

Title: DS564 – Design of Nuclear Installations Against External Events Excluding Earthquakes – SSG-68 (Rev.1)

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: WASSC Member Page 1 of 1 Country/Organization: Republic of Korea (ROK)/Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) Date: October 10, 2025							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
1	Page 2/ Line 16	Remove a phrase in the second dot. (before) The possibility for siting nuclear installations in non-traditional or higher-risk environments, including remote regions, ~~~constraints. (after) The possibility for siting nuclear installations in non-traditional site or higher risk environments , including remote regions, ~~~constraints.	o In my opinion, it would be better to remove the phrase based on the above paragraph.			0	The phrase above highlights combined climate-driven events and is one of the higher-risk environments as listed in the "...including remote regions..." in the second bullet.

Title: DS564 – Design of Nuclear Installations Against External Events Excluding Earthquakes – SSG-68 (Rev.1)

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Country/Organization: FRANCE-ASNR Date:							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
1.	3	The revision includes ... • The potential deployment of mobile reactors and microreactors , including floating ones, and underground designs , which pose unique challenges in terms of adaptability to external hazards. • The possibility for siting nuclear installations in non-traditional or higher-risk environments, including remote regions , post-industrial areas, and zones with complex logistical constraints.	The link between adaptability and mobile reactors is clear while there is not such a link for microreactors or underground design The impact of remote location is not sufficiently explained. At a minimum it should be clarified what it means (remote regarding what?)		0		Rearranged the topics on underground design and microreactors within the second and third bullets for improved clarity. Specified as ‘remote regions with limited infrastructure’ in the second bullet for clarity
2.	3	It will also take into account the growing frequency and severity of combined climate-related events that may challenge the performance of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety .	Safety related SSCs is a too narrow scope. It is crucial to take due consideration of “all of the elements that contribute to safety” (and this is the definition of SSC important to safety according to IAEA glossary)	0			
3.	3	The revision will include recommendations on the design provisions to address new external hazard conditions arising from evolving siting environments, such as remote , underground, or repurposed...	See comment 1			0	Specified as ‘remote regions with limited infrastructure’ in the second bullet for clarity
4.	5	• New siting contexts, including remote locations , post-industrial (brownfield) areas, ...	See comment 1			0	Specified as ‘remote regions with limited infrastructure’ in the second bullet for clarity
5.	5	The revised Safety Guide will continue to focus on the protection of safety-related SSCs important to safety of nuclear installations against external events (and combinations of external events) ...	See comment 2	0			

6.	6	IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 2, Leadership and Management for Safety (2016)	Please elaborate more in detail the link with leadership and management or consider deletion			0	Section 7 of SSG-68 covers application of management system. Please see Section 7 and Table A.1. of the DPP.
7.							

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: Page.... of.... Country/Organization: Belgium – FANC/Bel V Date: 28/04							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
1		Suggestion: make the importance given to the ‘graded approach’ and RIPB aspects more consistent with the approach taken in DS463.	Although included in the appendix, the concepts of ‘graded approach’ and ‘RIPB’ are rather absent from the main body of the document (just an evocation in section 3). The equivalent guide for seismic design considers these two points more explicitly. In Table A.1, the DPP of DS563 refers to gaps for sections 2&3, in addition to section 9, which specifically addresses this point. For the DPP of DS564, only one specific section refers to a ‘graded approach’. The RIPB is not addressed.	0			Highlighted ‘risk-informed performance-based’ design approach throughout the DPP.

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER Reviewer: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Country/Organization: Canada				RESOLUTION			
		Page 1 of 2 Date: October 10, 2025					
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
1.	Section 4	It is recommended to consider explicitly listing the primary target users (e.g., regulators, designers, operating organizations, technical support organizations).	Listing audience to whom the recommendations are primarily aimed at is appropriate for a Specific Safety Guide.	0			Moved “The revised Safety Guide will provide structured and practical recommendations to support implementation by regulatory bodies, designers, and operating organizations.” from Scope to Objective.
2.	Section 5	It is recommended to consider explicitly referencing “fusion facilities” in Section 5, consistent with references in Table A.1 (Section 5 gaps) to ensure technology-neutral applicability	Scope is well-defined and expanded to reflect current technologies and site contexts.	0			
3.	Section 6	It is recommended to including a specific statement in Section 6 noting how duplication will be managed through cross-referencing rather than restating requirements.	Section 6 needs to include a discussion on methods for identifying and avoiding duplication.			0	The last paragraph in Section 6 will cover it.
4.	Section 7	It is recommended to consider adding a separate annex or appendix for advanced reactor and innovative design considerations,	Section 7 needs to be expanded to address non-traditional sites, incorporate graded			0	As mentioned in the Annex of the DPP, general design

