DS517 - Revision by amendment of 3 Specific Safety Guides on Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities

Status: STEP 8

Revision von SSG-5 (Ex DS344), SSG-6 (Ex DS317) und SSG-7 (Ex DS318)

  • SSG-5: "Safety of Conversion Facilities and Uranium Enrichment Facilities"
  • SSG-6: "Safety of Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facilities"
  • SSG-7: "Safety of Uranium and Plutonium Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facilities"

 

Beteiligte IAEO-Komitees: NUSSC, RASSC, WASSC, EPReSC, NSGC

Specific Safety Guides

STEP 12    
STEP 11 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 11
STEP 8
DS517A_SSG-5
DS517B_SSG-6
DS517C_SSG-7
Kommentare der Mitgliedsstaaten
und IAEO-Bewertung
IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 8

STEP 7
DS517A_SSG-5
DS517B_SSG-6
DS517C_SSG-7

Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung
Kommentare der SSCs DS517A_SSG-5
Kommentare der SSCs DS517B_SSG-6
Kommentare der SSCs DS517C_SSG-7

IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 7
DS517A_SSG-5 clean / track
DS517B_SSG-6 clean / track
DS517C_SSG-7 clean / track
STEP 4    
STEP 3 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 3

Document Preparation Profile "DPP"

Zurück zur Übersicht "In Entwicklung befindliche Safety Standards"

Background Information

The IAEA Safety Standards related to the safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities were all published before SSR-4 and represent the international consensus on the safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities which existed in the period of their development and publication (2010).

The publication of SSR-4 in 2017 superseded IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-5, Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities (2014), and introduced some new requirements and significantly modified several others.

The gap analysis identified that much of the existing technical contents of specific Guides for nuclear fuel cycle facilities – namely SSG-5, SSG-6 and SSG-7 -  remains valid, but has outdated references and does not fully address all the requirements in SSR-4, including the guidance on: management and verification of safety, general design requirements, main safety functions, defence in depth concept, safety analysis and operational limits and conditions, accident management and feedback of operating experience. Finally, the guidance on safety functions in these Guides does not reflect developments in functional safety for control systems and electrical power und thus current Guides need in-depth technical revision.

More specifically, amendments to the Guides are needed to address the following:

  • All the content of the Guides will be checked against Appendixes and Annexes of NS-R-5 that were removed when replaced by SSR-4.
  • Some statements in the Guides that are expressed as “should” statements may now duplicate requirements of SSR-4 and GSR Parts 2-7. Such statements should be carefully checked and either removed from the Guides or modified to make them useful recommendations.
  • Other new IAEA Safety Standards have been developed to support the GSRs and Specific Requirements NS-R-3 (Rev.1) which also apply to nuclear fuel cycle facilities. These Safety Guides should be referenced in the Guides where necessary, along with other documents Safety Series that are relevant.
  • The Guides have to be updated to better reflect current operational practices at nuclear fuel cycle facilities and the state-of-the-art in relevant technologies.
  • The provision of SSGs that are specific to facility types should address the principal concern of applying graded approach to SSR-4. The effect of application of the graded approach to the particular type of the facility should be explained, where fulfilling the Guide addresses the graded element of the requirements of SSR-4.
  • SSR-4 contains a new requirement relating to the interfaces between safety, nuclear security and the State system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material. Interfaces between safety and security will be covered, in a consistent manner with nuclear security recommendations for physical protection and insider threats, where appropriate.
  • Relevant operational experience feedback will be considered when revising the Guides. 

 

In addition, the following specific issues will be addressed for SSG-5:

  • The scope can be reduced to centrifuges in design and operation with gas diffusion only decommissioning;
  • Include auxiliary activities such as sampling, homogenization and blending within scope;
  • Include guidance on use of water for cleaning cylinders with heels;
  • Consider hazardous material assessments for uranium hexafluoride;
  • Include safety culture aspects specific for conversion facilities and uranium enrichment facilities;
  • Include the information on support systems and analytical laboratories.

 

In addition, the following specific issues will be addressed for SSG-6:

  • Keep the scope to commercial uranium below 6% and confirm that fuel fabrication with reprocessed U containing traces of Pu is covered;
  • Include auxiliary activities such as sampling, homogenization and blending within scope;
  • Consider hazardous material assessments for uranium hexafluoride;
  • Include the information on support systems and analytical laboratories;
  • Include safety culture aspects specific for uranium fuel fabrication facilities;
  • Check for consistency with SSG-27 (which is being updated in parallel).

 

In addition, the following specific issues will be addressed for SSG-7:

  • Include auxiliary activities such as sampling, homogenization and blending within scope;
  • Include safety culture aspects specific for uranium and plutonium mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities;
  • Include the information on support systems and analytical laboratories;
  • Check for consistency with SSG-27 (which is being updated in parallel).