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Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

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General Safety Requirements Part 7
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IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

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PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR A
NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

DRAFT

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

This publication includes a CD-ROM containing the IAEA Safety Glossary: 2007 Edition (2007) and the Fundamental Safety Principles (2006), each in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish versions. The CD-ROM is also available for purchase separately. See: <http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/publications.asp>

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PREFACE BY THE JOINT SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS

It is recognized among organizations responsible for emergency management (including those responsible for the management of conventional emergencies) that good preparedness in advance of an emergency can substantially improve the emergency response. Moreover, one of the most important features of the preparations is that they are integrated among the different bodies involved, ensuring clear lines of responsibility and authority.

The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident ('Early Notification Convention') and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency ('Assistance Convention') adopted in 1986 place specific obligations on the Parties and on the IAEA. The practical implementation of the various articles of these conventions as well as the fulfilment of some obligations of the IAEA (under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Legal Series No. 16, 1994, Article 16, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, INFCIRC/546, 1997, Article 25) warrant appropriate requirements for emergency management.

In March 2002, the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Safety Requirements publication, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2), jointly sponsored by seven international organizations (FAO, IAEA, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, OCHA and WHO), which established the requirements for efficient preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Since its publication in 2002, Member States were using these Safety Requirements publication in establishing or enhancing their emergency preparedness and response arrangements and capabilities. The IAEA General Conference, in resolution GC(56)/RES/9, emphasized "the importance for all Member States of implementing emergency preparedness and response programmes, including strengthening mechanisms to facilitate timely international information exchange during a nuclear emergency, and requests the IAEA, Member States and relevant international organizations to address compatibility issues in the development of national and international emergency response mechanisms and procedures consistent with the IAEA's Safety Standards".

To ensure the coordinated and consistent emergency preparedness and response arrangements at the international level, the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE), as an interagency co-ordination mechanism, co-ordinates emergency preparedness and response arrangements of the relevant international intergovernmental organizations (international organizations). The IACRNE also works towards coordinated and consistent international standards on emergency preparedness and response and their practical implementation in States and relevant international organizations.

The IAEA, relevant international organizations and Member States reviewed the IAEA Safety Requirements publication No. GS-R-2 based on lessons identified in exercises and in response to emergencies that occurred since its publication in 2002 (including the accident at the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011). The revised IAEA Safety Requirements publication No. GS-R-2 is hereby published as General Safety Requirements Part 7 in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.

[[A paragraph on Sponsoring Organizations to be inserted accordingly]]

These Safety Requirements are binding on the IAEA Secretariat in relation to its own operations and on States in relation to operations assisted by the IAEA.

These Safety Requirements are also to be applied by Sponsoring Organizations in accordance with their respective mandates and the Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations (EPR - Joint Plan). Other international organizations irrespective of whether they are members of the IACRNE are encouraged to consider these Safety Requirements in their own emergency management arrangements.

The IAEA on behalf of the joint Sponsoring Organizations, wishes to express its great appreciation to all those who assisted in the drafting, review and revision of Safety Requirements and in the process of reaching a consensus.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1

2 BACKGROUND

3 1.1. This publication in the IAEA Safety Standards Series applies the Fundamental Safety
4 Objective and Safety Principles of Fundamental Safety Principles the IAEA Safety Fundamentals [1].

5 1.2. This publication addresses the fundamental safety principle, Principle 9, concerned with
6 ensuring that arrangements are made for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological
7 emergency [1]. This publication also provides for consistency with the Nuclear Security
8 Fundamentals, Essential Element 11, concerned with ensuring planning for, preparedness for, and
9 response to a nuclear security event [2]. It therefore addresses the emergency arrangements to be in
10 place irrespective of the initiator of the emergency, whether due to a natural event, human error,
11 mechanical or other failure or a nuclear security event.

12 1.3. In 2002, the IAEA published the Safety Requirements publication, Preparedness and
13 Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, jointly sponsored by seven international
14 organizations (FAO, IAEA, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, OCHA and WHO)¹. The present Safety
15 Requirements publication is a revised and updated version of Safety Requirements Series No. GS-R-2
16 to take account of developments and experience gained since 2002 with due consideration, but not
17 limited to, the experience gained in the response to the accident at the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi
18 Nuclear Power Plant. The publications [3] and [4] elaborate on the requirements established in this
19 publication and provide guidance on their implementation.

20 1.4. This publication is the Safety Requirements publication in the IAEA Safety Standards Series
21 addressing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency
22 including the transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation. All
23 other Safety Requirements publications in the IAEA Safety Standards Series reference and are
24 consistent with these requirements in relation to emergency preparedness and response.

25 1.5. The response to a nuclear or radiological emergency may involve many national organizations
26 (e.g. the operating organization and response organizations at local, regional and national level) and
27 international organizations. The functions of many of these organizations would be the same for a
28 nuclear or radiological emergency as for a conventional emergency. However, the response to a
29 nuclear or radiological emergency might also involve specialized agencies and technical experts.
30 Therefore, in order to be effective, the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency must be well

¹ FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, IAEA, Vienna (2002).

1 coordinated and emergency arrangements must be appropriately integrated with those for a
2 conventional emergency and those for a nuclear security event.

3 1.6. Both safety measures and security measures have in common the aim of protecting human life
4 and health and the environment. Safety and security measures must be designed and implemented in
5 an integrated manner so that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not
6 compromise security² [1].

7 1.7. This publication also provides guidance for (1) preparedness and response for a nuclear and
8 radiological emergency for the relevant international organizations and (2) the inter-agency
9 coordination within the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies
10 (IACRNE).

11 1.8. It is assumed that States applying these requirements have in place an infrastructure for the
12 purpose of regulating the safety of facilities and activities that could pose radiation risks. This includes
13 laws and regulations governing their safe operation and an independent regulatory body with
14 responsibilities for establishing rules for safe operation and for enforcing them. In this context, the
15 IAEA has issued a General Safety Requirements publication on the governmental, legal and regulatory
16 framework for safety [5]. In addition, it is assumed that States applying these requirements have in
17 place an infrastructure for the purpose of regulating the nuclear security of nuclear material and other
18 radioactive material, associated facilities and associated activities, as well as nuclear security measures
19 for nuclear material and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. In this context, IAEA
20 Nuclear Security Series [6-8] provide recommendations.

21 OBJECTIVE

22 1.9. The present publication establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and
23 response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. Their implementation is intended to mitigate the
24 consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency.

25 1.10. The fulfilment of these requirements will also contribute to the harmonization of arrangements
26 for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency worldwide as such an
27 emergency may be a transnational.

28 1.11. These requirements are intended to be applied by the Government at the national level by
29 means of adopting legislation, establishing regulations and making other arrangements, including
30 assigning responsibilities (e.g. to the operating organization or operating personnel of a facility or an
31 activity, local or national officials, response organizations or the regulatory body etc.) and verifying
32 effective implementation.

² An example is the operating organization's contingency plan that includes measures to respond to thefts and acts of sabotage at a nuclear facility. The contingency plan for the nuclear facility needs to be compatible with the emergency arrangements developed by the operating organization for the same facility [6].

1 SCOPE

2 1.12. The requirements apply to all those facilities and activities with the potential for causing
3 radiation exposure, environmental contamination or public concern warranting protective actions and
4 other response actions in a nuclear or radiological emergency, and that are:

5 (a) Used in a State that chooses to adopt the requirements or that requests any of the Sponsoring
6 Organizations to provide for the application of the requirements;

7 (b) Used by States with the assistance of Sponsoring Organizations in compliance with applicable
8 national and international legal instruments;

9 (c) Used by the IAEA or which involve the use of materials, services, equipment, facilities and
10 non-published information made available by the IAEA or at its request or under its control or
11 supervision; or

12 (d) Used under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement whereby the parties request the IAEA to
13 provide for the application of the requirements.