		including siting in non-traditional contexts such as remote locations, post-industrial areas, and co-location with existing infrastructure. This would improve usability for Member States deploying such technologies and provide general guidance on potential hazards associated with co-located facilities, including non-nuclear installations requiring nuclear heat.	approaches, and consider emerging hazards.				considerations for non-traditional site environments will be added to Section 2 of the SSG-68 revision. Detailed guidance and case studies are planned to be covered in an IAEA Safety Report Series and a TECDOC.
--	--	---	--	--	--	--	--

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: Jun PENG Page 6 of 1 Country/Organization: China Date: 30 Sep 2025							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
1	Table A.1. Section5	Explain the meaning of “previously unaddressed hazards” or delete it.	It is unclear what “previously unaddressed hazards” specifically refers to. In addition, if “previously unaddressed hazards” exists, it indicates that the previous design of the nuclear power plant was unsafe.	0			Added ‘, if any.’ at the end of the sentence. Drafting step will review if there are any new hazards ‘previously unaddressed’.
2	Table A.1. Section5	It is suggested to delete “Ensure technology neutrality and applicability to all installation types”, mainly for large NPPs, other nuclear facilities can refer to the implementation.	The protection design against external events varies greatly from different nuclear facilities.			0	SSG-68 provides recommendations for all types of nuclear installations. Scope of nuclear installations is defined in IAEA Nuclear Safety and Security Glossary (2022).
3	6	It is suggested to remove version (publication year) references for both the revised version and the version to be revised.	It is necessary to align with the latest version and concurrently revised version.			0	Current references in this DPP reflect the latest version of the IAEA SSs. Deleting version and publication year of the IAEA SSs can cause confusion. The list of references will be updated during drafting and review step.
4	7	It is suggested to separate the “design considerations for mobile reactor site environments” in framework Chapter 2, and the revision should clearly define the scope of site considerations for mobile reactors.	Considering the special characteristics of mobile reactors.			0	Transportable Nuclear Power Plants (TNPPs) will be addressed in Section 2 (“Design considerations for non-traditional site environments”) and Section 5, as specifically indicated in Table A.1 and throughout the DPP.
5	7	It is suggested to change “Floating object impact” to “object impact”, and delete “hazardous liquid spill events”.	“object impact” can cover both land-based and maritime mobile objects.	0			Rephrased as “Hazardous events caused by floating objects and oil spills”

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: Jun PENG Page 6 of 1 Country/Organization: China Date: 30 Sep 2025							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
			“Hazardous liquid spill events” can be incorporated into “external fires”, “external explosions” or “chemical release events”.				

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: ENISS Page 1 of 3 Country/Organization: ENISS Date: 13/10/2025							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
General comment							
1	§ 2, 3 rd para	These developments reflect a coordinated effort by the IAEA and Member States to update the safety framework for requirements and recommendations pertaining to external hazards, expand the applicability to new reactor technologies, and to respond to combined hazard scenarios including climate-driven and human-induced events.	For enhanced clarity.	0			
2	§ 2, 3 rd para	The revision of SSG-68 will align it with this evolving set of standards, ensure consistency in terminology and methodology, and reflect best practices for in the design and operation of current installations, as well as in the design of the and next-generation of nuclear installations.	For enhanced clarity.	0			
3	§ 4, to be inserted as the last para	“For existing nuclear installations, including land based nuclear power plants in operation or under construction, it might not be practicable to apply all the new or	It is proposed to add this sentence (taken from para 1.3 of IAEA Safety Standard Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1): Safety of Nuclear Power		0		Added appropriate paragraph reflecting the concerns at 5.

