

Document Preparation Profile (DPP) Version 4.0 dated 05/12/2024

1. IDENTIFICATION

Document Category: Nuclear Security Recommendations

Working ID: NST074

Proposed Title: Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities (NSS No. 14, Revision 1)

Proposed Action: Revision of a publication
Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities (NSS No. 14), published 2011,

Review Committee(s) or Group: NSGC, EPRReSC, NUSSC, RASSC, TRANSSC, WASSC

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2. BACKGROUND

The Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities (NSS No. 14) along with Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) (NSS No. 13) and Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control (NSS No. 15) comprise the second tier of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series, known as the Nuclear Security Recommendations. Originally published in January 2011, over a decade has passed since the publication of NSS No. 14. Given this timeframe, a thorough review for all three Nuclear Security Recommendations (Nos. 13, 14 and 15), hereinafter referred to as “the Recommendations” was initiated in 2019 to determine the necessity of revising the documents.

To facilitate this process, a consultancy meeting was convened in February 2020 to assess the potential revision of NSS14. The meeting, attended by 18 experts from 15 Member States, concluded that revision was necessary, specifically to address inconsistencies, clarify terminology, and make limited updates and clarifications, as outlined in the Annex to this DPP.

During its 18th meeting, the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) recommended that such a limited revision of the Recommendations be undertaken. Additionally, the committee advised that a parallel revision of Nuclear Security Fundamentals “Objective and Essential Elements of a State's Nuclear Security Regime” (NSS No. 20), hereinafter referred to as “the Fundamentals”, should also be conducted.

3. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRODUCTION OF THE PUBLICATION

Over a decade has passed since the release of Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities (NSS No. 14). Since January 2011, 7 revisions and 29 new

publications have been issued within the Nuclear Security Series, including the Fundamentals, covering areas such as information and computer security, capacity building, nuclear security culture, emerging threats and technologies, insider threats, the safety–security interface, transport and others. Fifteen of them are either crosscutting publications or directly support the implementation of NSS No. 14. While the recommendations provided in NSS No. 14 remain largely applicable and relevant, the practical application of this publication in Member States over the years has highlighted certain areas that could benefit from limited updates to enhance its usability (see Annex). The publication will be updated to align with any revised terminologies and address inconsistencies identified in relation to the Fundamentals and other Recommendations during the revision process.

Updates are also needed to incorporate references to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fundamentals and the relevant legally binding and non-binding international instruments, for example, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, as appropriate. The revision should remain consistent with, and complement, the established legally binding international instruments.

4. OBJECTIVE

The current objective of the publication will remain broadly unchanged, as set out in the publication:

“... to provide guidance to States and competent authorities on how to develop or enhance, to implement and to maintain a nuclear security regime for radioactive material, associated facilities and associated activities.”

Additional clarification could be added to the objective to enhance precision and ensure consistency.

5. SCOPE

The scope of the publication will undergo limited changes and remain broadly unchanged as set out in publication. Annex details the scope of anticipated changes.

The publication will continue covering the security of radioactive material throughout its life cycle: manufacture, supply, receipt, possession, storage, use, transfer, import, export, transport, maintenance, and recycling or disposal.

6. PLACE IN THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE RELEVANT SERIES AND INTERFACES WITH EXISTING AND/OR PLANNED PUBLICATIONS

The Recommendations are the second tier in the Nuclear Security Series, governed by the Fundamentals, and this current structure will remain unchanged.

NSS No. 14 is connected to numerous lower-level Nuclear Security Series publications, including existing publications and publications currently under development. NSS No. 14 provides the recommendations, while these publications offer more detailed guidance, thereby supporting the implementation of recommendations.

To ensure a coordinated approach, this revision is anticipated to be conducted simultaneously with the revision of the other Recommendations (NSS Nos 13 and 15) and the Fundamentals. This will guarantee that any revisions made to one of the publications will be subsequently noted and their implications considered across all related top-tier Nuclear Security Series publications. Additionally, this approach aims to improve consistency among the Recommendations publications and with the Fundamentals in order to provide an improved basis for the revision of existing lower-level guidance (e.g., Implementing Guides and Technical Guidance publications) and the development of new lower-level guidance.

Interfaces between IAEA Nuclear Security Series and the IAEA Safety Standards Series will also be noted, where appropriate.

The Divisions of the Nuclear Safety and Security Department will be consulted during the revision process as necessary.

7. OVERVIEW

The table of contents of the publication will remain broadly unchanged, as follows:

1. INTRODUCTION
2. OBJECTIVES OF A STATE'S NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIME FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, ASSOCIATED FACILITIES AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES
3. ELEMENTS OF A STATE'S NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIME FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, ASSOCIATED FACILITIES AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, ASSOCIATED FACILITIES AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES.
5. DEFINITIONS

While NSS No. 14 was not co-sponsored by any international organization, recognizing the benefits of such collaboration the current revision of the document should consider co-sponsorship from EUROPOL, ICAO, IMO, INTERPOL, UNICRI, UNODC, WCO and other relevant international governmental organizations, as appropriate. Annex IV of the [*Step-by-Step Preparation and Review Process. Manual for the Review Process for Draft Nuclear Security Series Publications and for the Application of the Strategies and Processes for the Establishment of IAEA Safety Standards \(SPESS B\)*](#) provides detailed information on co-sponsorship, its benefits, and associated process.