14 1.13. The requirements also apply to the off-site jurisdictions that may need to take protective
15 actions and other response actions in a State that adopts the requirements.

16 1.14. The requirements apply to actions in preparedness and response for emergencies involving
17 ionizing radiation only. The requirements do not apply to preparedness or response for emergencies
18 involving hazards associated with non-ionizing radiation such as microwave, ultraviolet or infrared
19 radiation.

20 1.15. The requirements apply for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency
21 irrespective of the initiator of the emergency, whether due to a natural event, human error, mechanical
22 or other failure or a nuclear security event. They do not cover preparedness for, or response measures
23 that are specific to, nuclear security events, for which separate recommendations are provided in Refs
24 [6-8]. Such response measures include activities related to instruments alarms, information alerts,
25 management of a crime scene, nuclear forensics and related actions that would be taken in relation to a
26 nuclear security event. However, the requirements provide for a coordinated and integrated approach
27 to preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency arising from a nuclear security
28 event that necessitates protective actions and other response actions to be taken for protection of
29 public, workers, emergency workers and patients.

30 STRUCTURE

31 1.16. This publication comprises five main sections. Section 2 provides for the interpretation and
32 application of these safety requirements. Section 3 establishes the goals of emergency preparedness
33 and response, together with the principles for taking protective actions and other response actions that
34 are applicable for meeting these goals. Section 4 establishes the general requirements that must be met

1 before effective emergency arrangements can be started and defines the emergency preparedness
2 categories for which the requirements have been established using a graded approach. Section 5
3 provides the requirements for performing the functions critical for an effective emergency response.
4 The requirements for emergency response apply to the performance of critical functions or tasks in a
5 nuclear or radiological emergency. The requirements for emergency preparedness apply to
6 preparations to be made in order to ensure that there is a capability to meet the requirements for
7 response. Section 6 establishes requirements for the infrastructure necessary to develop and maintain
8 adequate preparedness arrangements. Guidance values for restricting exposure of emergency workers
9 and helpers in an emergency are provided in Appendix I. The internationally agreed generic criteria
10 for which protective actions and other response actions are expected to be undertaken in a nuclear or
11 radiological emergency are provided in Appendix II.

12

DRAFT

2. INTERPRETATION, RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS AND ENTRY INTO FORCE

DEFINITIONS

2.1. Terms used in this publication have the meanings given under Definitions.

INTERPRETATION

2.2. Except as specifically authorized by the statutory governing body of a relevant Sponsoring Organization, no interpretation of this standard by any officer or employee of the Sponsoring Organization other than a written interpretation by the Director General of the Sponsoring Organization will be binding on the Sponsoring Organization.

RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS

2.3. The requirements of this standard are in addition to and not in place of other applicable requirements, such as those of relevant binding conventions and national regulations.

2.4. In cases of conflict between the requirements of this standard and other applicable requirements, the government or the regulatory body, as appropriate, shall determine which requirements are to be enforced.

2.5. Nothing in this standard shall be construed as restricting any actions that may otherwise be necessary for protection and safety or as relieving the parties referred to in this standard from complying with applicable laws and regulations.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

2.6. The Secretariat envisages that, for IAEA's own operations and for those operations assisted by the IAEA, arrangements will be made to meet these requirements within a period of no more than one year from the date of publication.

2.7. These standards shall come into force one year after the date of their adoption or acknowledgement, as appropriate, by the relevant Sponsoring Organization.

2.8. If a State decides to adopt this standard, this standard shall come into force at the time indicated in the formal adoption by that State, and preferably within a period of no more than one year from the date of its publication.

1

2

3. GOALS OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

3

GOALS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE

4

3.1. In a nuclear or radiological emergency, the practical goals of emergency response are:

5

(a) To regain control of the situation;

6

(b) To prevent or mitigate on-site and off-site consequences;

7

(c) To avoid or minimize severe deterministic effects;

8

(d) To render first aid, to provide critical medical treatment and to manage the treatment of radiation injuries;

9

10

(e) To reduce the risk of stochastic effects;

11

(f) To prevent, to the extent practicable, the occurrence of non-radiological consequences;

12

(g) To keep the public informed;

13

(h) To protect, to the extent practicable, property and the environment; and

14

(i) To prepare, to the extent practicable, for the resumption of normal social and economic activity.

15

GOAL OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

16

3.2. The goal of emergency preparedness is to ensure an adequate capability in place at the operating organization and local, regional, national levels and, where appropriate, international levels for effectively meeting the practical goals for emergency response (see para. 3.1) in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency for the following infrastructure elements: authority and responsibilities; organization and staff; coordination; plans and procedures; tools, equipment and facilities; training, drills and exercises; and overall management system including a quality management programme.

23

4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

Requirement 1: Emergency management system

The government shall ensure that an integrated and coordinated emergency management system for a nuclear or radiological emergency is established and maintained.

4.1. The government shall ensure that an emergency management system¹ is established and maintained on the territories and within the jurisdiction of the State for the purposes of emergency response to protect human life, health and the environment in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency.

4.2. The emergency management system shall be commensurate with the results of the hazard assessment (see paras 4.15–4.23) and shall enable an effective emergency response to reasonably foreseeable events (including very low probability events).

4.3. The emergency management system shall be integrated, to the extent practicable, into an all-hazards emergency management system (see also paras 5.4 and 5.5).

4.4. The government shall ensure the coordination and consistency of its emergency arrangements with international emergency arrangements².

4.5. Relevant international organizations shall coordinate their arrangements in preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency and their emergency response actions.

Requirement 2: Roles and responsibilities

The government shall make provisions to ensure that all roles and responsibilities for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency are clearly specified and assigned.

GENERAL

4.6. The government shall make adequate preparations to anticipate, prepare for and respond at local, regional and national levels to nuclear or radiological emergencies and also, as appropriate, at the international level. This shall include adopting legislation and establishing regulations to effectively govern the preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency at any level (see paras 1.11 and 4.11).

¹ The term ‘management system’ reflects and includes the concept of ‘quality control’ and its evolution through ‘quality assurance’ and ‘quality management system’ (the system for managing quality).

² Arrangements set under the Assistance Convention and the Early Notification Convention [9] are examples of these international emergency arrangements.

1 4.7. The government shall ensure that all roles and responsibilities for preparedness and response
2 for a nuclear or radiological emergency are clearly allocated in advance among operating
3 organizations, the regulatory body and response organizations³.

4 4.8. The government shall ensure that operating organizations, the regulatory body and response
5 organizations have the necessary resources, considering their expected roles and responsibilities, to
6 deal with radiological and non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency,
7 whether the emergency occurs within or beyond national borders.

8 COORDINATING MECHANISM

9 4.9. The government shall establish a national coordinating mechanism, consistent with its
10 emergency management system:

11 (a) to ensure that roles and responsibilities are clearly allocated and are well understood by
12 operating organizations, response organizations and the regulatory body (see para. 4.7);

13 (b) to coordinate:

14 i. the hazard assessment within the State (see paras 4.15–4.23); and

15 ii. the periodic reviews of the assessed hazards (see para. 4.19);

16 (c) to coordinate and ensure consistency among the emergency arrangements of the various
17 response organizations and the regulatory body under the all-hazards approach, including
18 those arrangements for response to relevant nuclear security events, and, as appropriate, to
19 coordinate and ensure consistency with those arrangements of other States and of international
20 organizations;

21 (d) to coordinate and ensure consistency among the emergency arrangements, contingency plans
22 and security plans of operating organizations required by the regulatory body and by other
23 competent authorities with responsibilities for regulating nuclear security, as relevant (see
24 para. 4.13(b));

25 (e) to ensure that appropriate emergency arrangements are in place, both on-site and off-site, as
26 appropriate, in relation to facilities and activities under regulatory control, both within the
27 State and, as relevant, beyond its borders, and also for sources that are not under regulatory
28 control⁴;

³ This also includes allocation of roles and responsibilities, as appropriate, among members of the government.

