WNA/CORDEL Comments on: DS 446 Commissioning for NPP, Draft 5 27 May 2011

		COMMENTS BY REV	VIEWER			RESOLUTIO	ON
		act: Irina Borysova [borysova@world-nucle	<u> </u>				
Count	ry/Organ	ization: WNA/CORDEL	Date: 27 M	ay 2011			
Com. No.	Para/ Line	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
NO.	No.				as follows		J. S.
1	1.01	1.1 This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It supplements and elaborates on Section 4 of Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation [1] on safety requirements for the commissioning of nuclear power plants. It is based on the IAEA Safety Standard for "Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation" [1] and it concretizes the respective specific safety requirements on commissioning due to recommendations of cumulated best practice. This Safety Guide is a revision of replaces the IAEA Safety Guide on Commissioning for Nuclear Power Plants which was issued in 2003 as Safety Series No. NS-G-2.9.	The new relevant reference (Specific Safety Requirements, SSR 2/2) which will be published soon to replace NS-R-2 (2000) should be referred here. Further IAEA Safety Standards, e.g. SSG-12 "Licensing Process for Nuclear Installations", (2010), should be considered avoiding repetitions or inconsistencies and it should be	Accepted (This Guide has not published yet)			
			mentioned in the reference list.				

Com.	Para/	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted,	Rejected	Reason for
No.	Line				but modified		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
2	1.02	1.2 The revision of the Safety Series	The whole para. 1.2	Accepted			
		publication No. NS-G-2.9 process was	should be revised	(This Guide has			
		eonducted according also oriented to the	considering the	not			
,		following:	relevant	published			
		• the technical content of the original	requirements in the	yet)			
		Safety Guide was kept largely	new SSR 2/2 and if				
		unchanged and updated where	necessary additional				
		necessary;	particularities.				
3	2.03	2.2 The commissioning has the chiestine		Accepted			
3	2.03	2.3 The commissioning has the objective to demonstrate that the NPP as		Accepted			
		constructed meets the design					
		requirements and the safety requirements					
		as described in the safety analysis report.					
		For the achievement of future safe and					
		reliable operation of the plant, the					
		commissioning process should also					
		allow:		P			
1		• to validate those operating and					
		surveillance procedures for which the					
		commissioning tests provide					
		representative activities and					
		conditions.					
		• to verify by trial use, to the extent					
		practical, that the facility operating	·				
		procedures and the emergency					
		procedures are adequate.					
		• to familiarise the NPP's operating,					
		maintenance and technical staff with					

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		the operation and management of the power plant.					
4	2.04	COMMISSIONING PROGRAMME	The entire part "COMMISSIONING PROGRAMME" should be compared and adjusted to be adequate to SSR 2/2, Section 6: Requirement 25: "Commissioning programme", "The operating organization shall ensure that a commissioning programme is developed and implemented." and the further detailed requirements described in para. 6.1 to 6.15.	Accepted (This Guide has not published yet)			

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No.	Line No.				as follows		modification/rejection
5	2.08	2.8 The commissioning programme should be structured so as to ensure that: - milestones where the regulatory body authorization are is required to proceed in the process of commissioning		Accepted			
6	2.15	2.15 The commissioning programme should be prepared in the frame of the existing Management System giving proper consideration of to all management aspects.		Accepted			
7	2.27	2.27 For multiunit sites the following provision should be taken: c. Special provision should be made to ensure that the safety of a unit already in operation is not jeopardized in the commissioning tests of another unit. Such provisions should include conducting a hazard assessment and obtaining the prior approval (if required) of the regulatory body, in accordance with national practices and specific written approval from the manager responsible for the operating unit.	This statement needs to be softened in order to be compatible with different national regulations.	Accepted			
8	3.21	3.21 The responsibilities of the operating organization should include: — — to arrange for the required submissions to the regulatory	This statement needs to be introduced in order to be flexible with different national	Accepted			

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		body at the approved stages hold points and milestones and to comply with its requirements, in accordance with national practices;	regulations.				
9	3.22	3.22 In discharging these responsibilities, various methods may be adopted by the management of the operating organization. The essential tasks in achieving the necessary coordination are as follows: — — to make available, since-from the start of commissioning phase, operating, maintenance and technical staff for their familiarization with the operation and management of the NPP;		Accepted			
10	3.32	3.32 The responsibilities of the construction group in relation to the commissioning process should include the following: — — to provide, for use as baseline data, as-built documentation of installation construction and test certificates, highlighting design changes	Point was missed	Accepted			

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No.	Line				but modified as follows		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
		and concessions;					
		— Ensure that <u>configuration</u>					
		control is maintained and that					
		the effected system design					
		<u>basis</u> <u>documentation</u>					
		(including the FSAR (as					
		required)) has been updated to					
		reflect any design changes					
		and/or concessions.					
		— to transfer the installed					
		systems to the commissioning					
		group using a system of					
		documents such as transfer					
		certificates;					
		—					
11	3.34	3.34 The responsibilities of the	Issue was missed.	Accepted			
		operating group at the plant in relation to	According to SSR				
		commissioning should be as follows:	2/1 (safety				
			requirements on				
		— to establish and implement a	design of NPPs),				
		procedure for the systematic	e.g. chapter 2, a				
		recording of plant data as	formal process				
		results of commissioning tests	should be installed				
		;	to maintain the				
		— Establish and implement a	integrity of the				
		<u>procedure</u> <u>including</u>	plant design				
		organisational responsibility	throughout its				
		to maintain plant design and	lifetime controlled				
		configuration control over the	by a formally				

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	No.				as follows		
		operating life of the plant	designated entity				
		(concept of maintaining the	within the operating				
		integrity of plant design). This	organization taking				
		<u>includes</u> maintaining the	the responsibility.				
		safety analysis report current					
		and up to date.					
12	3.44	3.44 Concerning the responsibility of the		Accepted			
		commissioning group to repeat testing of					
		systems that have been commissioned					
		initially as partially installed, the					
		<u>following should be considered</u> :					
13	3.45	3.45 The following particular aspects			Accepted		
		should be considered in relation to the			Delimitation means		
		interface between commissioning and			distribution		
		operating activities:					
		provisions in the definition of					
		role, functions and					
		delimitation delineation of					
		responsibilities of operating					
		group and commissioning					
		group before transfer of					
		structures, systems and					
		components for operation					
14	3.49	3.49 The regulatory body should		Accepted			
		prepare a programme of review and					
		assessment of the commissioning					
		process. Before the start of					
		commissioning, the regulatory body					
		should review and approve the					

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		commissioning programme as required by national practice. Where appropriate, hold points should be established in order to assess test results before regulatory authorization is given to proceed as required by national practice.					
15	3.50	3.50 Before authorizing the loading of nuclear fuel or initial criticality, the regulatory body should complete as appropriate the review and assessment of such aspects as: — — the adequacy of the arrangements for physical protection important to safety;	Clarification is needed. Is this a recommendation to ensure adequate arrangements for physical security of the plant against potential terrorist threats and to safeguard the new and spent nuclear fuel? If that is not what this bullet means then that needs to be added to this list.	Accepted			
16	3.54	3.54 The most important transfer of responsibility is the transfer of responsibility for safety and security. Special care should be taken to ensure that responsibilities for personnel, plant and safety and security are clearly		Accepted			

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	NO.	defined and rest with the appropriate organization. From the time of the arrival of nuclear fuel at the site, responsibility for safety_and_security_should rest with the operating organization.					
17	3.55	3.55 Responsibility for systems should be transferred gradually to the operating group as soon as the testing has been performed and results approved before the introduction of fissile and radioactive material (pre-nuclear), tests have been performed and the results approved. In this way operating personnel can carry out the inspection prior to acceptance in a thorough manner. Some systems (e.g. electrical systems) may be transferred, to operating personnel with responsibilities for operation only before the pre-nuclear tests have been performed and the results approved.		Accepted			
18	3.57	3.57 The following documentation should be included in the acceptance package for each system: — — acceptance packages from the construction (including welding inspection records);		Accepted			
19	3.60	3.60 A licensee should have human resource planning process in place to		Accepted			

Com. No.	Para/ Line	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
	No.	ensure adequacy of organization during commissioning. This includes the			us follows		
		planning of the organization and raising the competences competency of the staff during the commissioning. Adequacy of					
		organization and <u>competences</u> <u>staff</u> <u>competency</u> needs to be assessed <u>in-on a</u> continuous bases.					
20	3.61	3.61 The licensee organization might be a mix of own staff and a group of consultants. Licensee should have a systematic processes in place to train and monitor consultants. It is especially important to ensure that consultants have adequate competency from a nuclear know-how point of view.		Accepted			
21	3.66	3.66 A training programme should be developed to cover these aspects. The subjects that should be considered are: — — nuclear safety, industrial safety, fire protection, and radiation protection; and security;		Accepted			
22	3.69	3.69 The training programme and trainees should be subject to periodic assessment, the results of which should be passed on to the commissioning manager and supervisors.		Accepted			

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No.	Line	_			but modified		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
23	3.77	3.77 The self-assessment of		Accepted			
		management should be implemented by					
		the operating organization in order to					
		evaluate the effectiveness of the					
		performance of the commissioning					
		programme in all areas for which the					
		management has responsibility. The					
		purpose of management self-assessment					
		should be to evaluate known performance					
		issues, to identify management aspects					
		contributing to these issues and to make					
1		improvements. Guidelines for the					
		conduct of of themanagement self-					
		assessment of management can be found					
		in Ref. [GS-R-3], and further details are					
		in Ref. [GS-G-3.1].					
24	3.80	3.80 The operating organization should		Accepted			
		take the necessary action to remedy, in a					
		timely manner, any deficiencies revealed					
		in the assessment process.					
25	3.81	3.81 The provision of a consistent		Accepted			
		process for the management of non-					
		conformances is a requirement of all					
		safety management systems, and the					
		process applies to the failure of					
		components to meet their specified					
		performance requirements and for larger					
		systems to meet the <u>ir</u> requirements from					
		the safety analysis or other performance					