		revised recommendations described in the DPP. In addition, it might not be feasible to modify designs that have already been approved by regulatory bodies. For the safety analysis of such designs, it is expected that a comparison will be made with the current standards, for example as part of the periodic safety review for the facility, to determine whether the safe operation of the facility could be further enhanced by means of reasonably practicable safety improvements.”	Plants: Design), in order to acknowledge the same caveat put forward in SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1). This sentence should be included as such in the future draft, section 1 (Background).				Scope. “It is recognized that for existing nuclear installations, including cases where the design has already been approved by regulatory bodies, the practical implementation of newly introduced recommendations may need to be considered in a graded manner, taking into account feasibility aspects such as those assessed during periodic safety review processes.”
4	§5/ Line 8	“ Combined and cascading events, such as extreme precipitation with flooding, wildfires coupled with infrastructure failure, and long-duration severe weather scenarios.”	The concept of ‘cascading events’ would be fairly new, as this is not currently defined in the <i>IAEA Nuclear Safety and Security Glossary, 2022 (Interim) Edition</i> , nor used in other safety standards (in which ‘cascading effects’ is		0		Rephrased as “Combined events and cascading aspects”

			used, but not ‘cascading events’).				
			In order to avoid confusion, it is proposed to remove it.				
5	§ 6, Line 1	This Safety Guide falls within the thematic area of Site Evaluation Facilities and Activities	Also referring to the Status of IAEA Safety Standards, as of July 2024. Nevertheless, the (corrected) sentence does not add significantly to the text and may be deleted.	0			
6	§ 6, last para	Close cooperation during the whole process will be needed among the coordinators of the relevant Safety Standards, including SSR-1, SSG-2/1, SSG-67, which are currently under review, as well as all relevant sections of NSNI, and WES/NSRW as needed.	Is ”SSG-2/1” a misspell of SSR-2/1? Or of SSG-21?	0			Replaced it with SSR-2/1
7	Annex	2. Combined, Cascading, and Emerging Hazards	Cf. the reason provided for the comment # 4		0		Replaced ‘cascading’ with ”cascade-type” since it meant to be hazards triggering the other event.
8	Annex	Table A-1, item 3 Design Basis for External Events — Expand on compound and cascading combined hazards.	Cf. the reason provided for the comment # 4		0		Replaced ‘cascading’ with ”cascade-type” since it meant to be hazards triggering the other event.

9	Annex	Table A-1, item 4 Installation Layout and Design Approach — Emphasize adequate separation and redundancy under emerging and cascading combined external events	Cf. the reason provided for the comment # 4	0			‘Combined’ refers to different external hazards occurring simultaneously or in an overlapping manner, whereas ‘cascading’ describes a situation in which one hazard triggers or intensifies another in a sequential or chain-reaction manner. As these concepts are distinct, it is appropriate to retain the term ‘cascading’.
10	Page 8	In Table A.1 section 5 in last column with proposed revisions is written: <i>Ensure technology neutrality and applicability as far as possible/relevant to all installation types, including large NPPs, SMRs, FNPPs, TNPPs, advanced and non-water-cooled reactors, research reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and fusion facilities.</i>	It seems impossible to ensure technology neutrality and applicability to all installation types for all the recommendations. It is then proposed to include a limit in this objective. In order to appropriately cover the needs, there could be additional design specific chapters/sections to deal with	0			

			the differences.				

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: Federal Ministry for the Environment, Climate Action, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMUKN) (with comments of GRS) Pages: 3 Country/Organization: Germany Date: 06.10.2025							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
1.	Page 1 Section 2 Line 2	... It was developed in response to evolving international safety requirements following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, with particular emphasis on addressing design extension conditions beyond design basis events and enhancing resilience to extreme external hazards.	SSG-68 states that it was developed “to provide recommendations on engineering related matters in order to meet the applicable safety requirements...” (para. 1.8) and that “In the evaluation of the safety of the nuclear installation in relation to beyond design basis external events, acceptance criteria applicable to the treatment of design extension conditions should be applied” (para. 2.21). Please clarify.			0	The document discusses how reactors should be able to handle accidents that are more severe than the design basis but still foreseeable, thus the term design extension conditions is more aligned with IAEA terminology. The term "beyond design basis events" is generally more associated with events that are very unlikely and go beyond the scope of design extension conditions. In the context of IAEA SSG-68, design extension conditions is the preferred terminology to describe scenarios that reactors are expected to be designed for.
2.	Page 1 Section 2 Line 13	... Therefore, this revision will include all nuclear installations. <u>Fusion facilities will be considered as well.</u>	As fusion facilities are mentioned in Table A.1, it makes sense to include them here as well.		0		Revised the sentence-“Therefore, this revision will also extend the scope to include all nuclear installations and fusion facilities.”
3.	Page 3	• The escalation of combined	Prolonged blackouts are not				

