

Date: 29 August 2014
Rev. 9.0

Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

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[[To be updated accordingly.]]

General Safety Requirements Part 7
No. GSR Part 7

Draft DS457

Status: STEP 12 Review of the draft publication by the CSS

Action: Endorsement of the Committee's decision to approve the draft to the BoG for establishment as a safety standard

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR A
NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

DRAFT

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES No. GSR Part 7

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

This publication includes a CD-ROM containing the IAEA Safety Glossary: 2007 Edition (2007) and the Fundamental Safety Principles (2006), each in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish versions. The CD-ROM is also available for purchase separately. See: <http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/publications.asp>

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[[To be updated accordingly.]]

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA, 2015

Draft DS457

Rev 9.0

29/08/2014

DRAFT

PREFACE

Organizations responsible for emergency management (including those responsible for the management of conventional emergencies) recognize that good preparedness in advance of an emergency can substantially improve the emergency response. Moreover, one of the most important features of emergency preparedness is integration of arrangements among the different bodies involved, ensuring clear lines of responsibility and authority.

The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident ('Early Notification Convention') and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency ('Assistance Convention'), both adopted in 1986, place specific obligations on the States Parties and on the IAEA. The practical implementation of the various articles of these Conventions, as well as the fulfilment of certain obligations of the IAEA Secretariat under the Convention on Nuclear Safety (Legal Series No. 16, 1994, Article 16) and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (INFCIRC/546, 1997, Article 25), warrant the establishment of appropriate arrangements for emergency management.

In March 2002, the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Safety Requirements publication, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2), jointly sponsored by seven international organizations (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), IAEA, International Labour Organization (ILO), OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Health Organization (WHO)), which established the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Since its publication in 2002, States have been using this Safety Requirements publication in establishing or enhancing their arrangements and capabilities for emergency preparedness and response. The 56th General Conference of the IAEA in 2012, in resolution GC(56)/RES/9, emphasized "the importance for all Member States of implementing emergency preparedness and response programmes, including strengthening mechanisms to facilitate timely international information exchange during a nuclear emergency, and requests the IAEA, Member States and relevant international organizations to address compatibility issues in the development of national and international emergency response mechanisms and procedures consistent with the IAEA's safety standards".

To ensure that emergency preparedness and response arrangements are coordinated and consistent at the international level, the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE), as an interagency co-ordination mechanism, co-ordinates the emergency preparedness and response arrangements of the relevant international intergovernmental organizations (hereafter, relevant international organizations). The IACRNE also works towards coordinated and

consistent international standards on emergency preparedness and response and their practical application.

The IAEA Secretariat, relevant international organizations and Member States reviewed the IAEA Safety Requirements publication No. GS-R-2 on the basis of lessons identified in exercises and from the response to emergencies that have occurred since its publication in 2002 (including the emergency response to the accident that occurred in March 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan) and in consideration of recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).

The revision of GS-R-2 commenced in 2011 with a series of drafting meetings on the basis of thematic areas as well as with a series of review meetings of IACRNE. The draft text that was developed was considered at a technical meeting held in November 2012 in which representatives of IAEA Member States and relevant international organizations participated. On the basis of recommendations from these meetings, a revised draft text was prepared and was submitted for a first review by all safety standards review committees in the first half of 2013. In July 2013, the approved draft text was submitted to IAEA Member States and relevant international organizations for comment. On the basis of comments received, a new version of the draft text was prepared and submitted for a second review by all review Committees in the first half of 2014. [[to be completed later]]

The revised GS-R-2 is hereby published in the IAEA Safety Standards Series as General Safety Requirements Part 7.

[[A paragraph on Sponsoring Organizations to be inserted accordingly]]

These safety requirements are binding on the IAEA Secretariat in relation to its own operations and on Member States in relation to operations assisted by the IAEA.

These safety requirements are also to be applied by Sponsoring Organizations in accordance with their respective mandates. All relevant international organizations, irrespective of whether or not they are members of the IACRNE, are encouraged to consider these safety requirements in their own emergency management arrangements.

The IAEA, on behalf of the joint Sponsoring Organizations, wishes to express its great appreciation to all those who assisted in the drafting, review and revision of the safety requirements and in the process of reaching a consensus.

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1. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1.1. This publication in the IAEA Safety Standards Series is governed by the fundamental safety objective and the fundamental safety principles established in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals [1]. In particular, this publication addresses Principle 9 which is concerned with the arrangements that must be made for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency [1].

1.2. This publication also provides for consistency with the essential element No. 11 of the IAEA Nuclear Security Fundamentals [2] which is concerned with the planning for, preparedness for, and response to a nuclear security event. It therefore addresses the emergency arrangements that must be in place irrespective of the initiator of the emergency, whether due to a natural event, a human error, a mechanical or other failure or a nuclear security event.

1.3. In 2002, the IAEA published the Safety Requirements publication, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, jointly sponsored by seven international organizations (FAO, IAEA, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, OCHA and WHO)¹. The present Safety Requirements publication is a revised and updated version of GS-R-2 to take into account developments and experience gained since 2002. In the revision process, due consideration has been given to — but was not limited to — experience gained from the response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) [3]. IAEA Safety Guides [4, 5] elaborate on the requirements established in GS-R-2 and provide recommendations and guidance on their implementation. In addition, Ref. [6] provides guidance on planning and preparing for emergency response to transport accidents involving radioactive material.

1.4. This publication is the Safety Requirements publication that addresses the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency (including for the transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation). Other Safety Requirements publications refer to and are made consistent with these requirements in relation to emergency preparedness and response.

1.5. The response to a nuclear or radiological emergency may involve many national organizations (e.g. the operating organization and response organizations at local, regional and national levels) as well as international organizations. The functions of many of these organizations may be the same for

¹ FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, IAEA, Vienna (2002).

the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency as for the response to a conventional emergency. However, the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency might also involve specialized agencies and technical experts. Therefore, in order to be effective, the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency has to be well coordinated and emergency arrangements must be appropriately integrated with arrangements for the response to a conventional emergency and with the response measures for a nuclear security event.

1.6. Safety measures and security measures have in common the aim of protecting human life and health and the environment. Paragraph 1.10 of Ref. [1] states “Safety and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner so that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not compromise security”. This emphasizes the importance of effective coordination between safety measures and security measures in relation to the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency.

1.7. This publication also provides guidance for (1) preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency by the relevant international organizations and (2) the inter-agency coordination performed through the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE).

1.8. It is assumed that States applying these requirements have in place an infrastructure for the purpose of regulating the safety of facilities and activities that could pose radiation risks. This includes laws and regulations governing the safe operation of facilities and the safe conduct of activities, and an independent regulatory body with responsibilities for establishing and enforcing rules for safe operation and safe conduct. In this context, the IAEA has issued General Safety Requirements publications on the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety [7] and on radiation protection and safety of radiation sources [8].

1.9. In addition, it is assumed that States applying these requirements have in place an infrastructure for the purpose of regulating the nuclear security of nuclear material and other radioactive material, associated facilities and associated activities, as well as nuclear security measures for nuclear material and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. This also includes an independent regulatory body as well as other competent authorities with responsibility for nuclear security. In this context, IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications [9–11] provide recommendations.

1 OBJECTIVE

2 1.10. The present publication establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and
3 response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. The application of these requirements is also
4 intended to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency if such an emergency
5 arises despite all efforts made to prevent it.

6 1.11. The fulfilment of these requirements will contribute to the harmonization worldwide of
7 arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

8 1.12. These requirements are intended to be applied by the government at the national level by
9 means of adopting legislation and establishing regulations, and by making other arrangements,
10 including assigning responsibilities (e.g. to the operating organization or the operating personnel of a
11 facility or an activity, local or national officials, response organizations or the regulatory body) and
12 verifying their effective implementation.

13 1.13. The requirements are also intended for use by response organizations, operating organizations
14 and the regulatory body with regard to preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological
15 emergency, as well as by authorities with responsibilities in emergency preparedness and response at
16 the local and regional level and, as appropriate, by relevant international organizations at the
17 international level.

18 SCOPE

19 1.14. The requirements apply for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency
20 in relation to all those facilities and activities, as well as sources, with the potential for causing
21 radiation exposure, environmental contamination or concern on the part of the public warranting
22 protective actions and other response actions.

23 1.15. The requirements also apply to preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological
24 emergency in relation to off-site jurisdictions that may need to take protective actions and other
25 response actions.

26 1.16. The requirements apply for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency
27 irrespective of the initiator of the emergency, whether the emergency follows a natural event, a human
28 error, a mechanical or other failure or a nuclear security event. The requirements do not cover
29 preparedness for, or response measures that are specific to, nuclear security events, for which
30 recommendations are provided in Refs [9-11]. Such response measures include activities for the
31 identification, collection, packaging and transport of evidence contaminated with radionuclides,
32 nuclear forensics and related actions in the context of investigation into the circumstances surrounding
33 a nuclear security event. The requirements established here do provide for a coordinated and
34 integrated approach to preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency arising from
35 a nuclear security event that necessitates protective actions and other response actions to be taken for

1 protection of members of the public, workers and emergency workers, helpers in an emergency and
2 patients.

3 STRUCTURE

4 1.17. This publication comprises six sections. Section 2 provides for the interpretation and
5 application of these requirements. Section 3 establishes the goals of emergency preparedness and
6 response. Section 4 establishes the general requirements that must be met before effective emergency
7 arrangements can be made, defines the emergency preparedness categories for which the requirements
8 have been established by using a graded approach and elaborates on the development of a protection
9 strategy on the basis of the hazards assessed. Section 5 provides the requirements to be met for
10 performing the functions critical for an effective emergency response. Section 6 establishes
11 requirements for the infrastructure necessary to develop and maintain adequate arrangements for
12 preparedness. Guidance values for restricting exposure of emergency workers in a nuclear or
13 radiological emergency are provided in Appendix I. The generic criteria for use in the development of
14 the protection strategy for initiating protective actions and other response actions in a nuclear or
15 radiological emergency are provided in Appendix II. Annex I presents the applicability of paragraphs
16 for each emergency preparedness category.

17

2. INTERPRETATION, RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS AND ENTRY INTO FORCE

DEFINITIONS

2.1. Terms used in this publication have the meanings given under Definitions. Unless otherwise stated under Definitions, terms are defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary (2007).

INTERPRETATION

2.2. Except as specifically authorized by the statutory governing body of a Sponsoring Organization, no interpretation of this standard by any officer or employee of the Sponsoring Organization other than a written interpretation by the Director General of the Sponsoring Organization shall be binding on the Sponsoring Organization.

RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS

2.3. The requirements of this standard are established in addition to and not in place of other applicable requirements, such as those of relevant binding conventions and national laws and regulations.

2.4. In cases of conflict between the requirements of this standard and other applicable requirements, the government or the regulatory body, as appropriate, shall determine which requirements are to be enforced.

2.5. Nothing in this standard shall be construed as restricting any actions that may otherwise be necessary for protection and safety or as relieving the parties referred to in this standard from complying with applicable laws and regulations.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

2.6. The Secretariat envisages that, for the IAEA's own operations and for those operations assisted by the IAEA, arrangements will be made to meet these requirements within a period of no more than one year from the date of publication of this standard.

2.7. These standards shall come into force one year after the date of their adoption or acknowledgement, as appropriate, by the Sponsoring Organizations.

2.8. If a State decides to adopt this standard, this standard shall come into force at the time indicated in the formal adoption by that State, and preferably within a period of no more than one year from the date of its publication.

1

2

3. GOALS OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

3

GOAL OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

4

3.1. The goal of emergency preparedness is to ensure that an adequate capability is in place at the operating organization and at local, regional and national levels and, where appropriate, at the international level for an effective response in a nuclear or radiological emergency. This relates to an integrated set of infrastructural elements that include, but are not limited to: authority and responsibilities; organization and staffing; coordination; plans and procedures; tools, equipment and facilities; training, drills and exercises; and a management system.

9

10

GOALS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE

11

3.2. In a nuclear or radiological emergency, the goals of emergency response are:

12

(a) To regain control of the situation and to mitigate consequences;

13

(b) To save lives;

14

(c) To avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects;

15

(d) To render first aid, to provide critical medical treatment and to manage the treatment of radiation injuries;

16

17

(e) To reduce the risk of stochastic effects;

18

(f) To keep the public informed and to maintain public trust;

19

(g) To mitigate, to the extent practicable, non-radiological consequences;

20

(h) To protect, to the extent practicable, property and the environment;

21

(i) To prepare, to the extent practicable, for the resumption of normal social and economic activity.

22

4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

Requirement 1: Emergency management system

The government shall ensure that an integrated and coordinated emergency management system for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency is established and maintained.

4.1. The government shall ensure that an emergency management system is established and maintained on the territories and within the jurisdiction of the State for the purposes of emergency response to protect human life, health, property and the environment in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency.

4.2. The emergency management system shall be commensurate with the results of the hazard assessment (see paras 4.18–4.26) and shall enable an effective emergency response to foreseeable events (including very low probability events).

4.3. The emergency management system shall be integrated, to the extent practicable, into an all-hazards emergency management system (see also para. 5.7).

4.4. The government shall ensure the coordination and consistency of national emergency arrangements with the relevant international emergency arrangements¹.

Requirement 2: Roles and responsibilities in emergency preparedness and response

The government shall make provisions to ensure that roles and responsibilities for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency are clearly specified and assigned.

GENERAL

4.5. The government shall make adequate preparations to anticipate, prepare for, respond to and recover from a nuclear or radiological emergency at the operating organization, local, regional and national levels, and also, as appropriate, at the international level. These preparations shall include adopting legislation and establishing regulations for effectively governing the preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency at all levels (see para. 1.12).

4.6. The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for effectively governing the provision of prompt and adequate compensation for victims of damage caused by a nuclear or radiological emergency.

¹ Arrangements set under the Assistance Convention and the Early Notification Convention [12] are examples of international emergency arrangements that are relevant for States Parties to these Conventions.

4.7. The government shall ensure that all roles and responsibilities for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency are clearly allocated in advance among operating organizations, the regulatory body and response organizations².

4.8. The government shall ensure that response organizations, operating organizations and the regulatory body have the necessary human, financial and other resources, in view of their expected roles and responsibilities and the assessed hazards, to prepare for and to respond to both radiological and non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency, whether the emergency occurs within or beyond national borders.

4.9. The government shall ensure that operating organizations, response organizations and the regulatory body establish, maintain and demonstrate leadership in relation to preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency (see also Ref. [13]).

COORDINATING MECHANISM

4.10. The government shall establish a national coordinating mechanism³ to be functional at the preparedness stage, consistent with its emergency management system, with the following functions:

- (a) to ensure that roles and responsibilities are clearly specified and understood by operating organizations, response organizations and the regulatory body (see para. 4.7);
- (b) to coordinate the hazard assessment within the State (see paras 4.18–4.26) and the periodic reviews of the assessed hazards (see para. 4.25);
- (c) to coordinate and ensure consistency among the emergency arrangements of the various response organizations, operating organizations and the regulatory body at local, regional and national levels under the all-hazards approach, including those arrangements for response to relevant nuclear security events, and, as appropriate, those arrangements of other States and of international organizations;
- (d) to ensure consistency among requirements for emergency arrangements, contingency plans and security plans of operating organizations specified by the regulatory body and by other competent authorities with responsibilities for regulating nuclear security, as relevant, and to ensure that these arrangements and plans are integrated (see para. 4.14(b));
- (e) to ensure that appropriate emergency arrangements are in place, both on the site and off the site, as appropriate, in relation to facilities and activities under regulatory control, both within the

² This also includes the allocation of roles and responsibilities, as appropriate, among members of the government.

³ The mechanism for ensuring the coordination may differ for different tasks. It may be an existing body or a newly established body (e.g. a committee consisting of representatives from different organizations and bodies) that has been given the authority to ensure the coordination.

State and, as relevant, beyond its borders, and also for sources that are not under regulatory control⁴;

(f) to coordinate arrangements made for enforcing compliance with the national requirements for emergency preparedness and response established by legislation and regulations (see paras 1.12, 4.5 and 4.12);

(g) to coordinate an analysis of an emergency subsequently, including analysis of the emergency response (see para. 5.99);

(h) to ensure that appropriate and coordinated training and exercise programmes are in place and implemented and that training and exercises are systematically evaluated;

(i) to coordinate clear and coherent communication with the public in preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

REGULATORY BODY

4.11. The government shall ensure that arrangements for preparedness and response to a nuclear or radiological emergency for facilities and activities under the responsibility of the operating organization are dealt with through the regulatory process.

4.12. The regulatory body is required to establish or adopt regulations and guides to specify the principles, requirements and associated criteria for safety upon which its regulatory judgements, decisions and actions are based [7]. These principles, requirements and associated criteria shall include principles, requirements and associated criteria for emergency preparedness and response of the operating organization (see also paras 1.12 and 4.5).

4.13. The regulatory body shall require that arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency be in place for the on-site area for any regulated facility or activity that could necessitate emergency response actions. Appropriate emergency arrangements shall be established by the time the source is brought to the site, and complete emergency arrangements shall be in place before the commencement of operation of the facility or commencement of the activity. The regulatory body shall verify compliance with the required arrangements.