⁴ Examples of sources not under regulatory control are orphan sources and sources under governmental control but not under regulatory control, such as sources in military applications. This also encompasses radioactive material that is out of regulatory control as defined in Ref. [8].

1 (f) to ensure that arrangements are in place for enforcing compliance with the national
2 requirements for emergency preparedness and response established by legislation, regulations
3 and guides (see paras 4.6 and 4.11);

4 (g) to coordinate the analysis of an emergency and an emergency response (see para. 5.139);

5 (h) to ensure that appropriate training and exercise programmes are in place and implemented and
6 that training and exercises are systematically evaluated;

7 (i) to coordinate:

8 i. provision of public information in a nuclear or radiological emergency (see para.
9 5.95); and

10 ii. the identification of inappropriate actions taken by the public or any other actors in a
11 nuclear or radiological emergency and actions taken promptly to address inappropriate
12 actions (see paras 5.120 and 5.124).

13 REGULATORY BODY

14 4.10. The arrangements for preparedness to respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency for
15 facilities and activities under the responsibility of the operating organization shall be dealt with
16 through the regulatory process.

17 4.11. The regulatory body is required to establish or adopt regulations and guides to specify the
18 principles, requirements and associated criteria for safety upon which its regulatory judgements,
19 decisions and actions are based [5]. These principles, requirements and associated criteria shall include
20 those for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

21 4.12. The regulatory body shall require that arrangements for preparedness and response for a
22 nuclear or radiological emergency be in place for the on-site area for any regulated facility or activity
23 that could necessitate emergency action and shall carry out inspections to verify a compliance with the
24 required arrangements. For a facility in category I, II or III and for an activity in category IV (see para.
25 4.17), appropriate emergency arrangements shall be established from the time that the source is
26 brought to the site, and complete emergency arrangements shall be ensured before the commencement
27 of operation of the facility or commencement of the activity.

28 4.13. The regulatory body shall ensure and shall be provided by the operating organization with
29 sufficient assurance, for all facilities and activities under regulatory control, that the emergency
30 arrangements:

31 (a) are integrated with those of other response organizations as appropriate before the
32 authorization is granted;

33 (b) are integrated with contingency plans in the context of Ref. [6] and with security plans in the
34 context of Ref. [7];

1 (c) provide a reasonable assurance of an effective response, in compliance with these
2 requirements, in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency;

3 (d) are tested in an exercise before the commencement of operation of a facility or
4 commencement of an activity and thereafter, at suitable intervals.

5 4.14. The regulatory body shall ensure that the operating organization is given sufficient authority
6 to promptly take protective actions and other response actions on the site in response to a nuclear or
7 radiological emergency.

8 **Requirement 3: Assessment of hazards**

9 **The government shall ensure that a hazard assessment is performed to provide a basis for a**
10 **graded approach to preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.**

11 4.15. Identified hazards and potential consequences of an emergency shall provide a basis for
12 establishing arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.
13 These arrangements shall be commensurate with these hazards and consequences.

14 4.16. Based on the identified hazards and potential consequences of a nuclear or radiological
15 emergency, protection strategies shall be developed, justified and optimized, following steps
16 elaborated in Ref. [3], for taking effective protective actions and other response actions to avoid or to
17 minimize severe deterministic effects and to reduce the risk of stochastic effects, in accordance with
18 the generic criteria in Appendix II.

19 4.17. For the purposes of these requirements, assessed hazards are grouped according to the
20 emergency preparedness categories shown in Table I. The five emergency preparedness categories
21 (hereinafter referred to as 'categories') in Table I establish the basis for graded approach to be applied
22 in application of these safety requirements and for developing generically justified and optimized
23 arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

24

1 TABLE I. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF THESE
2 REQUIREMENTS

Category	Description
I	Facilities, such as nuclear power plants, for which on-site events ^{a, b} (including those beyond design basis) are postulated that could give rise to severe deterministic effects ^c off the site that warrant precautionary urgent protective actions, urgent or early protective actions and other response actions in accordance with international standards ^d , or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities.
II	Facilities, such as some types of research reactors and nuclear reactors used to power vessels, for which on-site events ^{a, b} are postulated that could give rise to doses to people off the site that warrant urgent or early protective actions and other response actions in accordance with international standards ^d , or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities. Category II (as opposed to category I) does not include facilities for which on-site events (including those beyond design basis) are postulated that could give rise to severe deterministic effects off the site, or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities.
III	Facilities, such as industrial irradiation facilities or some medical facilities, for which on-site events ^b are postulated that could warrant protective action and other response actions in accordance with international standards ^d on the site, or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities. Category III (as opposed to category II) does not include facilities for which events are postulated that could warrant urgent and early protective actions off the site, or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities.
IV	Activities and acts that could give rise to a nuclear or radiological emergency that could warrant protective actions and other response actions in accordance with international standards ^d in an unforeseen location. These activities and acts include: (a) transport of nuclear or radioactive material and other authorized activities involving mobile dangerous sources such as industrial radiography sources, nuclear powered satellites or radioisotope thermoelectric generators or fixed sealed sources; and (b) theft of a dangerous source and use of a radiological dispersal device or radiological exposure device. This category also includes: (a) detection of elevated radiation levels of unknown origin or commodities with contamination; (b) identification of medical symptoms due to radiation overexposure; and (c) transnational emergency as a result of a nuclear or radiological emergency abroad that is not a category V. Category IV represents a level of hazard that applies for all States and jurisdictions.
V	Areas within emergency planning zones and distances ^e for a facility in category I or II not located in the State where the facility is located (i.e. across the border).

3 ^{a.} Involving an atmospheric or aquatic release of radioactive material, or external exposure (such as due to a
4 loss of shielding or a criticality event), that originates from a location on the site.

5 ^{b.} Such events include nuclear security events.

6 ^{c.} Doses in excess of those for which protective actions and other response actions are expected to be
7 undertaken under any circumstances in accordance with the generic criteria in Appendix II. See
8 'deterministic effect' in the Definitions list of this publication.

9 ^{d.} See the generic criteria in Appendix II.

10 ^{e.} See para. 5.53.

11

- 1 4.18. The government shall ensure that for all facilities and activities, a comprehensive hazard
2 assessment is performed. The hazard assessment shall consider:
- 3 (a) events that could occur at the facility or activity, including those not considered in the design
4 basis;
- 5 (b) events involving a combination of a nuclear or radiological emergency and a conventional
6 emergency such as an emergency following an earthquake, a volcanic eruption, a tropical
7 cyclone, a tsunami, an aircraft crash or any civil disturbances that affects wide areas and/or
8 impairs capabilities to provide support in the emergency response;
- 9 (c) events affecting several facilities and activities simultaneously and their interactions;
- 10 (d) events at nuclear facilities or events affecting activities in other States;
- 11 (e) results from threat assessments [6-8].
- 12 4.19. The government shall ensure that a review is periodically performed in order to ensure that all
13 facilities and activities that could experience events that would necessitate protective actions and other
14 response actions are identified. This review shall be undertaken to take into account any changes to the
15 hazards within the State and beyond its borders including any change in assessments of threats, the
16 experience and lessons learned from research, operation and emergency exercises, and technological
17 developments (see paras 6.30, 6.34 and 6.36). The results of this review shall be used to revise the
18 emergency arrangements.
- 19 4.20. Operating organizations shall appropriately revise the emergency arrangements (a) prior to
20 any change in the facility or activity that may impact the existing hazard assessment (e.g. movement of
21 irradiated reactor fuel to a new location, projected flooding or storms) and (b) when new information
22 challenging the existing arrangements become available.
- 23 4.21. In the hazard assessment, facilities and activities, on-site areas, off-site areas and locations
24 shall be identified for which a nuclear or radiological emergency could warrant:
- 25 (a) Precautionary urgent protective actions (taken on the basis of conditions at the facility or on
26 the site before environmental monitoring is conducted (see Ref. [3]) to avoid or to minimize
27 severe deterministic effects by keeping doses below levels approaching the generic criteria at
28 which urgent protective actions and other response actions are to be undertaken under any
29 circumstances in accordance with Appendix II;
- 30 (b) Urgent protective actions and other response actions to avoid or to minimize severe
31 deterministic effects and to reduce the risk of stochastic effects in accordance with Appendix
32 II;
- 33 (c) Early protective actions and other response actions, in accordance with Appendix II;
- 34 (d) Other response actions such as longer term medical actions in accordance Appendix II; or
- 35 (e) Protection for the emergency workers in accordance with paras 5.65–5.79 and Appendix I.