	Section 3 Line 13	climate-driven events, such as <u>e.g.</u> concurrent flooding, wildfires, and prolonged blackouts , posing challenges to existing safety margins and emergency preparedness strategies.	necessarily climate-driven events, but rather consequences that can have various causes. Hence, please delete.				
4.	Page 3 Section 5 Line 7	New siting contexts, including remote locations, post-industrial (brownfield) areas, and co-location with existing infrastructures, such as former coal- or gas-fired power stations <u>and associated hazard spectrum which might be vastly different compared with conventional sites.</u>	New sites might not only have different surroundings but also different hazard spectra in a sense, that some hazards may be present, which do not play an important role for conventional sites. E.g. in former mining areas sinkholes may play an unproportionally bigger role.		0		Added “and associated hazard spectra, which may differ significantly from those of conventional sites.”
5.	Page 7 Annex Line 20	The revised guide will provide expanded recommendations on the design of nuclear installations to withstand combinations of external events, such as <u>e.g.</u> flooding and fire, or external explosions with loss of off site power.	Loss of off-site power should be subject to other Safety Guides, such as SSR-2/1. Currently the off-site power supply is identified by the IAEA as the “preferred power supply” for Nuclear Power Plants (SSG-34). Both, off-site power supply and the safety power system are part of the defence in depth system. Thus, please remove statements related to explosions and loss of off-site power.			0	Explosion is one of the scopes of human-induced events among other external events, and explosion can cause loss of off-site power, loss of access roads for emergency plans, and so forth. Current version of SSG-68 describes off-site power (e.g. paras 2.26 and 2.32)
6.	Page 7 Annex Line 6	- Interfaces with site evaluation recommendations and updated defence-in-depth strategies will be strengthened. <u>Interfaces between the hazard evaluation guide and the design guide will be clarified.</u>	The interfaces between the hazard evaluation guides and the design guide should be clarified. E.g. in its current version SSG-68 is referring back to SSG-18	0			

			for design issues, which might lead to confusion.				
7.	Page 7 Annex Line 8	Application of Graded <u>Approach</u> and Risk-Informed Design Approaches <u>risk-informed performance-based design principles.</u>	Please align with IAEA Safety Glossary: there is no such a term as “Risk-Informed Design Approach”. The proposed wording, as used in current Draft DS563 “Seismic Design for Nuclear Installations“ is more appropriate.	0			
8.	Page 7 Annex Line 12	• The integration of risk-informed and performance-based approaches <u>design principles</u> will support balanced and technically justified decisions in defining design bases and evaluating protective features against postulated risks from external events.	Same as above, please align to official and defined IAEA terms.	0			
9.	Page 7 Annex Line 15	• Special focus will be given to design extension conditions <u>explanation of the relationships between design basis, especially design extension conditions, and beyond design basis external events</u> for extreme or low-frequency events.	Explain relationships between design basis, design extension conditions, and beyond design basis external event. Current version of SSG-68, para. 2.21 states: “In the evaluation of the safety of the nuclear installation in relation to beyond design basis external events, acceptance criteria applicable to the treatment of design extension conditions should be applied”.	0			Revised as “• Special focus will be given to explaining the relationships between design basis, particularly design extension conditions, and beyond design basis external events, especially for extreme or low-frequency events.”
10.	Page 7 Table A.1 Section 3	- Expand on compound and cascading hazards, <u>taking into consideration emerging hazards</u>	Please consider the possibility to include emerging hazards as well.	0			

