DS516 - Criticality Safety in the Handling of Fissile Material

Status: SSG-27 (Rev. 1)

Veröffentlichung 2022

Revision von SSG-27 (Ex DS407)

 Beteiligte IAEO-Komitees: NUSSC, RASSC, WASSC, TRANSSC, EPReSC, NSGC

 Specific Safety Guide

STEP 13   Step 13 for publication
STEP 12    
STEP 11 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 11
STEP 8 Kommentare der Mitgliedsstaaten
und IAEO-Bewertung
IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 8
STEP 7 Kommentare der SSCs IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 7
STEP 4    
STEP 3 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 3

 

Zurück zu „IAEO Safety Standards Series“ (Übersicht aller derzeit gültigen Sicherheitsstandards)

Background Information

Under this DPP will be revised one Guide: SSG-27 “Criticality Safety in the Handling of Fissile Material” (Group 3). According to criteria of grouping the Safety Guides by three DPPs, Safety Guide in Group 3 covers specific area of nuclear safety – criticality safety – it is applied to all nuclear facilities where fissile materials are handled and needs involvement of specialized technical experts for revision.

The Guide covers criticality safety in the handling, processing, storage, transport and disposal of fissile materials or waste containing fissile material. The Guide makes recommendations on how to ensure subcriticality in systems involving fissile material from design through construction, commissioning and operation to decommissioning and disposal of waste. It covers all types of facilities and activities that have or use fissile material, except those that are designed to be intentionally critical, for example the core in a nuclear reactor, or a critical assembly.

 In cases where criticality safety is specifically addressed by regulations, for example transport that is performed in accordance with the SSR-6, this Safety Guide supplements but does not replace the specific regulatory guidance. Amendment of SSG-27 will not contradict SSR-6 in respect to criticality detection, emergency preparedness and application of the double contingency principle.

The recommendations of this Guide should be applied to operations that are intended to remain subcritical in nuclear power plants and research reactors, for example, the handling and storage of fresh fuel and spent fuel.

The interface between safety, the system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material will also be considered.