8. PRODUCTION SCHEDULE:

Provisional schedule for preparation of the publication, outlining realistic expected dates for each step

STEP 1: Preparing a DPP	DONE
STEP 2: Internal review of the DPP (Approval by the Coordination Committee)	Aug 2024
STEP 3: Review of the DPP by the review Committee(s) (Approval by review Committee(s))	Q4 2024
STEP 4: Review of the DPP by the CSS (approval by CSS) or information of the CSS on the DPP	
STEP 5: Preparing the draft publication	Jan 2025 – Feb 2027
STEP 6: First internal review of the draft publication (Approval by the Coordination Committee)	Mar 2027

STEP 7: First review of the draft publication by the review Committee(s) (Approval for submission to Member States for comments)	Jun 2027
STEP 8: Soliciting comments by Member States	Jul – Oct 2027
STEP 9: Addressing comments by Member States	Nov 2027– Feb 2028
STEP 10: Second internal review of the draft publication (Approval by the Coordination Committee)	Mar 2028
STEP 11: Second review of the draft publication by the review Committee(s) (Approval of the draft)	Jun 2028
STEP 12: (For Safety Standards) Editing of the draft publication in MTCDD and endorsement of the draft publication by the CSS (For nuclear security guidance) DDG's decision on whether additional consultation is needed, establishment by the Publications Committee and editing	Jul – Dec 2028
STEP 13: Approval by the Board of Governors (for SF and SR only)	
STEP 14: Target publication date	Q2 2029

9. RESOURCES

Three Consultancy Meetings are likely to be needed during the revision process. Some of these may be convened virtually, as deemed appropriate. Additionally, about two Technical Meetings covering all four publications might be necessary to better address Member States' feedback on proposed revisions.

To ensure a coordinated revision of the Fundamentals and the Recommendations, and to harmonize the four drafts, meetings with the Chairs of the meetings to be conducted, potentially including a limited number of additional technical experts, are likely to be needed. These meetings may also be held virtually.

The technical officers assigned to the revision of other top-tier publications (the Fundamentals and Recommendations) should communicate regularly on each other's progress.

Additionally, the Secretariat will provide timely updates to the lead committee on the progress of the revision of the Fundamentals and the Recommendations, and will keep it informed about the meetings scheduled for the revision and their outcomes.

ANNEX

Drawing on the results of the review process for NSS No. 14, the following gaps should be addressed in the limited revision of this publication:

- Revise unclear and inconsistent definitions;
- Ensure consistency of terminology among the Recommendations publications and with the Fundamentals, and, where applicable, within the publication;
- Ensure consistency of concepts among the Recommendations publications and with the Fundamentals, in cases where the inconsistencies are likely to lead to difficulties for States in implementing the guidance therein;
- Consider enhancing or adding a limited amount of text to account for experience gained during the last decade, as well as developments in the following areas, in cases where the guidance provided in the existing text is not adequate to support lower-level, more detailed guidance:
 - Information and computer security;
 - Insider threats;
 - Emerging threats;
 - New and emerging technologies that could be used to strengthen nuclear security systems, while keeping the publication overarching and technology-neutral;
 - Safety-security interfaces;
 - Sustainability and resilience of nuclear security regime including in unplanned situations for which continuity of operations is needed (e.g., pandemics and natural disasters).

Additionally, other topics, identified based on the information collected throughout the extensive review process, should be subject to further discussion during the revision process.

The revision should also consider if there are concerns related to disused radioactive sources, radioactive waste, sabotage and response to nuclear security events involving radioactive material that are not adequately addressed by the existing text in NSS No 14. If a potential gap is found, minimal text should be added, providing high-level guidance to be developed further in lower-level publications. In the case of disused radioactive sources, any additional or revised text should be consistent with the Code of Conduct Supplementary Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources (DRS), published in 2018.

Keeping in mind the importance of the stability of the Recommendations for States, the revision should be limited. It should generally avoid any changes that alter the structure of the publication (i.e. the top section level structure, as outlined in the Overview section of this DPP) or the level of detail. For any proposed changes, it should be carefully considered whether or not the existing language in the publication is broad enough that further information could simply be added in lower-level publications without the need to edit the Recommendations.

As noted in the main text of the DPP, a consultancy meeting to inform the revision of this publication was held in February 2020. One of its outcomes is the recommendation to review of the scope of NSS No.13 and NSS No.14 to decide in which document the security of nuclear material against unauthorized removal for offsite or onsite exposure or dispersal would be best addressed. Further, results and conclusions of that meeting are recorded and can be found summarized in the Chair' Report for the

meeting. It will be made available to the experts that will participate in drafting and they will be considered during the revision process.