1 4.22. The hazard assessment shall also identify facilities and locations at which there is a significant
2 likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control (e.g. scrap metal processing
3 facilities, national border crossing points, seaports, airports and abandoned military or other facilities
4 where dangerous sources may have been used in the past etc.).

5 4.23. For all facilities and activities, non-radiation related hazards to people on and off the site that
6 are associated with the facility or activity (such as the release of toxic chemicals, e.g. uranium
7 hexafluoride (UF₆), fires, explosions, etc.) that may impair the effectiveness of the actions taken in
8 response to the nuclear or radiological emergency at the facility or activity shall be identified in the
9 hazard assessment.

10

DRAFT

5. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

1

2 GENERAL

3 5.1. The requirements for response established in this Section apply for the response to a nuclear
4 or radiological emergency. The requirements for response must be met to achieve the practical goals
5 of emergency response (see para. 3.1). In order to ensure that there is the necessary capability to meet
6 the requirements for response, the requirements for preparedness apply as part of the planning and
7 preparation process for emergency response.

8 **Requirement 4: Managing emergency response operations**

9 **The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the emergency response**
10 **operations to be appropriately managed.**

11 **Response**

12 5.2. For facilities in categories I, II and III, the on-site emergency response shall be promptly
13 executed and managed without impairing the performance of the continuing operational safety and
14 security functions both within the facility and at other facilities at the same site.

15 5.3. For facilities in categories I, II and III, the off-site emergency response shall be promptly
16 executed and effectively managed and coordinated with the on-site emergency response.

17 5.4. The emergency response shall be coordinated between all response organizations, including
18 those specialized in responding in a conventional emergency and in an emergency initiated by a
19 nuclear security event.

20 5.5. The emergency response shall be managed immediately and continuously under a clearly
21 specified command and control system and shall be directed by clearly designated emergency
22 response commander.

23 5.6. Information necessary for making decisions on the allocation of resources shall be appraised
24 throughout the nuclear or radiological emergency.

25 5.7. For facilities in categories I or II and areas within category V, response organizations
26 (including those of other States) within the emergency planning zones and distances (see para. 5.53)
27 shall coordinate their emergency responses and shall provide mutual support.

28 **Preparedness**

29 5.8. For facilities in categories I, II and III, arrangements shall be made for the transition from
30 normal operations to emergency operations to be clearly defined and to be effectively made without
31 jeopardizing safety and nuclear security. The responsibilities of all persons who would be on the site
32 in an emergency shall be designated as part of the arrangements for the transition. It shall be ensured

1 that the transition to the emergency response and the performance of initial response actions do not
2 impair the ability of the operating personnel (such as the control room staff) to ensure safe and secure
3 operation while taking mitigatory actions.

4 5.9. For facilities in categories I, II and III, arrangements shall be made for coordinating the
5 emergency responses of all the off-site response organizations with the on-site response.

6 5.10. For a site where several facilities in category I are collocated, adequate arrangements (in terms
7 of number of qualified personnel and amount of equipment and supplies, for example) shall be made
8 to manage all the facilities if each of them is under emergency conditions simultaneously. This shall
9 include arrangements to manage the deployment and the protection and safety of personnel responding
10 on and off the site (see paras 5.65–5.79).

11 5.11. For facilities and activities in categories I, II, III and IV, arrangements shall be made to
12 ensure, as far as practicable, that the facility or activity has nuclear security system [6, 7] that would
13 be functional in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

14 5.12. Arrangements for response to a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be coordinated and
15 integrated with arrangements at the national, regional and local level for response to conventional
16 emergencies and to emergencies initiated by nuclear security events. Arrangements shall be made for
17 coordinated response to a radiological emergency with other States, as appropriate.

18 5.13. Arrangements shall be made for the establishment and implementation of a clearly specified
19 command and control system for emergency response as part of the emergency management system
20 (see paras 4.1–4.3) and for identifying a single clearly designated emergency response commander
21 (see para. 6.4) to direct the emergency response under the all hazards approach. When different
22 emergency response commanders are designated to direct the on-site and off-site response, these
23 arrangements shall provide sufficient assurance for their effective coordination. An emergency
24 response commander shall be available immediately and continuously following a notification of an
25 emergency and shall not be assigned any other responsibilities that would interfere with the prompt
26 execution of the specified functions (see para. 6.5).

27 5.14. Arrangements shall be made for obtaining and assessing the information necessary in order to
28 allocate resources for all response organizations.

29 5.15. For facilities in category I or II and areas within category V, arrangements shall be made for
30 coordinating the response to a nuclear emergency between response organizations (including those of
31 other States) within the emergency planning zones and distances (see para. 5.53).

32 **Requirement 5: Identifying, notifying and activating**

33 **The government shall ensure that a system is put in place for the prompt identification and**
34 **notification of emergency conditions and for the activation of an emergency response.**

1 **Response**

2 5.16. For facilities and activities in categories I, II, III and IV, when circumstances necessitate an
3 emergency response, operating personnel shall promptly determine the appropriate emergency class
4 (see para. 5.25) or the level of emergency response and shall initiate the appropriate on-site actions.
5 Upon classification of the nuclear or radiological emergency, the operating personnel shall promptly
6 notify and provide sufficient information to, as appropriate, the off-site notification point.

7 5.17. When circumstances necessitate an emergency response, those staff at locations where there is
8 a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control (see para. 4.22)
9 and first responders in an emergency at an unforeseen location shall promptly initiate the appropriate
10 actions on the site and shall notify and provide sufficient information, as appropriate, to the off-site
11 notification point.

12 5.18. Upon notification of a nuclear or radiological emergency warranting an off-site response, the
13 off-site notification point shall promptly initiate a preplanned and coordinated response that is
14 appropriate to the emergency class or the level of emergency response.

15 5.19. In the event of a transnational emergency, the notifying State shall promptly notify⁵, either
16 directly or through the IAEA, those States that may be affected. The notifying State shall also notify⁶
17 the IAEA of a transnational emergency. The notifying State shall provide information on the nature of
18 the emergency and on any potential transnational consequences and shall respond to requests from
19 other States and from the IAEA for information with the intent of minimizing any consequences.

20 5.20. Appropriate emergency response actions shall be initiated promptly upon the receipt of a
21 notification from another State or of information from the IAEA on a notification relating to an actual
22 or potential transnational emergency that could affect the State or its nationals.

23 **Preparedness**

24 5.21. Notification point(s)⁷ shall be established to receive notification of an actual or potential
25 nuclear or radiological emergency. The notification point(s) shall be continuously available to receive
26 any notification or request for support and to respond promptly or to initiate a preplanned and
27 coordinated off-site response appropriate to the emergency class or the level of emergency response.
28 The notification point(s) shall have immediate and continuous communication with the response

⁵ Such a notification is in accordance with the State's obligations under the general principles and rules of international law, and for the case of a significant transboundary release, it is in accordance with the Early Notification Convention [9].

⁶ Such a notification is in accordance with the State's obligations under the general principles and rules of international law, and for the case of a significant transboundary release, it is in accordance with the Early Notification Convention [9].

⁷ This can be the notification point used to receive notification of and to initiate the off-site emergency response to an emergency of any type (conventional, nuclear or radiological).