4.14. Before commencement of operation of the facility or commencement of the activity, the regulatory body shall ensure, for all facilities and activities under regulatory control that could necessitate emergency response actions, that the on-site emergency arrangements:

(a) are integrated with those of other response organizations as appropriate;

⁴ Examples of sources not under regulatory control are sources that have been abandoned, lost or stolen and sources under governmental control but not under regulatory control. Examples also include radioactive material that is out of regulatory control as defined in Ref. [11].

- (b) are integrated with contingency plans in the context of Ref. [9] and with security plans in the context of Ref. [10];
- (c) provide, to the extent practicable, assurance of an effective response to a nuclear or radiological emergency.

4.15. The regulatory body shall ensure that the operating organization is given sufficient authority to promptly take necessary protective actions on the site in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency that may result in off-site consequences.

OPERATING ORGANIZATION

4.16. The operating organization shall establish and maintain arrangements for on-site preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency for facilities or activities under its responsibility, in accordance with the applicable requirements (see paras 1.12, 4.5 and 4.12).

4.17. The operating organization shall demonstrate that, and shall provide the regulatory body with an assurance that, emergency arrangements are in place for an effective response on the site to a nuclear or radiological emergency in relation to the facility or the activity under its responsibility.

Requirement 3: Responsibilities of international organizations in emergency preparedness and response

Relevant international organizations shall coordinate their arrangements in preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency and their emergency response actions.⁵

Requirement 4: Hazard assessment

The government shall ensure that a hazard assessment is performed to provide a basis for a graded approach in preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

4.18. Hazards identified and potential consequences of an emergency shall provide a basis for establishing arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. These arrangements shall be commensurate with the hazards identified and the potential consequences of an emergency.

4.19. For the purposes of these requirements, assessed hazards are grouped in accordance with the emergency preparedness categories shown in Table I. The five emergency preparedness categories (hereinafter referred to as 'categories') in Table I establish the basis for a graded approach to be applied in application of these safety requirements and for developing generically justified and optimized arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

⁵ The Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies and its Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations are examples of such coordination.

1 TABLE I. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORIES

Category	Description
I	Facilities, such as nuclear power plants, for which on-site events ^{a, b} (including those not considered in the design ^c) are postulated that could give rise to severe deterministic effects ^d off the site that warrant precautionary urgent protective actions, urgent or early protective actions and other response actions to achieve the goals of emergency response in accordance with international standards ^e , or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities.
II	Facilities, such as some types of research reactor and nuclear reactors used to power vessels, for which on-site events ^{a, b} are postulated that could give rise to doses to people off the site that warrant urgent or early protective actions and other response actions to achieve the goals of emergency response in accordance with international standards ^e , or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities. Category II (as opposed to category I) does not include facilities for which on-site events (including those not considered in the design) are postulated that could give rise to severe deterministic effects off the site, or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities.
III	Facilities, such as industrial irradiation facilities or some medical facilities, for which on-site events ^b are postulated that could warrant protective actions and other response actions to achieve the goals of emergency response in accordance with international standards ^e on the site, or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities. Category III (as opposed to category II) does not include facilities for which events are postulated that could warrant urgent or early protective actions off the site, or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities.
IV	Activities and acts that could give rise to a nuclear or radiological emergency that could warrant protective actions and other response actions to achieve the goals of emergency response in accordance with international standards ^e in an unforeseen location. These activities and acts include: (a) transport of nuclear or radioactive material and other authorized activities involving mobile dangerous sources such as industrial radiography sources, nuclear powered satellites or radioisotope thermoelectric generators; and (b) theft of a dangerous source and use of a radiological dispersal device or radiological exposure device. This category also includes: (i) detection of elevated radiation levels of unknown origin or of commodities with contamination; (ii) identification of clinical symptoms due to exposure to radiation; and (iii) a transnational emergency that is not in category V arising from a nuclear or radiological emergency in another State. Category IV represents a level of hazard that applies for all States and jurisdictions.
V	Areas within emergency planning zones and distances ^f in a State for a facility in category I or II located in another State.

2 ^{a.} Involving an atmospheric or aquatic release of radioactive material, or external exposure (due, for
3 example, to a loss of shielding or a criticality event), that originates from a location on the site.

4 ^{b.} Such events include nuclear security events.

5 ^{c.} This includes events that are beyond the design basis accidents and, as appropriate, events that are beyond
6 design extension conditions.

7 ^{d.} See 'deterministic effect' in the Definitions list.

8 ^{e.} See the goals of emergency response in para. 3.2 and the generic criteria in Appendix II.

9 ^{f.} See para. 5.36.

4.20. The government shall ensure that for facilities and activities, a hazard assessment on the basis of a graded approach is performed. The hazard assessment shall include consideration of:

- (a) events that could affect the facility or activity, including events of very low probability and events not considered in the design;
- (b) events involving a combination of a nuclear or radiological emergency with a conventional emergency such as an emergency following an earthquake, a volcanic eruption, a tropical cyclone, severe weather, a tsunami, an aircraft crash or civil disturbances that may affect wide areas and/or impair capabilities to provide support in the emergency response;
- (c) events that could affect several facilities and activities concurrently and the interactions among the facilities and activities affected;
- (d) events at facilities in other States or events involving activities in other States.

4.21. The government shall ensure that the hazard assessment identifies those facilities and locations at which there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control⁶.

4.22. The government shall ensure that the hazard assessment includes consideration of the results of threat assessments for nuclear security purposes⁷ [9–11].

4.23. In the hazard assessment, facilities and activities, on-site areas, off-site areas and locations shall be identified for which a nuclear or radiological emergency could — with account taken of the uncertainties in and limitations of the information available — warrant:

- (a) precautionary urgent protective actions to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects by keeping doses below levels approaching the generic criteria at which urgent protective actions and other response actions are to be undertaken under any circumstances in accordance with Appendix II;
- (b) urgent protective actions and other response actions to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects and to reduce the risk of stochastic effects in accordance with Appendix II;
- (c) early protective actions and other response actions in accordance with Appendix II;
- (d) other response actions such as longer term medical actions in accordance with Appendix II; or
- (e) protection for emergency workers in accordance with paras 5.46–5.58 and Appendix I.

⁶ Examples of such facilities and locations are: scrap metal processing facilities, border crossing points, seaports, airports and abandoned military facilities or other facilities where dangerous sources may have been used in the past.

⁷ This includes consideration of ‘strategic locations’, i.e. locations of high security interest in the State which are potential targets for terrorist attacks using nuclear and other radioactive material and locations for detection of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control, in line with Ref. [11].

4.24. The government shall ensure that the hazard assessment also identifies non-radiation-related hazards⁸ to people on the site and off the site that are associated with the facility or activity and that may impair the effectiveness of the response actions to be taken.

4.25. The government shall ensure that a review of the hazard assessment is performed periodically with the aims of: (a) ensuring that all facilities and activities, on-site areas, off-site areas and locations where events could occur that would necessitate protective actions and other response actions are identified, and (b) taking into account any changes to the hazards within the State and beyond its borders, any change in assessments of threats for nuclear security purposes, the experience and lessons from research, operation and emergency exercises, and technological developments (see paras 6.30, 6.36 and 6.38). The results of this review shall be used to revise the emergency arrangements as necessary.

4.26. The government through the regulatory body shall ensure that operating organizations review appropriately and as necessary revise the emergency arrangements (a) prior to any changes in the facility or activity that affects the existing hazard assessment and (b) when new information that provides insights into the adequacy of the existing arrangements becomes available⁹.

Requirement 5: Protection strategy for an emergency

The government shall ensure that protection strategies are developed, justified and optimized at the preparedness stage for taking protective actions and other response actions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

4.27. The government shall ensure that, on the basis of the hazards identified and the potential consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency, protection strategies are developed, justified and optimized at the emergency preparedness stage for taking protective actions and other response actions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency to achieve the goals of emergency response.

4.28. Development of a protection strategy shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

- (1) Consideration shall be given on actions to be taken to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects and to reduce the risk of stochastic effects. Deterministic effects shall be evaluated on the basis of relative biological effectiveness (RBE) weighted absorbed dose to an organ or tissue. Stochastic effects in an organ or tissue shall be evaluated on the basis of equivalent dose to the organ or tissue. The detriment associated with the occurrence of stochastic effects in an exposed population shall be evaluated on the basis of the effective dose.

⁸ Examples of non-radiation-related hazards are the release of toxic chemicals, e.g. uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), fires, explosions and floods.

⁹ Examples of such changes and available information include the movement of irradiated nuclear fuel to a new location, projected flooding, storms or other meteorological hazards.

- (2) A reference level expressed in terms of residual dose shall be set, typically as an effective dose in the range 20–100 mSv, acute or annual, that includes dose contributions via all exposure pathways. This reference level shall be used together with the goals of emergency response (see para. 3.2) and the specific time frame in which particular goals are to be achieved¹⁰;
- (3) On the basis of the outcome of the justification and optimization of the protection strategy, national generic criteria for taking protective actions and other response actions, expressed in terms of projected dose or dose that has been received, shall be developed taking account of the generic criteria in Appendix II. If the national generic criteria for projected dose or received dose are exceeded, protective actions and other response actions, either individually or in combination, shall be implemented;
- (4) Once the protection strategy has been justified and optimized and a set of national generic criteria has been developed, pre-established operational criteria (conditions on the site, emergency action levels (EALs), and operational intervention levels (OILs)) for initiating the different parts of an emergency plan and taking protective actions and other response actions shall be derived from the generic criteria¹¹. Arrangements shall be established in advance to revise these operational criteria, as appropriate, in a nuclear or radiological emergency, with account taken of the prevailing conditions as these evolve.

4.29. Each protective action, in the context of the protection strategy, and the protection strategy itself shall be justified by being demonstrated to do more good than harm, with account taken not only of those detriments that are associated with radiation exposure but also of those associated with impacts of the actions taken on public health¹², economy, society and the environment.

4.30. The government shall ensure that interested parties are involved and consulted, as appropriate, in the development of the protection strategy.

¹⁰ The sole application of the reference level for effective dose would not be sufficient to develop the protection strategy. Consideration needs to be given on the particular goal to be met in the response, the time allowing for actions to be taken effectively and the appropriate dose quantity to be used to ensure that the organ doses will be kept below those at which protective actions and other response actions are justified (see para. 4.28 (1)). For example, actions to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects are to be taken urgently when projected doses expected to be received within a short period of time exceed those in Table II.1 of Appendix II for the RBE weighted absorbed dose to an organ or a tissue. In this case, if such doses are received, then prompt and appropriate medical actions are necessary. Moreover, selection of a particular value (to be used for optimization purposes and for retrospective assessment of effectiveness of actions and strategy taken) within the proposed range of 20–100 mSv acute or annual effective dose would depend of the phase of the emergency, the practicality of reducing or preventing exposures and other factors. While in the urgent phase of an emergency, effective dose of 100 mSv acute or annual may be justified as one of the dosimetric basis for implementing and optimizing a protection strategy, in the later phases, such as during the transition, an effective dose of 20 mSv per year may be justified as one of the dosimetric basis for implementing and optimizing a protection strategy to enable transitioning to existing exposure situation.

¹¹ The operational criteria (i.e. operational intervention levels) need to be derived for a representative person with account taken of those members of the public (i.e. pregnant women and children) that are most vulnerable to radiation exposure.

¹² Examples of such impacts include possible deaths among patients to be evacuated without needed medical care and possible reduced life expectancy due to resettlement.

1 4.31. The government shall ensure that the protection strategy is implemented safely and effectively
2 in an emergency response through the implementation of emergency arrangements, including but not
3 limited to:

- 4 (a) promptly taking urgent protective actions and other response actions with due consideration of
5 Appendix II to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects, if possible, on the basis of
6 observed conditions and before any exposure occurs;
- 7 (b) taking early protective actions and other response actions to reduce the risk of stochastic effects
8 with due consideration of Appendix II;
- 9 (c) providing for registration, health screening and longer term medical follow-up, as appropriate,
10 with due consideration of Appendix II;
- 11 (d) taking actions to protect emergency workers, with due consideration of guidance values
12 established in Appendix I;
- 13 (e) taking actions to mitigate non-radiological consequences, with due consideration of Appendix
14 II;
- 15 (f) assessing the effectiveness of the actions taken and adjusting them as appropriate on the basis of
16 prevailing conditions and available information and the reference level expressed in terms of
17 residual dose;
- 18 (g) revising the protection strategy as necessary and its further implementation;
- 19 (h) discontinuing protective actions and other response actions when they are no longer justified.

20

5. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

GENERAL

5.1. The requirements established in this Section ensure the functions that are critical in a nuclear or radiological emergency for the emergency response to be effective and for achieving the goals of emergency response (see para. 3.2).

Requirement 6: Managing emergency response operations

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for emergency response operations to be appropriately managed.

5.2. For facilities in categories I, II and III, arrangements shall be made for the on-site emergency response to be promptly executed and managed without impairing the performance of the continuing operational safety and security functions both in the facility and at other facilities on the same site. The transition from normal operations to operations under emergency conditions on the site shall be clearly specified and shall be effectively made. The responsibilities of all personnel who would be on the site in an emergency shall be designated as part of the arrangements for the transition. It shall be ensured that the transition to the emergency response and the performance of initial response actions do not impair the ability of the operating personnel (such as operating personnel in the control room) to ensure safe and secure operation while taking mitigatory actions.

5.3. For facilities in categories I, II and III and, where appropriate, for activities in category IV, arrangements shall be made for an off-site emergency response to be promptly executed, effectively managed and coordinated with an on-site emergency response.

5.4. For a site where several facilities in category I and II are collocated, adequate arrangements shall be made to manage the emergency response at all the facilities if each of them is under emergency conditions simultaneously. This shall include arrangements to manage the deployment of and the protection of personnel responding on and off the site (see paras 5.46–5.58).

5.5. For facilities and activities in categories I, II, III and IV, arrangements need to be made, as far as practicable, so that the facility or activity has nuclear security system(s) [9–11] that would be functional in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.6. Arrangements for response to a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be coordinated and integrated with arrangements at the national, regional and local levels for response to a conventional emergency and to a nuclear security event¹³. These arrangements shall take into consideration that the initiator of the nuclear or radiological emergency may not be known early in the response.

¹³ This coordination and integration includes coordination with and integration of those response measures such as identification, collection, packaging and transport of evidence contaminated with radionuclides, nuclear

5.7. Arrangements shall be made for the establishment and use of a clearly specified and unified command and control system for emergency response under the all-hazards approach as part of the emergency management system (see paras 4.1–4.3). The command and control system shall provide sufficient assurance for effective coordination of on-site and off-site response. The authority and responsibility for directing the emergency response and for making decisions on emergency response actions to be taken shall be clearly designated. The responsibility for directing the emergency response and for decision making on emergency response actions to be taken shall be promptly discharged following a notification of an emergency.

5.8. Arrangements shall be made for obtaining and assessing the information necessary for making decisions on the allocation of resources for all response organizations throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.9. For facilities in category I or II and areas in category V, arrangements shall be made for coordinating the emergency response between response organizations (including those of other States) within the emergency planning zones and distances (see para. 5.36) and for providing mutual support.

5.10. Arrangements shall be made with other States, as appropriate, for coordinated response to a radiological emergency.

Requirement 7: Identifying and notifying a nuclear or radiological emergency and activating an emergency response

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the prompt identification and notification of a nuclear or radiological emergency and for the activation of an emergency response.

5.11. Off-site notification point(s)¹⁴ shall be established to receive notification of an actual or potential nuclear or radiological emergency. The notification point(s) shall be maintained continuously available to receive any notification or request for support and to respond promptly or to initiate a preplanned and coordinated off-site response appropriate to the emergency class or the level of emergency response. The notification point(s) shall have immediate communication with the response organizations that are providing support using suitable, reliable and diverse means of communication.

5.12. For facilities in categories I and II and for areas in category V, the notification point shall have immediate communication with the authority assigned the responsibility to decide on and to initiate precautionary urgent protective actions and urgent protective actions off the site (see also para. 5.7).

forensics and related activities in the context of an investigation into the circumstances surrounding a nuclear security event.

¹⁴ This may be the notification point used to receive notification of and to initiate an off-site emergency response to an emergency of any type (conventional, nuclear or radiological).

5.13. At facilities and locations where there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control (see para. 4.21), arrangements shall be made to ensure that the on-site managers of operations and other personnel are aware of the indicators of a potential radiological emergency, the appropriate notification, and protective actions and other response actions warranted immediately in an emergency. For facilities and locations where there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control and for an emergency at an unforeseen location, arrangements shall be made to ensure that the local officials responsible for the response and first responders are aware of the indicators of a potential radiological emergency, the appropriate notification, and protective actions and other response actions warranted immediately in an emergency.