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		specifications. A robust system for recording and resolving non-conformances and for approving concessions, corrective and preventative actions is necessary. Refer to [GS-R-3] and [GS-G-3.1] for further information.					
26	3.82	Experience Feedback of Experience from Commissioning 3.82 The commissioning phase yields much information that should		Accepted			
27	3.89	3.89 A potential nuclear hazard could arise if an operating plant is adjacent to a construction site or a commissioning site. If this is the case, emergency arrangements should be made for the protection of the construction personnel and commissioning personnel. Account should be taken in the emergency Emergency arrangements should take into account of any other any local hazards.		Accepted			
28	3.90	3.90 All the parties involved in the commissioning programme should be trained appropriately to cope with any anticipated emergency at the plant under during commissioning.		Accepted			
29	3.94	3.94 Measures should be established to protect SSCs at on—the site. Security	This sentence does not make clear what	Accepted			

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No.	Line				but modified as follows		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
		access control should be established	security you are				
		before initiating work affecting items	referring toplease				
		important to safety.	clarify.				
			There needs to be a				
			distinction between				
			industrial security				
			which is in effect up				
			to receipt of nuclear				
			fuel on site and				
			nuclear security				
			which is in place				
			once nuclear fuel is				
			received on site.				
30	4.01	4.1 The implementation of		Accepted			
		commissioning activities should be					
		initiated only after it is authorised by the					
		regulatory body.		_			
		One main document to be submitted (see					
		Annex 2) in advance to the regulatory					
		body is the Safety Analysis Report whose					
		content will be updated according to					
1		commissioning results and will be					
		subsequently submitted for an					
		operationing license.					
31	4.03	4.3 The commissioning program should		Accepted			
		be implemented in stages (sub-stages) so					
		as that at the end of each stage a review					
		of the results can be performed to support					
		the decision whether the commissioning					

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	No.	program shall continue to the next stage, or whether the succeeding stages need to be modified as a consequence of results obtained or because some activities in the					
		stage have not been undertaken or have not been completed.					
32	4.04	4.4 The commissioning program should be implemented ensuring the compliance of the activities carried out with the established requirements of the management system developed and established by the Commissioning Organization. In To this end, all contractors, and subcontractors, involved in the commissioning process should ensure that their own arrangements to ensure quality meets the requirements of the management system.		Accepted			
34	4.05	4.5 According to different technology and possible construction processes, there could could be tests performed offsite on SSC performed offsite which need to be considered as part of the commissioning process. In such cases, specific justification should be provided showing the validity of the performed tests to the current installed conditions of the SSC and related functional and physical interfaces.		Accepted			

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	No.				us folio ws		
35	4.0	4.6 The commissioning process should be		Accepted			
		documented in compliance with the					
		licensee management system. The					
		documentation showing the testing and					
		results, analysis, deviations and					
		dispositions should be kept for the					
		<u>lifecycle</u> of the NPP-lifecycle.					
36	4.08	4.8 Preparatory process for testing should		Accepted			
		clearly identify the test purpose and test					
		objectives from the commissioning test					
		program, with particular focus of on the					
		safety objectives. The safety objectives					
		should be clearly put in evidence in order					
		to facilitate the regulatory review. The					
		safety objectives are mainly linked with					
		the identification of the safety functions		_			
		of the SSC to be tested and the related					
		safety requirements.					
37	4.09	4.9 The scope of the test in terms of		Accepted			
		functions, parameters and requirements to					
		be tested should be defined with					
		indication of approach and methods					
		applied for each relevant aspect. If the					
		testing procedure will make use of results					
		of already performed in-factory tests, this	~				
		has tomust be defined and justified					
		showing the validity and applicability of					
		performed factory tests to the onsite					
		physical and functional status of					

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		equipment or system subject to the test and its interfaces with the rest of NPP.					
38	4.10	4.10 The acceptance criteria (against which the test results will be evaluated), their acceptability or the evidence of potential non-conformity should be clearly defined in the preparatory activity. The technical basis of the acceptance criteria should—be consistent with the safety objectives and requirements.			What is the comment?		
39	4.12	4.12 The acceptance criteria should be defined and justified in order to ensure that they do demonstrated the achievement of test safety objectives. This definition and justification should taking take into account the limitation of achieving site specific conditions for the commissioning test test regarding feasibility of obtaining on site particular conditions—without impairing the plant, structure or equipment integrity. The acceptance criteria definition and justification should or the need to establish a link between the safety requirements to be demonstrated and the parameters measured during the test.		Accepted			
40	4.13	4.13 A list of the acceptance criteria that should be verified shall be available at		Accepted			

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No.	Line				but modified as follows		modification/rejection
	No.						
,		the end of each commissioning stage or					
		sub-stage stage shall be available, notably					
		the acceptance criteria linked to safety					
		concerns. It is This represents one of the					
		main inputs to assess the ability to					
		proceed to further commissioning stages.					
41	4.18	4.18 The development, verification and	Th is requirement is	Accepted			
		validation of commissioning test	very confusing. Please				
		procedures should benefit from the use of	rewrite this sentance so				
		simulator or computer codes. The use of	it is clear what is being required. It is not at all				
		simulator should contribute also to the	clear what is asking				
		preparation on specific relevant aspects	here.				
		of the team implementing the					
		commissioning test.					
42	4.19	4.19 The test procedures should state		Accepted			
		any necessary deviations/changes from					
		the normal <u>plant</u> operating					
		configurations. Examples of such					
		deviations/changes may be temporary					
		interlock bypasses, temporary additional					
		interlocks, temporary system bypasses,					
		valve configurations and instrument					
		settings. The test procedures should also					
		include all necessary checks that are					
		needed to ensure that these deviations are	₩				
		made correctly. They should also include					
		all necessary steps for the restoration of					
		the systems and components to their					
		normal status once the testing is					

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No.	Line				but modified as follows		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
		completed. Consistent with safety					
		requirements, consideration should be					
		given to minimizing such arrangements					
		and to ensuring that any deviations from					
		the normal functioning of the as-built					
		systems do not invalidate the test					
		objectives.					
43	4.20	4.20 Although the format of		Accepted			
		procedures may vary from plant to plant,					
		the contents of test procedures should					
		include, but are not limited to, the					
		following:					
		c. Limiting criteria- Applicable					
		operational limits and conditions,					
		including appropriate temporary					
		operational limits and conditions,					
		should be stated. In addition those					
		plant limits and conditions which					
		must be observed to prevent					
		damage to plant should be also be					
		included.					
1							

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No.	Line				but modified		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
44	4.29.	4.29 The start of a test of a SSC should		Accepted			
		require that certain other activities have					
		been performed first, e.g., completion of					
		construction, and/or preliminary tests,					
		inspections, and certain other					
		preoperational tests or operations. The					
		typical prerequisites of the testing are as					
		following:					
		• construction and					
		installation activities					
		associated with the system					
		to be tested have been					
		completed and					
		documented.					
		• tests of individual					
		components or subsystems					
		to demonstrate that they					
		meet their functional					
		requirements have been					
		completed.					
		• surveillance tests					
		necessary to demonstrate					
		the proper operation of					
		interlocks, set-points, and					
		other protective features,					
		systems, and equipment	This requirement is				
		required by the	repeated in greater				
		specifications have been	detail below and				
		completed.	should be deleted				

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		 checkout of wiring continuity and electrical protective devices; adjustment of settings on torque-limiting devices and calibration of instruments have been completed; all special conditions for the plant or system or status of equipment necessary prior to the commencement of testing using the procedure are implemented 					
		 all necessary jumpers, interlocks are installed for the certain testing configuration all records for the temporary changes are made required personnel are available pre-test briefing is performed testing and measuring devices are adjusted, calibrated and checked 					

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	 procedures checked for their validity field inspections have been made to ensure that the equipment is ready for testing, including inspection for proper fabrication and cleanness; communication tools are available and checked for operability availability of approved test procedures developed according to the design and with verified validity taking into account potential system changes taken place that have occurred during construction written authorization, as required, should be issued prior to the commencement of the performance of the test or commissioning stage documentation (state that all documentation showing the readiness for the test to 					

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	No.				as follows		
		be performed shall be issued and approved) • safety analysis (safety analysis of the NPP conditions during the test to be performed shall be carried out in advance and shall show the existence of acceptable safety conditions during the performance of the test), • compliance with regulatory authorization corresponding to what was envisaged in the commissioning program, to the hold points established by the regulatory body and also to specific conditions and request issued by the regulator, in accordance with national practices,	This should be added to be flexible to different national approaches.				
45	4.30	4.30 The starting of a commissioning stage or sub stage, as described in the commissioning program, should be based on the completion of the previous stage and fulfilment of pre-defined conditions.					

