Status: SSG-63
Veröffentlichung 2020
Revision von NS-G-1.4 (Ex DS276)
Beteiligte IAEO-Komitees: NUSSC, WASSC, TRANSSC, NSGC
Specific Safety Guide
| STEP 13 | Kommentare der SSCs | |
| STEP 12 | Kommentare der SSCs | IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 12 |
| STEP 11 | Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung | IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 11 |
| STEP 8 | Kommentare der Mitgliedsstaaten und IAEO-Bewertung |
IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 8 |
| STEP 7 | Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung | IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 7 |
| STEP 4 | ||
| STEP 3 | Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung | IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 3 |
Document Preparation Profile "DPP"
Zurück zu „IAEO Safety Standards Series“ (Übersicht aller derzeit gültigen Sicherheitsstandards)
Background Information
The document (NS-G-1.4) was first published in 2003.
The current revision (DS487) was initiated to
- comply with the long term structure of safety standards approved in 2008
- ensure coherency and consistency with all safety requirements in SSR-2/1 Rev 1 (2016), in particular with Req. 80 updated in Rev.1
- incorporate feedback from the accident at the TEPCO Fukushima-Daiichi NPP
The scope of NS-G-1.4 remains essentially unchanged
- Application primarily to land based stationary NPPs
- Fuel handling and storage systems that remain part of the operational activities of nuclear reactor(s)
The new information in DS487 includes
- Guidance and recommendations for all the relevant safety requirements in SSR-2/1 Rev. 1
- Detailed guidance and recommendations for ensuring an appropriate decay heat removal from the irradiated fuel storage in normal operation and accident conditions including internal/ external hazards
- Guidance for implementing appropriately a defence in depth
- Detailed guidance and recommendations for preventing high radiation doses and large radioactive release
- Separate sections for “fuel storage and the cooling systems”/“fuel handling”/”Handling of equipment for fuel inspection or repair”/“spent fuel cask handling” has been added.
Implications arising from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident
- Specific recommendations to avoid high radiation doses and to prevent uncover of the irradiated fuel assemblies
- Multiple means to remove decay heat from irradiated fuel
- Redundancy, diversity and independency among these means; Implemented combination of these should be adequate to demonstrate that the uncovering of the fuel assemblies is prevented with a high level of confidence
- Recommendations for appropriate instrumentation and monitoring
- Possibility to recover the coolant inventory by the use of non-permanent equipment.