5.14. The operating organization of a facility or activity in category I, II, III or IV shall make arrangements for promptly classifying, on the basis of the hazard assessment, a nuclear or radiological emergency warranting protective actions and other response actions to protect workers, emergency workers, members of the public and, as relevant, patients and helpers in an emergency in accordance with the protection strategy (see Req. 5). This shall include a system for classifying all types of nuclear or radiological emergency¹⁵ as follows:

- (a) *General emergency* at facilities in category I or II for an emergency that warrants taking precautionary urgent protective actions, urgent protective actions, and early protective actions and other response actions on the site and off the site. Upon declaration of this emergency class, appropriate actions shall promptly be taken, in accordance with the available information relating to the emergency, to mitigate the consequences of the emergency on the site and to protect people on the site and off the site.
- (b) *Site area emergency* at facilities in category I or II for an emergency that warrants taking protective actions and other response actions on the site and in the vicinity of the site. Upon declaration of this emergency class, actions shall promptly be taken: (i) to mitigate the consequences of the emergency on the site and to protect people on the site; (ii) to increase the readiness to take protective actions and other response actions off the site if this becomes necessary on the basis of observable conditions, reliable assessments and/or results of monitoring; and (iii) to conduct off-site monitoring, sampling and analysis.
- (c) *Facility emergency* at facilities in category I, II or III for an emergency that warrants taking protective actions and other response actions at the facility and on the site but does not warrant taking protective actions off the site. Upon declaration of this emergency class, actions shall promptly be taken to mitigate the consequences of the emergency and to protect people at the facility and on the site. Emergencies in this class do not present an off-site hazard.

¹⁵ The emergency classes may differ from those specified in (a–e) provided that emergencies of all these types are included.

(d) *Alert* at facilities in category I, II or III for an event that warrants taking actions to assess and to mitigate the potential consequences at the facility. Upon declaration of this emergency class, actions shall promptly be taken to assess and to mitigate the potential consequences of the event and to increase the readiness of the on-site response organizations.

(e) *Other nuclear or radiological emergency*¹⁶ for emergency in category IV that warrants taking protective actions and other response actions at any location. Upon declaration of this emergency class and the level of emergency response, actions shall promptly be taken to mitigate the consequences of the emergency on the site, to protect those in the vicinity (e.g. workers and emergency workers and the public) and to determine where and for whom protective actions and other response actions are warranted.

5.15. For facilities in category I, II or III and for category IV, arrangements shall be made to review the declared emergency class in the light of any new information and, as appropriate, to revise it.

5.16. The emergency classification system for facilities and activities in categories I, II, III and IV shall take into account all postulated emergencies including those of very low probability. The operational criteria for classification shall include emergency action levels and other observables and indicators of the conditions at the facility and/or on-site or off-site. The emergency classification system shall be established with the aim of allowing for the prompt initiation of an effective response in recognition of the uncertainty of the available information. It shall be ensured that the process for rating an event on the joint IAEA and OECD/NEA International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) [14] does not delay the emergency classification or emergency response actions¹⁷.

5.17. For facilities and activities in categories I, II and III, and for category IV, arrangements shall be made: (1) to promptly recognize and classify a nuclear or radiological emergency; (2) upon classification, to promptly declare the emergency class and to initiate a coordinated and preplanned on-site response; (3) to notify the appropriate notification point (see para. 5.11) and to provide sufficient information for an effective off-site response; and (4) upon notification, to initiate a coordinated and preplanned off-site response, as appropriate, in accordance with the protection strategy. These arrangements shall include suitable, reliable and diverse means of warning persons on the site, of notifying the notification point (see paras 5.39, 5.40, 6.22 and 6.34) and of communication among response organizations.

¹⁶ This class covers broad types of emergency (see Table I and paras 4.21 and 4.22). A graded approach may need to be taken when postulating emergencies and expected consequences within the class in order to determine the level of emergency response warranted.

¹⁷ The emergency classification system is not to be confused with INES. INES may be used by States for the purpose of communicating to the public the safety significance of an event only. INES must not be used as a basis for emergency response actions.

1 5.18. In the event of a transnational emergency, the notifying State shall promptly notify^{18,19}, either
2 directly or through the IAEA, those States that could be affected and the IAEA of the emergency. The
3 notifying State shall provide information on the nature of the emergency and on any potential
4 transnational consequences and shall respond to requests from other States and from the IAEA for
5 information for the purposes of minimizing any consequences.

6 5.19. The State shall make known to the IAEA and to other States, directly or through the IAEA, its
7 single warning point responsible for receiving emergency notifications and information from other
8 States and information from the IAEA. This warning point shall be maintained continuously available
9 to receive any notification, request for assistance or request for verification and to initiate promptly a
10 response or verification. The State shall promptly inform the IAEA and, directly or through the IAEA,
11 inform other States of any changes that occur in respect of the warning point. The State shall make
12 arrangements for promptly notifying and for providing relevant information to, directly or through the
13 IAEA, those States that could be affected by a transnational emergency.

14 5.20. The notifying State shall have arrangements in place for promptly responding to requests from
15 other States or from the IAEA for information in respect of a transnational emergency, in particular
16 with regard to minimizing any consequences. These arrangements shall include making known to the
17 IAEA and to other States, directly or through the IAEA, its designated organization(s) for so doing.

18 5.21. Arrangements shall be made for promptly and directly notifying any State within the
19 emergency planning zones and distances (see para. 5.36) in which urgent and early protective actions
20 and other response actions could be required to be taken.

21 5.22. Appropriate emergency response actions shall be initiated in a timely manner upon the receipt
22 of a notification from another State or of information from the IAEA on a notification relating to an
23 actual or potential transnational emergency that could have impacts on the State or its nationals.

¹⁸ Such a notification is in accordance with the State's obligations under the general principles and rules of international law and, for the case of a transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance for another State, it is in accordance with the Early Notification Convention [12].

¹⁹ A transnational emergency that is considered to represent a public health emergency of international concern may also be expected to be notified in accordance with the International Health Regulations [15].

Requirement 8: Taking mitigatory actions

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for taking mitigatory actions in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.23. The operating organization of a facility or activity in category I, II, III or IV shall promptly decide on and take actions²⁰ on-site that are necessary to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency involving a facility or an activity under its responsibility.

5.24. Off-site emergency services shall be made available for, and shall be capable of, supporting the on-site response at facilities and activities in category I, II, III or IV.²¹

5.25. For facilities in category I, II or III, arrangements shall be made for mitigatory actions to be taken by the operating personnel to prevent escalation of an emergency, to return the facility to a safe and stable state, to reduce the potential for radioactive releases or exposures, and to mitigate the consequences of any actual releases or exposures. These arrangements shall take into account the full range of possible conditions affecting the emergency response, including those resulting from the conditions in the facility and those resulting from the impacts of postulated natural, human induced or other events and affecting regional infrastructure or affecting several facilities simultaneously. Arrangements shall include emergency operating procedures and guidance for the operating personnel on mitigatory actions for severe conditions (for a nuclear power plant, as part of the accident management programme [16]), for the full range of postulated emergencies, including accidents that are not considered in the design and associated conditions. As far as practicable, the continued functionality of nuclear security system(s) (see Refs [9–11]) needs to be considered in these arrangements.

5.26. The operating organization of a facility or activity in category I, II, III or IV shall assess and determine, at the preparedness stage, when and under what conditions assistance from off-site emergency services may need to be provided on the site, consistent with the hazard assessment and the protection strategy.²¹

5.27. For facilities in category I, II or III, arrangements shall be made, in particular by the operating organization, to provide technical assistance to the operating personnel. On-site teams for mitigating the consequences of an emergency (e.g. damage control, firefighting) shall be available and shall be prepared to perform actions in the facility. Paragraph 5.15 of Ref. [17] states “Any equipment that is necessary for actions to be taken in manual response and recovery processes shall be placed at the most suitable location to ensure its availability at the time of need and to allow safe access to it under

²⁰ Such actions may include actions with off-site consequences such as discharge of radioactive material to the environment, provided that the appropriate off-site organizations are notified in advance.

²¹ This should not be understood as reducing the responsibility of the operating organization to have adequate capabilities to respond to an emergency arising in the facility or activity under its responsibility.

the environmental conditions anticipated”. The operating personnel directing mitigatory actions shall be provided with information and technical assistance that allows them to take actions effectively to mitigate the consequences of the emergency. Arrangements shall be made to obtain support promptly from the emergency services (e.g. police, medical and firefighting services) off the site. Off-site emergency services shall be afforded prompt access to the facility and shall be informed of on-site conditions and provided with instructions and with means for protecting themselves as emergency workers.

5.28. Arrangements shall be made for the operating organization of an activity in category IV, first responders in an emergency at an unforeseen location and those personnel at locations where there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control (see para. 4.21) to take promptly all practicable and appropriate actions to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency. These arrangements shall include providing basic instructions and training in the means of mitigating the potential consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency (see para. 5.41).

5.29. Arrangements shall be made to provide expertise and services in radiation protection promptly to local officials, first responders in an emergency at an unforeseen location and specialized services (e.g. law enforcement agencies) responding to emergencies involving activities in category IV, and to those personnel at locations where there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control (see para. 4.21). This shall include arrangements for on-call advice or other appropriate mechanisms and arrangements to dispatch onto the site an emergency team capable of assessing the radiation hazards, mitigating the radiological consequences and managing the exposure of emergency workers. In addition, arrangements shall be made to determine whether and when additional assistance is necessary and how to obtain such assistance (see paras 5.24 and 5.91).

5.30. Arrangements shall be made to initiate a prompt search in the event that a dangerous source could possibly be in the public domain as a result of its loss or unauthorized removal (see para. 5.44).

Requirement 9: Taking urgent protective actions and other response actions

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to assess emergency conditions and to take urgent protective actions and other response actions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.31. Arrangements shall be made so that the magnitude of hazards and the possible development of hazardous conditions are assessed initially and throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency in order to promptly identify, characterize or anticipate, as appropriate, new hazards or the extent of hazards and to revise the protection strategy.

5.32. The operating organization of a facility in category I, II or III shall make arrangements to promptly assess and anticipate: abnormal conditions at the facility; exposures and radioactive releases

1 and releases of other hazardous material; radiological conditions on the site and, as appropriate, off the
2 site; and any exposures or potential exposures of workers and emergency workers, the public and, as
3 relevant, patients and helpers in an emergency. These assessments shall be used:

4 (a) for deciding on mitigatory actions to be taken by the operating personnel;

5 (b) as a basis for emergency classification (see para. 5.14);

6 (c) for deciding on protective actions and other response actions to be taken on the site, including
7 those for the protection of workers;

8 (d) for deciding on protective actions and other response actions to be taken off the site;

9 (e) where appropriate, to identify those who could potentially have been exposed on the site at
10 levels requiring appropriate medical attention in accordance with Appendix II.

11 These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the
12 protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)) and provision for access to instruments displaying or measuring
13 those parameters that can readily be measured or observed in a nuclear or radiological emergency. In
14 these arrangements, the expected response of instrumentation and structures, systems and components
15 at the facility under emergency conditions shall be taken into account.

16 5.33. The operating organization for activities in category IV shall make arrangements to assess
17 promptly the extent and/or the significance of any abnormal conditions on the site, any exposures or
18 any contamination. These assessments shall be used:

19 (a) for initiating the mitigatory actions;

20 (b) as a basis for protective actions and other response actions to be taken on the site; and

21 (c) for determining the level for emergency response and for communicating the extent of the
22 hazards to the appropriate off-site response organizations.

23 These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the
24 protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)).

25 5.34. Arrangements shall be made such that information on emergency conditions, assessments and
26 protective actions and other response actions that have been recommended and have been taken is
27 promptly made available, as appropriate, to all relevant response organizations and to the IAEA
28 throughout the emergency.

29 5.35. Arrangements shall be made for actions to save human life or to prevent serious injury to be
30 taken without delay on the grounds of the possible presence of radioactive material (see paras 5.37 and
31 5.61). These arrangements shall include providing first responders in an emergency at an unforeseen
32 location with information on the precautions to take in giving first aid or in transporting an individual
33 with possible contamination.

5.36. For facilities in category I or II, arrangements shall be made for effectively making decisions on and taking urgent and early²² protective actions and other response actions off the site in order to achieve the goals of emergency response, on the basis of a graded approach and in accordance with the protection strategy. The arrangements shall be made with account taken of the uncertainties in and limitations of the information available when protective actions and other response actions have to be taken to be effective, and shall include the following:

(a) The specification of off-site emergency planning zones and distances²³ for which arrangements shall be made at the preparedness stage for taking protective actions and other response actions effectively. These emergency planning zones and distances shall be contiguous across national borders, where appropriate, and shall include:

(i) A precautionary action zone (PAZ), for facilities in category I, for which arrangements shall be made for taking urgent protective actions and other response actions, before any significant release²⁴ of radioactive material occurs, on the basis of conditions at the facility (i.e. conditions leading to the declaration of a general emergency; see para. 5.14), in order to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects.

(ii) An urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ), for facilities in category I or II, for which arrangements shall be made to initiate urgent protective actions and other response actions, if possible before any significant release of radioactive material occurs, on the basis of conditions at the facility (i.e. conditions leading to the declaration of a general emergency; see para. 5.14), and after a release occurs, on the basis of monitoring and assessment of the radiological situation off the site, in order to reduce the risk of stochastic effects²⁵. Any such actions shall be taken in such a way as not to delay the implementation of precautionary urgent protective actions and other response actions within the precautionary action zone.

²² Although defined under this overarching requirement, emergency planning zones and distances are applicable for both urgent and early protective actions and other response actions. Within emergency planning zones the main focus is on taking precautionary urgent and urgent protective actions and other response actions. However, within emergency planning distances urgent decisions may be warranted, as a precaution, to prevent inadvertent ingestion and to restrict the consumption of food, milk and drinking water that may be directly contaminated and consumed following a significant release of radioactive material into the environment.

²³ The off-site emergency planning zones and distances may differ from those specified provided that, at the preparedness stage, such areas and distances are designated and arrangements are made to effectively take precautionary urgent, urgent and early protective actions and other response actions within these areas and distances in order to achieve the goals of emergency response.

²⁴ A significant release of radioactive material is a radioactive release that warrants taking protective actions or other response actions off the site.

²⁵ Taking actions within the urgent protective action planning zone in order to reduce the risk of stochastic effects would not mean that no severe deterministic effects could be observed within the urgent protective action planning zone. However, severe deterministic effects are most likely to occur within the precautionary action zone.

(iii) An extended planning distance (EPD) from the facility, for facilities in category I or II, which is the area beyond the urgent protective action planning zone for which arrangements shall be made to conduct monitoring and assessment of the radiological situation off the site in order to identify areas within such a period of time as would allow the risk of stochastic effects to be reduced effectively by taking protective actions and other response actions within a day to a week and a month following a significant release.

(iv) An ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD) from the facility, for facilities in category I or II, is the area beyond the extended planning distance for which arrangements shall be made to take response actions (1) for protecting the food chain and water supply²⁶ as well as for protecting commodities other than food from contamination following a significant release and (2) for protecting the public from the ingestion of food, milk and drinking water and from the use of commodities other than food with possible contamination following a significant release.

(b) Criteria, based on the emergency classification and on conditions at the facility and off the site (see paras 4.28(3), 4.28(4), 5.14 and 5.15), for initiating and adjusting urgent protective actions and other response actions within the emergency planning zones and distances, in accordance with the protection strategy.

(c) Authority and responsibility to provide sufficient and updated information to the notification point at any time to allow for an effective off-site emergency response.

5.37. Within the emergency planning zones and distances, arrangements shall be made for taking appropriate protective actions and other response actions effectively, as necessary, promptly upon the notification of a nuclear or radiological emergency. These arrangements shall include arrangements for:

(a) prompt execution of authority and discharge of responsibility for making decisions to initiate protective actions and other response actions upon the notification of an emergency (see para. 5.12);

(b) warning permanent, transient and special population groups or those responsible for them and warning special facilities;

(c) taking urgent protective actions and other response actions such as evacuation, restrictions on the food chain and on water supply, prevention of inadvertent ingestion, restrictions on the consumption of food, milk and drinking water and on the use of commodities, decontamination of evacuees, control of access and traffic restrictions; and

(d) protection of emergency workers and helpers in an emergency.

²⁶ 'Water supply' refers to water supplies that use rainwater or other untreated surface water.

1 The arrangements shall be coordinated with all jurisdictions (including, to the extent practicable,
2 jurisdictions beyond national borders where relevant) within any emergency planning zone or
3 distance. These arrangements shall ensure that services necessary for ensuring public safety (e.g.
4 rescue services and health services for the care of critically ill patients) are provided continuously
5 throughout the emergency, including while protective actions and other response actions are being
6 taken.

7 5.38. Within emergency planning zones and distances, arrangements shall be made for the timely
8 monitoring and assessment of contamination, radioactive releases and doses for the purpose of
9 deciding on or adjusting the protective actions and other response actions that need to be taken or that
10 are being taken. These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in
11 accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)).