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		should be completed and the results of such tests evaluated and approved before proceeding to the fuel loading and subcritical tests.					
46	4.33	 4.33 In determining the sequence of testing, the following points should be carefully considered: (1) Sequence of commissioning tests should be planned in a chronological order in which they are expected to be performed and that the systems required to ensure the nuclear safety of a commissioning stage should be adequately tested prior to integrated system testing. 		Accepted			
47	4.35	4.35 A review should therefore be undertaken before the commencement of this stage to ensure that the tests have been carried out on those systems and components required for this stage for which the construction group is responsible. The tests should ensure that the construction is of the appropriate quality and that the equipment is in a fit state for commissioning to be started.	This requirement is a repeat of requirement 4.33 (2). One of these requirements should be deleted.	Accepted			
48	4.45	4.45 The purpose of the stage of fuel loading and subcritical tests is to ensure that the fuel is loaded into the reactor safely in accordance with the loading		Accepted			

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	7.00	pattern recalculated in the design. In addition, at this stage it should be confirmed that the reactor is in a suitable condition to be started up and that all prerequisites for permitting the reactor to go critical have been met (see also the Appendix).					
49	4.47	4.47 The beginning of initial fuel loading is the commencement of operation; from this point onwards the relevant safety and security requirements for plant operation apply [1]. Responsibility for meeting these safety requirements should usually rest from this juncture with the plant manager. plant systems and containment, should be clearly described and documented on the basis of the safety analysis report and the existing regulatory requirements. These prerequisites should be satisfied well in advance of the initiation of fuel loading.		Accepted			
50	4.48	4.48 The requirements and procedures should be in place to test the fuel <u>loading</u> machine and/or any other tool or systems necessary before the commencement of fuel loading. The personnel responsible for <u>fuel</u> loading should be qualified and trained in advance. Proper training should be		Accepted			

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	INO.	carried out on the fuel machine, including					
		operations in the reactor cavity and spent					
		fuel pit, using dummy fuel assemblies.					
		Operators of the <u>fuel</u> loading machine					
		should be licensed in accordance with					
		local regulations.					
51	4.52	4.52 The fuel loading procedure should		Accepted			
31	4.32	require, as appropriate: periodic data		recepted			
		recording; audible indication of flux					
		increases; and monitoring of neutron					
		count rate instruments when fuel is being					
		inserted and/or when other operations are					
		performed that could affect core					
		reactivity. In addition, sub criticality					
		checks should be performed at regular					
		steps in the loading procedure to					
		determine safe loading increments for					
		subsequent loading. Predictions of the		P			
		behaviour of the core in terms of its					
		reactivity should be available for					
		evaluation of the sub criticality margin. If					
		actual measurements deviate from the					
		predicted values, procedures should					
		require further <u>fuel</u> loading to be stopped					
		until the circumstances have been	~				
		analysed, the reasons for the deviations					
		have been determined, and any					
		appropriate corrective action has been					
		taken. (The Appendix contains further					

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	NO.	guidance on the details to be included in					
		1 ~					
50	150	the procedures for fuel loading.)		Accepted			
52	4.56	4.56 Before reactivity is increased		Accepted			
		('inserted') to approach initial criticality,					
		the necessary prerequisites should be met					
		to ensure that the reactor is in the proper					
		condition for start-up in terms of the	· ·				
		availability and readiness of qualified					
		personnel and systems important to					
		safety. It should be adequately					
		documented that these prerequisites have					
		been met and the reactor is in the proper					
		condition for start-up, and the appropriate					
1		approvals to proceed to this stage of					
		commissioning is have been obtained.					
53	4.57	4.57 Before the approach to criticality				Rejected	
		is started, operability of the automatic				Shall is used in	
		reactivity shutdown devices is required				"Requirements"	
		toshall be ensured and appropriate start					
		up monitoring instrumentation to shall be					
		available to initiate shutdown devices					
		when necessary.					
54	4.61	4.61 At the stage of initial criticality		Accepted			
		and low power tests, the initial criticality					
		of the loaded core is achieved for the first	₩				
		time. The subsequent low power tests					
		should be made to confirm that: the					
		performance of the reactor core is					
		commensurate with predictions made in					

Com.	Para/	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted,	Rejected	Reason for
No.	Line				but modified as follows		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
		the core design; the reactor core is in a					
		proper condition for operation at higher					
		power levels and the characteristics of the					
		reactor core coolant, reactivity control					
		systems and shielding (as appropriate)					
		and reactor physics parameters are in					
		accordance with predictions made in the					
		<u>core</u> design. In order to permit power					
		testing, assurance should first be obtained					
		on the basis of the information gained					
		from these tests that there is no serious					
		discrepancy between measured values of					
		reactor physics parameters and other					
		parameters and values used in the safety					
		analysis report. The power levels of this					
		stage for low power testing should be the					
		lowest power that gives reliable and		^			
		stable measurements and enable the					
		required conditions to necessary to					
		perform the specified tests. Special start-					
		up instrumentation should be provided if					
		necessary.					
55	4.66	4.66 Tests should be made to		Accepted			
		demonstrate to the extent practicable that					
		the plant operates in accordance with the					
		design both in steady state conditions and					
		during and after anticipated operational					
		occurrences, including reactor trips,					
		isolations and load rejections initiated at					

Com.	Para/	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted,	Rejected	Reason for
No.	Line				but modified		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
		appropriate power levels.					
56	4.68	4.68 After the test completion the test		Accepted			
		results should be reviewed to provide					
		assurances that the testing performed					
		demonstrates that the performance of the					
		systems considered is in accordance with					
		the plant design intent, and that any					
•		operating constraints have been			-	· ·	
		identified. It should ensure that all					
		necessary data have been obtained and					
		analysed, and that a technical evaluation					
		and report have been completed. It should					
		also provide assurances that the					
		succeeding stages can be conducted					
		safely and that the safety of the plant is					
		never dependent on the performance of		_			
		untested structures, systems or					
		components.					
57	4.69	4.69 The evaluation process should		Accepted			
		assure that the interpretation of test data					
		is appropriately reviewed by competent					
		persons who have the technical expertise					
		to determine that the operational					
		characteristics of the component,					
		structure, system (CSS) and/or process is					
		performing satisfactorily. The evaluation					
		of the test results should include a					
		comparison with the acceptance criteria					
		and should be carried out by the					

Com.	Para/	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted,	Rejected	Reason for
No.	Line				but modified as follows		modification/rejection
	No.				as folio ws		
		commissioning group, the designer and					
		the regulator in accordance with national					
		<u>practices.</u> —The objective is to clarify that					
		the <u>plant</u> design intent has been met.					
58	4.70	4.70 At the end of a stage, the results		Accepted			
		of the tests in the that stage and the					
		general condition of the plant should be					
		reviewed by the representatives of the			_	*	
		commissioning group and the operating					
		organization prior to approval being					
		granted to begin the next stage.					
		Depending on the national regulatory					
		practices, the regulatory body may be					
		involved in the review and approval of					
		the results of the specific stage. All test					
		reports for the stage should be completed					
		and all test certificates should be signed					
		before this review.		P			
59	4.71	4.71 Reviews should ensure that all			Accepted		
		systems and special testing equipment for			Will be		
		the tests in the next stage will be			modified		
		available before proceeding to that the			to avoid		
		next stage, and that all relevant			duplication		
		administrative and control procedures			of words		
		will be complied with, as documented.	~				
60	4.72	4.72 To ensure that the commissioning		Accepted			
		programme proceeds in an orderly					
		manner, suitable preparations should be					
		made so that the stage completion and					

Com.	Para/	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted,	Rejected	Reason for
No.	Line				but modified		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
		approval documents can be produced					
		expeditiously. To this end, reviews of test					
		results should be undertaken and test					
		results should be accepted at suitable					
		times during the progress of testing					
		within each stage. The end of each stage					
		should include preparations for the start					
		of the succeeding stage and a means			-	<u> </u>	
		should be arranged for the continual					
		updating of the documentation (see					
`		Section 5). In addition, close liaison					
		should be maintained with all participants					
		in the commissioning programme,					
		including personnel at the headquarters of					
		the operating organization and personnel					
		of the regulatory body.					
61		4.73 Progress to the next stage should		Accepted			
		only be permitted by the operating					
		organization when the completed review					
		of the current stage has been approved by					
		the operating organization as—in					
		accordance with the requirements of the					
		regulatory body.					
62	4.76	4.76 Stage completion certificate		Accepted			
		should be issued to certify that all the	*				
		tests in commissioning tests during the					
		respective stage have been satisfactorily					
		completed (listing all deficiencies, if					
		any). It should also list associated test					

Com.	Para/	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted,	Rejected	Reason for
No.	Line				but modified		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
		certificates.					
63	4.78	4.78 The commissioning group should		Accepted			
		report the test results to the operating					
		organization and, as required, to other					
		participants in the commissioning					
		programme. Although it may be					
		expedient to prepare summary reports for					
		a quick assessment of the test results, a			_		
		formal comprehensive report should be					
		submitted containing all the required					
		information, including a collation and					
		final evaluation of the test results. These					
		formal reports should be retained for					
		<u>record</u> purposes of keeping a record. In					
		addition to individual tests, stage test					
		reports and a final station commissioning		_			
		report should be prepared.					
		(1) conduct of the test, including initial					
		and final state of plant, the actual					
		limitations experienced, and					
		problems encountered and actions					
		taken to overcome them, including					
		modifications to the plant or					
		procedures;					
64	4.80	4.80 During commissioning, changes		Accepted			
		to <u>plant</u> design, programmes or tests may					
		be necessary, unexpected results may be					
		obtained and incidents may occur. The					
		operating organization should establish					

Com.	Para/	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
No.	Line No.				as follows		modification/rejection
	110.	procedures for dealing with these					
		situations.					
65	5.07	5.7 The Commissioning Management		Accepted			
		System Manual (MSM) (sometimes					
		referred to as the Commissioning					
		Manual) should form the part of the suite					
		of commissioning documentation, set out					
		the management organisation and					
		documentation processes agreed between					
		the Operating organisation and the					
		Commissioning group. The					
		Commissioning MSM applies to the					
		testing and commissioning of new					
		nuclear power plant and encompasses					
		then span of activities from the					
		completion of erection through plant					
		completion and commissioning to					
		establish the power plant in leading to					
		commercial operation. The					
		Commissioning MSM should detail the					
		commissioning management structure to					
		permit commissioning activities to be					
		logically planned and safely executed.					
66	5.10	5.10 The commissioning documentation		Accepted			
		should include the basic information on					
		the principles and objectives of the plant					
		commissioning tests as well as details of					
		the testing to be carried out on the plant.					
		Such documentation should contain					

Com.	Para/	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted,	Rejected	Reason for
No.	Line				but modified as follows		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
		sufficient information about the design,					
		function and expected performance of the					
		plant systems to adequately characterise					
		the system for subsequently proposed test					
		<u>definition.defining</u> the proposed tests.					
		This documentation may also include the					
		vendor specifications, design basis and					
		safety analysis report and records of			-		
		subsequent changes to any of these					
		documents, requirements of the					
		regulatory body, licences and other					
		relevant statutory documents. Such					
		information should also substantiate the					
		proposed commissioning tests and clearly					
		address any specific precautions or					
		measures required during the tests in					
		order to protect personnel and plant. The					
		testing substantiations may be presented					
		as the separate document or included in					
		the testing procedures.					
67	5.13	5.13 These documents are related to a		Accepted			
		System (or group of Systems or particular					
		commissioning scope). Each SCP gives a					
		brief description of the objectives,					
		principles, test conditions and acceptance					
		criteria for all the tests to be performed					
		within the test phases for the concerned					
		system (s), including the reference of to					
1		documents to be used for test					

