Status: STEP 3
Revision von NSS No. 15
Beteiligte IAEO-Komitees: NSGC, EPReSC, NUSSC, RASSC, TRANSSC, WASSC
Nuclear Security Recommendations
STEP 12 | ||
STEP 11 | Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung | IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 11 |
STEP 8 | Kommentare der Mitgliedsstaaten und IAEO-Bewertung |
IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 8 |
STEP 7 | Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung | IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 7 |
STEP 4 | IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 4 | |
STEP 3 | Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung | IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 3 |
Zurück zur Übersicht "In Entwicklung befindliche Safety Standards"
Background Information
Drawing on the results of the review process for NSS No.15, the following gaps should be addressed in the limited revision of this publication:
1. Revise unclear and inconsistent definitions;
2. Ensure consistency of terminology among the Recommendations publications and with the Fundamentals, and, where applicable, within the publication;
3. Ensure consistency of concepts among the Recommendations publications and with the Fundamentals, in cases where the inconsistencies are likely to lead to difficulties for States in implementing the guidance therein;
4. Consider enhancing or adding a limited amount of text to account for experience gained during the last decade, as well as developments in the following areas, in cases where the guidance provided in the existing text is not adequate to support lower-level, more detailed guidance:
- Information and computer security;
- Insider threats;
- New and emerging technologies that could be used to strengthen nuclear security systems, while keeping the publication overarching and technology-neutral;
- Safety-security interfaces;
- Risk-informed and graded approach;
- National nuclear security detection architecture;
- Sustainability and resilience of nuclear security regime including in unplanned situations for which continuity of operations is needed (e.g., pandemics and natural disasters).
5. Consider providing clarification on the following areas:
- Interface between threat assessment, nuclear security detection and response activities;
- Nuclear security response to a nuclear security event;
- Administrative and technical arrangements to place found, seized, or confiscated material out of regulatory control under appropriate State’s control.
Keeping in mind the importance of the stability of the Recommendations for States, the revision should be limited. It should generally avoid any changes that alter the structure of the publication or the level of detail. Changes should be generally limited to the addition of and editing of individual sentences and paragraphs, and, for any proposed changes, it should be carefully considered whether or not the existing language in the publication is broad enough that further information could simply be added in lower-level publications without the need to edit the Recommendations. The revision should also consider whether there is a need for additional recommendations related to material out of regulatory control.