1 organizations that are providing support. Such communication shall use suitable and diverse means of
2 communication.

3 5.22. For facilities in categories I and II and for areas in category V, the off-site notification point
4 shall have immediate and continuous communication with the off-site decision maker who has the
5 authority and responsibility, as appropriate, without consultation, immediately to initiate precautionary
6 urgent protective actions and urgent protective actions and other response actions off-site. In a nuclear
7 or radiological emergency, the off-site decision maker shall not be given any other responsibilities that
8 would interfere with prompt execution of the specified function (see para. 6.5).

9 5.23. At facilities and locations where there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous
10 source that is not under control (see para. 4.22), arrangements shall be made to ensure that the on-site
11 managers of operations and other staff, as well as the local officials responsible for the response, are
12 aware of the indicators of a potential radiological emergency and aware of the appropriate
13 notifications and protective actions and other response actions warranted immediately in the event of
14 an emergency.

15 5.24. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that first responders in an emergency at an unforeseen
16 location are aware of the observable indicators of a potential radiological emergency, appropriate
17 notification, and protective actions and other response actions warranted immediately in the event of
18 an emergency.

19 5.25. The operating organization of a facility or activity in category I, II, III or IV shall make
20 arrangements for promptly classifying nuclear and radiological emergencies warranting protective
21 actions and other response actions in order to protect workers, emergency workers, patients and the
22 public in accordance with Appendices I and II. The emergency classes may differ from those specified
23 below provided that emergencies of all these types are addressed:

24 (a) *General emergencies* at facilities in category I or II for an emergency that warrants taking
25 urgent protective actions and other response actions on the site and off the site. Upon
26 declaration of this emergency class, appropriate actions shall promptly be taken, according to
27 the available information relating to the emergency, to mitigate the consequences of the
28 emergency on the site and to protect people on the site and off the site.

29 (b) *Site area emergencies* at facilities in category I or II for an emergency that warrants taking
30 protective actions and other response actions on the site and in the vicinity of the site based on
31 off-site monitoring and other assessments. Upon declaration of this emergency class, actions
32 shall promptly be taken: (i) to mitigate the consequences of the emergency on the site and to
33 protect people on the site, (ii) to prepare to take protective actions and other response actions
34 off the site if this becomes necessary, (iii) to use reliable technical/radiological assessments
35 and/or projections provided that their limitations are recognized and that they can be used
36 promptly (see para. 6.23) and (iv) to conduct monitoring and sampling off the site.

1 (c) *Facility emergencies* at facilities in category I, II or III for an emergency that warrants taking
2 protective actions and other response actions at the facility. Upon declaration of this
3 emergency class, actions shall promptly be taken to mitigate the consequences of the
4 emergency and to protect people at the facility. Emergencies in this class can never give rise to
5 an off-site hazard.

6 (d) *Alerts at facilities* in category I, II or III for an emergency that warrants taking actions to
7 assess and to mitigate the consequences of the emergency at the facility. Upon declaration of
8 this emergency class, actions shall promptly be taken to assess and to mitigate the
9 consequences of the emergency and to increase the readiness of the on-site and off-site
10 response organizations, as appropriate.

11 (e) *Other nuclear or radiological emergencies* for emergencies involving activities in category IV
12 that warrant taking protective actions and other response actions. Upon declaration of this
13 emergency class and the level of emergency response, actions shall promptly be taken to
14 mitigate the consequences of the emergency on the site, to protect those in the vicinity (e.g.
15 the public, workers, emergency workers) and to determine where and for whom other
16 protective actions and other response actions are warranted.

17 5.26. The emergency classification system for facilities and activities in categories I, II, III and IV
18 shall take into account all postulated emergencies including those of very low probability. The
19 operational criteria for classification shall include emergency action levels (EALs) related to abnormal
20 conditions for the facility or activity concerned and associated, either actual or projected, progression
21 and other observables and indicators of the conditions at the facility and/or on the site or off the site
22 (see para. 5.48). The classification system shall be established with the aim of allowing for the prompt
23 initiation of an effective response in recognition of the uncertainty of projections to be used and other
24 reliable information showing when the response actions may need to be taken to be effective. It shall
25 be ensured that the process of rating the event on the joint IAEA and OECD/NEA International
26 Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) [10] does not delay the emergency classification or
27 other response actions⁸.

28 5.27. For each facility or activity in category I, II, III or IV, arrangements shall be made: (1) to
29 promptly recognize and classify a nuclear or radiological emergency, (2) upon classification, to
30 promptly declare the emergency class and to initiate an appropriate on-site response, and (3) to notify
31 the appropriate off-site notification point (see para. 5.21) and to provide sufficient information for an
32 effective off-site response. These arrangements shall include appropriate and diverse means for
33 alerting people on the site and for notifying off-site notification point (see paras 5.57, 5.56, 6.24 and
34 6.34).

⁸ The emergency response classification system is not to be confused with INES. INES is used by States for the purpose of communicating to the public the severity of an event only. INES cannot be used as the basis for emergency response actions.

1 5.28. Declaration of a particular class of emergency at a facility or activity in category I, II, III or IV
2 shall promptly initiate the appropriate level of coordinated and preplanned emergency response
3 consistent with the results of the hazard assessment (see para. 4.22) in order to meet the goals of
4 emergency response, as appropriate, on and off the site. The responsibilities and initial response
5 actions of all response organizations shall be specified for each class of emergency.

6 5.29. For facilities in category I or II and for areas within category V, the hazard assessment shall
7 demonstrate, for the range of postulated emergencies, that identification, notification, activation and
8 other initial response actions can be performed in time to meet the practical goals (see para. 3.1) of
9 emergency response.

10 5.30. Arrangements shall be made such that the absence of detailed plans for a nuclear or
11 radiological emergency which have not been formulated in advance shall not delay the emergency
12 response.

13 5.31. The State shall make known to the IAEA and to other States, directly or through the IAEA, its
14 single warning point responsible for receiving emergency notifications and information from other
15 States and information from the IAEA. This warning point shall be continuously available to receive
16 any notification, request for assistance or request for verification and to initiate promptly a response or
17 verification. The State shall promptly inform the IAEA and, directly or through the IAEA, other States
18 of any changes that may occur in respect of the warning point.

19 5.32. The State shall make arrangements for promptly notifying and for providing relevant
20 information to, directly or through the IAEA, those States that may be affected by a transnational
21 emergency. The State shall have arrangements in place for promptly responding to requests from other
22 States or from the IAEA for available information in respect of a transnational emergency, in
23 particular with regard to minimizing any transnational consequences. These arrangements shall
24 include making known to the IAEA and to other States, directly or through the IAEA, its designated
25 organization(s) for doing so.

26 5.33. Arrangements shall be made to promptly and directly notify any State within the emergency
27 planning zones and distances (see para. 5.53) in which urgent and early protective actions and other
28 response actions could be required to be taken.

29 **Requirement 6: Taking mitigatory actions**

30 **The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for taking mitigatory actions in a**
31 **nuclear or radiological emergency.**

32 **Response**

1 5.34. The operating organization of a facility or activity in category I, II, III or IV shall promptly
2 decide on, and take actions⁹ on-site necessary to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiological
3 emergency involving a facility or an activity under its responsibility.

4 5.35. First responders in an emergency at an unforeseen location and those staff at locations where
5 there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control (see para.
6 4.22) shall take all practicable and appropriate actions to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or
7 radiological emergency.

8 5.36. Off-site emergency services shall be made available, and shall be capable, to support the on-
9 site response at facilities and activities in category I, II, III or IV.

10 **Preparedness**

11 5.37. Arrangements shall be made to provide expertise and services in radiation protection promptly
12 to local officials, first responders in an emergency at an unforeseen location and specialized services
13 (e.g. law enforcement agencies) responding to emergencies involving activities in category IV and to
14 those staff at locations where there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that
15 is not under control (see para. 4.22). This shall include arrangements for on-call advice or other
16 appropriate mechanisms and arrangements to dispatch on-site an emergency team capable of assessing
17 the radiation hazards, mitigating the radiological consequences and managing the exposure of
18 emergency workers. In addition, arrangements shall be made to determine whether and when
19 additional assistance is necessary and how to obtain such assistance (see paras 5.126 and 5.128).