Com.	Para/	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted,	Rejected	Reason for
No.	Line				but modified as follows		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
		performance (test guidelines, test					
		procedures), the phases during which					
		they are performed and their logical					
		sequence.					
68	5.14	Stage Commissioning Programs	The acronym for	Accepted			
		(S <u>TG</u> CP):	System				
			Commissioning				
		5.14 These documents are related to a	Programs (SCP)				
		Commissioning Stage (or sub-stage)	and Stage				
			Commissioning				
			Program (SCP) are				
			the same. I suggest				
			using a different				
			name or				
			acronymlike				
			STGCP				
69	5.15	5.15 In scheduling of the	This is a repeated	Accepted			
		commissioning activities the safety	recommendation				
		considerations should be taken as a first	from above when				
		priority. The following principles should	developing the				
		be maintained when scheduling the	commissioning				
		commissioning programmes:	program.				
		• Only thoseplant configurations	Think about				
		that have been addressed in the	deleting it here. It is				
		Safety Analysis Report should be	redundant.				
		made during theallowed during					
		<u>testing</u> test that have been					
		addressed in the Safety Analysis					
		Report					

Com.	Para/	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted,	Rejected	Reason for
No.	Line				but modified as follows		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
		• The sequence of the tests should					
		be arranged in a such manner that					
		the most onerous tests are carried					
		out after the less onerous ones					
		• The testing schedules should be					
		arranged in such a manner that all					
		auxiliary systems that are needed					
		for the system to be tested are					
		tested in advance					
		Procedures					
70	5.19	Test reports	Please review this	Accepted			
		5.19 A report should be	section (para. 5.19	Will be combined			
		drawn up on the results of all tests	to 5.29). Much of	and			
		included in the testing programme.	the details of the	shortened			
		Formal reports for each test should be	test reports, stage				
		prepared by the individuals responsible	reports, certificates,				
		and should be approved by the	test certificates etc.				
		commissioning group. The format of a	occur in earlier				
		report may vary but normally it should					
		include:	Safety Guide. There				
			is no need to repeat				
			it twice.				
			Decide where the				
			details are best				
			located and delete				
7.1	4.2	A 17	duplication.				
71	A.2.	Appendix					
		A.2. The following activities and					
		checks should be considered for					

Com. No.	Para/ Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
		completion before fuel loading: — verification of the configuration of all relevant systems as specified in the design documentation; — inspections of fuel assemblies, reactivity control devices and other absorbers, and the identification of fuel (careful distinction should be made between different types of fuel and different grades of enrichment, and note taken of which of the elements are 'poison' elements); — completion of any pre-fuel loading fuel assembly required (i.e. fuel channelling) — operability of nuclear start up instrumentation, in terms of proper calibration, location (source-fuel-detector geometry) and functionality, including audible and visual alarm indications in the control room as well as the response of the instrumentation to a neutron source;					
72	Annex 1	Annex 1 TYPICAL LISTING OF COMMISSIONING TESTS	This Annex is not very helpful nor arranged logically. It is just a list of commissioning tests, in no			Annex demonstrates usual practice and is not obligatory	

Com.	Para/	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted,	Rejected	Reason for
No.	Line				but modified		modification/rejection
	No.				as follows		
			particular order, for				
			all types of reactors.				
			Most regulators				
			have				
			commissioning test				
			guidance for				
			PWRs, BWRs and				
			Heavy Water PWRs				
			etc.				
			A more meaningful				
			Annex would be to				
			summarize the				
			regulatory guidance				
			on recommended				
			commissioning test	_			
			by reactor type for				
			the current				
			generation of PWR,				
			BWR and heavy				
			water reactors etc				
			In the US,				
			Regulatory Guide				
			1.68 governs				
			commissioning				
			testing. I would use				
			this regulatory				
			guide as an outline				

Com. No.	Para/ Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
			for this section and add any specific EU commissioning test requirements for the current generation of reactors and step thru a pre-op and startup progam. Including the strartup test conditions and commissioning tests from fuel load to 100% power operation.				
73	REF.	[1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation, Safety Standards Series No. NS R-2Specific Safety Requirements, SSR 2/2, IAEA, Vienna (2000).	Reference list should be updated	Accepted			
74	REF	[] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Licensing Process for Nuclear Installations, SSG-12, IAEA, Vienna, (2010)	Reference list should be updated	Accepted			

Japan Title: Commissioning for Nuclear Power Plants, DS446 (Rev of NS-G-2.9)

		COMMENTS BY REVIE	WER		RESOLUTIO	N	
Reviewer:	S. Maki	Page 1					
Country/C	rganizatio	n: Japan/ NISA Dat	e: 3 June 2011				
Note: <u>Unde</u>	rlined means	s insertion of ward(s) and delete means d	eletion.				
Comment No.	Para/Lin e No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modif./rejectio
1	Before 4.14	Available information on operating experience, including reportable occurrences at operating power reactor, should also be used appropriately in developing and executing the test procedure.	New item to test safely and efficiently.	Accepted			
2	4.29	• All applicable limiting condition for operation (Technical Specification requirement) at tested power should be met.	New bullet to test safely.	Accepted			
3	4.41	Add the following next to paragraph 4.41; "For a new type plant, a test should, to the extent possible, verify that any flow induced vibration beyond design assumption dose not occurred during operating conditions."	Such requirement should be explicitly defined.	Accepted			
4	4.88	Are there any drafts of substances for "Safety Assessment and Regulatory Approval"?	There is an item of Safety Assessment and Regulatory Approval in chapter 4 of Table of Content.				

5	Annex1 Whole	We propose that each explanations should be defined the object of nuclear power plant types. So the names of nuclear power plant type is added the end of each sentences. For example: P49 A.5 (a) Tests of the chemical control system: proper blending of boric solution and moderator, uniform mixing and adequacy of sampling and analytical techniques, (PWR) · · ·	This document is described all type of nuclear power plants. As the commissioning tests are different for the specific type, distinction should be defined.		Annex demonstrates usual practice and is not obligatory	
6	4.5	According to different technology and possible construction processes there could <u>be</u> tests on SSC performed off-site which need to be considered as part of the commissioning process.	Typo-miss.	Accepted		
7	4.37 L.4/ 4.44	4.37Any required pre-service inspections should be performed during or at the end of these stages.	Editorial comment. Duplicated of paragraph 4.44.	Accepted		
8	4.45 L.2	recalculated—precalculated	Editorial comment. As same as paragraph 3.19 of NS-G-2.9.	Accepted		

CANADA DS446 – Commissioning of Nuclear Power Plants

RESOLUTION COMMENTS BY REVIEWER Reviewer: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Page 1.. of..2.. Country/Organization: CANADA, CNSC, with input from Canada's nuclear industry Date: June 2, 2011 Proposed new text Accepted, but Comment Para/Line Reason Accepted Rejected Reason for No. modified as follows modification/rejection No. Document needs considerable work The document appears to Thank General be a very early draft and you could benefit significantly from improvements in language and organization. 2.8. In place of "The tests are gather Accepted For clarity bullet (sic) in commissioning..." recommend using "The tests are grouped or arranged in commissioning..." In place of "..to proceed in the 2.8 For clarity Accepted process of commissioning", bullet recommend using "..to proceed in the process or stages of commissioning." In place of "... management and the 3.9 Reporting directly to the Accepted Will be regulatory authority", recommend authority might be deleted using "... management and the considered whistle regulatory authority or blowing.

clarity.

Accepted

Does

For

ombudsman.

In place of "...with appropriate

3.26

5

		experience", recommend using	experience also include			
		"with appropriate experience and qualifications."	competence?			
6	3.33 19 th		For clarity	Accepted		
	bullet	requested, reviewed and	1 of charty			
		implemented when design criteria				
		are not met or when they fall short",				
		recommend using "changes are				
		requested, reviewed, and				
		implemented, and re-tested when				
		design criteria are not met or when				
		they fall short"				
7	References	In place of "GS-R-3 THE	Spelling	Accepted		
		MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR				
		FACILIRIES AND ACTIVITIES",				
		suggest using "GS-R-3 THE				
		MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR				
		FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES				
8	References	1	Spelling	Accepted		
		APPLICATION OF THE				
		MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR				
		FACILIRIES AND ACTIVITIES",				
		recommend using GS-G-3.1				
		APPLICATION OF THE				
		MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR				
		FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES				

European commission Comments on IAEA Draft Safety Guide DS 446

		COMMENTS BY REVIEWER					
Reviewer:			Date: 24/05/2011		RE	SOLUTION	
Country/Org	ganization: EC						
Comment No. / Reviewer	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
1	To be included between paragraph s 3.4 and 3.5	As some contractors involved in large commissioning project are not familiar with specific nuclear requirements, contracting documentation should include and emphasize the specific nuclear requirements and local nuclear regulations particularly as regards quality management and safety culture. Compliance with those requirements should be properly checked at the stage of awarding contracts and until the work is fully implemented	Some contractors involved in large commissioning project are not familiar with specific nuclear requirement	Accepted			
2	To be included between paragraph s 3.11 and 3.12	Oversight and quality control of ongoing works should be provided by an organisation which is competent and experienced in the works, clearly identified as responsible for	Activities performed by utility's staff without proper qualification should be avoided		Accepted Oversight and control of quality of ongoing		

Reviewer: Date: 24/05/2011

Country/Org	ganization: E0						
Comment No. / Reviewer	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
		quality control, and independent of the organisation in charge of the works.			works should be provided by competent organisati on		
3	To be included after paragraph 4.9 (section Test scope and methods)	 The safety systems should be tested in conditions representative of real accident conditions, and if that is not possible, specific arrangements should be made for the systems concerned in terms of acceptance tests, quality assurance, etc. The scope of the tests should include all the components and devices that are used during normal operation and those which could be used under 	For completeness of the chapter	Accepted Will be coordinated with comment from France			

RESOLUTION

Reviewer: Date: 24/05/2011 RESOLUTION

Country/Organization: EC

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Comment No. / Reviewer	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
		accident conditions, including passive components such as pipes, as they may be clogged, and including manufactured components, with correct documentation, as the quality control at the manufacturing plant may be deficient. The automatic start-up of systems after a power disruption should be tested during commissioning. The tests should be designed to detect an unexpected (spurious) actuation of a safety system.					
4	To be included at	 The functionality of any standby component which 	•	Accepted Will be			

Reviewer: Date: 24/05/2011

Country/Organization: EC

Comment No. / Reviewer	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
	the end of paragraph 4.33 (bullets 5, 6, 7)	is normally not in operation, must be regularly tested, as a long period of inactivity and the construction of other equipment during this period could alter the test results. - Safety systems should be submitted to overall functional tests as far as possible, to ensure not only the performance of each single component but the performance of the whole system, including the interactions between different components.		coordinated with other NUSSC members comments			

RESOLUTION

		COMMENTS BY REVIEWER					
Reviewer:			Date: 24/05/2011		RESOLUTION		
Country/Organization: EC							
Comment No. / Reviewer	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
		should be designed to take account of the fact that simultaneous tests may have an influence on each other's results.					