12 5.39. The operating organization of a facility in category I, II or III shall make arrangements to
13 ensure the safety of all persons on the site in a nuclear or radiological emergency. These shall include
14 arrangements to do the following:

- 15 (a) to notify all persons on the site of an emergency on the site;
- 16 (b) for all persons on the site to take appropriate actions immediately upon notification of an
17 emergency;
- 18 (c) to account for those persons on the site and to locate and recover those persons unaccounted for;
- 19 (d) to provide immediate first aid;
- 20 (e) to take urgent protective actions.

21 Such arrangements shall also include ensuring the provision, for all persons present in the facility and
22 on the site, of: suitable assembly points, provided with continuous radiation monitoring; a sufficient
23 number of suitable escape routes; suitable and reliable alarm systems and means for warning and
24 instructing them under the full range of emergency conditions.

25 5.40. The operating organization of a facility in category I, II or III shall ensure that suitable,
26 reliable and diverse means of communication are available at all times under the full range of
27 emergency conditions for use in taking protective actions and other response actions on the site and for
28 communication with off-site officials responsible for taking protective actions and other response
29 actions off the site or within any emergency planning zones or distances.

30 5.41. Operating personnel of activities in category IV, first responders in an emergency at an
31 unforeseen location and those personnel at locations where there is a significant likelihood of
32 encountering a dangerous source that is not under control (see para. 4.21) shall be provided with
33 guidance and training on taking urgent protective actions and other response actions. This shall
34 include guidance and training on the approximate radius of the inner cordoned off area in which urgent

protective actions and other response actions would initially be taken and on the adjustment of this area on the basis of observed or assessed conditions on the site.

Requirement 10: Providing instructions, warnings and relevant information to the public

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to provide the public who are affected or are potentially affected by a nuclear or radiological emergency with information that is necessary for their protection, to warn them promptly and to instruct them on actions to be taken.

5.42. For facilities in category I or II and areas in category V, arrangements shall be made to provide permanent, transient and special population groups or those responsible for them and special facilities within the emergency planning zones and distances (see para. 5.36), before operation and throughout the lifetime of the facility, with information on the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency. This shall include information on the potential for a nuclear or radiological emergency, on the nature of the hazards, on how people will be warned or notified, and on the actions to be taken in the emergency. The information shall be provided in the languages mainly spoken within the emergency planning zones and distances. The effectiveness of these arrangements for public information shall be periodically assessed.

5.43. For facilities in category I or II and in areas in category V, arrangements shall be made to register those members of the public in special population groups and, as appropriate, those responsible for them, and to promptly issue them and permanent and transient population groups, as well as special facilities in the emergency planning zones and distances, with a warning and instructions upon declaration of a general emergency (see para. 5.14). This shall include providing instructions on the actions to be taken, in the languages mainly spoken within these emergency planning zones and distances (see para. 5.36).

5.44. For facilities in category III and category IV, arrangements shall be made to provide the public with information and instructions in order to identify and locate people who may have been affected by a nuclear or radiological emergency and who may need response actions such as decontamination, medical examination or health screening. These arrangements shall include arrangements for issuing a warning to the public and providing information in the event that a dangerous source could be in the public domain as a consequence of its loss or unauthorized removal.

5.45. Arrangements shall be made by response organizations in a State to promptly provide information and advice to its nationals and to those with interests in other States²⁷ in a nuclear or radiological emergency declared beyond national borders, with due account taken of the response

²⁷ Examples include travellers, those working and/or living abroad, importers and exporters, and companies operating abroad.

actions recommended in the State in which the emergency occurred as well as in the State(s) affected by that emergency (see paras 5.70 and 6.14).

Requirement 11: Protecting emergency workers and helpers in an emergency

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to protect emergency workers and to protect helpers in an emergency.

5.46. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that emergency workers are, to the extent practicable, designated in advance and are fit for the intended duty. These arrangements shall include health surveillance for emergency workers for the purpose of assessing their initial fitness and continuing fitness for their intended duties (see also Ref. [8]).

5.47. Arrangements shall be made to register and to integrate into the emergency response operations those emergency workers who were not designated as such in advance of a nuclear or radiological emergency and helpers in an emergency. This shall include designation of the response organization(s) responsible for ensuring the protection of emergency workers and the protection of helpers in an emergency.

5.48. The operating organization and response organizations shall determine the anticipated hazardous conditions, both on the site and off the site, in which emergency workers might have to perform response functions in a nuclear or radiological emergency in accordance with the hazard assessment and the protection strategy.

5.49. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the protection of emergency workers and of helpers in an emergency for the range of anticipated hazardous conditions in which they might have to perform response functions. These arrangements, as a minimum, shall include:

- (a) training those emergency workers designated as such in advance;
- (b) providing emergency workers not designated in advance and helpers in an emergency immediately before the conduct of their specified duties with instructions on how to perform the duties under emergency conditions ('just in time' training);
- (c) managing, controlling and recording the doses received;
- (d) provision of appropriate specialized protective equipment and monitoring equipment;
- (e) provision of iodine thyroid blocking, as appropriate, if exposure due to radioactive iodine is possible;
- (f) obtaining informed consent to perform specified duties, when appropriate;
- (g) medical examination, longer term medical actions and psychological counselling, as appropriate.

1 5.50. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that all practicable means
2 are used to minimize doses to emergency workers and to helpers in an emergency due to exposure in
3 the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency (see para. I.2 of Appendix I) and to optimize their
4 protection.

5 5.51. In a nuclear or radiological emergency, the relevant requirements for occupational exposure in
6 planned exposure situations established of Ref. [8] shall be applied, in accordance with a graded
7 approach, for emergency workers, except as required in para. 5.52.

8 5.52. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that no emergency worker
9 is subject to an exposure in an emergency that could give rise to an effective dose in excess of 50 mSv
10 other than (1) for the purposes of saving life or preventing serious injury; (2) when taking actions to
11 prevent severe deterministic effects or actions to prevent the development of catastrophic conditions
12 that could significantly affect people and the environment, or (3) when taking actions to avert a large
13 collective dose.

14 5.53. For the exceptional circumstances of para. 5.52, national guidance values shall be established
15 for restricting the exposures of emergency workers, in accordance with Appendix I.

16 5.54. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that emergency workers
17 who undertake emergency response actions in which the doses received might exceed an effective
18 dose of 50 mSv do so voluntarily²⁸; that they have been clearly and comprehensively informed in
19 advance of the associated health risks as well as of available protective measures; and that they are, to
20 the extent possible, trained in the actions that they may be required to take. Emergency workers not
21 designated as such in advance shall not be the first emergency workers chosen for taking actions that
22 could result in their doses exceeding the guidance values of dose for life saving actions, given in
23 Appendix I. Helpers in an emergency shall not be allowed to take actions that could result in their
24 receiving doses in excess of an effective dose of 50 mSv.

25 5.55. Arrangements shall be made to assess as soon as practicable the individual doses received in a
26 response to a nuclear or radiological emergency by emergency workers and helpers in an emergency
27 and, as appropriate, to restrict further exposures in the response to the emergency (see Appendix I).

28 5.56. Emergency workers and helpers in an emergency shall be given appropriate medical attention
29 for doses received in a response to a nuclear or radiological emergency (see Appendix II) or at their
30 request.

31 5.57. Emergency workers who receive doses in a response to a nuclear or radiological emergency
32 shall normally not be precluded from incurring further occupational exposure. However, qualified

²⁸ The voluntary basis for response actions by emergency workers is usually covered in the emergency arrangements.

medical advice²⁹ shall be obtained before any further occupational exposure if an emergency worker has received an effective dose exceeding 200 mSv or at the request of the emergency worker.

5.58. Information on the doses received in the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency and information on any consequent health risks shall be communicated, as soon as practicable, to emergency workers and to helpers in an emergency.

Requirement 12: Managing the medical response in a nuclear or radiological emergency

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the provision of appropriate medical screening and triage, medical treatment and longer term medical actions for those people who could be affected in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.59. On the presentation of clinical symptoms of radiation exposure or other indications of a possible nuclear or radiological emergency, the medical personnel or other responsible parties who identify the clinical symptoms or other indications shall notify the appropriate local or national officials and shall take response actions as appropriate.

5.60. Arrangements shall be made for medical personnel, both general practitioners and emergency staff, to be made aware of the clinical symptoms of radiation exposure and of the appropriate notification procedures and other response actions that are warranted if a nuclear or radiological emergency has occurred or is suspected.

5.61. Arrangements shall be made so that, in a nuclear or radiological emergency, individuals with possible contamination can nonetheless promptly be given appropriate medical attention. These arrangements shall include ensuring that transport services are provided where needed and providing instructions³⁰ to medical personnel on the precautions to take.

5.62. For facilities in categories I, II and III, arrangements shall be made to manage an adequate number of individuals with contamination or having been overexposed, including arrangements for first aid, the estimation of their doses, medical transport and their initial medical treatment in predesignated medical facilities.

5.63. For areas within emergency planning zones (see para. 5.36), arrangements shall be made for performing medical screening and triage and for assigning to a predesignated medical facility any

²⁹ The qualified medical advice is intended to assess continuing fitness of the worker for its intended tasks involving occupational exposure in line with Ref. [8]. In line with para. 5.56, any emergency worker is to be given appropriate medical attention for doses received. To illustrate this, the generic criterion for dose that is received in Table II.2 of Appendix II (of 100 mSv effective dose in a month) will indicate that an emergency worker receiving such dose needs to be registered and subjected to health screening and that the emergency worker needs appropriate longer term medical follow-up in order to detect early and to treat radiation induced health effects effectively.

³⁰ This includes advice that universal precautions in health care against infection (e.g. surgical masks and gloves) generally provide medical personnel with adequate protection when treating individuals possibly having contamination.

individual exposed at levels exceeding the criteria in Table II.1 of Appendix II. These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)).

5.64. Arrangements shall be made to identify people with possible contamination or having possibly been exposed sufficient to result in radiation induced health effects and to provide them with appropriate medical attention including longer term medical follow up. These arrangements shall include:

- (a) guidelines for effective diagnosis and treatment;
- (b) designated medical personnel trained in clinical management of radiation injuries;
- (c) designated institutions for evaluating radiation exposure (external and internal), for providing specialized medical treatment and for longer term medical actions.

This shall also include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)) and arrangements for consultation on treatment following any exposure that could result in severe deterministic effects (see Appendix II) with medical practitioners experienced in dealing with such injuries³¹.

5.65. Arrangements shall be made for the identification of individuals in those groups that are at risk of sustaining increases in the incidence of cancers as a result of radiation exposure in a nuclear or radiological emergency. Arrangements shall be made to take longer term actions to detect radiation induced health effects among such groups in time to allow for their effective treatment. These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)).

Requirement 13: Communicating with the public throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for communicating with the public throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.66. Arrangements shall be made for providing useful, timely, truthful, clear and appropriate information to the public in a nuclear or radiological emergency, with account taken that the usual means for communication might have been damaged in the emergency or by its initiating event (e.g. by an earthquake or by flooding) or overburdened by use. These arrangements shall also include arrangements for keeping the international community informed, as appropriate. These arrangements shall account for the protection of sensitive information in circumstances when a nuclear or radiological emergency is initiated by a nuclear security event. Communication with the public in a

³¹ Such arrangements for consultation on treatment include international assistance to be provided through or to be coordinated by the IAEA and by WHO; for example, under the Assistance Convention [12].

nuclear or radiological emergency shall be carried out on the basis of a strategy to be developed at the preparedness stage as part of the protection strategy. Arrangements shall be made to adjust this strategy in the emergency response on the basis of prevailing conditions.

5.67. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that information provided to the public by response organizations, operating organizations, the regulatory body and others (e.g. international organizations) in a nuclear or radiological emergency is coordinated and consistent, with due recognition of the evolutionary nature of the emergency.

5.68. Arrangements shall be made so that information is provided to the public in a nuclear or radiological emergency in plain and understandable language.

5.69. The government shall ensure that a system for putting radiological health hazards in perspective in a nuclear or radiological emergency is developed and implemented with the following aim:

- To support informed decisions concerning protective actions and other response actions to be taken;
- To help in ensuring that actions taken do more good than harm;
- To address public concerns regarding potential health consequences.

In the development of such a system, due consideration shall be given to pregnant women and children as individuals who are most vulnerable to radiation exposure.

5.70. Arrangements shall be made to explain to the public any changes in the protective actions and other response actions being recommended in the State and any differences from those being recommended in other States (see paras 6.13–6.15).

5.71. Arrangements shall be made to identify and address, to the extent practicable, misconceptions, rumours and incorrect and misleading information that might be circulating widely in a nuclear or radiological emergency, in particular those that might result in the public taking inappropriate actions³² (see Req. 16).

5.72. Arrangements shall be made to respond to enquiries from the public and from the news media, both national and international, including enquiries received from or through the IAEA. These arrangements shall recognize the evolutionary nature of emergencies and the need to respond in a timely manner to enquiries even when the information requested is not yet available.

Requirement 14: Taking early protective actions and other response actions

³² Inappropriate actions in this context include, but are not limited to: actions that interfere with prompt implementation of protective actions, such as self-evacuation from inside and from outside areas in which evacuation is ordered, unnecessarily burdening of the health care system, discrimination against people or shunning of products from an area affected by a nuclear or radiological emergency, unjustified voluntary terminations of pregnancy and cancellation of commercial flights.

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to take early protective actions and other response actions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.73. Within the extended planning distance (see para. 5.36), arrangements shall be made for effective relocation that may be required following a significant radioactive release and for the prevention of inadvertent ingestion in accordance with the protection strategy (see Req. 5). These arrangements shall include:

- (a) provision of instructions and advice to prevent an inadvertent ingestion;
- (b) prompt monitoring and assessment;
- (c) use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4));
- (d) the means for accomplishing relocation and for assisting those persons who have been relocated;
- (e) provisions to extend monitoring and assessment and the actions taken beyond the extended planning distance if necessary.

5.74. Within the ingestion and commodities planning distance (see para. 5.36), arrangements shall be made for prompt protection in relation to, and for restriction of, non-essential local produce, forest products (e.g. wild berries, wild mushrooms), milk from grazing animals, drinking water supplies, animal feed and commodities with or possibly with contamination following a significant radioactive release in accordance with the protection strategy (see Req. 5). These arrangements shall include:

- (a) provision of instructions and advice:
 - (i) to protect the food chain, water supply and commodities from contamination;
 - (ii) to prevent ingestion of food, milk and drinking water with or possibly with contamination;
 - (iii) to prevent use of commodities with or possibly with contamination;
- (b) prompt monitoring, sampling and analysis;
- (c) use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4));
- (d) the means to enforce the restrictions;
- (e) provisions to expand the monitoring and assessment and the restrictions beyond this distance if necessary.

5.75. Within the emergency planning zones and inner cordoned off area, arrangements shall be made for monitoring the contamination levels of people, vehicles and goods moving out of areas with contamination, in order to control the spread of contamination and, as applicable, for the purposes of

decontamination in accordance with the protection strategy (see Req. 5). These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)) and shall take into consideration that some vehicles and items potentially with contamination as well as members of the public and emergency workers may have left these areas before the establishment of contamination control points and boundaries.

5.76. Arrangements shall be made for access control and restriction control for areas in which evacuations and relocations are carried out within emergency planning zones, the extended planning distance and the inner cordoned off area, in accordance with the protection strategy (see Req. 5). Returns to these areas for short periods of time shall be permitted if justified (e.g. to feed animals left behind) and provided that those individuals entering the area are: (1) subject to control and dose assessment while in the area; (2) instructed on how to protect themselves; and (3) briefed on the associated risks.

5.77. Arrangements shall be made to test decontamination methods before their general use and to assess their effectiveness in terms of dose reduction.

5.78. For a transnational emergency in category IV, arrangements shall be made for taking early protective actions and other response actions as appropriate at areas beyond category V, including promptly conducting monitoring and assessment of contamination (a) of food, milk and drinking water and, as appropriate, of commodities other than food, and (b) of vehicles and cargoes that are also likely to have contamination, with the aim of mitigating the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and reassurance of the public. These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)).

5.79. The monitoring in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be carried out on the basis of a strategy to be developed at the preparedness stage as part of the protection strategy. Arrangements shall be made to adjust the monitoring in the emergency response on the basis of prevailing conditions.

5.80. Arrangements shall be made to carry out retrospective assessment of exposures incurred by members of the public as a consequence of a nuclear or radiological emergency, and to make the results of these assessments publicly available. The assessments shall be based on the best available information, shall be put into perspective in terms of the associated health hazards (see para. 5.69) and shall be promptly updated in the light of any information that would yield substantially more accurate results.

Requirement 15: Managing radioactive waste in a nuclear or radiological emergency

The government shall ensure that radioactive waste is managed safely and effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.81. The national policy and strategy for radioactive waste management [18] shall apply for radioactive waste generated in a nuclear or radiological emergency taking into account these requirements.

5.82. The protection strategy (see Req. 5) shall take into account radioactive waste that might arise from protective actions and other response actions that are to be taken.

5.83. Radioactive waste arising in a nuclear or radiological emergency, including radioactive waste arising from associated protective actions and other response actions taken, shall be identified, characterized and categorized in due time and shall be managed in a manner that does not compromise the protection strategy taking into account prevailing conditions at these evolve.