20 5.38. The operating personnel of an activity in category IV, first responders in an emergency at an
21 unforeseen location and those staff at locations where there is a significant likelihood of encountering
22 a dangerous source that is not under control (see para. 4.22) shall be given basic instruction in the
23 means of mitigating the potential consequences of emergencies (also see para. 5.58).

24 5.39. The operating organization of an activity in category IV shall make arrangements to respond
25 promptly to emergencies in relation to the authorized activity in order to mitigate the consequences.

26 5.40. Arrangements shall be made to initiate a prompt search in the event that a dangerous source
27 could possibly be in the public domain as a result of its loss or unauthorized removal (also see para.
28 5.63).

29 5.41. For facilities in category I, II or III, arrangements shall be made for mitigatory action by the
30 operating personnel to prevent an escalation of the emergency, to return the facility to a safe and stable
31 state, to ensure as far as practicable the continued functionality of the nuclear security system (see Ref.
32 [6-8]), to reduce the potential for releases of radioactive material or exposures and to mitigate the

⁹ Such actions may include actions such as discharge of radioactive material to the environment, provided that the appropriate off-site organizations are notified in advance.

1 consequences of any actual releases or exposures. These arrangements shall take into account full
2 range of possible conditions affecting the emergency response (such as potential impact of postulated
3 natural, human induced or other events affecting regional infrastructure and several facilities
4 simultaneously) as well as the following aspects: the operational actions necessary; the operational
5 information needs; the workload and habitability conditions of the operating personnel (such as in the
6 control room); the response actions necessary in the facility; the conditions in the facility and, where
7 appropriate, the conditions in the vicinity of the facility, in which response actions are necessary,
8 including possible hazardous conditions affecting emergency workers (e.g. high temperatures, toxic
9 gases, high external dose rates etc.); and the response and availability of the personnel,
10 instrumentation and structures, systems and components of the facility under emergency conditions.
11 Arrangements shall include emergency operating procedures and guidance for the operating personnel
12 on mitigatory actions for severe conditions (for a nuclear power plant as part of the accident
13 management programme [11]), for the full range of postulated emergencies, including accidents that
14 are beyond the design basis and/or the design extension conditions and associated conditions.

15 5.42. For facilities in category I, II or III, arrangements shall be made, in particular by the operating
16 organization, to provide technical assistance to the operating personnel. On-site teams for mitigating
17 the consequences of an emergency (e.g. damage control, firefighting) shall be available and shall be
18 prepared to perform actions in the facility. Any equipment necessary in response and recovery shall be
19 placed so as to be readily available and accessible in the anticipated emergency conditions or
20 environmental conditions when needed. The operating personnel directing mitigatory actions shall be
21 provided with information and technical assistance that allows them to take effective actions to
22 mitigate the consequences of the emergency. Arrangements shall be made to obtain support promptly
23 from the emergency services (e.g. police, medical and firefighting services) off the site. Off-site
24 emergency services shall be afforded prompt access to the facility and shall be informed of on-site
25 conditions and provided with instructions and with means of protecting themselves as emergency
26 workers (see paras 5.65–5.79 and Appendix I).

27 **Requirement 7: Taking urgent protective actions and other response actions**

28 **The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to assess emergency conditions and**
29 **to take urgent protective actions and other response actions in a nuclear or radiological**
30 **emergency with account taken of international standards.**

31 **Response**

32 5.43. The magnitude of hazards and the possible development of hazardous conditions shall be
33 appraised initially and throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency. This shall include observing
34 the abnormal conditions at the facility or in the activity, use of reliable and timely
35 technical/radiological assessments and/or projections (see para. 6.23) and conducting radiation

1 monitoring, environmental monitoring and assessment, in order promptly to identify, characterize or
2 anticipate, as appropriate, new hazards or the extent of hazards and to refine the protection strategy.

3 5.44. All appropriate actions shall be taken to save lives and to prevent severe deterministic effects.

4 5.45. Urgent protective actions and other response actions shall be taken effectively in accordance
5 with national generic criteria (see para. 5.50) and with due consideration of the conditions specific to
6 the emergency.

7 5.46. Urgent protective actions and other response actions shall be modified as appropriate to take
8 into account any new information relating to the emergency that becomes available. A protective
9 action and other response action shall not be implemented if it is not justified or shall be discontinued
10 when it is no longer justified.

11 5.47. Information about emergency conditions, assessments and protective actions and other
12 response actions that have been recommended and have been taken shall be promptly made available,
13 as appropriate, to all relevant response organizations throughout the emergency.

14 **Preparedness**

15 5.48. The operating organization of a facility in category I, II or III shall make arrangements to
16 assess and anticipate promptly: abnormal conditions at the facility; exposures and releases of
17 radioactive material and other hazardous material; radiological conditions on and off the site; and any
18 actual or potential exposures of the public. These assessments shall be used: for deciding on mitigatory
19 actions to be taken by the operating personnel; as a basis for emergency classification (see para. 5.25);
20 for deciding on urgent protective actions and other response actions to be taken on the site including
21 those for protection of workers; and for recommendations for urgent protective actions and other
22 response actions to be taken off the site. These arrangements shall include provision for access to
23 instruments displaying or measuring those parameters that can readily be measured or observed in a
24 nuclear or radiological emergency. In these arrangements, the expected response of instrumentation
25 and structures, systems and components at the facility under emergency conditions shall be taken into
26 account. Any use of technical/radiological assessments and/or projections shall be made with
27 recognition of their limitations and provided that they can be used promptly (see para. 6.23).

28 5.49. The operating organization for activities in category IV shall make arrangements to assess
29 promptly the extent and/or the significance of any abnormal conditions on the site, any exposures or
30 any contamination. These assessments shall be used for initiating the mitigatory actions, as a basis for
31 protective actions and other response actions to be taken on the site; to identify members of the public
32 who could potentially be exposed; and to communicate the extent of the hazard and the recommended
33 protective actions and other response actions to the appropriate off-site response organizations.

34 5.50. National generic criteria for taking urgent protective actions and other response actions shall
35 be established in accordance with the generic criteria in Appendix II and shall be justified and

1 optimized with account taken of local and national conditions and conditions specific to the range of
2 postulated emergencies. Based on the national generic criteria, predetermined operational intervention
3 levels (OILs) shall be developed for triggering urgent protective actions and other response actions.
4 Arrangements shall be made for revision of these operational intervention levels, as appropriate, in a
5 nuclear or radiological emergency, with account taken of the prevailing conditions as they evolve.

6 5.51. Arrangements shall be made for adjusting urgent protective actions and other response actions
7 as the emergency evolves, when appropriate, with involvement of interested parties.

8 5.52. First responders in an emergency at an unforeseen location shall be informed that, in the event
9 of an immediate danger to life (such as a fire), they should not delay any action to save human life or
10 prevent serious injury on the grounds of the possible presence of radioactive material. First responders
11 in an emergency at an unforeseen location shall be informed of the precautions to take in giving first
12 aid or in transporting an individual with possible contamination.