CEZ Comments on IAEA Draft Safety Guide DS 446

		COMMENTS BY REVIEWER						
Reviewer:	Kaspar		Date: 27/05/2011	RESOLUTION				
Country/Org	ganization: Cz	zech Republic/CEZ						
Comment No. / Reviewer	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejecti on	
1/Kaspar	TOC	Table of Content 1. INTRODUCTION Background Objective Scope	It's necessary to determine if TOC should be 2 leveled (I'd prefer) or 3 leveled, but it shall		Will be 2 level TOC. This is Guideline			

Reviewer: Kaspar Date: 27/05/2011 RESOLUTION

Comment No. / Reviewer Para/l	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
	Structure COMMISSIONING PROCESS Commissioning Objectives Commissioning Programme Stages of Commissioning Execution of Commissioning Regulatory Body role Operating Organization Role CORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT Management System General Safety Culture Graded Approach (There is no requirement about Graded Approach) Quality Assurance Organizational arrangements General Operating organization Commissioning organization Functions and responsibilities General Construction group Commissioning group Operating group Operating group Other participants in the commissioning activities Interfaces General Interface between construction activities and commissioning	be unified. My proposal of 3 leveled TOC (corresponding with the requirements in the draft) is in the left column.		NS-G-2.9 (not a requirement)		

Reviewer: Kaspar Date: 27/05/2011 RESOLUTION

Comment No. / Reviewer	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/reject on
		activities Interface between commissioning activities and operating activities Interface with Regulatory Body Systems Transfer & Plant Handover Resources Provision of Resources/General Training and Qualifications Process Implementation Measurement, Assessment and Improvement of Commissioning General Management of Non-Conformances Feedback of Experience from Commissioning Maintenance during commissioning Emergency Arrangements Security arrangements Security arrangements Security arrangements Testing Tests Preparation for Testing Testing Prerequisites Testing Stages and Sequence General/ Sequencing the testing process Preoperational tests Initial fuel loading and					

Reviewer: Kaspar Date: 27/05/2011 RESOLUTION

		_				ı	
Comment No. / Reviewer	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/reject on
		subcritical tests - Initial criticality - Low power testing - Power ascension tests • Review, Evaluation and Reporting of Test Results - Review and evaluation of test results - Review of the stage completion - Approvals and Issue of Certificates - Reporting of test results • Handling of Deviations - Modifications - Unexpected test results and occurrences - Safety Assessment & Regulatory Approval (There is no requirement about this topic) 5. DOCUMENTATION - The Commissioning Documentation Arrangements - The Scope and Structure of Commissioning Documentation Appendix – Provisions connected with fuel loading References - Annex 1 – Typical listing of commissioning license documents					
2	Req.2.2	(designers, construction group, license holder, operating and the	Authorities should be communicated with too.	Accepted			

Reviewer: Kaspar Date: 27/05/2011 RESOLUTION

Comment No. / Reviewer	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejecti on
		commissioning group and authorities)					
3	Req.2.8	 all the tests necessary to demonstrate that the plant meets the design parameters and properties stated in the safety analysis report are performed; the tests are designated into commissioning stages defined in a logical sequence from nonnuclear testing stages to nuclear testing stages and from individual components and system tests to overall integrated system test stages, with the overall plant test stage at the end. milestones(witness-points) are identified where the regulatory body authorization is required and proceeding in the process of commissioning is allowed only after this authorization. 	For clarity of these points		Accepted Will be properly integrated.		
4	Req.2.10	The commissioning programme	For clarity of this point	Accepted			

Reviewer: Kaspar Date: 27/05/2011 RESOLUTION

Comment No. / Reviewer	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejecti on
		should include: — the hold points at which reviews and furter analysis are required to check the compliance to safety requirements and witness-points to receive authorization from the regulatory body to proceed with comissioning;		To be coordinated with comment from France			
5	Req.2.13	The programme should also provide a framework for the timely production of all documentation.	For clarity of this point	Accepted			
6	Req.2.14	The commissioning programme should be written in such a form as to enable the objectives and methods of testing to be readily understood by all concerned personnel and to allow control and co-ordination by management.	For clarity of this point	Accepted			
7	Req.2.18	On the basis of the broad range of commissioning practices in different countries, the commissioning process	For clarity of this point			Rejected Does not change anything.	

Reviewer: Kaspar Date: 27/05/2011 RESOLUTION

Comment No. / Reviewer	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejecti on
						Original text will be kept	
8	Req.2.14	In determining the sequence of testing, the following points should be carefully considered: — some systems should be pretested to be available for the proper testing of other systems;	For clarity of this point			Rejected Does not change anything. Original text will be kept	

FRANCE TITLE: DS446 Commissioning for Nuclear Power Plants - April 2011

		COMMENTS BY REVIEWER			RESO	LUTION	
Reviewer:		F. Féron	Page				
	rganization:	France /ASN	Date: 31 May 2011		T	г	T .
Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
1.			This guide gets too much in the details, both from an organizational point of view (responsibilities between licensee, commissioning group, construction group, contractors) and from a technical point of view (annex on typical commissioning tests)	Agreed			
2.			Not enough reference to the management system, but too derived means (administrative procedures)	Agreed			
3.			Much duplication inside the document. Such duplications should be avoided.	Agreed			
4.			Is the document enough technology neutral (see annex 1)?	To be discussed			
5.			INSAG is working on a document on licensing the country's first NPP. Commissioning oversight is one topic addressed by this document. How was INSAG input used in DS446	To be discussed			

		COMMENTS BY REVIEWER			RESO	LUTION	
Reviewer: Country/On	rganization:	F. Féron France /ASN	Page Date: 31 May 2011				
Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
6.	1.3	as currently followed in Member States, which will enable commissioning to proceed safely and to a high quality. It will also enable the necessary assurances to be provided to ensure that the plant	Simplification			Rejected No changes from the original text	
7.	2.1	Commissioning is an essential process ensuring for the subsequent safe operation of the plant	Commissioning does not ensure safe operation; it contributes to but is not enough by itself	Accepted			
8.	2.3	The commissioning has the objective to demonstrate that the NPP as constructed meets the design requirements and the safety requirements as described in the safety analysis report and the license conditions	Clarification	Accepted			
9.	2.3	 to familiarise the NPP's operating, maintenance and technical management staff with the operation and management of the power plant. 	Superfluous	Accepted			

		COMMENTS BY REVIEWER		RESOLUTION			
Reviewer:		F. Féron	Page				
	rganization:	France /ASN	Date: 31 May 2011			l .	
Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
10.	2.4	The commissioning programme should cover all the activities to be performed on structures, systems and components to bring them to an operating mode and should cover the full widest range of plant conditions required in the design and the considered in the safety analysis report and in the license conditions. It should allow verifying, while remaining in a safe domain, the assumptions made in the safety analysis report and the existence of adequate margins between design and safety requirements and actual performance.	some accident conditions won't be tested (airplane crash) or would only have indirect tests.	Accepted			
11.	2.7	• arrival of fuel at the site enacting the safety <u>and security</u> link with fuel storage, including control of building access and relevant systems operation and monitoring.		Accepted			
12.	2.7 2 nd bullet list	 Milestones, including those where the regulatory body authorization are required to proceed in the process of commissioning 	Miliestones are not limited to those of the regulatory body.	Accepted			

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	rganization:	France /ASN	Date: 31 May 2011				D C
Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
13.	2.22	However, tests should not be conducted and operating modes or plant configurations should not be established if: - they have not been analysed and found safe, - if they fall outside the range of assumptions made in analysing postulated accidents in the safety analysis report, or - if they might damage the plant or jeopardize safety.		Accepted			
14.	2.24	 certain systems should be operational to ensure that other systems can be tested without jeopardizing personnel, the plant or nuclear safety; 	Superfluous	Accepted			
15.	2.24	— at any given stage, those relevant tests which are to be considered should be grouped together in an integrated systems test step (or sub-stage)—and—completed before the commissioning programme can safely continue.	Initial wording is confusing	Accepted			
16.	2.26	The commissioning programme should be comprehensive, including statutory non-nuclear tests according to national practice, and should have sufficient scope for redundancy in testing to ensure that there have been no omissions in testing complex systems.	Superfluous	Accepted			

