DS487 - Design of Fuel Handling and Storage Systems for Nuclear Power Plants

Status: SSG-63

Veröffentlichung 2020

Revision von NS-G-1.4 (Ex DS276)


Specific Safety Guide

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Zurück zu „IAEO Safety Standards Series“ (Übersicht aller derzeit gültigen Sicherheitsstandards)

Background Information

The document (NS-G-1.4) was first published in 2003.

The current revision (DS487) was initiated to

  • comply with the long term structure of safety standards approved in 2008
  • ensure coherency and consistency with all safety requirements in SSR-2/1 Rev 1 (2016), in particular with Req. 80 updated in Rev.1
  • incorporate feedback from the accident at the TEPCO Fukushima-Daiichi NPP


The scope of NS-G-1.4 remains essentially unchanged

  • Application primarily to land based stationary NPPs
  • Fuel handling and storage systems that remain part of the operational activities of nuclear reactor(s)


The new information in DS487 includes

  • Guidance and recommendations for all the relevant safety requirements in SSR-2/1 Rev. 1
  • Detailed guidance and recommendations for ensuring an appropriate decay heat removal from the irradiated fuel storage in normal operation and accident conditions including internal/ external hazards
  • Guidance for implementing appropriately a defence in depth
  • Detailed guidance and recommendations for preventing high radiation doses and large radioactive release
  • Separate sections for “fuel storage and the cooling systems”/“fuel handling”/”Handling of equipment for fuel inspection or repair”/“spent fuel cask handling” has been added.


Implications arising from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident

  • Specific recommendations to avoid high radiation doses and to prevent uncover of the irradiated fuel assemblies
  • Multiple means to remove decay heat from irradiated fuel
  • Redundancy, diversity and independency among these means; Implemented combination of these should be adequate to demonstrate that the uncovering of the fuel assemblies is prevented with a high level of confidence
  • Recommendations for appropriate instrumentation and monitoring
  • Possibility to recover the coolant inventory by the use of non-permanent equipment.