13 5.53. For facilities in category I or II, arrangements shall be made for effectively making and
14 implementing decisions on urgent protective actions and other response actions to be taken off the site
15 in order to meet the goals of emergency response based on a graded approach. This capability shall
16 make use of existing public infrastructure (e.g. buildings and transport networks) to avoid or minimize
17 severe deterministic effects and to reduce the risk of stochastic effects, for the full range of possible
18 emergencies (including those not considered in the design basis) at those facilities. These
19 arrangements, depending on the capability to use existing public infrastructure (e.g. buildings,
20 transport networks etc.), shall include the following:

21 (a) The specification of off-site emergency planning zones and distances for which arrangements
22 shall be made for taking protective actions and other response actions. These emergency
23 planning zones and distances shall be contiguous across national borders, where appropriate,
24 and shall include:

25 (i) A precautionary action zone (PAZ), for facilities in category I, for which arrangements shall
26 be made at the preparedness stage with the goal of taking precautionary urgent protective
27 actions and other response actions, before any significant release¹⁰ of radioactive material
28 occurs, on the basis of conditions at the facility (i.e. conditions leading to the declaration of a
29 general emergency; see para. 5.25), in order to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic
30 effects.

31 (ii) An urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ), for facilities in category I or II, for which
32 arrangements shall be made at the preparedness stage with the goal of initiating precautionary
33 urgent protective actions if possible before a release on the basis of conditions at the facility
34 (i.e. conditions leading to the declaration of a general emergency; see para. 5.25) and urgent

¹⁰ A release that warrants taking protective actions or other response actions off the site.

1 protective actions and other response actions on the basis of reliable and timely predictions of
2 the radiological situation off the site (see para. 6.23) if available or on monitoring off the site,
3 in order to take response actions that are effective in reducing the risk of stochastic effects¹¹
4 off the site. Any such actions shall be taken in such a way as not to delay the implementation
5 of precautionary urgent protective actions and other response actions within the precautionary
6 action zone.

7 (iii) An extended planning distance (EPD) from the facility, for facilities in category I or II, for
8 which arrangements shall be made at the preparedness stage to conduct monitoring and on the
9 basis of predetermined operational intervention levels (see paras 5.50 and 5.103), identify
10 areas within a period that would be effective in reducing the risk of stochastic effects by
11 taking: (1) urgent protective actions and other response actions (e.g. evacuation) within a day
12 following a release or (2) early protective actions and other response actions (e.g. relocation)
13 within a week to a month following a release.

14 (iv) An ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD) from the facility, for facilities in
15 category I or II, for which arrangements shall be made at the preparedness stage, following the
16 declaration of a general emergency, to take effective response actions in accordance with the
17 generic criteria in Appendix II, to protect the public from food, milk, water and commodities
18 that may be contaminated by the release. These arrangements shall be made taking account of
19 the uncertainty and limitations of the information available when protective actions and other
20 response actions need to be taken to be effective.

21 (b) Criteria, based on emergency classification and on conditions at the facility and off the site (see
22 paras 5.25, 5.26 and 5.48) and on use of reliable technical/radiological assessments and/or
23 projections provided their limitations are recognized and that they can be used promptly (see
24 para. 6.23), for the formulation of recommendations for urgent protective actions and other
25 response actions off the site, which are to be provided to off-site officials responsible for taking
26 protective actions within the emergency planning zones and distances. In addition, arrangements
27 shall be made to provide for any necessary revision of these recommendations, prior to their
28 implementation, to take account of prevailing conditions in an actual emergency and of any
29 exposures or results of environmental monitoring following a release of radioactive material
30 (see para. 5.55).

31 (c) A single position on the site at all times with the authority and responsibility promptly to
32 recommend protective actions and other response actions to the off-site notification points upon
33 the declaration of a nuclear or radiological emergency (see para. 5.27).

¹¹ This does not mean that severe deterministic effects could not be observed within UPZ. However, severe deterministic effects are most likely to occur within PAZ.

1 (d) Arrangements for the prompt notification of the off-site notification points to include all the
2 jurisdictions (including those beyond national borders) within the emergency planning zones
3 and distances.

4 5.54. Within the emergency planning zones and distances, arrangements shall be made for taking
5 appropriate and effective protective actions and other response actions, as necessary, promptly upon
6 the notification of a nuclear or radiological emergency. These arrangements shall include
7 arrangements for: designation and training of off-site decision makers to promptly initiate protective
8 action and other response actions upon the notification of an emergency (see para. 5.22); taking
9 appropriate actions for the protection of emergency workers; alerting permanent, transient and special
10 population groups or those responsible for them and special facilities. The arrangements shall be
11 coordinated with all jurisdictions (including those beyond national borders) within any emergency
12 planning zone or distance. These arrangements shall also include arrangements to ensure that services
13 are continuously provided in order to ensure public safety (e.g. services for the care of critically ill
14 patients) throughout the emergency, including during the implementation of protective actions and
15 other response actions.

16 5.55. Within emergency planning zones, arrangements shall be made for promptly assessing
17 contamination, releases of radioactive material and doses for the purpose of deciding on or adjusting
18 the protective actions and other response actions that have been taken. These shall include
19 arrangements for: (a) use of reliable technical/radiological assessments and/or projections provided
20 their limitations are recognized and that they can be used promptly (see 6.23) and (b) promptly
21 conducting environmental monitoring and monitoring for contamination on people (e.g. evacuees)
22 within the emergency planning zones and promptly assessing the results of the monitoring on the basis
23 of predetermined operational intervention levels. Arrangements shall also be made to take these
24 actions within emergency planning distances at an early stage.

25 5.56. The operating organization of a facility in category I, II or III shall make arrangements to
26 ensure the safety of all persons on the site in a nuclear or radiological emergency. This shall include
27 arrangements: to notify people on the site of an emergency; for all persons on the site to take
28 appropriate actions immediately upon notification of an emergency; to account for those on the site; to
29 locate and recover those unaccounted for; to take urgent protective actions; and to provide immediate
30 first aid. This also includes ensuring the provision of: suitable assembly points for all persons on the
31 site that are provided with continuous radiation monitoring; a sufficient number of safe escape routes;
32 and suitable and robust alarm systems and means of communication so that all persons present in the
33 facility and on the site could be warned and instructed, even under emergency conditions.

34 5.57. The operating organization of a facility in category I, II or III shall ensure that suitable and
35 diverse means of communication that are necessary for taking protective actions and other response
36 actions on the site and for communication with off-site officials responsible for the implementation of

1 protective actions and other response actions off the site or within any emergency planning zones or
2 distances are available at all times under the full range of emergency conditions.

3 5.58. Operating personnel of activities in category IV, first responders in an emergency at an
4 unforeseen location and those staff at locations where there is a significant likelihood of encountering
5 a dangerous source that is not under control (see para. 4.22) shall be provided with guidance on taking
6 urgent protective actions and other response actions in accordance with national generic criteria (see
7 para. 5.50). This shall include the approximate radius of the inner cordoned off area in which urgent
8 protective actions and other response actions would initially be taken and its adjustment on the basis of
9 observed or assessed conditions on the site.

10 **Requirement 8: Providing information and issuing instructions and warnings to the public**

11 **The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to warn the public promptly of a**
12 **nuclear or radiological emergency and to instruct them on actions that they must take.**

13 **Response**

14 5.59. Upon declaration of a nuclear or radiological emergency, the public shall be promptly warned
15 of the emergency and shall be instructed in the actions that they must take without undue delay that
16 could jeopardize the effectiveness of protective actions and other response actions.

17 **Preparedness**

18 5.60. For facilities in category I or II and areas within category V, arrangements shall be made to
19 provide information, before operation and throughout the lifetime of the facility, on the response to a
20 nuclear or radiological emergency to permanent, transient and special population groups or those
21 responsible for them and to special facilities within the emergency planning zones and distances (see
22 para. 5.53). This shall include information on the potential for a nuclear or radiological emergency, on
23 the nature of the hazard, on how people will be warned or notified and on the actions to be taken in the
24 emergency. The information shall be provided in the languages mainly spoken in these emergency
25 planning zones and distances. The effectiveness of these arrangements for public information shall be
26 periodically assessed.

27 5.61. Arrangements shall be made for facilities in category I or II and in areas within category V to
28 register those members of the public within the special population groups and, as appropriate, those
29 responsible for them and promptly to provide a warning and instruction to the permanent, transient and
30 special population groups or those responsible for them and to special facilities in the emergency
31 planning zones and distances upon declaration of a general emergency (see para. 5.54). This shall
32 include instructions in the languages mainly spoken in these emergency planning zones and distances
33 (see para. 5.53) on the actions to be taken.