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
17.	2.27 c	Such provisions should include conducting a hazard assessment and <u>may require</u> obtaining the prior approval of the regulatory body <u>or and specific written</u> approval from the manager responsible for the operating unit.	It may not be systematic	Accepted			
18.	2.29	The commissioning program should be approved by the regulatory body before implementation.	Inconsistent with last sentence of 2.28. Regulator involvement is already mentioned in 2.28	Accepted			
19.	2.30	The regulatory body during the commissioning implementation at predefined hold points or milestones, based on the evaluation of test results, appropriate reports prepared by the licensee and onsite supervision inspection activity, should provide authorization decide whether the licensee may to proceed to subsequent (sub) stage or sub stage of the commissioning program.	provided if the regulator assessment is it is not yet	Accepted			
20.	2.34	Delete 2.34	Superfluous (self evident after reading 2.31)	Accepted			

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Country/Or Commen t No.	rganization: Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Date: 31 May 2011 Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
21.	3.4	The system should cover all items, services and processes <u>related to commissioning</u> , <u>including those</u> important to safety and should include a means of establishing control over all activities during commissioning, thereby providing confidence that they are performed according to the established requirements. In establishing and implementing the management system for commissioning determining how the requirements are to be applied, a graded approach based on the relative importance to safety of each item or process should be used.	The management system is wider than safety related aspects. The characteristics of a management systems are described in details in other IAEA standards.	Accepted			j
22.	3.5	The classification should can provide a basis for determining commissioning requirements, methods, testing, inspections, reviews, qualification of personnel and record requirements.	Classification of SSC does not help a lot in defining commissioning	Accepted			
23.	3.5	Generally the more important to safety a SSC is the more inclusive, restrictive, and specific instructions should be to provide the commissioning results needed for an assigned safety classification.	Supefluous	Accepted			
24.	3.6	— The administrative requirements established by the <u>licensee's</u> management.	Clarification	Accepted			
25.	3.9	Delete 3.9	The guidance is more showing a lack of safety culture				

Reviewer:		COMMENTS BY REVIEWER F. Féron	Page	RESOLUTION			
Country/Or	rganization:	France /ASN	Date: 31 May 2011				
Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
26.	3.12	Delete 3.12	Too vague			Relates to original text	
27.	3.13	There may be other representatives participating in commissioning activities, such as representatives of the designers, the manufacturers, and the regulatory body.	The regulator oversights activities but does not participate in.	Accepted			
28.	3.13	The designers should also review the commissioning data, certify that the performance meets the design intent and be involved in the resolving of problems and defects detected during commissioning stage	Too detailed. The licensee is responsible and the document he asked to its contractors, including designer, is to be flexible. Recommanding designer input in reviewing tests results and resolving deviation is enough.	Accepted			
29.	3.14	There may be many ways in which the construction, commissioning and operating groups could be formed by different organizations.	Superfluous. The licensee has overall responsibility.	Accepted			
30.	3.14	If the operating organization decides to contract the commissioning activities to another organization, it should be made clear that the ultimate responsibility for adequate commissioning, and more generally safety, remains with the operating organization.	To focus on commissioning.		Accepted With no "adequate" and "more generally"		
31.	3.17	Delete first bullet	The guide is on commissioning. The second bullet adequately covers the bullet to be deleted		Accepted. Will be combined.		

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection	
32.	3.19	When commissioning activities are conducted under the responsibility of the by contractors, the operating organization should	Responsibility lies with the operating organization.	Accepted				
33.	3.19	the operating organization should make the necessary arrangements to review and approve these activities at all stages, establishing appropriate hold points and milestones.	Clarification	Accepted				
34.	3.21	—to arrange for the required submissions to the regulatory body at the approved stages hold points and milestones and to comply with its requirements;	Superfluous	Accepted				
35.	3.21	— These procedures should take into account the views and experience of members of the construction, commissioning and operating groups as well as other participants such as those from the designers or the manufacturers, the consultants;	No need to explicitly mention consultants.		Accepted. Full stop after "other participants"			
36.	3.22	—to consider the safety aspects of commissioning procedures and their proposed changes;	The initial status has also to be considered	Accepted				
37.	3.22	—to monitor the resolution of those defects or deviations detected during commissioning phase;	Deviations from procedures or criteria should also be considered	Accepted				
38.	3.24	The commissioning group should be headed by a commissioning manager who has had relevant experience with nuclear power plants	Experience in commissioning of plant may be as useful as nuclear experience.		Accepted "relevant experience and qualification".			

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection	
39.	3.26	Delete 3.26	Too much detailed.	Accepted				
40.	3.27	The commissioning manager should prepare sub organizational charts showing the allocation of responsibilities for staffing and systems to each test team leader. These charts should be made available to other groups in order to help ensure the effective co-ordination of work should be ensured between test teams.	Too much detailed.	Accepted				
41.	3.28	In addition to the overall commissioning planning and scheduling. The detailed planning and scheduling function should be managed in the commissioning group	To include both idea of overall and detailed planning	Accepted				
42.	3.29	Responsibility for commissioning activities may be assigned to a contractor, the construction organization or the operating organization.	Responsibility lies with the operating organization.	Accepted				
43.	3.29	Whatever the arrangement, the organization or individual responsible performing for commissioning should be accountable to the organization or individual responsible for compliance with the licence	Responsibility lies with the operating organization.	Accepted				
44.	3.29	—confirming that the plant has been tested within the design limits only;	Superfluous	Accepted				
45.	3.30	A gradual handover of systems and components of the plant from construction group and to operation group	Туро	Accepted				

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	rganization: Para/Line	France /ASN	Date: 31 May 2011		Accepted but		Reason for
Commen t No.	No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	modification/rejection
46.	3.31	Delete 3.31	Superfluous and weakens the guidance. As a result, it would be more appropriate to have the following paragraphs in one or several annex(es).	Accepted (However is affects the original version that is agreed not to change a lot)			
47.	3.32	The responsibilities of the construction group in relation to the commissioning process should generally include the following		Accepted			
48.	3.32		Might be more appropriate as/in an annex	Accepted			
49.	3.32	Delete "— to issue certificates of completion of installation construction giving the necessary assurances to the commissioning group;"	Duplicates another bullet	Accepted			
50.	3.33		Might be more appropriate as/in an annex	Accepted			
51.	3.33	The responsibilities of the commissioning group should generally include the following		Accepted			

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
52.	3.33 bullet list		The bullet list is very long. It should be re-organized by grouping item dealing with similar topics and rationalize to reduce the level of details.	Accepted			
53.	3.33	 to eertify document he commissioning programme has been satisfactorily completed; 	Certificate is a mean.	Accepted			
54.	3.33	—to establish procedures for analysing the results of tests, to resolve or have resolved any deviation detected, and producing test reports and test certificates.	Resolution of deviation is a major point. Certificate is a mean.	Accepted			
55.	3.34		Might be more appropriate as/in an annex	Accepted			
56.	3.34	The responsibilities of the operation group at the plant in relation to the commissioning process should generally include the following		Accepted			
57.	3.34	—to ascertain satisfy themselves that the systems which are transferred comply with specified performance requirements, the design intent and safety requirements and that the means to operate the systems are available;	Means to operate are a required specification	Accepted			
58.	3.34	—to become increase competent in the methods of operation of the plant;	Incompetent personnel can't be allowed to operate the plant, even during commissioning	Accepted			

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
59.	3.35		Might be more appropriate as/in an annex	Accepted			
60.	3.35	—to provide support for evaluation and assessment of tests results, including any deviation	Assessment of deviation is a major point.	Accepted			
61.	3.37	The interface between these activities should be adequately managed to ensure the protection and safety of the plant and personnel and to allow for adequate ensure that the commissioning programme is not impaired.	Adequate commissioning is the goal, not adequate implementation of the commissioning programme (which my be inadequate)	Accepted			
62.	3.40	All the organizations involved in the commissioning process should develop an appropriate achieve and sustain the same level of safety culture, which should be an inherent feature of the operating organization commensurate with the task they perform.	It can't be expected that every person and organization to have the same level of safety culture.	Accepted			
63.	3.41	Clear and well understood lines of authorization and communication between construction and commissioning activities should be established and documented so as to manage a rigorous work prioritization policy. The lines of communication should support the commissioning schedule and should comply with the agreement on the scope of activities in both organizations, in particular at the interfaces.	Superfluous	Accepted			

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
64.	3.42	The construction group may have responsibility be the lead group for some activities during the commissioning programme. This responsibility should be defined well in advance of commencement of this programme in order to preven misunderstandings. The activities of the construction group during the commissioning phase should be properly scheduled so as to meet the requirements for construction and commissioning.	operating organization. Duplicates earlier guidance.	Accepted			
65.	3.43		Might be more appropriate as/in an annex	Accepted			
66.	3.43	 procedures for performance of works or systems under the commissioning responsibility 		Accepted			
67.	3.44	Delete 3.44 and replace it by: "3.44 Specific attention should be paid to systems which have been partly installed and, as a consequence, have only been partially commissioned. Commissioning tests should be designed and implemented to allow for the adequate commissioning of the full system."		Accepted			
68.	3.45		Might be more appropriate as/in an annex	Accepted			

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
69.	3.46	There should be plans to include operating personnel in commissioning activities at the plant at all levels, thus providing the operating staff with an opportunity to become familiar with and gain experience of the plant. This approach to training and preparation of the operating staff during commissioning will contribute towards the assurance of safety during valuable for the initial operation of the plant.	Too much details	Accepted			
70.	3.47	Procedures for operating and periodic testing should be used as far as the conditions of the plant will allow in the commissioning phase so as to validate them, eventually with success criteria more numerous or more challenging that the ones later used during operation prior to the initial loading of the core.	further than periodic test as it enable to get baseline data as	Accepted			
71.	3.48	Personnel should adhere to normal operating rules such as those relating to access to the control room, control of information, control cabinets and switchboards, communications with the control room about abnormalities and changes in plant configuration. The need for adherence to normal operating rules should be re-emphasized to personnel after the core has been loaded	Superfluous. Adherence is expected.	Accepted			