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: Japan NUSSC member of Country/Organization: Japan / NRA 10, Oct., 2025				Page			
				Date:			
No	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
1.	2. BACKGROUND 2 nd para	Especially, a number of relevant IAEA Safety Standards have been recently revised or are undergoing revision to reflect lessons learned, technological advancements, and new safety practices, such as IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-1, SSG-9 (Rev. 1), SSG-18 (DS541), SSG-79, SSG-35, NS-G-3.2 (DS529), and NS-G-3.6 (DS531). In addition, the Safety Standards on external events design needs to be aligned not only with IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1), which is under preparation for review also being revised as DS562, but also with other applicable safety requirements (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-3 and SSR-4). <u>In addition, appropriate consistency with the contents of all relevant Safety Standards will be maintained, in particular SSR-1 (DS557) and SSR-2/2 (Rev. 1) (DS532).</u>	To keep consistency with related requirements that are being revised at the same time. Now SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1) is being revised in DS562 and it is expected to develop further time than DS564. So specify how to keep a consistency between the requirement and this guide. In addition, it should be harmonized with SSR-1 (DS557) and SSR-2/2 (Rev. 1) (DS532). The same comment is in the DPP-DS563.		0		The suggestions were adopted by rephrasing the second sentence of the same paragraph -“In addition, the Safety Standards for external events design should be aligned not only with the external events-related IAEA Safety Standards Series but also with other applicable safety requirements (e.g. IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev.1) (DS562), SSR-2/2 (Rev. 1) (DS532), SSR-3 and SSR-4).”
2.	3. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRODUCTION OF THE PUBLICATION	The possibility for siting nuclear installations in non-traditional or higher-risk environments, including remote regions, post-industrial areas, and zones with complex logistical constraints.	Clarify the background information in the bullet. There seems to be less detail information, which newly introduced site such as remote	0			Clarified with specific phrases like “...including remote regions with limited infrastructure, post-industrial

	3 rd para 2 nd bullet		regions, post-industrial areas, and zones with complex logistical constraints in the annex.				areas that may have legacy contamination or outdated facilities, and zones with complex logistical constraints due to difficult terrain or transportation challenges.”
3.	7. OVERVIEW	2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DESIGN OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AGAINST EXTERNAL EVENTS Requirements for site evaluation <u>Design principles for nuclear installations</u> Additional design considerations for external events Structures, systems and components (SSCs) to be protected against external events Design and evaluation for design basis and beyond design basis external events Design safety features for design basis and beyond design basis external events Design considerations for non-traditional site environments Administrative measures	For SMRs installed on remote islands or remote locations, the control room may be far from the reactor, unlike with traditional nuclear reactors. In line with SSR 2/1 (Rev. 2), para. 2.7 of current safety guide SSG-68 addresses control room, and the revised guide should also include considerations of design measures for <u>remote control rooms</u> in this sub-section.			0	It is not appropriate to mention ‘remote control rooms’ on the Guide because SSG-68 is technology-neutral and provides recommendations that should be applied to all types of nuclear installations . Nevertheless, the requirements quoted in SSG-68 are planned to be monitored

							and updated, as necessary, to ensure consistency in drafting step.

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: NUSSC Page.... of.... Country/Organization: Republic of Korea/Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) Date:							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
1	§2 (Background) and	A comment related to climate change.: Incorporate a comprehensive set of climate-change-related external hazards, including not only sea-level rise but also flooding, heatwaves, and the increase in seawater/river-water temperatures that may challenge the performance of the ultimate heat sink. (Current) “... such as increasing climate change impacts, space weather, and innovative designs leading to non-traditional site environments ...” → (suggestion) “... such as increasing climate-change-related impacts — including sea-level rise, low-flow conditions, prolonged heatwaves, and rising seawater/river-water temperatures that may affect the ultimate heat sink — as well as space weather and innovative designs leading to non-traditional site	The stated objective of this revision is to ensure that design recommendations adequately consider the effects of climate change on external events. Therefore, in addition to sea/river-level rise, other climate-driven phenomena such as increased seawater temperatures and extreme hydrometeorological conditions should be explicitly reflected. This will align the guide with SSR-1 (2019) and the ongoing revision of SSG-18 (DS 541) regarding meteorological and hydrological hazards, ensuring a consistent and comprehensive treatment of climate-change impacts.		0		Added a detailed list of examples in the Annex. “2. Combined, Cascading, and Emerging Hazards ...including sea-level rise, low-flow conditions, prolonged heatwaves, rising seawater/river-water temperatures that may affect the ultimate heat sink extreme weather patterns, and long-duration events.”

