NST073 - Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 6)

Status: STEP 3

Revision von NSS No. 13

Beteiligte IAEO-Komitees: NSGC, EPReSC, NUSSC, RASSC, TRANSSC, WASSC

Nuclear Security Recommendations

Zurück zur Übersicht "In Entwicklung befindliche Safety Standards"

Background Information

Drawing on the results of the review process for NSS No. 13 (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), the dual titling of the publication should be maintained, so that the title of the revision will be Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 6) (NSS No. 13, Revision 1).

Furthermore, the following gaps should be addressed in a limited revision of Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) (NSS No. 13):

1. Revise unclear and inconsistent definitions;
2. Ensure consistency of terminology among the Recommendations publications and with the Fundamentals, and, where applicable, within the publication;
3. Ensure consistency of concepts among the Recommendations publications and with the Fundamentals, in cases where the inconsistencies are likely to lead to difficulties for States in implementing the guidance therein;
4. Consider enhancing or adding a limited amount of text to account for experience gained during the last decade, as well as developments in the following areas, in cases where the guidance provided in the existing text is not adequate to support lower-level, more detailed guidance:

• Information and computer security;
• Insider threats;
• Emerging threats;
• New and emerging technologies that could be used to strengthen nuclear security systems; while keeping the publication overarching and technology-neutral;
• Safety-security interfaces;
• Sustainability and resilience of nuclear security regime including in unplanned situations for which continuity of operations is needed (e.g., pandemics and natural disasters).

In addition, the revision should consider updating the definition of “nuclear facility' and providing clarification in relation to the topics such as security plan, security during the lifetime of a nuclear facility and sabotage thresholds, which is drawn upon the outcomes of the review process.

Keeping in mind the importance of the stability of the Recommendations for States, the revision should be limited. It should generally avoid any changes that alter the structure of the publication or their level of detail. Changes should be generally limited to the addition of and editing of individual sentences and paragraphs, and, for any proposed changes, it should be carefully considered whether or not the existing language in the publication is broad enough that further information could simply be added in lower-level publications without the need to edit the NSS No.13.

Furthermore, the revision of the NSS No.13 should be in coordination and harmonization with revision of the other top tier publications. In this regard, the revision of the NSS No.13 and NSS No.14 should consider the outcomes of the consultancy meeting on revision of NSS No.14, held in February 2020, that recommended review of the scope of NSS No.13 and NSS No.14 to decide in which document the security of nuclear material against unauthorized removal for offsite or onsite exposure or dispersal would be best addressed.