NST074 - Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities

Status: STEP 3

Revision von NSS No. 14

Beteiligte IAEO-Komitees: NSGC, EPReSC, NUSSC, RASSC, TRANSSC, WASSC

Nuclear Security Recommendations

STEP 12    
STEP 11 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 11
STEP 8 Kommentare der Mitgliedsstaaten
und IAEO-Bewertung
IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 8
STEP 7 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 7
STEP 4   IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 4
STEP 3 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 3

 

Zurück zur Übersicht "In Entwicklung befindliche Safety Standards"

Background Information

Drawing on the results of the review process for NSS No.14, the following gaps should be addressed in the limited revision of this publication:

  1. Revise unclear and inconsistent definitions;
  2. Ensure consistency of terminology among the Recommendations publications and with the Fundamentals, and, where applicable, within the publication;
  3. Ensure consistency of concepts among the Recommendations publications and with the Fundamentals, in cases where the inconsistencies are likely to lead to difficulties for States in implementing the guidance therein;
  4. Consider enhancing or adding a limited amount of text to account for experience gained during the last decade, as well as developments in the following areas, in cases where the guidance provided in the existing text is not adequate to support lower-level, more detailed guidance:
  • Information and computer security;
  • Insider threats;
  • Emerging threats;
  • New and emerging technologies that could be used to strengthen nuclear security systems, while keeping the publication overarching and technology-neutral;
  • Safety-security interfaces;
  • Sustainability and resilience of nuclear security regime including in unplanned situations for which continuity of operations is needed (e.g., pandemics and natural disasters).

The revision should also consider if there are concerns related to disused radioactive sources, radioactive waste, sabotage and response to nuclear security events involving radioactive material that are not adequately addressed by the existing text in NSS No 14.

If a potential gap is found, minimal text should be added, providing high-level guidance to be developed further in lower-level publications. In the case of disused radioactive sources, any additional or revised text should be consistent with the Code of Conduct Supplementary Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources (DRS), published in 2018.

Recommendations for security of nuclear material against sabotage or construction of an improvised nuclear device are provided in NSS No.13, whereas NSS No. 14 includes recommendations for protection of nuclear material against unauthorized removal for potential subsequent off-site exposure or dispersal. Review of the scope of both publications is warranted to decide in which publication the security of nuclear material against unauthorized removal for off-site exposure or dispersal would be best addressed.

Keeping in mind the importance of the stability of the Recommendations for States, the revision should be limited. It should generally avoid any changes that alter the structure of the publication or the level of detail. Changes should be generally limited to the addition of and editing of individual sentences and paragraphs, and, for any proposed changes, it should be carefully considered whether or not the existing language in the publication is broad enough that further information could simply be added in lower[1]level publications without the need to edit the Recommendations.