		environments ...”					
2	§3 (Justification for the Production of the Publication)	(Current) “This revision is also needed to update SSG-68 to reflect newly emerging or intensified external hazard conditions that can affect the design of nuclear installations. In recent years, several new dimensions of external risk, such as increasing climate change impacts, space weather, and innovative designs ...” → (Suggestion) “This revision is also needed to update SSG-68 to reflect newly emerging or intensified external hazard conditions that can affect the design of nuclear installations. In recent years, several new dimensions of external risk — particularly those driven by climate change, such as sea-level rise, flooding, extreme heat, and increased seawater/river-water temperatures influencing cooling performance — as well as space weather and innovative designs ...””			0		Added a detailed list of examples in the Annex. “2. Combined, Cascading, and Emerging Hazards ...including sea-level rise, low-flow conditions, prolonged heatwaves, rising seawater/river-water temperatures that may affect the ultimate heat sink extreme weather patterns, and long-duration events.”
3	§6 (Interfaces)	Correct “SSG- 2/1” to “SSR- 2/1 (Rev. 1)”	Editorial correction for consistency.	0			
4	Annex – Feedback Analysis Report, Table A.1	“Update background and objective to reflect the evolution of external hazards (e.g. climate change effects on site design parameters, human-induced risks).”		0			

	(Section 1 “Introducti on” row)	add the following phrase: “including potential effects on ultimate heat sink temperature and long-duration heatwaves.”					
--	---------------------------------------	---	--	--	--	--	--

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: A. AMRI Page 1.... of.... Country/Organization: Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Commission Date: 12/10/2025							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
1	General	The DPP should explain how to manage references to requirements/recommendations that are themselves undergoing revisions in parallel.	Reference is made to requirements (e.g. SSR-1) that are or will be undergoing revision.	0			Sections 2 & 6 have already explained.
2.	Section 3 (Justification for the Production of the Publication), paragraph 2, line 3	Please clarify the meaning of 'space weather' in the context of this safety guide and use the corresponding wording.	The wording 'space weather' is not clear.	0			Added an example of "space weather", geomagnetic storms, next to it in Section 2, where it was used for the first time in the DPP. (※ Space weather used in this DPP refers to changes and activity in space — mainly from the Sun — that can affect the Earth and its systems, such as satellites, power grids, and communication signals. The conditions of the

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: A. AMRI Page 1.... of.... Country/Organization: Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Commission Date: 12/10/2025							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
							Earth system come from space, mainly from the Sun.)
3.	Section 4 (Objective), paragraph 2, lines 6 and 7.	Please consider reformulating the last sentence by using the right terminology, as follows: It will also take into account the growing frequency and severity of combined climate-related events that may challenge the performance of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety.	‘safety-related’ has a specific meaning, in particular for the SSCs of a nuclear power plant that can be important to safety and not necessary safety-related.		“...structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to the safety of nuclear installations.”		Reflected multiple comments.
4.	Section 5 (Scope), paragraph 3, line 1	Please consider using ‘SSCs important to safety’ instead of ‘safety-related SSCs’	See reason explained in the previous comment.		“...SSCs important to the safety of”		Reflected multiple comments.
5.	Section 7 (Overview), contents of the report, chapter 2 (General considerations for the design of Nuclear Installations Against External Events), title ‘Design safety features	Please check the terminology of ‘design safety features’ for both design basis external events and beyond design basis external events and modify accordingly.	Terminology/editorial There should be a difference in the terminology, according to the one used in SSG-68, unless that one is intended to be revised - Design features for	0			There is no intention for changes in using this terminology. To avoid confusion, ‘external events’ was added after ‘design basis’ in the

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: A. AMRI Page 1.... of.... Country/Organization: Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Commission Date: 12/10/2025							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
	for design basis and beyond design basis external events'		design basis external events; - Additional design features for beyond design basis external events.				title.
6.	Section 7 (Overview)	None of the chapters/ sections of the table of contents highlights climate change impact, while this impact was noted in the section 3 related to justifications as one important factor justifying the revision of SSG-68.	General comment. The impact of climate change was noted in the section 3 related to justifications as one important factor justifying the revision of SSG-68.	0			As specified in Table A.1, the impact of climate change will be considered throughout the revision of SSG-68.

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER				RESOLUTION			
Reviewer: ONR Page 1 of 1 Country/Organization: UK Date:							
Comment No.	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modified as follows	Rejected	Reason for modification/rejection
Comment 1	Table A.1 section 5, column 3	“including the effects of climate change and associated uncertainty ;”	To address substantial uncertainty in climate change predictions	0			
Comment 2	Page 5	“Other extreme meteorological conditions and climate change ”	To explicitly consider climate change			0	There are other categories under Section 5 related with climate change effect.. Climate change effect will be explicitly considered in Section 5, as described in Table A.1.