5.84. Arrangements shall be made for radioactive waste to be managed safely and effectively. These arrangements shall include:

- (a) a plan to characterize waste, including in situ measurements and analysis of samples;
- (b) criteria for categorization of waste;
- (c) avoiding, to the extent possible, the mixing of waste of different categories;
- (d) minimizing the amount of material declared unduly as radioactive waste;
- (e) a method of determining appropriate predisposal management options (including processing, storage and transport), with account taken of the interdependences between all steps as well as impacts on the anticipated end points (clearance, authorized discharge, reuse, recycling, disposal) [18, 19];
- (f) a method of identifying appropriate storage options and sites;
- (g) consideration of non-radiological aspects of waste (e.g. chemical properties such as toxicity, biological properties).

5.85. Consideration shall be given to the management of human remains and animal remains with contamination as a result of a nuclear or radiological emergency, with due account taken of religious practices and cultural practices.

Requirement 16: Mitigating non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and emergency response

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for mitigating the non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and emergency response.

5.86. Non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and of an emergency response shall be taken into consideration in deciding on the protective actions and other response actions to be taken in the context of the protection strategy (see Req. 5).

5.87. Arrangements shall be made for mitigating the non-radiological consequences of an emergency and an emergency response and for responding to concerns of the public in a nuclear or radiological emergency. These arrangements shall include providing the public with: (a) information on any associated health hazards and clear instructions on the actions to be taken (see Req. 10 and Req. 13); (b) medical and psychological counselling; and (c) adequate social support, as appropriate.

5.88. Arrangements shall be made to mitigate the impacts on international trade of a nuclear or radiological emergency and associated protective actions and other response actions, with account taken of the generic criteria in Appendix II. These arrangements shall provide for information of the public and interested parties (such as importing States) on control put in place in relation to traded commodities, including food, vehicles and cargoes being shipped, and on any revision of national criteria.

5.89. Arrangements shall be put in place for inappropriate actions taken by members of the public and by commercial, industrial, infrastructural or other governmental or non-governmental bodies to be, to the extent practicable, promptly identified and appropriately addressed. This shall include the designation of organization(s) with the responsibility for monitoring for, identifying and addressing inappropriate actions.

Requirement 17: Requesting, providing and receiving international assistance for emergency preparedness and response

The government shall ensure that adequate arrangements are in place to benefit from, and to contribute to the provision of, international assistance for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.90. Governments and international organizations shall put in place and maintain arrangements to respond in a timely manner to a request made by a State, in accordance with established mechanisms and respective mandates, for assistance in preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.91. Arrangements shall be put in place and maintained for requesting and obtaining international assistance by States or international organizations and for providing assistance to States (either directly or through the IAEA) in preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, on the basis of international instruments (e.g. the Assistance Convention [12]), bilateral agreements or other mechanisms. These arrangements shall take due account of compatibility requirements for the capabilities to be rendered and obtained among different States so as to ensure the usefulness of these capabilities.

Requirement 18: Terminating a nuclear or radiological emergency

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place and are implemented for the termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency, with account taken of the need for the resumption of accustomed social and economic activities.

5.92. Adjustment of protective actions and other response actions and of other arrangements that are aimed at enabling the termination of an emergency shall be made by a formal process that includes consultation with interested parties.

5.93. Arrangements for communication with the public in a nuclear or radiological emergency (see Req. 13) shall include arrangements for communicating on the basis for adjusting protective actions and other response actions and other arrangements aimed at enabling the termination of the emergency. This shall include providing the public with information on the need for any continuing protective actions following termination of the emergency and any necessary modifications to their personal behaviour. Arrangements shall be made, during this period, to closely monitor public opinion and the response of news media in order to ensure that any concerns can be promptly addressed. These arrangements shall ensure that any information provided to the public puts health hazards in perspective (see para. 5.69).

5.94. The termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be based on a formal decision made public and shall include prior consultation with interested parties, as appropriate.

5.95. Both radiological consequences and non-radiological consequences shall be considered in deciding on the termination of an emergency as well as in justifying and optimizing further protection strategies as necessary.

5.96. The transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation and the return to a planned exposure situation shall be made in a coordinated and orderly manner, by making any necessary transfer of responsibilities and with the involvement of relevant authorities and interested parties.

5.97. The government shall ensure, as part of its emergency preparedness, that arrangements are in place for the termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency. The arrangements shall take into account that the decision on the termination of the emergency might be taken at different times in different geographical areas. The planning process shall include as appropriate:

- (a) the roles and functions of organizations;
- (b) methods of transferring information;
- (c) means for assessing radiological consequences and non-radiological consequences;
- (d) conditions, criteria and objectives to be met for enabling the termination (see Appendix II);

- (e) review of the hazard assessment and of the emergency arrangements;
- (f) establishment of national guidelines for termination of an emergency;
- (g) arrangements for continuing communication with the public, and for monitoring of public opinion and the response of the news media;
- (h) arrangements for consultation with interested parties.

5.98. Once the emergency is terminated, all workers undertaking relevant work shall be subject to the relevant requirements for occupational exposure in planned exposure situations [8], and individual monitoring, environmental monitoring and health surveillance shall be conducted subject to the requirements for planned exposure situation or existing exposure situation, as appropriate [8].

Requirement 19: Analysing the emergency and the emergency response

The government shall ensure that the nuclear or radiological emergency and the emergency response are analysed in order to identify actions to be taken to prevent other emergencies and to improve emergency arrangements.

5.99. Arrangements shall be made to document, protect and preserve, to the extent practicable, in an emergency response data and information important for an analysis of the nuclear or radiological emergency and the emergency response. Arrangements shall be made to undertake a timely and comprehensive analysis of the nuclear or radiological emergency and the emergency response with the involvement of interested parties. These arrangements shall give due consideration to the need for making contributions to relevant internationally coordinated analysis and for sharing the findings of the analysis with relevant response organizations. The analysis shall give due consideration to:

- (a) reconstruction of the scenario for the emergency;
- (b) root causes of the emergency;
- (c) regulatory controls including regulations and regulatory oversight;
- (d) general implications for safety, including the possible involvement of other sources or devices (including those in other States);
- (e) general implications for nuclear security, as appropriate;
- (f) necessary improvements to emergency arrangements;
- (g) necessary improvements of the regulatory control.

5.100. Arrangements shall be made to enable comprehensive interviews on the circumstances of the nuclear or radiological emergency to be conducted with those involved.

1 5.101. Arrangements shall be made to acquire the expertise necessary to perform an analysis of the
2 nuclear or radiological emergency (e.g. from the IAEA, from another State or from the manufacturer
3 of relevant equipment).

4 5.102. Arrangements shall be made to take actions promptly on the basis of an analysis to prevent
5 other emergencies, including the information of other operating organizations as relevant or of other
6 States through the IAEA.

7

6. REQUIREMENTS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE

GENERAL

6.1. This section establishes the requirements for infrastructural elements essential to providing the capability for fulfilling the requirements established in Section 5 in accordance with the hazard assessment and the protection strategy.

Requirement 20: Authorities for emergency preparedness and response

The government shall ensure that authorities for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency are clearly established.

6.2. The authority for developing, maintaining and regulating arrangements, both on the site and off the site, for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be established by means of acts, legal codes or statutes.

6.3. All of the functions specified in Section 5 shall be assigned to the appropriate operating organizations and to local, regional and national organizations. The involvement of these organizations in the performance of these functions, or in support of their performance, shall be documented³³. The documentation shall specify their roles, functions, authorities and responsibilities in emergency preparedness and response and shall assent to the authorities, roles and responsibilities of other response organizations. Conflicting or potentially conflicting and overlapping roles and responsibilities shall be identified and conflicts shall be resolved at the preparedness stage through the national coordinating mechanism (see para. 4.10).

6.4. The authority and responsibility for making decisions on response actions to be taken on the site and off the site (see para. 5.7) and for communication with the public shall be clearly assigned for each phase of the response.

6.5. The emergency arrangements shall include clear allocation of responsibilities, authorities and arrangements for coordination and for communication in all phases of the response. These arrangements shall include:

- ensuring that for each response organization a position in the response hierarchy has the authority and responsibility to direct and to coordinate its response actions;
- clearly assigning the authority and responsibility for the direction and coordination of the entire response (see para. 5.7) and for the resolution of potential conflicts between response organizations;

³³ Typically this involvement is documented as part of the appropriate national, regional and local emergency response plans.

- 1 – assigning to an on-site position the authority and responsibility for notifying the appropriate
- 2 organization(s) of an emergency and for taking immediate on-site actions;
- 3 – assigning to an on-site position the responsibility for directing the entire on-site response (see
- 4 paras 5.3 and 5.7).

5 These arrangements shall be such as to ensure that those personnel with authority and responsibility to

6 perform critical response functions³⁴ in an emergency response are not assigned any other

7 responsibilities in an emergency that would interfere with the prompt performance of the specified

8 functions.

9 6.6. The arrangements for delegation and/or transfer of authority shall be specified in the relevant

10 emergency plans, together with arrangements for notifying all appropriate parties of the transfer.

11 **Requirement 21: Organization and staffing for emergency preparedness and response**

12 **The government shall ensure that the overall organization for emergency preparedness and**

13 **response is clearly specified and staffed with sufficient personnel who are qualified and fit for**

14 **their intended duty.**

15 6.7. The organizational relationships for emergency preparedness and response and interfaces

16 between all the response organizations shall be established.

17 6.8. The positions responsible within each operating organization and response organization for

18 performance of the response functions specified in Section 5 shall be assigned in the emergency plans

19 and procedures. The positions responsible within each operating organization, each response

20 organization and the regulatory body for the performance of activities at the preparedness stage, in

21 accordance with these requirements, shall be assigned as part of the routine organizational structures

22 and shall be addressed, as appropriate, in the emergency plans and procedures.

23 6.9. Personnel who are assigned to positions in all operating organizations and response

24 organizations to perform the functions necessary to meet the requirements established in Section 5

25 shall be qualified and fit for their intended duty.

26 6.10. Appropriate numbers of suitably qualified personnel shall be available at all times (including

27 during 24 hour a day operations) so that appropriate positions can be promptly staffed as necessary

28 following the declaration and notification of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Appropriate

29 numbers of suitably qualified personnel shall be available in the long term to staff the various

30 positions necessary to take mitigatory actions, protective actions and other response actions.

³⁴ Critical response functions are functions that must be performed promptly and correctly in order to classify, declare and notify an emergency, to activate an emergency response, to manage the response, to take mitigatory actions, to protect emergency workers and to take urgent protective actions on and off the site.

6.11. For a site where multiple facilities in category I or II are collocated, an appropriate number of suitably qualified personnel shall be available to manage the response at all facilities if each of the facilities is under emergency conditions simultaneously (see para. 5.4).

Requirement 22: Coordination of emergency preparedness and response

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the coordination of emergency preparedness and response between the operating organization and local, regional, and national authorities, and, where appropriate, at the international level.

6.12. Arrangements shall be developed, as appropriate, for the coordination of emergency preparedness and response and of protocols for operational interfaces among operating organizations and authorities at the local, regional and national levels, including those organizations and authorities responsible for the response to conventional emergencies and to nuclear security events (see paras 4.4, 4.10, 6.3 and Req. 6). The arrangements shall be clearly documented and the documentation shall be made available to all relevant parties. Arrangements shall be put in place to ensure effective working relationships among these organizations, both at the preparedness stage and in an emergency.

6.13. When several different organizations of the State or of other States are expected to have or to develop tools, procedures or criteria for use in the response to the same emergency, arrangements for coordination shall be put in place to improve consistency of the assessments of the situation, including assessments of contamination, doses and radiation induced health effects and any other relevant assessments made in a nuclear or radiological emergency, so as not to give rise to confusion.

6.14. Arrangements shall be made to coordinate with other States in the event of a transnational emergency any protective actions and other response actions that are recommended to their citizens and to embassies in order either to ensure that they are consistent with those recommended in these States, or to provide an opportunity for them to explain to the public the basis for the differences (see para. 5.70).

6.15. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that States with areas in category V are provided with appropriate information for developing their own preparedness to respond to a transboundary emergency and that appropriate coordination across national borders is in place. These arrangements shall include:

- (a) agreements and protocols to provide information necessary to develop a coordinated means for notification, classification schemes and criteria for taking and adjusting protective actions and other response actions;
- (b) arrangements for communication with the public;
- (c) arrangements for the exchange of information between decision making authorities.

1 **Requirement 23: Plans and procedures for emergency response**

2 **The government shall ensure that plans and procedures necessary for effective emergency**
 3 **response are established.**

4 6.16. Plans, procedures and other arrangements for effective emergency response, including
 5 coordinating mechanisms, letters of agreement or legal instruments, shall be made for coordinating a
 6 national emergency response. The arrangements for a coordinated national emergency response:

- 7 – shall specify the organization responsible for the development and maintenance of the
 8 arrangements;
- 9 – shall describe the responsibilities of operating organizations and other response organizations;
- 10 – shall describe the coordination effected between these arrangements and the arrangements for
 11 response to a conventional emergency and to a nuclear security event.

12 Consideration shall also be given to parts of these plans, procedures and other arrangements that are
 13 confidential.

14 6.17. Each response organization shall prepare a general emergency plan or plans for coordinating
 15 and performing their assigned functions as specified in Section 5 and in accordance with the hazard
 16 assessment and the protection strategy. A national emergency response plan shall be developed that
 17 integrates all relevant plans for emergency response in a coordinated manner and consistently with an
 18 all hazards approach. Emergency plans shall specify how responsibilities for managing emergency
 19 response operations are to be discharged on the site, off the site and across national borders, as
 20 appropriate. The plans for emergency response shall be coordinated with any other plans and
 21 procedures that may be implemented in a nuclear or radiological emergency, in order to ensure that the
 22 simultaneous implementation of the plans would not reduce their effectiveness or cause conflicts. Such
 23 other plans and procedures include emergency plans for facilities in category I and for areas in
 24 category V; security plans and contingency plans [9, 10]; procedures for the investigation of a nuclear
 25 security event, including identification, collection, packaging and transport of evidence contaminated
 26 with radionuclides; nuclear forensics and related activities [11]; evacuation plans; and plans for
 27 firefighting.

28 6.18. The appropriate responsible authorities shall ensure that:

- 29 (a) a ‘concept of operations’³⁵ for emergency response is developed at the beginning of the
 30 preparedness stage;

³⁵ A ‘concept of operations’ is a brief description of the ideal response to a postulated nuclear or radiological emergency, used to ensure that all those personnel and organizations involved in the development of a capability for emergency response share a common understanding.

- (b) emergency plans and procedures are prepared and, as appropriate, approved for any facility or activity, areas and locations that could give rise to an emergency warranting protective actions and other response actions;
- (c) response organizations and operating organizations, as appropriate, are involved in the preparation of emergency plans and procedures, as appropriate;
- (d) in the content, features and extent of emergency plans, account is taken of the results of any hazard assessment and any lessons from operating experience and from emergencies that have occurred, including conventional emergencies (see paras 4.18–4.26);
- (e) emergency plans and procedures are periodically reviewed and updated (see paras 6.36 and 6.38).

6.19. The operating organization of a facility or for an activity in category I, II, III or IV shall prepare an emergency plan. This emergency plan shall be coordinated with those of all other bodies having responsibilities in a nuclear or radiological emergency, including public authorities, and shall be submitted to the regulatory body for approval.

6.20. The operating organization and response organizations shall develop the necessary procedures and analytical tools to be able to perform the functions specified in Section 5 for the goals of emergency response to be achieved and for an emergency response to be effective.

6.21. Procedures and analytical tools shall be tested under simulated emergency conditions and shall be validated prior to initial use. Any arrangements for use of analytical tools early in the emergency response for supporting decision making on protective actions and other response actions shall be made in due recognition of the limitations³⁶ of such analytical tools and in a way that would not reduce the effectiveness of response actions. These limitations shall be made clear to, and recognized by, those responsible for decision making.

Requirement 24: Logistical support and facilities for emergency response

The government shall ensure that adequate logistical support and facilities are provided to enable emergency response functions to be performed effectively.

6.22. Adequate tools, instruments, supplies, equipment, communication systems, facilities and documentation (such as procedures, checklists, manuals, telephone numbers and email addresses) shall be provided for performing the functions specified in Section 5. These items and facilities shall be selected or designed to be operational under the conditions (such as radiological conditions, working conditions and environmental conditions) that could be encountered in the emergency response, and to

³⁶ Example for such limitation is that the timing and magnitude of radioactive releases in an emergency at a nuclear power plant that would warrant taking precautionary urgent protective actions and urgent protective actions off the site before, or shortly after, a radioactive release may not be predictable. In addition, the radioactive release could occur over several days, resulting in complex deposition patterns off the site.

be compatible with other procedures and equipment for the response (e.g. compatible with the communication frequencies of other response organizations), as appropriate. These support items shall be located or provided in a manner that allows their effective use under the emergency conditions postulated.

6.23. For facilities in category I and II, as contingency measures, alternative supplies, such as an alternative supply of water and an alternative electrical power supply, including any necessary equipment, for taking on-site mitigatory actions shall be ensured. This equipment shall be located and maintained so that it can be functional and readily accessible when needed (see also Ref. [16]).