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
72.	3.49	Where appropriate, hold points should be established in order to assess test results before regulatory authorization is may be given to proceed.	Authorization may not be granted.	Accepted			
73.	3.49	Add a sentence "During commissioning, the regulatory body should perform inspections to verify that the commissioning activities conform to applicable requirements."	Inspections are to be added.	Accepted			
74.	3.50	—— the adequacy of <u>safety significant</u> operating procedures and instructions, <u>especially main administrative</u> <u>procedures</u> , <u>normal operating procedures</u> <u>and including emergency operating procedures and accident management procedures</u> ;	To refocus on safety issues	Accepted			
75.	3.50	the arrangements to ensure quality for all commissioning, operation and maintenance activities; the records and reporting system; the radiation protection programme; onsite emergency preparedness; the arrangements for commissioning and operating activities (including periodic testing, maintenance, inspection and surveillance);	Simplification by regrouping bullets	Accepted			

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
76.	3.50	 the measures for accounting for fissile and radioactive materials; the fulfilment of the applicable requirements in respect of safeguards and accounting for fissile material. 	Simplification by regrouping bullets	Accepted			
77.	3.50	the adequacy of support for technical procurement, safety and other matters at the operating organization or at the site if appropriate;	Too much detailed	Accepted			
78.	3.50	—the adequacy of the arrangements for security physical protection important to safety;	Physical protection is only one matter. Overall security is the issue	Accepted			
79.	3.51	—the updated final safety analysis report and updated OLC.	To add OLC	Accepted			
80.	3.54	Delete 3.54	Responsibility for safety always lies with the operating organization. It is just that arrival or fuel changes the risks generated by the plant. There is thereof actual risks as they were before only potential risks	Accepted			
81.	3.55	Delete 3.55	Too much detailed		Accepted Will be shortened to one, first sentence		

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
82.	3.56	The transfer of documentation is a key feature in the handover process. Documentation should be transferred in system packages and over a reasonable period of time in order for the plant personnel to be able to make a comprehensive review of every package. Account should be taken in these transfers of how the responsibilities for testing after fuel loading, at initial criticality, at low power and at power escalation are assigned.	Too much detailed	Accepted			
83.	3.58	Engineering Competent (or suitably qualified) personnel should be designated to conduct the review to be carried out by the operating organization receiving the handover package.	To offer flexibility	Accepted			
84.	3.61	Delete 3.61	Too much detailed	Accepted			
85.	3.63	Delete 3.63	Superfluous (see 3.23 and 3.24)	Accepted			
86.	3.65	In addition, provision should be made for training of personnel who participate in the commissioning process should include relevant in certain—aspects of the plant site and methods of working.	Clarification	Accepted			
87.	3.66	—the criteria for and importance of reporting incidents and deviation;	Deviations are also to be reported	Accepted			
88.	3.66	—environmental protection and management and waste management.	Туро	Accepted			

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	rganization:	France /ASN	Date: 31 May 2011				
Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
89.	3.67	Delete 3.67	Contradictory with 3.65 (which des not discriminate among personnel)	Accepted			
90.	3.68	Delete 3.68	Duplicates an item in 3.66	Accepted			
91.	3.69	Delete 3.69	Not specific to training in relation to commissioning				
92.	3.70	Aspects of As for safety culture should be included in the training programme. It should be emphasized in the training programme that individuals should be aware of the significance of their duties and the possible consequences of mistakes arising from misconceptions or lack of diligence. Commissioning and construction personnel	Superfluous	Accepted			
93.	3.75	Delete 3.75	Not specific to commissioning Reference to other IAEA standards in 3.73 is enough		Accepted Will be rephrased with reference to GS-R-3, GS-G- 3.1 and GS-G-3.5		
94.	3.76	Delete 3.76	Not specific to commissioning Reference to other IAEA standards in 3.73 is enough		Accepted Will be rephrased with reference to GS-R-3, GS-G- 3.1 and GS-G-3.5		
95.	3.77	Delete 3.77	Not specific to commissioning Reference to other IAEA standards in 3.73 is enough		Accepted Will be rephrased with reference to GS-R-3, GS-G- 3.1 and GS-G-3.5		

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
96.	3.78	Delete 3.78	Not specific to commissioning Reference to other IAEA standards in 3.73 is enough		Accepted Will be rephrased with reference to GS-R-3, GS-G- 3.1 and GS-G-3.5		
97.	3.79	Delete 3.79	Not specific to commissioning Reference to other IAEA standards in 3.73 is enough		Accepted Will be rephrased with reference to GS-R-3, GS-G- 3.1 and GS-G-3.5		
98.	3.80	Delete 3.80	Not specific to commissioning Reference to other IAEA standards in 3.73 is enough		Accepted Will be rephrased with reference to GS-R-3, GS-G- 3.1 and GS-G-3.5		
99.	3.85	Add "Recommendations and guidance on maintenance activities can be found in Ref. [8]."		Accepted			
100.	3.86	Delete 3.86	Too much detailed and already covered by 3.85	Accepted			
101.	3.88	In preparing emergency arrangements for the commissioning phase, account should be taken of the fact that <u>construction related</u> non nuclear hazards <u>may still exist</u> such as fire could arise while the nuclear fuel is on the site.		Accepted			

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
102.	3.93 to 3.95	Delete 3.93 to 3.95	Too vague. Not specific to commissioning		Accepted. Security arrangements have to be addressed. Will be done in more precise matter.		
103.	4.1	Delete 4.1	Not true. Maybe sometimes true for tests at the plant. See also 4.5		Accepted Will be rephrased		
104.	4.2	For implementation of commissioning activities the management personnel, operating personnel and specific training personnel should may need to be licensed by the nuclear regulatory authority according to provisions of applicable norms and national regulations.	Simplification	Accepted			
105.	4.4	The commissioning program should be implemented ensuring the compliance of the activities carried out with the established consistent with requirements of the management system. In this end all contractors, and subcontractors, involved in the commissioning process should ensure that their own arrangements to ensure quality meet the requirements of the management system.	Simplification	Accepted			
106.	4.5	According to different technology and possible construction processes there could be tests on SSC performed off-site	Simplification	Accepted			

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
107.	4.8	The safety objectives are mainly linked with the identification of the safety criteria and characteristics mentioned in the (preliminary) safety analysis report functions of the SSC to be tested and the related safety requirements.	Clarification	Accepted			
108.	4.14	All commissioning tests should be performed in accordance with authorized written procedures. The preparation of test procedures, including their verification and approval, should be implemented according to the management system defined by an administrative procedure. The level of review should reflect the importance to safety of the system and the nature of the test.	Reference to the management system is more appropriate	Accepted			
109.	4.14	The procedures that are established should provide for timely reporting to allow commissioning to proceed safely and efficiently.	Safety is the focus, not speed.	Accepted			
110.	4.16	The <u>test</u> procedures should be subject to a thorough verification <u>involving</u> and approval process in which the regulatory authorities and the operating organization should participate.	test procedures	Accepted			
111.	4.17	This will permit the operating personnel to become familiar with them.	Superfluous	Accepted			
112.	4.20		Might be more appropriate as/in an annex	To be discussed			

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Commen t No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection	
113.	4.20 f	f. Acceptance criteria- The acceptance criteria should be stated and this statement should wherever possible be quantitative as well as qualitative (for fuel loading, for example). Origin of the criteria should be mentioned	It its useful to know where the criteria comes from to verify its adequacy and assess potential deviation.	Accepted				
114.	4.24	Delete 4.24	Somehow duplicates 4.22	Accepted Will be combined with 4.22				
115.	4.25	The administrative procedure should be developed by the commissioning organization to The management system should provide guidance to the commissioning personnel	Reference to the management system is more appropriate	Accepted				
116.	4.26	The commissioning management system should ensure that the calibration intervals are not exceeded for the testing equipment and measurement tools and ensuring that any new such equipment and tools are obtained with the appropriate calibration certificate.	Reference to the management system is more appropriate	Accepted				
117.	4.26	Any measurement and test equipment purchased by the commissioning organization shall be required to be supplied with the certification enabling the calibration of the equipment to be traceable to national standards.	Superfluous (duplicate first sentence of 4.26)	Accepted Will be adjusted				
118.	4.28	Delete 4.28	Not specific to commissioning. (duplicate first sentence of 4.26)	Accepted				

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119.	4.29	 surveillance tests necessary to demonstrate the proper operation of interlocks, set points, and other protective features, systems, and equipment required by the specifications. 	This is part of commissioning	Accepted Will be simplified			

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120. 4.29	 all records for the temporary changes are made required personnel available and briefing is completed briefing performed testing and measuring devices are adjusted, calibrated and checked procedures checked for their validity field inspections have been made to ensure that the equipment is ready for testing, including inspection for proper fabrication and cleanness; communication tools are available and checked for operability availability of approved test procedures developed according to the design and with verified validity taking into account potential changes taken place during construction written authorization, as required, should be issued prior to the commencement of the performance of the test or commissioning stage necessary documentation (state that all documentation showing the readiness for the test to be performed shall be issued and approved) is available 	Simplification by regrouping bullets				

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121.	4.35	A review should therefore be undertaken before the commencement of this stage to ensure that the tests have been carried out on those systems and components required for this stage for which the construction group is responsible	Superfluous	Accepted			
122.	4.39	Delete 4.39	Too much detailed. And restrictive (may be valid for other kind of tests)	To be discussed			
123.	4.43	Delete 4.43	Verification should have been done earlier		Accepted Will be "use and validation" of the procedures		
124.	4.45	it should be confirmed that the reactor is in a suitable condition to be started up and that all prerequisites for permitting the reactor to receive fuel in the vessel and to go critical have been met (see also the Appendix).	To include fuel loading	Accepted			
125.	4.47	The beginning of initial fuel loading is the commencement of operation; from this point onwards the relevant safety requirements for plant operation apply [1]. Responsibility for meeting these safety requirements should usually rest from this juncture with the plant manager.	The first sentence is wrong. Safety requirements on operation apply as soon as fuel is on-site. Responsibility lies with the operating organization, which usually delegates it to the plant manager	Accepted			
126.	4.47	These prerequisites should be satisfied well in advance of the initiation of fuel loading	Superfluous.	To be discussed			

