how to			
		manage the differences in the			
		results?			
		- As it is known that uncertainties			
		in seismic hazard analysis are			
		important, how conservative			
		should the analysis be and what			
		level of safety margin to choose?			
		- To recommend that the study			
		would be available to other			
		experts for peer review			
		- To recommend a better			
		coordination between			
		neighbouring countries			

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER					RESC	DLUTION	
Reviewer: Dr. Dana Havlín Nováková ¹ , Dr. František Gallovič ² Page 1 of 2							
Country/Org	ganization: SÚJH	3 ¹ , Charles University (Department of	of Geophysics Faculty of				
Mathematic	s and Physics) ² /	Czech Republic	Date: 4. 5. 2017				
Comment	Para/Line	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepte	Accepted, but	Rejected	Reason for
No.	No.			d	modified as		modification/rejecti
					follows		on
1	Page 2/	Providing guidance and methods	The assessment of			X	The guide is not
	Objective	of seismic hazard assessment for	seismic hazards in the				focusing only high
		areas with low seismicity.	SSG-9/DS507 is mainly				seismicity area, but
			focused on areas with				also low seismicity
			high seismic activity and				area.
			measurable and localized				

			earthquakes. The procedures and methods for these territories should not be fully accepted for the assessment of seismic hazard of territories with low seismic activity.			
		Providing guidance and developing seismic hazard assessment methods for deep underground radioactive waste disposal.	Due to the planning of deep repositories of radioactive waste in many countries, it would be appropriate to include a specific chapter on the assessment of seismic hazard in depth corresponding to the site of the underground radioactive waste repository. Seismic hazard assessment methods used for surface installations cannot be fully taken into account in the assessment of seismic hazards at the depth of the rock massif. It is necessary to focus the work of experts on the creation of a special methodology for this evaluation.			The deep repository is not in the scope of nuclear installations.
2	Page 3/	Predisposal Management of	Requirements for siting	X		
	Place in the	Radioactive Waste from Nuclear	and design of radioactive			

overall structur the rele series a interfac with ex and/or planned publica	of ant d s sting ons	waste deposits are based among others, also in SSG-9 /DS507 (p. 48 of SSG-41).	

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER					RESO	LUTION	
Country/Organization: FRANCE / ASN			Date: 19 April 2017				
pages							
Comme	Para/Line	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but	Rejected	Reason for
nt No.	No.				modified as follows		modification/rejection
1.	§6	GSR Part 2 and GSR Part 4 should also be	Management system	Х			
		mentioned	requirements and safety				
			assessment requirements are to				
			be implemented.				
2.	§6	SSR-2/1 should be included	SSR-2/1 does set expectations	Х			
			for seismic hazard, including to				
			address low probability events.				
3.	§7	6. SEISMIC HAZARD ANALYSIS	Consistency with current SSG-9	Х			
	_	6.1 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis	structure				
		6.2 Deterministic Seismic Hazard Analysis					
/							

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION				
Reviewer: F	Reviewer: Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear							
Safety (BMUB) (with comments of GRS) Pages 2								
Country/Org	Country/Organization: GERMANY Date: 2017-05-15							
Comment	Para/Line	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but	Rejected	Reason for	
No.	No.				modified as follows		modification/rejection	
1	page 2,	 Include and provide more guidance on 	There seems to be a	Х				
	section 4	the determination of parameters	consensus in the seismic					

	suitable to describe the damaging	engineering community that		
	offacts of aarthquakas	pask ground acceleration is		
	<u>enects of eartiquakes.</u>	peak ground acceleration is		
		demoging notential of		
		damaging potential of		
		eartinguakes. Therefore it		
		could be beneficial to		
		discuss more in detail other		
		parameters of earthquakes		
		which might provide a		
		better clue to the expected		
		earthquake effects (e.g.		
		CAV, spectral acceleration		
		of the plateau of the		
		response spectrum, intensity		
		measures etc.) and suitable		
		approaches for their		
		determination in the		
		framework of the seismic		
		hazard assessment.		
 page 5	Staff: 20 ?? staff weeks	For the revision of NS-G-		 After the 2011
P8	Consultants: 10 ?? consultant weeks	2.1 (DS503) which involves		Great Tohoku Japan
		a significant extension of		Earthquaka
		the scope of the Safety		
		Standard the same amount		significant revise is
		of staff (20) and consultant		necessary.
		(10) weeks has been		Moreover, SSG-9 is
		proposed Given the fact		twice size of NS-G-
		that in comparison to this		2.1
		effort the necessary		
		changes to SSG-9 are		
		limited there is an		
		imbalance between the two		
		resource estimates that		
		should be resolved by either		
		reducing the resources for		
		this revision or by		
		increasing them for DS502		
		according to the experience		
		according to the experience		
		with similar projects.		