6.24. Emergency response facilities or locations shall be designated to support the emergency response under the full range of postulated hazardous conditions and shall be assigned the following functions, as appropriate:

- (a) receiving notifications and initiating the response;
- (b) coordination and direction of on-site response actions;
- (c) providing technical and operational support to those personnel performing tasks at a facility and those responding off the site;
- (d) coordination and direction of off-site response actions with on-site response actions;
- (e) coordination of national response actions;
- (f) coordination of communication with the public;
- (g) coordination of monitoring, sampling and analysis;
- (h) managing those people who have been evacuated (including reception, registration, monitoring and decontamination, as well as provision for meeting their personal needs, such as for housing, feeding and sanitation);
- (i) managing safe storage of necessary resources;
- (j) providing individuals who have undergone exposure or contamination with appropriate medical attention and medical treatment.

6.25. For facilities in category I, emergency response facilities³⁷ and locations separate from the control room and supplementary control room shall be provided so that:

- (a) technical support can be provided to the operating personnel in the control room in an emergency (by a technical support centre);

³⁷ Such emergency response facilities may be collocated (i.e. these functions may be performed from a single emergency response facility or location) provided that it is ensured that they do not conflict with each other in performing their specified functions and that they are separated from the control rooms.

- 1 (b) operational control by personnel performing tasks at or near the facility can be maintained (by
 2 an operational support centre);
- 3 (c) the on-site emergency response is managed (by an emergency centre).

4 These emergency response facilities shall operate as an integrated system in support of the emergency
 5 response, without conflicting with each other's functions, and shall provide reasonable assurance of
 6 being operable and habitable under a range of postulated hazardous conditions, including conditions
 7 not considered in the design.

8 6.26. Arrangements shall be made for performing appropriate and reliable analyses of samples³⁸ and
 9 measurements of internal contamination for the purposes of emergency response and of health
 10 screening, as appropriate. Such arrangements shall include the designation of laboratories that would
 11 be operational under postulated emergency conditions.

12 6.27. Arrangements shall be made to obtain appropriate support from organizations responsible for
 13 providing support in conventional emergencies for logistics and communication, for social welfare and
 14 in other areas.

15 **Requirement 25: Training, drills and exercises for emergency preparedness and response**

16 **The government shall ensure that personnel relevant for emergency response shall take part in**
 17 **regular training, drills and exercises to ensure that they are able to perform their assigned**
 18 **response functions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.**

19 6.28. The operating organization and response organizations shall identify the knowledge, skills and
 20 abilities necessary to perform the functions specified in Section 5. The operating organization and
 21 response organizations shall make arrangements for the selection of personnel and for training to
 22 ensure that the personnel selected have the requisite knowledge, skills and abilities to perform their
 23 assigned response functions. The arrangements shall include arrangements for continuing refresher
 24 training on an appropriate schedule and arrangements for ensuring that personnel assigned to positions
 25 with responsibilities in emergency response undergo the specified training.

26 6.29. For facilities in category I, II or III, all personnel and all other persons on the site shall be
 27 instructed in the arrangements for them to be notified of an emergency and of their actions if notified
 28 of an emergency.

29 6.30. Exercise programmes shall be developed and implemented to ensure that all specified functions
 30 required to be performed for emergency response, all organizational interfaces for facilities in category
 31 I, II or III and the national level programmes for category IV or V are tested at suitable intervals.
 32 These programmes shall include the participation in some exercises of, as appropriate and feasible, all

³⁸ This could include, for example, arrangements for performing analyses of environmental and biological samples as well as other samples taken from the facility for the purpose of assessing its operational status.

the organizations concerned, people who are potentially affected and representatives of news media. The exercises shall be systematically evaluated (see para. 4.10(h)) and some exercises shall be evaluated by the regulatory body. Programmes shall be subject to review and revision in the light of experience gained (see paras 6.36 and 6.38).

6.31. The personnel responsible for critical response functions shall participate in drills and exercises on a regular basis so as to ensure their ability to take their actions effectively.

6.32. Officials off the site who are responsible for making decisions on protective actions and other response actions shall be trained and shall regularly participate in exercises. Officials off the site who are responsible for communication with the public in a nuclear or radiological emergency shall regularly participate in exercises.

6.33. The conduct of exercises shall be evaluated against pre-established objectives of emergency response to demonstrate that identification, notification, activation and response actions can be performed effectively to achieve the goals of emergency response (see para. 3.2).

Requirement 26: Quality management programme for emergency preparedness and response

The government shall ensure that a programme is established within integrated management systems to ensure the availability and reliability of all supplies, equipment, communication systems and facilities, plans, procedures and other arrangements necessary for effective response in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

6.34. The operating organization, as part of its management system (see Ref. [13]), and response organizations, as part of their emergency management system, shall establish a programme to ensure the availability and reliability of all supplies, equipment, communication systems and facilities, plans, procedures and other arrangements necessary to perform functions in a nuclear or radiological emergency as specified in Section 5 (see para. 6.22). The programme shall include arrangements for inventories, resupply, tests and calibrations, to ensure that these are continuously available and functional for use in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

6.35. The programme shall also include periodic and independent appraisals against functions as specified in Section 5, including participation in international appraisals³⁹.

6.36. Arrangements shall be made to maintain, review and update emergency plans, procedures and other arrangements and to incorporate lessons from research, operating experience (such as in the response to emergencies) and emergency exercises.

6.37. The operating organization and response organizations shall establish and maintain adequate records in relation to both emergency arrangements and the response to a nuclear or radiological

³⁹ Examples include those organized through the IAEA such as Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) missions.

1 emergency, to include dose assessments, results of monitoring and inventory of radioactive waste
2 managed, in order to allow for their review and evaluation. These records shall also provide for the
3 identification of those persons requiring longer term medical actions, as necessary, and shall provide
4 for the long term management of radioactive waste.

5 6.38. The operating organization and response organizations shall make arrangements to review and
6 evaluate responses in actual events and in exercises, in order to record the areas in which
7 improvements are necessary and to ensure that the necessary improvements are made (see Req. 19).

8 6.39. Relevant international organizations shall review and update their applicable standards and
9 guidelines and their relevant arrangements in emergency preparedness and response on the basis of
10 research and lessons from the response to actual emergencies and in emergency exercises.

11

Appendix I

GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY WORKERS

I.1. This Appendix provides guidance values as a basis for operational guidance for restricting the exposure of emergency workers.

I.2. Table I.1 provides guidance values for restricting exposure of emergency workers in an emergency response in terms of personal dose equivalent $H_p(10)$ from external exposure to strongly penetrating radiation. The values for $H_p(10)$ in Table I.1 assume that every effort has been made for protection against external exposure to weakly penetrating radiation and against exposure due to intakes or skin contamination (see para. 5.50),

I.3. The total effective dose and the relative biological effectiveness (RBE) weighted absorbed dose to an organ or tissue via all exposure pathways (i.e. both dose from external exposure and committed dose from intakes) need to be estimated as early as possible. Table II.1 provides guidance for the effective dose and the RBE weighted absorbed dose to an organ or tissue for consideration in restricting further exposure in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency once these doses have been estimated.

I.4. Possible severe deterministic effects to a fetus can occur at an equivalent dose to the fetus (e.g. from external exposure) of greater than 100 mSv. Consequently, female workers who are aware that they are pregnant or who might be pregnant need to be (1) informed of this risk and (2) excluded from taking actions in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency that might result in an equivalent dose to the fetus exceeding 50 mSv for the full period of in utero development of the embryo and fetus.

1 TABLE I.1. GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY
2 WORKERS

Tasks	Guidance value ^a
Life saving actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $H_p(10)^b < 500 \text{ mSv}$ - $E^c < 500 \text{ mSv}$ - $AD_T^d < \frac{1}{2}AD_{T, \text{Table II.1}}^e$ <p>This value may be exceeded — with due consideration of the generic criteria in Table II.1 of Appendix II — under circumstances in which the expected benefits to others clearly outweigh the emergency worker's own health risks, and the emergency worker volunteers to take the action and understands and accepts these health risks</p>
Actions to prevent severe deterministic effects and actions to prevent the development of catastrophic conditions that could significantly affect people and the environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $H_p(10) < 500 \text{ mSv}$ - $E < 500 \text{ mSv}$ - $AD_T < \frac{1}{2}AD_{T, \text{Table II.1}}$
Actions to avert a large collective dose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $H_p(10) < 100 \text{ mSv}$ - $E < 100 \text{ mSv}$ - $AD_T < \frac{1}{10}AD_{T, \text{Table II.1}}$

^a. These values are set to be two to ten times lower than the generic criteria in Table II.1 of Appendix II and they apply for:

(a) the dose from external exposure to strongly penetrating radiation for $H_p(10)$. Doses from external exposure to weakly penetrating radiation and from intake or skin contamination need to be prevented by all possible means. If this is not feasible, the effective dose and the RBE weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ have to be limited to minimize the health risk to the individual in line with the risk associated with the guidance values given here; and

(b) the total dose E (effective dose) and the RBE weighted absorbed dose to an organ or tissue AD_T via all exposure pathways (i.e. both dose from external exposure and committed dose from intakes) which are to be estimated as early as possible in order to enable any further exposure to be restricted as appropriate.

^b. $H_p(10)$ is the personal dose equivalent $H_p(d)$ where $d = 10 \text{ mm}$.

^c. Effective dose.

^d. RBE weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ.

^e. Values of RBE weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ given in Table II.1 of Appendix II.

Appendix II

GENERIC CRITERIA FOR USE IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

II.1. This Appendix provides generic criteria:

- (a) at which protective actions and other response actions are expected to be undertaken in a nuclear or radiological emergency under any circumstances to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects;
- (b) at which protective actions and other response actions are expected to be taken, if they can be taken safely, in a nuclear or radiological emergency to reasonably reduce the risk of stochastic effects;
- (c) at which restriction of international trade is warranted in a nuclear or radiological emergency, with due consideration of non-radiological consequences;
- (d) for use as a target dose for the transition to an existing exposure situation.

Appendix II includes examples of associated protective actions and other response actions. These generic criteria and associated protective actions and other response actions shall be considered in the development of the protection strategy including national generic criteria in accordance with Req. 5. Careful consideration is necessary if protective actions in the context of the protection strategy are to be taken when doses are below the generic criteria in Table II.1 and Table II.2 in order to ensure that such actions are justified (i.e. do more good than harm) and are optimized in accordance with Req. 5.

1 **GENERIC CRITERIA FOR DOSES RECEIVED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME FOR**
2 **WHICH PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE**
3 **UNDERTAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE**

4 II.2. Table II.1 provides generic criteria for taking protective actions and other response actions in a
5 nuclear or radiological emergency to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects.

6 **TABLE II.1. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR DOSES RECEIVED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF**
7 **TIME FOR WHICH PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE**
8 **EXPECTED TO BE UNDERTAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO AVOID OR TO**
9 **MINIMIZE SEVERE DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS [8]**

Acute external exposure (< 10 h)		If the dose is projected: – Take precautionary urgent protective actions immediately (even under difficult conditions) to keep doses below the generic criteria; – Provide public information and warnings; – Carry out urgent decontamination.
$AD_{\text{red marrow}}^a$	1 Gy	
AD_{fetus}	0.1 ^b Gy	
AD_{tissue}^c	25 Gy at 0.5 cm	
AD_{skin}^d	10 Gy to 100 cm ²	
Acute internal exposure due to an acute intake ($\Delta = 30$ d^e)		If the dose has been received: – Perform immediate medical examination, consultation and indicated medical treatment; – Carry out contamination control; – Carry out immediate decorporation ^g (if applicable); – Conduct registration for longer term medical follow-up; – Provide comprehensive psychological counselling.
$AD(\Delta)_{\text{red marrow}}$	0.2 Gy for radionuclides with atomic number $Z \geq 90^f$	
	2 Gy for radionuclides with atomic number $Z \leq 89^f$	
$AD(\Delta)_{\text{thyroid}}$	2 Gy	
$AD(\Delta)_{\text{lung}}^h$	30 Gy	
$AD(\Delta)_{\text{colon}}$	20 Gy	
$AD(\Delta')_{\text{fetus}}^i$	0.1 ^b Gy	

10 ^a $AD_{\text{red marrow}}$ represents the average RBE weighted absorbed dose to internal tissues or organs (e.g. red
11 marrow, lung, small intestine, gonads, thyroid) and to the lens of the eye from exposure in a uniform field of
12 strongly penetrating radiation.

13 ^b At 0.1 Gy there would be only a very small probability of severe deterministic effects to the fetus and only
14 during certain periods post-conception (e.g. between 8 and 15 weeks of gestation age), and only if the dose is
15 received at high dose rates. During other periods post-conception and for lower dose rates, the fetus is less
16 sensitive. There is a high probability of severe deterministic effects at 1 Gy. Therefore, 1 Gy is used as the
17 generic criterion for doses to the fetus received within a short period of time: (i) in the hazard assessment (see
18 para. 4.23), to identify facilities and activities, on-site areas, off-site areas and locations for which a nuclear
19 or radiological emergency could warrant precautionary urgent protective actions to avoid or to minimize
20 severe deterministic effects; (ii) for identifying exposure situations that are ‘dangerous to health’; and (iii) for

1 making arrangements (see para. 5.36) for applying decisions on urgent protective actions and other response
2 actions to be taken off the site to avoid or to minimize the occurrence of severe deterministic effects (e.g.
3 establishing a precautionary action zone).

4 ^c Dose delivered to 100 cm^2 at a depth of 0.5 cm under the body surface in tissue due to close contact with a
5 radioactive source (e.g. source carried in the hand or pocket).

6 ^d The dose is to the 100 cm^2 dermis (skin structures at a depth of 40 mg/cm^2 (or 0.4 mm) below the surface).

7 ^e $AD(\Delta)$ is the RBE weighted absorbed dose delivered over a period of time Δ by the intake (I_{05}) that will result
8 in a severe deterministic effect in 5% of exposed individuals. This dose is calculated as described in
9 Appendix I of Ref. [20].

10 ^f Different generic criteria are used to take account of the significant difference in RBE weighted absorbed
11 dose from exposure at the intake threshold values specific for these two groups of radionuclides.

12 ^g Decorporation is the action of the biological processes, facilitated by chemical or biological agents, by means
13 of which incorporated radionuclides are removed from the human body. The generic criterion for
14 decorporation is based on the projected dose without decorporation.

15 ^h For the purposes of these generic criteria 'lung' means the alveolar-interstitial region of the respiratory tract.

16 ⁱ For this particular case, ' Δ ' means the period of in utero development of the embryo and fetus.

17

1 **GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS TO**
2 **REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS**

3 II.3. Table II.2 provides generic criteria for taking protective actions and other response actions to
4 reduce the risk of stochastic effects in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5 **TABLE II.2. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE**
6 **ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS**

Generic criteria		Examples of protective actions and other response actions ^a
Projected dose that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take urgent protective actions and other response actions		
H_{thyroid}	50 mSv ^b in the first 7 days	Iodine thyroid blocking ^c
E^d H_{fetus}^e	100 mSv in the first 7 days 100 mSv in the first 7 days	Sheltering ^f ; evacuation; prevention of inadvertent ingestion; restriction on food, milk and drinking water ^g and restriction on food chain and water supply; restriction on commodities other than food; contamination control; decontamination; registration; reassurance of the public
Projected dose that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take early protective actions and other response actions		
E^d H_{fetus}^e	100 mSv in the first year 100 mSv for the full period of in utero development	Temporary relocation; prevention of inadvertent ingestion; restriction on food, milk and drinking water ^g and restriction on food chain and water supply; restriction on commodities other than food; contamination control; decontamination; registration; reassurance of the public
Dose that has been received and that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take longer term medical actions to detect and to effectively treat radiation induced health effects		
E^d	100 mSv in a month	Health screening based on equivalent doses to specific radiosensitive organs (as a basis for longer term medical follow-up) ^h , registration, counselling
H_{fetus}^e	100 mSv for the full period of in utero development	Counselling to allow informed decisions to be made in individual circumstances

^a. These examples are neither exhaustive nor grouped in a mutually exclusive way.

^b. This generic criterion applies only for administration of iodine thyroid blocking. For the thyroid, iodine thyroid blocking is an urgent protective action that is prescribed: (a) if exposure due to radioactive iodine is involved, (b) before or shortly after a release of radioactive iodine, and (c) within only a short period before or after the intake of radioactive iodine.

^c. The equivalent dose to the thyroid (H_{thyroid}) only due to exposure to radioiodine.

