DS509 - Revision by amendment of 8 SSGs on RReactors

Status: STEP 8

Revision durch Änderung von  NS-G-4.1,  NS-G-4.2, NS-G-4.3NS-G-4.4, NS-G-4.5 , NS-G-4.6, SSG-10  (Ex DS412) und SSG-37 (Ex DS436)


Specific Safety Guide



Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung

DS509-NS-G-4.1 IAEO-Bewertung
DS509-NS-G-4.2 IAEO-Bewertung
DS509-NS-G-4.3 IAEO-Bewertung
DS509-NS-G-4.4 IAEO-Bewertung
DS509-NS-G-4.5 IAEO-Bewertung
DS509-NS-G-4.6 IAEO-Bewertung
DS509-SSG-10 IAEO-Bewertung
DS509-SSG-37 IAEO-Bewertung

IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 7

DS509-NS-G-4.1 nach STEP 7
DS509-NS-G-4.2 nach STEP 7
DS509-NS-G-4.3 nach STEP 7
DS509-NS-G-4.4 nach STEP 7
DS509-NS-G-4.5 nach STEP 7
DS509-NS-G-4.6 nach STEP 7
DS509-SSG-10 nach STEP 7
DS509-SSG-37 nach STEP 7

STEP 4 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 4
STEP 3 Kommentare der SSCs und IAEO-Bewertung IAEO-Zusammenfassung nach STEP 3

Document Preparation Profile "DPP"

The revision of the Guides proposed in this DPP is timely because they predate SSR-3 and most of the General Safety Requirements publications, and as such, the Guides contain many references to superseded requirements, do not fully address all of the current requirements and do not cover the safety of subcritical assemblies. Also, some of the Guides are ten or more years old. In addition, guidance in similar NPP safety standards will be considered to ensure overall consistency. The added value of the revised Guides will be to provide target users with comprehensive, consistent and up-to-date guidance for implementing the safety requirements in SSR-3 and the General Safety Requirements as they apply to research reactors.

The revision of the eight Guides covered by this DPP will benefit from revisions to take into consideration the following:


  • Revisions implemented in the General Safety Requirements, other IAEA Safety Standards and, in particular, the new and modified requirements in SSR-3 since publication of the Guides;
  • Long Term Structure of the IAEA Safety Standards;
  • Feedback from the users of the IAEA Safety Standards related to research reactors;
  • Use of these Guides for subcritical assemblies, which are now in the scope of SSR-3;
  • Lessons from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and other events in the nuclear industry, including those occurring at research reactors that were reported to the Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors;
  •  Experience gained with INSARR missions.

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