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127.	4.48	Operators of the loading machine should be licensed in accordance with local regulations.	Already covered by 4.2	Accepted				
128.	4.49	Attention should be paid to adequate monitoring of neutron flux to prevent for the timely indication of potential inadvertent criticality and, if prevention fails, for the timely indication of such criticality.	Prevention is the first issue	Accepted				
129.	4.51	Delete 4.51	Too much detailed.	To be discussed				
130.	4.53	At By the end of fuel loading, the position of each core element should be independently confirmed and documented.	It should be done progressively, not only at the end.	Accepted				
131.	4.62	Appropriate tests of fuel handling equipment should be completed and radiological surveys and functional tests of radiation protection equipment should be made.	Too much detailed	Accepted				
132.	4.67	A review should be carried out at the end of the stage to confirm whether the operational limits and conditions are adequate and practicable	Covered by adequacy.	Accepted				
133.	4.68	After the each test completion the test results should be reviewed to provide assurances that the test was performed as intended and that test results testing performed demonstrates that the performance of the systems	Clarification	Accepted				

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134.	4.69	The evaluation process should assure that the interpretation of test data is appropriately reviewed by competent persons who have the technical expertise to determine that the operational characteristics of the component, structure, system (CSS) SSCs and/or process is performing satisfactorily.	To be consistent with IAEA terminology	Accepted			
135.	4.69	The evaluation of the test results should include a comparison with the acceptance criteria and an analysis of any deviation detected should be carried out by the commissioning group, the designer and the regulator. The objective is to clarify that the design intent has been met.	assessment.	Accepted			
136.	4.70	All test reports for the stage should be completed and all test certificates should be signed before this review.	Too detailed	Accepted			
137.	4.73	Progress to the next stage should only be permitted by the operating organization when the completed review of the current stage has been approved by the operating organization as and, where relevant, in accordance with the requirements of the regulatory body.	There may not be requirement of the regulatory body	Accepted			
138.	Title before 4.74	Approvals and Issue of Certificates test reports	Avoid the use of "certificate"	Accepted			

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139.	4.74	Documents should be prepared and issued during the progress of the commissioning activities to certify document the performance of the tests and provide phase clearances for the continuation of commissioning programme.	Test or phase certificate may be mentioned as a footnote	Accepted			
140.	4.74	Regulator's approval should be obtained when <u>necessary</u> clearing major stages indicated in the Commissioning programme .	Approval of regulator may be not only on major stages	Accepted			
141.	4.75	Delete 4.75	Too much detailed	Accepted			
142.	4.76	Delete 4.76	Too much detailed	Accepted			
143.	4.77	Delete 4.77	Too much detailed Already covered by rewording of 4.74	Accepted			
144.	4.78	The commissioning group should report the test results to the <u>relevant</u> operating organization and, as required, to other participants in the commissioning programme.	The commissioning group is within the operating organisation	Accepted			
145.	4.78	Although it may be expedient to prepare summary reports for a quick assessment of the test results, a formal comprehensive report should nevertheless be submitted established containing all the required information		Accepted			
146.	4.79	Formal reports for each test should be prepared-by the individuals responsible and should be reviewed and approved according to the management system.	To put emphasis on the management system.	Accepted			

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147.	4.80	The operating organization should establish procedures for dealing with these situations, within the frame of its management system.	management system.	Accepted			
148.	4.83	These changes to the procedures or documents should be <u>performed according</u> to the management system authorized by means of a change notice.	To put emphasis on the management system.	Accepted			
149.	4.85	Any changes to the approved test procedures should be controlled according to the management system by means of an appropriate administrative procedure.	To put emphasis on the management system.	Accepted			
150.	4.88	In spite of adherence to appropriate good design, approved construction and commissioning procedures, and good work methods, unexpected test results or occurrences may arise	Simplification	Accepted			
151.	4.88	—A review should be carried out to understand the cause(s) of the event and to decide on the corrective actions to be taken.	Understanding root cause is generally necessary to identify appropriate corrective action		Accepted To identify the causes		
152.	5.1	The structure, content, extent and control of commissioning documents should therefore be described in the management system of the operating organization approved by the operating organization.	To put emphasis on the management system.	Accepted			
153.	5.2	evidence to the various participants that the design intent has been met, that deviations, if any, have been assessed and of that appropriate modifications have been made;	To insist on deviation management	Accepted			

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154.	5.2	 assurance to the operating organization that commissioning is proceeding <u>safely</u> in accordance with all requirements; 		Accepted			
155.	5.3	The preparation, review, approval and control of commissioning documentation should be in accordance with the management system the documentation control requirements. [Ref. GS-R-3].	management system.	Accepted			
156.	5.3	All commissioning documentation including latest approved issues, completed test documents <u>and</u> test reports and test certification should be retained in <u>an appropriate location</u> the Commissioning Documentation Centre or Commissioning Archive, whatever appropriate, for both control and archival purposes.		Accepted			
157.	5.4	Commissioning documents are normally provided by the commissioning group. The commissioning group should ensure that methods for the preparation, safe keeping, retrieval and review of documents should be are specified.		Accepted			

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158.	5.4	For document control purposes, an	Too detailed	Accepted			
		integrated and consistent referencing					
		procedure should be established covering					
		all commissioning documents. Special					
		methods of identification of important					
		documents with self-checking features to					
		facilitate reviews and audits of records		_	· ·		
		should be considered. Document control					
		procedures should be in place to ensure that					
		those persons participating in a					
		commissioning activity are provided with					
		approved procedures.					
159.	5.6	Delete 5.6	Superfluous	Accepted			

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160.	5.7	The Commissioning Management System Manual (MSM) (sometimes referred to as the Commissioning Manual) should form the part of the suite of commissioning documentation, set out the management organisation and documentation processes agreed between the Operating organisation and the Commissioning group. The Commissioning MSM applies to the testing and commissioning of new nuclear power plant and encompasses then span of activities from the completion of erection through plant completion and commissioning to establish the power plant in commercial operation. The Commissioning MSM should detail the commissioning management structure to permit commissioning activities to be logically planned and safely executed.	Too detailed	Accepted				
161.	5.8	The MSM should provide the basis for the planning and execution of the testing and proving of plant items and systems, as a coordinated activity within the operating organization and between the Operating organisation and its relevant contractors and Commissioning group and to enable the Commissioning group to meet their contractual commitments for the plant within their supply	Gives a broader scope, larger than the commissioning group.	Accepted				

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162.	5.9	The Commissioning MSM, referring as appropriate to the (main) management system, should comprise the following items of the commissioning process:	To make a link with the licensee general management system	Accepted				
163.	5.9	 Responsibilities of the participating organisations in relation to the testing and commissioning of power plant The commissioning testing programme 	Testing is part of commissioning	Accepted				
164.	5.9	Add a bullet "management of deviations detected during commissioning"	To insist on deviation management	Accepted				
165.	5.11	Delete 5.11	Superfluous (introduction to the following paragraphs)	Accepted				
166.	5.12 and title before 5.12	Overall Plant Commissioning Program (OPCP) 5.12 This document The Overall Plant Commissioning Program (OPCP) gives a general presentation of the Commissioning Program for the whole plant,	Simplification	Accepted				
167.	5.13 and title before 5.13	System Commissioning Programs (SCP) 5.13 These documents System Commissioning Programs (SCP) are related to a System (or group of Systems or particular commissioning scope).	Simplification	Accepted				
168.	5.14 and title before 5.14	Stage Commissioning Programs (SCP): 5.14 These documents Stage Commissioning Programs (SCP) are related to a Commissioning Stage (or sub-stage)	Simplification	Accepted				

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169.	5.16	Arrangements should be made, within the frame of the management system, to ensure that these procedures are reviewed and approved before issue, and that their subsequent amendment is controlled.	To put emphasis on the management system.	Accepted			
170.	5.17	The preparation of test procedures, including their verification and approval, should be defined within the management system by an administrative procedure.	To put emphasis on the management system.	Accepted			
171.	5.18	Based on the tests scheduled in the approved commissioning programme	Superfluous	Accepted			
172.	5.18	The detailed content of the test procedures are in paragraphs ????	Reference missing	Accepted			
173.	5.19	Formal reports for each test should be prepared by the individuals responsible and should be approved according to the management system processes by the commissioning group	To put emphasis on the management system.	Accepted			
174.	5.22	Documents should be prepared and issued during the progress of the commissioning activities in order to <u>certify report on</u> the performance of the tests and to provide the required <u>authorizations inputs</u> for the continuation of the programme	Avoid the use of "certify". Authorization may be too strong	Accepted			
175.	5.23	Delete 5.23	Too much detailed. Furthermore, duplicate prior guidance	Accepted	Will be combined and simplified in light of previous comments		

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176.	5.24	Delete 5.24	Too much detailed. Furthermore, duplicate prior guidance (see 4.74 and following)	Accepted	Will be combined and simplified in light of previous comments			
177.	5.25	Delete 5.25	Too much detailed. Furthermore, duplicate prior guidance (see 4.74 and following)	Accepted	Will be combined and simplified in light of previous comments			
178.	5.26	Delete 5.26	Too much detailed. Furthermore, duplicate prior guidance (see 4.74 and following)	Accepted	Will be combined and simplified in light of previous comments			
179.	5.27	Documents should be prepared and issued for the handover of plant systems in order to eertify formalize that the plant system was installed and tested		Accepted				
180.	5.27 bullet list	Delete bullet list	Duplicates 3.57	Accepted				
181.	Appendi x		Transform appendix into an annex	To be discussed				
182.	Appendi x 1A3	Replace — the minimum number of personnel necessary to load fuel; — identification of the permitted working time of the personnel; By " – organizational aspects (such as number of personnel required)"	To broaden the topic	Accepted				

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183.	Annex 1 A1		The draft "Reactors are now being designed which include many passive safety features or which do not include some parts of the systems mentioned here. Clearly the commissioning for such reactors will differ in many respects." Are the following paragraph technology neutral?				
184.	Annex 1		This is a long list so it may be understood as being exhaustive? is this the purpose?				
185.	Annex 2	Delete annex 2	There is a standard on licensing process	To be discussed			
186.	/						