- 1 d. Effective dose.
- 2 e. H_{fetus} is the equivalent dose to the fetus (set to the maximum committed equivalent dose to any organ)
- 3 from intake to the embryo or fetus for different chemical compounds and different times relative to
- 4 conception.
- 5 f. As a less disruptive protective action, sheltering may be implemented at lower doses as long as justified
- 6 and optimized in accordance with Req. 5 with due consideration of the reference level in para. 4.28(2).
- 7 g. Restrictions on food, milk and drinking water using these generic criteria are to be applied before
- 8 sampling and analysis of food, milk and drinking water are carried out. Such restrictions apply as long as
- 9 replacements of food, milk and drinking water or other alternatives are available to ensure they would not
- 10 result in severe malnutrition, dehydration or other severe health consequences.
- 11 h. When results of the screening indicate that the criteria in Table II.1 are exceeded, then appropriate
- 12 medical attention on the basis of Appendix II (see Table II.1) is necessary.
- 13

1 GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND OTHER
2 COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS

3 II.4. Table II.3 provides generic criteria for taking protective actions and other response actions to
4 reduce the risk of stochastic effects from the ingestion of food, milk and drinking water and from the
5 use of other commodities in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

6 II.5. A value of 1/10 of the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for early protective actions and other
7 response actions is established as generic criteria for restrictions on food, milk and drinking water and
8 other commodities to ensure that the dose via all exposure pathways, including ingestion, will not
9 exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for early protective actions and other response actions.

10 II.6. If restrictions on food, milk or drinking water would result in severe malnutrition or
11 dehydration because replacements are not available, food, milk or drinking water with concentration
12 levels of radionuclides that are projected to result in doses above the generic criteria given in Table
13 II.3 may be consumed until replacements are available; otherwise, the people affected may be
14 relocated, provided that this would not result in doses above the generic criteria given in Table II.1.

15 TABLE II.3. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND OTHER
16 COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS

Generic criteria		Examples of protective actions and other response actions
Projected dose from ingestion of food, milk and drinking water and from the use of other commodities that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take protective actions and other response actions		
E^a	10 mSv per annum	Restrict consumption, distribution and sale of non-essential ^b food, milk and drinking water ^d and restrict the use and distribution of other commodities. Replace essential food, milk and drinking water as soon as possible or relocate the people affected if replacements are not available. Estimate the doses of those who might have consumed food, milk and drinking water or used other commodities to determine whether this resulted in doses warranting medical attention in accordance with Table II.2.
H_{fetus}^c	10 mSv for the full period of in utero development	

17 ^{a.} Effective dose.

18 ^{b.} Restricting essential food, milk or drinking water could result in dehydration, severe malnutrition or
19 other severe health consequences; therefore, essential food, milk and drinking water is to be restricted
20 only if alternatives are available.

21 ^{c.} H_{fetus} is the equivalent dose to the fetus (set to the maximum committed equivalent dose to any organ)
22 from intake to the embryo or fetus for different chemical compounds and different times relative to
23 conception.

24 ^{d.} These criteria for taking actions on food, milk and drinking water are applied once the sampling and
25 analysis of food, milk and drinking water is carried out. This would also provide a basis for
26 discontinuing restrictions imposed on food, milk and drinking water as a precaution on the basis of the
27 generic criteria in Table II.2.

GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS

II.7. Table II.4 provides generic criteria for taking protective actions and other response actions to reduce the risk of stochastic effects arising from the use of vehicles, equipment and other items from an area affected by a nuclear or radiological emergency.

II.8. A value of 1/10 of the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for early protective actions and other response actions is established as a generic criterion for vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area, to ensure that the dose via all exposure pathways, including the use of such vehicles, equipment and other items, would not exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for early actions for a member of the public.

II.9. Restricting the use of vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area could interfere with taking urgent protective actions and other response actions or with providing services essential to public health or wellbeing (e.g. the transfer of patients requiring continuous specialized medical treatment, who would reach a final destination only once a ship or an aircraft has left the affected area). Such vehicles, equipment and other items whose use would give rise to a projected dose above the generic criteria given in Table II.4 may be used until replacements are available, provided that:

- (a) their use will not result in doses that exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.1 for members of the public or the guidance values given in Appendix I for restricting the exposure of emergency workers, or the restriction set in para. 5.54 for exposures of helpers in an emergency;
- (b) actions are taken to manage and control the dose to the user as an emergency worker, a helper in an emergency or a member of the public, as appropriate.

1 TABLE II.4. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO
 2 REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS

Generic criteria		Examples of protective actions and other response actions
Projected dose from the use of vehicles, equipment or other items from an affected area that exceed the following generic criteria: Take protective actions and other response actions.		
E^a	10 mSv per annum	Restrict non-essential ^b use.
H_{fetus}^c	10 mSv for the full period of in utero development	<p>Use essential vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area until replacements are available provided that: (a) their use will not result in doses exceeding the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for a member of the public or the guidance values given in Appendix I for restricting the exposure of emergency workers, and (b) actions are taken to control the dose to the user as an emergency worker, helper in an emergency or a member of the public, as appropriate.</p> <p>Estimate the exposure of those emergency workers, helpers in an emergency and members of the public who may have used a vehicle, equipment and other item from an affected area to determine whether this could have resulted in a dose warranting medical attention in accordance with Table II.2.</p>

a. Effective dose.

b. Restricting use of essential vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area could interfere with taking urgent protective actions and other response actions or with providing services essential to public health or wellbeing (e.g. the transfer of patients requiring continuous medical treatment).

c. H_{fetus} is the equivalent dose to the fetus (set to the maximum committed equivalent dose to any organ) from intake to the embryo or fetus for different chemical compounds and different times relative to conception.

GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD AND OTHER COMMODITIES TRADED INTERNATIONALLY

II.10. Table II.5 provides generic criteria aimed at the effective implementation of response actions to reduce the non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency by providing a basis for the continuation or the resumption of international trade.

II.11. Values that exceed the generic criteria in Table II.5 do not necessarily mean that food and other commodities are unsafe in terms of radiation induced health effects. Food and other commodities are to be considered unsafe only if the ingestion of food or the use of commodities would give rise to a projected dose that would exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.1 or Table II.2.

II.12 The generic criteria for food traded internationally derive from the level used by the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission [21]. These generic criteria, and generic criteria for other commodities traded internationally that could contain radionuclides following a nuclear or radiological emergency, are established at 1/100 of the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for early protective actions and other response actions to ensure that doses to the public would be a small fraction of those for which actions are warranted to reduce the risk of stochastic effects.

II.13. For food traded internationally that could contain radionuclides following a nuclear or radiological emergency, the operational criteria (i.e. guideline levels) as published by the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission [21] may ultimately be used (see para. 5.23 of Ref. [8]).

II.14. If restricting trade in food and other commodities could result in severe health impacts or other detrimental effects in another State, then the food and other commodities that would give rise to a projected dose that exceeds the generic criteria in Table II.5 may be traded if justified until replacements are available, provided that:

- (a) trade is approved with the receiving State;
- (b) trade will not result in doses that exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for the public;
- (c) actions are taken to manage and control the dose during shipping;
- (d) actions are taken to control the consumption and use of food and other commodities and to reduce the dose to members of the public.

1 TABLE II.5. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD AND OTHER COMMODITIES TRADED
 2 INTERNATIONALLY

Generic criteria		Examples of other response actions
Projected dose from food and other commodities that exceed the generic criteria: Take response actions to restrict international trade.		
E^a	1 mSv per annum	Restrict non-essential ^b international trade.
H_{fetus}^c	1 mSv for the full period of in utero development	Trade essential food and other commodities until replacements are available if: (a) trade is approved with the receiving State; (b) trade will not result in doses to the public that exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.2; (c) actions are taken to manage and control the dose during shipping; and (d) actions are taken to control the consumption and use of food and other commodities and to reduce the dose to members of the public.

3 ^{a.} Effective dose.

4 ^{b.} Restricting the trade of essential commodities and food could result in severe health impacts or other
 5 detrimental conditions in another State.

6 ^{c.} H_{fetus} is the equivalent dose to the fetus (set to the maximum committed equivalent dose to any organ)
 7 from intake to the embryo or fetus for different chemical compounds and different times relative to
 8 conception.

9

GENERIC CRITERIA FOR ENABLING TRANSITION TO AN EXISTING EXPOSURE SITUATION

II.15. Generic criteria shall be established in terms of the projected dose for the implementation of protective actions and other actions aimed at enabling the termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency through transition to an existing exposure situation with due consideration of, and verification of the fulfilment of, the conditions set in para. II.16. These criteria are established to 1/5¹ of the generic criteria for the early protective actions and other response actions given in Table II.2 and are:

- (a) an effective dose of 20 mSv per annum; and
- (b) an equivalent dose to a fetus of 20 mSv for the full period of utero development.

II.16. The decision to terminate the nuclear or radiological emergency and the concurrent transition to an existing exposure situation is to be taken after:

- (a) justified actions (see para. 4.29) have been taken to reach the generic criteria² for enabling transition to an existing exposure situation and it has been confirmed that further actions to reach these criteria would do more harm than good;
- (b) confirmation that the source of exposure is fully characterized for all members of the public living as normal in the area;
- (c) the exposure situation is understood and remains stable;
- (d) any restrictions on normal living conditions are limited and provisions are in place to confirm compliance with such restrictions;
- (e) confirmation that interested parties, including the public, have been consulted and are being kept informed about the basis for the adjustment and the transition, with the associated health hazards put into perspective (see para. 5.69).

¹ Criteria established to 1/5 of the generic criteria for the early protective actions and other response actions given in Table II.2 are considered to be generically justified. This is of the order of the dose for which the government is required to establish an action plan to reduce activity concentrations of sources of exposure (e.g. Rn-222) for the existing exposure situation [8]. Being at the lower bound of the reference level for an emergency exposure situation (see para. 4.28), this level is also consistent with the reference levels established in Ref. [8] for both emergency exposure situations and existing exposure situations.

² Actions taken (see para. 4.29) to reach the generic criteria in para. II.15 need to be justified and optimized in accordance with Req. 5. However, it may not be feasible to reach these criteria for enabling the transition to an existing exposure situation. If not feasible or justified to reach these generic criteria, the transition may still be enabled as long as the generic criteria for early protective actions and other response actions given in Table II.2 are not exceeded.

DRAFT

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Annex

APPLICABILITY OF PARAGRAPHS IN THIS PUBLICATION BY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORY

A-1. Table A-1 presents the applicability of paragraphs in this publication by emergency preparedness category.

**TABLE A-1. APPLICABILITY OF PARAGRAPHS IN THIS PUBLICATION BY EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS CATEGORY**

Category	Paragraphs applicable in this publication				
I					6.23, 6.25
II	1.1-1.6 2.1-2.8 3.1-3.2 4.1-4.20, 4.22-4.29	5.5, 5.14-5.17, 5.23- 5.24, 5.26	5.2-5.3, 5.25, 5.27, 5.32, 5.39-5.40, 5.62 6.29	5.4, 5.9, 5.12, 5.36-5.38, 5.42-5.43, 5.63, 5.73-5.74 6.11	
III	5.1, 5.6-5.8, 5.11, 5.18-5.20, 5.22, 5.31, 5.34-	6.19-6.20	4.21		
IV	5.35, 5.45-5.58, 5.61, 5.64-5.72, 5.76-5.77, 5.79-5.102 6.1-6.10, 6.12-6.18, 6.21-6.22, 6.24, 6.26-6.28, 6.30-6.38		5.10, 5.13, 5.28, 5.29-5.30, 5.33, 5.41, 5.59-5.60, 5.78	5.44	/
V		5.9, 5.12, 5.21, 5.37-5.38, 5.42-5.43, 5.63, 5.73-5.74			

DEFINITIONS

*The following definitions apply for the purposes of these Standards.
Further definitions are provided in the IAEA Safety Glossary: Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety
and Radiation Protection (2007 Edition), IAEA, Vienna (2007):
<http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/safety-glossary.asp>*

The symbol ‘①’ denotes an information note; this note is not part of the definition.

*Those terms that are defined in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3 have been indicated
with *.*

*New and revised definitions have been indicated with **.
Terms that are not marked are as defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary: Terminology Used in Nuclear
Safety and Radiation Protection (2007 Edition), IAEA, Vienna (2007) or as defined in the referenced
publication of the Nuclear Security Series.*

arrangements

See (emergency) arrangements.

authorization*

The granting by a regulatory body or other governmental body of written permission for a
person or organization to conduct specified activities.

control*

The function or power or (usually as controls) means of directing, regulating or restraining.

① It should be noted that the usual meaning of the English word control in safety related contexts
is somewhat ‘stronger’ (more active) than that of its usual translations and other similar words
in some other languages. For example, ‘control’ typically implies not only checking or
monitoring something but also ensuring that corrective or enforcement measures are taken if
the results of the checking or monitoring indicate such a need. This is in contrast, for example,
to the more limited usage of the equivalent word in French and Spanish.

regulatory control. Any form of control or regulation applied to facilities and activities by a
regulatory body for reasons relating to nuclear safety and radiation protection or to nuclear
security.

① In nuclear security series [11], the phrase ‘out of regulatory control’ is used to describe a
situation in which nuclear material or other radioactive material is present without an
appropriate authorization, either because controls have failed for some reason, or because they
never existed.

dangerous source

See source.

deterministic effect*

A health effect of radiation for which generally a threshold level of dose exists above which the severity of the effect is greater for a higher dose.

① The level of the threshold dose is characteristic of the particular health effect but may also depend, to a limited extent, on the exposed individual. Examples of deterministic effects include erythema and acute radiation syndrome (radiation sickness).

① Such an effect is described as a severe deterministic effect if it is fatal or life threatening or results in a permanent injury that reduces quality of life.

① Deterministic effects are also referred to as 'harmful tissue reactions'.

early protective actions**

See protective actions.

emergency*

A non-routine situation or event that necessitates prompt action, primarily to mitigate a hazard or adverse consequences for human health and safety, quality of life, property or the environment. This includes nuclear and radiological emergencies and conventional emergencies such as fires, release of hazardous chemicals, storms or earthquakes. It includes situations for which prompt action is warranted to mitigate the effects of a perceived hazard.

nuclear or radiological emergency. An emergency in which there is, or is perceived to be, a hazard due to:

- 1) The energy resulting from a nuclear chain reaction or from the decay of the products of a chain reaction; or
- 2) Radiation exposure.

! When used in IAEA publications, the term radiation normally refers only to ionizing radiation. The IAEA has no statutory responsibilities in relation to non-ionizing radiation.

emergency action level (EAL)*

A specific, predetermined, observable criterion used to detect, recognize and determine the emergency class.

(emergency) arrangements*

The integrated set of infrastructural elements necessary to provide the capability for performing a specified function or task required in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These elements may include authorities and responsibilities, organization, coordination, personnel, plans, procedures, facilities, equipment or training.

emergency class*

A set of conditions that warrant a similar immediate emergency response.

- ① This is the term used for communicating to the response organizations and to members of the public the level of response needed. The events that belong to a given emergency class are defined by criteria specific to the installation, source or practice, which, if exceeded, indicate classification at the prescribed level. For each emergency class, the initial actions of the response organizations are predefined.

emergency classification

The process whereby an authorized official classifies an emergency in order to declare the applicable emergency class.

- ① Upon declaration of the emergency class, the response organizations initiate the predefined response actions for that emergency class.

emergency exposure situation*

An emergency exposure situation is a situation of exposure that arises as a result of an accident, a malicious act, or any other unexpected event, and requires prompt action in order to avoid or reduce adverse consequences.

- ① Emergency exposures can be reduced only by protective actions and other response actions.

emergency plan*

A description of the objectives, policy and concept of operations for the response to an emergency and of the structure, authorities and responsibilities for a systematic, coordinated and effective response. The emergency plan serves as the basis for the development of other plans, procedures and checklists.

- ① A *concept of operations* is a brief description of the ideal response to a postulated nuclear or radiological emergency, used to ensure that all those involved in the development of a capability for emergency response share a common understanding.

emergency planning distance**

See extended planning distance (EPD) and ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD).

emergency planning zone

See precautionary action zone (PAZ) and urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ).

emergency planning zones and distances**

See precautionary action zone (PAZ), urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ), extended planning distance (EPD) and ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD).

emergency preparedness**

The capability to take actions that will effectively mitigate the consequences of an emergency for human life, health, property and the environment.

emergency procedures*

A set of instructions describing in detail the actions to be taken by emergency workers in an emergency.

emergency response**

The performance of actions to mitigate the consequences of an emergency for human life, health, property and the environment. It may also provide a basis for the resumption of normal social and economic activity.

emergency (response) action**

An action to be taken in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency to mitigate the impact of an emergency on human health and safety, property or the environment.

① Emergency response actions comprise protective actions and other response actions.

Other response action. An action to be taken in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency that is not a protective action.

① The most common other response actions are: medical examination, consultation and treatment; registration and longer term medical follow-up; providing comprehensive psychological counselling; public information and other actions to mitigate non-radiological consequences and for public reassurance.

emergency response facility or location**

Facility or location needed for supporting an emergency response, to which specific functions are assigned at the preparedness stage and which need to be usable under emergency conditions.

① There are two different types of emergency response facilities or locations: those established in advance (e.g. technical support centre for nuclear power plants) and those established at the time of an emergency (e.g. medical screening and triage area).

① Depending on the emergency preparedness category and on the nature of an emergency, an emergency response facility may be an emergency response location.

emergency services

The local off-site response organizations that are generally available and that perform emergency response functions. These may include police, fire fighters and rescue brigades, ambulance services and control teams for hazardous materials.

emergency worker*

A person having specified duties as a worker in response to an emergency.

① Emergency workers may include workers employed, both directly and indirectly, by registrants and licensees as well as personnel of responding organizations, such as police officers, firefighters, medical personnel, and drivers and crews of evacuation vehicles.

① Emergency workers may or may not be designated as such in advance to an emergency. Emergency workers not designated as such in advance to an emergency, are not necessarily workers prior to the emergency.

existing exposure situation*

An existing exposure situation is a situation of exposure that already exists when a decision on the need for control needs to be taken.

① Existing exposure situations include exposure to natural background radiation that is amenable to control; exposure due to residual radioactive material that arose from past practices that were never subject to regulatory control or exposure due to residual radioactive material arising from a nuclear or radiological emergency after an emergency exposure situation has been declared to be ended.

extended planning distance (EPD)**

A distance around a facility for the area within which arrangements are made following declaration of a general emergency to conduct monitoring and to identify areas warranting response actions to be taken off the site within a period following the significant release that would allow to effectively reduce the risk of stochastic effects among members of the public.

① The area within EPD serves for planning purposes and may not be the actual area in which monitoring is to be conducted to identify where early protective actions such as relocation are necessary. While efforts need to be made at the preparedness stage to prepare for taking effectively early protective actions within this area, the actual area will be determined by the prevailing conditions during an emergency. As a precaution, some urgent actions may be warranted within EPD to reduce the risk of stochastic effects among members of the public.

facilities and activities*

A general term encompassing nuclear facilities, uses of all sources of ionizing radiation, all radioactive waste management activities, transport of radioactive material and any other practice or circumstances in which people may be subject to exposure to radiation from naturally occurring or artificial sources.

① Facilities includes: nuclear facilities; irradiation installations; some mining and raw material processing facilities such as uranium mines; radioactive waste management facilities; and any other places where radioactive material is produced, processed, used, handled, stored or disposed of — or where radiation generators are installed — on such a scale that consideration of protection and safety is required.

① Activities includes: the production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial, research and medical purposes; the transport of radioactive material; the decommissioning of

facilities; radioactive waste management activities such as the discharge of effluents; and some aspects of the remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities.

① This term is intended to provide an alternative to the terminology of sources and practices (or intervention) to refer to general categories of situations. For example, a practice may involve many different facilities and/or activities, whereas the general definition (1) of source is too broad in some cases: a facility or activity might constitute a source, or might involve the use of many sources, depending upon the interpretation used.

① The term facilities and activities is very general, and includes those for which little or no regulatory control may be necessary or achievable: the more specific terms authorized facility and authorized activity should be used to distinguish those facilities and activities for which any form of authorization has been given.

① In the Fundamental Safety Principles (Safety Fundamentals), the term ‘facilities and activities — existing and new — utilized for peaceful purposes’ is abbreviated for convenience to facilities and activities as a general term encompassing any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from naturally occurring or artificial sources (see Ref. [1], para. 1.9).

first responders

The first members of an emergency service to respond at the scene of an emergency.

generic criteria**

Levels for the projected dose or the received dose at which protective actions and other response actions are to be taken.

graded approach*

- 1) For a system of control, such as a regulatory system or a safety system, a process or method in which the stringency of the control measures and conditions to be applied is commensurate, to the extent practicable, with the likelihood and possible consequences of, and the level of risk associated with, a loss of control.
- 2) An application of safety requirements that is commensurate with the characteristics of the practice or source and with the magnitude and likelihood of the exposures.

hazard assessment**

Assessment of hazards associated with facilities, activities or sources within or beyond the borders of a State in order to identify:

- (a) Those events and the associated areas for which protective actions and other response actions may be required within the State;
- (b) The actions that would be effective in mitigating the consequences of such events.

helpers in an emergency**

Members of the public who willingly and voluntarily help in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency.

- ① Helpers in an emergency are aware that they may be exposed to radiation while helping in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency.

ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD)**

A distance around a facility for the area within which arrangements are made to take effective response actions following the declaration of a general emergency in order to reduce the risk for stochastic effects among members of the public and to mitigate the non-radiological consequences as a result of distribution, sale and consumption of food, milk and drinking water and of use of commodities other than food that may have contamination from the significant release.

- ① The area within ICPD serves for planning purposes to prepare for implementation of response actions to monitor and control commodities including food either for domestic use or for international trade. The actual area will be determined by the prevailing conditions during an emergency. As a precaution, some urgent actions may be warranted within ICPD to prevent ingestion of food, milk or drinking water and to prevent use of commodities that may have been contaminated following the significant release.

inner cordoned off area**

An area established by the first responders around source of a potential radiation hazard within which protective actions and other response actions are recommended to be taken to protect the first responders and the public from possible external exposure and contamination.

interested party*

A person, company, etc., with a concern or interest in the activities and performance of an organization, business, system, etc.

- ① The term interested party is used in a broad sense to mean a person or group having an interest in the performance of an organization. Those who can influence events may effectively become interested parties — whether their ‘interest’ is regarded as ‘genuine’ or not — in the sense that their views need to be considered. Interested parties have typically included the following: customers, owners, operators, employees, suppliers, partners, trade unions; the regulated industry or professionals; scientific bodies; governmental agencies or regulatory bodies (national, regional and local) whose responsibilities may cover nuclear energy; the media; members of the public (individuals, community groups and interest groups); and other States, especially neighbouring States that have entered into agreements providing for an exchange of information concerning possible transboundary impacts, or States involved in the export or import of certain technologies or materials.

management system*

A set of interrelated or interacting elements (the system) for establishing policies and objectives and enabling the objectives to be achieved in an efficient and effective manner.

① The component parts of the management system include the organizational structure, resources and organizational processes. Management is defined (in ISO 9000) as coordinated activities to direct and control an organization.

① The management system integrates all elements of an organization into one coherent system to enable all of the organization's objectives to be achieved. These elements include the organizational structure, resources and processes. Personnel, equipment and organizational culture as well as the documented policies and processes are parts of the management system. The organization's processes have to address the totality of the requirements on the organization as established in, for example, IAEA safety standards and other international codes and standards.

non-radiological consequences**

Adverse psychological, social or economic consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency or of the response to an emergency that have effects on human life, health, property or the environment.

notification

(1) A report submitted promptly to a national or international authority providing details of an emergency or a possible emergency; for example, as required by the Convention of Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident [12].

(2) A set of actions taken upon detection of emergency conditions with the purpose of alerting all organizations with responsibility for emergency response in the event of such conditions.

notification point

A designated organization with which arrangements have been made to receive notification (meaning (2)) and to initiate promptly predetermined actions to activate a part of the emergency response.

notifying State

The State that is responsible for notifying (see notification (1)) potentially affected States and the IAEA of an event of actual, potential or perceived radiological significance for other States.

① This includes:

(1) The State Party that has jurisdiction or control over the facility or activity (including space objects) in accordance with Article 1 of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident [12]; or

(2) The State that initially detects, or discovers evidence of, a transnational emergency, for example by: detecting significant increases in atmospheric radiation levels of unknown origin; detecting

contamination in transboundary shipments; discovering a dangerous source that may have originated in another State; or diagnosing clinical symptoms that may have resulted from exposure outside the State.

nuclear or radiological emergency

See emergency.

nuclear security*

The prevention and detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities.

nuclear security event

An event that has potential or actual implications for nuclear security that must be addressed [2].

- ① Nuclear security event includes events that are criminal or intentional unauthorized act and unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities and associated activities. Examples of such events include a sabotage, a radiological dispersal device or radiological exposure device etc. and threat thereof.

off-site (area)

See site (area).

on-site (area)

See site (area).

operational criteria**

Values of measurable quantities or observables to be used during the response in a nuclear or radiological emergency in order to determine the need for appropriate protective actions and other response actions.

- ① These include operational intervention levels (OILs), emergency action levels (EALs), specific observables and other indicators of conditions on the site. The operational criteria are sometimes referred to as triggers.

operational intervention level (OIL)*

A set level of a measurable quantity that corresponds to a generic criterion.

- ① Operational intervention levels are typically expressed in terms of dose rates or of activity of radioactive material released, time integrated air concentrations, ground or surface concentrations, or activity concentrations of radionuclides in environmental, food or water samples. An operational intervention levels is a type of action level that is used immediately and directly (without further assessment) to determine the appropriate protective actions on the basis of an environmental measurement.

1 **operating organization**

2 Any organization or person applying for authorization or authorized and/or responsible for
3 nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste or transport safety when undertaking activities or in relation to
4 any nuclear facilities or sources of ionizing radiation. This includes, inter alia, private individuals,
5 governmental bodies, consignors or carriers, licensees, hospitals, self-employed persons, etc.

6 ① Operator includes either those who are directly in control of a facility or an activity during use
7 of a source (such as radiographers or carriers) or, in the case of a source not under control
8 (such as a lost or illicitly removed source or a re-entering satellite), those who were responsible
9 for the source before control over it was lost.

10 **operating personnel**

11 Individual workers engaged in operation of an authorized facility or conduct of an authorized
12 activity.

13 **planned exposure situation***

14 A planned exposure situation is a situation of exposure that arises from the planned operation
15 of a source or from a planned activity that results in an exposure from a source.

16 ① Since provision for protection and safety can be made before embarking on the activity
17 concerned, associated exposures and their probabilities of occurrence can be restricted from
18 the outset. The primary means of controlling exposure in planned exposure situations is by
19 good design of installations, equipment and operating procedures. In planned exposure
20 situations, a certain level of exposure is expected to occur.

21 **precautionary action zone (PAZ)****

22 An area around a facility for which arrangements have been made to take urgent protective
23 actions in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency to avoid or to minimize severe
24 deterministic effects off the site. Protective actions within this area are to be taken before or shortly
25 after a release of radioactive material or exposure on the basis of the prevailing conditions at the
26 facility.

27 **preparedness stage****

28 The stage prior to a nuclear or radiological emergency at which arrangements for an effective
29 emergency response are established.

30 **projected dose***

31 The dose that would be expected to be received if planned protective actions were not taken.

1 **protective action***

2 An action for the purposes of avoiding or reducing doses that might otherwise be received in
3 an emergency exposure situation or an existing exposure situation.

4 **early protective action****. A protective action in the event of a nuclear or radiological
5 emergency that can be implemented within days to weeks and still be effective.

6 ① The most common early protective actions are relocation and longer term
7 restrictions on consuming food with contamination.

8 **mitigatory action***. Immediate action by the operator or other party:

9 (a) To reduce the potential for conditions to develop that would result in exposure or a
10 release of radioactive material requiring emergency response actions on or off the site; or

11 (b) To mitigate source conditions that may result in *exposure* or a release of radioactive
12 material requiring emergency response actions on or off the site.

13 **urgent protective action***. A protective action in the event of an emergency which must be
14 taken promptly (usually within hours to a day) in order to be effective, and the effectiveness of
15 which will be markedly reduced if it is delayed.

16 ① Urgent protective actions include iodine thyroid blocking, evacuation, short term sheltering,
17 actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion, decontamination of individuals and prevention of
18 ingestion of food, milk or water possibly with contamination.

19 ① The urgent protective actions which must be taken before or shortly after a release of
20 radioactive material, or before an exposure, on the basis of the prevailing conditions to avoid
21 or to minimize the risk of severe deterministic effects are referred to as precautionary urgent
22 protective actions.

23 **radiological assessor****

24 A person or team who in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency assists the operator
25 or off-site response organizations by performing radiation surveys, performing dose assessments,
26 controlling contamination, ensuring the radiation protection of emergency workers and formulating
27 recommendations on protective actions and other response actions.

28 **regulatory body***

29 An authority or a system of authorities designated by the government of a State as having
30 legal authority for conducting the regulatory process, including issuing authorizations, and thereby
31 regulating nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety.

32 ① The national competent authority for the regulation of radioactive material transport safety is
33 included in this description.

1 **representative person***

2 An individual receiving a dose that is representative of the doses to the more highly exposed
3 individuals in the population.

4 ① ICRP Publication 101 indicates that the dose to the representative person “is the equivalent of,
5 and replaces, the mean dose in the ‘critical group’”, and provides guidance on assessing doses
6 to the representative person. The concept of critical group remains valid.

7 **residual dose***

8 The dose expected to be incurred after protective actions have been terminated (or a decision
9 has been taken not to implement protective actions).

10 ① This applies in an existing exposure situation or an emergency exposure situation.

11 **response organization***

12 An organization designated or otherwise recognized by a State as being responsible for
13 managing or implementing any aspect of an emergency response.

14 ① This also includes those organizations necessary to support the management and/or
15 implementation of an emergency response, such as meteorological services.

16 **site (area)****

17 A geographical area that contains an authorized facility, authorized activity or source within
18 which the management of the authorized facility or authorized activity or first responders may directly
19 initiate emergency response actions.

20 ① This is typically the area within the security perimeter fence or other designated property
21 marker. It may also be the controlled area around a radiography source or an inner cordoned
22 off area established by first responders around a suspected hazard.

23 **On-site (area).** (Area) within the site area.

24 **Off-site (area).** (Area) outside the site area.

25 **source***

26 1. Anything that may cause *radiation exposure* - such as by emitting *ionizing radiation* or by
27 releasing *radioactive material* - and can be treated as a single entity for *protection and safety*
28 purposes.

29 ① For example, a sterilization gamma irradiation unit is a source for the practice of radiation
30 preservation of food and sterilization of other products; an X ray unit may be a source for the
31 practice of radiodiagnosis; a nuclear power plant is part of the practice of generating electricity
32 by nuclear fission, and may be regarded as a source (e.g. with respect to discharges to the
33 environment) or as a collection of sources (e.g. for occupational radiation protection purposes).

A complex or multiple installation situated at one location or site may, as appropriate, be considered a single source for the purposes of application of international safety standards.

2. *Radioactive material* used as a *source* of *radiation*.

- ① Such as those sources used for medical applications or in industrial instruments. These are, of course, *sources* as defined in (1), but this usage is less general.

dangerous source. A *source* that could, if not under *control*, give rise to *exposure* sufficient to cause *severe deterministic effects*. This categorization is used for determining the need for *emergency arrangements* and is not to be confused with categorizations of *sources* for other purposes.

- ① The term *dangerous source* relates to dangerous quantities of radioactive material (D-values) recommended in Ref. [20].

radioactive source. A *source* containing radioactive *material* that is used as a source of radiation.

special facility

A facility for which predetermined facility specific actions need to be taken if urgent protective actions are ordered in its locality in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency.

- ① Examples include chemical plants that cannot be evacuated until certain actions have been taken to prevent fire or explosions and telecommunications centres that must be staffed in order to maintain local telephone services.

special population groups

Members of the public for whom special arrangements are necessary in order for effective protective actions to be taken in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Examples include disabled persons, hospital patients and prisoners.

stochastic effect*

A radiation induced health effect, the probability of occurrence of which is greater for a higher radiation dose and the severity of which (if it occurs) is independent of dose.

- ① Stochastic effects may be somatic effects or hereditary effects, and generally occur without a threshold level of dose. Examples include solid cancer and leukaemia.

transient population groups

Those members of the public who are residing for a short period of time (days to weeks) in a location (such as a camping ground) that can be identified in advance. This does not include members of the public who may be travelling through an area.

transnational emergency

A nuclear or radiological emergency of actual, potential or perceived radiological significance for more than one State.

① This may include:

(1) A significant transboundary release of radioactive material (however, a transnational emergency does not necessarily imply a significant transboundary release of radioactive material);

(2) A general emergency at a facility or other event that could result in a significant transboundary release (atmospheric or aquatic) of radioactive material;

(3) A discovery of the loss or illicit removal of a dangerous source that has been transported across or is suspected of having been transported across a national border;

(4) An emergency resulting in significant disruption to international trade or travel;

(5) An emergency warranting the taking of protective actions for foreign nationals or embassies in the State in which it occurs;

(6) An emergency resulting in or potentially resulting in severe deterministic effects and involving a fault and/or problem (such as in equipment or software) that could have serious implications for safety internationally;

(7) An emergency resulting in or potentially resulting in great concern among the population of more than one State owing to the actual or perceived radiological hazard.

significant transboundary release

A release of radioactive material to the environment that may result in doses or levels of contamination beyond national borders from the release which exceed generic criteria for protective actions and other response actions, including food restrictions and restrictions on commerce.

urgent protective action

See protective action.

urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ)

An area around a facility for which arrangements have been made to take urgent protective actions in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency to avert doses off the site in accordance with international safety standards. Protective actions within this area are to be taken on the basis of environmental monitoring — or, as appropriate, prevailing conditions at the facility.

warning point**

A designated organization to act as a point of contact that is staffed or able to be alerted at all times for promptly responding to, or initiating a response to, an incoming notification (meaning (1)) warning message, request for assistance or request for verification of a message, as appropriate, from the IAEA.

1 **worker***

2 Any person who works, whether full time, part time or temporarily, for an employer and who
3 has recognized rights and duties in relation to occupational radiation protection.

4 ① A self-employed person is regarded as having the duties of both an employer and a worker.

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CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW

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DRAFT