1 5.62. Arrangements shall be made for facilities and activities in category III and IV to provide
2 information and instructions to the public to identify and locate people who may have been affected by
3 the nuclear or radiological emergency and who may require urgent or longer term response actions
4 such as decontamination, medical examination or medical screening (see para. 5.89).

5 5.63. Arrangements shall be made by response organizations supported by the operating
6 organization, if any, for issuing a warning to the public in the event that a dangerous source could
7 possibly be in the public domain as a consequence of its loss or unauthorized removal.

8 5.64. Arrangements shall be made by response organizations for information and advice to be
9 promptly provided to national citizens and to those with interests abroad (e.g. to travellers and to
10 exporters) in a nuclear or radiological emergency declared beyond national borders with due account
11 taken of the response actions recommended either within the State where the emergency occurred or
12 within the State affected by that emergency (see paras 5.97 and 6.14)..

13 **Requirement 9: Protecting emergency workers and helpers in an emergency**

14 **The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to protect emergency workers and**
15 **to protect helpers in an emergency.**

16 **Response**

17 5.65. Emergency workers and helpers in an emergency shall be appropriately protected.

18 5.66. Emergency workers not designated as such in advance of a nuclear or radiological emergency
19 and helpers in an emergency shall be registered and integrated into the emergency response
20 operations.

21 **Preparedness**

22 5.67. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that emergency workers are, to the extent practicable,
23 designated in advance.

24 5.68. Arrangements shall be made to register and to integrate into the emergency response
25 operations those emergency workers who were not designated as such in advance of a nuclear or
26 radiological emergency and helpers in an emergency. This shall include designation of the response
27 organization(s) responsible for ensuring their protection.

28 5.69. The operating organization and response organizations shall determine the anticipated
29 hazardous conditions both on-site and off-site in which emergency workers might have to perform
30 response functions in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

31 5.70. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that arrangements are in
32 place for the protection of emergency workers and of helpers in an emergency for the range of

1 anticipated hazardous conditions in which they might have to perform response functions. These
2 arrangements, as a minimum, shall include:

- 3 (a) training of those emergency workers designated as such in advance;
- 4 (b) providing instructions immediately before their use to those emergency workers not
5 designated as such in advance and to helpers in an emergency on how to perform their
6 specified duties under emergency conditions ('just in time' training);
- 7 (c) managing, controlling and recording the doses received;
- 8 (d) provision of appropriate specialized protective equipment and monitoring equipment;
- 9 (e) medical follow-up and psychological counselling, as appropriate;
- 10 (f) obtaining informed consent to perform specified duties, when appropriate.

11 5.71. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that all practical means are
12 used to minimize doses to emergency workers and helpers in an emergency due to exposure to non-
13 penetrating external radiation and due to intakes of radionuclides or to skin contamination.

14 5.72. In a nuclear or radiological emergency, the relevant requirements for occupational exposure in
15 planned exposure situation established in Ref. [14] shall be applied for emergency workers, in
16 accordance with a graded approach, except as required in para. 5.73.

17 5.73. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that no emergency worker
18 is subject to an exposure in an emergency in excess of 50 mSv other than (1) for the purposes of
19 saving life or preventing serious injury, (2) when undertaking actions to prevent severe deterministic
20 effects and actions to prevent the development of catastrophic conditions that could significantly affect
21 people and the environment, or (3) when undertaking actions to avert a large collective dose.

22 5.74. For the exceptional circumstances of para. 5.73, national guidance values shall be established
23 for restricting the exposures of emergency workers and helpers in an emergency, in accordance with
24 Appendix I.

25 5.75. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that emergency workers
26 who undertake actions in which the doses received might 50 mSv do so voluntarily¹²; that they have
27 been clearly and comprehensively informed in advance of the associated health risks as well as of
28 available protective measures; and that they are, to the extent possible, trained in the actions that they
29 may be required to take. Emergency workers not designated as such in advance shall not be the first
30 choice for taking actions that might result in their exceeding the guidance values of dose for life
31 saving actions given in Appendix I. Helpers in an emergency shall not be allowed to take actions that

¹² The voluntary basis for response actions by emergency workers is usually covered in the emergency arrangements.

1 might result in their exceeding the guidance values of dose for taking actions to avert a large collective
2 dose given in Appendix I.

3 5.76. Arrangements shall be made to assess the individual doses received in the response to a
4 nuclear or radiological emergency by the emergency workers and helpers in an emergency as soon as
5 practicable and, as appropriate, to restrict further exposures in response to the emergency (see
6 Appendix I).

7 5.77. Emergency workers who receive doses in the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency
8 shall normally not be precluded from incurring further occupational exposure. However, qualified
9 medical advice shall be obtained before any further occupational exposure if an emergency worker has
10 received an effective dose exceeding 200 mSv or at the request of the emergency worker.

11 5.78. Information on the doses received in the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency and
12 information concerning any consequent health risks shall be communicated to the emergency workers
13 and to the helpers in an emergency.

14 5.79. Emergency workers and helpers in an emergency shall receive medical attention appropriate
15 for the doses received in the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency (see Appendix II) or at
16 their request.

17 **Requirement 10: Managing the medical response**

18 **The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the provision of appropriate**
19 **medical screening and triage, medical treatment and longer term medical actions for those who**
20 **could be affected in a nuclear or radiological emergency.**

21 **Response**

22 5.80. On the presentation of clinical symptoms of radiation exposure or other effects indicative of a
23 possible nuclear or radiological emergency, the medical personnel or other responsible party who
24 identifies the symptoms or the other effects shall notify the appropriate local or national officials and
25 shall take response actions as appropriate.

26 5.81. Appropriate specialized treatment shall be given to any person who receives a dose that could
27 potentially result in severe deterministic effects, consistent with national generic criteria (see para.
28 5.89).

29 5.82. Where appropriate, actions shall be taken to detect, in time to allow for effective treatment,
30 radiation induced health effects among workers, emergency workers, patients and the public resulting
31 from exposure in a nuclear or radiological emergency, consistent with national generic criteria (see
32 para. 5.89).

33 **Preparedness**

1 5.83. Arrangements shall be made for medical personnel, both general practitioners and emergency
2 staff, to be made aware of the clinical symptoms of radiation exposure and of the appropriate
3 notification procedures and other response actions warranted if a nuclear or radiological emergency
4 has occurred or is suspected.

5 5.84. Arrangements shall be made so that, in a nuclear or radiological emergency, individuals are
6 provided promptly with appropriate medical attention regardless of their possible contamination.
7 These arrangements shall include ensuring transport services are provided when needed and providing
8 the advice to medical personnel that universal precautions against infection (e.g. masks, gloves, etc.)
9 provide sufficient protection when treating patients with possible contamination.

10 5.85. Facilities in category I, II and III shall make arrangements to treat a limited number of
11 individuals with contamination or overexposure, including arrangements for first aid, the estimation of
12 doses, medical transport and the initial medical treatment of individuals with contamination or
13 overexposure in predesignated medical facilities.

14 5.86. For areas within the emergency planning zones (see para. 5.53), arrangements shall be put in
15 place for performing medical screening and triage and for assigning any individual exposed at levels
16 exceeding the criteria in Table II.1 of Appendix II to a predesignated medical facility on the basis of
17 predetermined operational criteria (see para. 5.89).

18 5.87. Arrangements shall be made at the national level to identify and to treat people who have
19 undergone exposure or contamination. These arrangements shall include: guidelines for effective
20 treatment; the designation of medical personnel trained in the early diagnosis and treatment of
21 radiation injuries; and the selection of approved institutions to be used for extended medical treatment
22 or longer term medical follow-up of individuals subjected to radiation exposure or contamination and
23 for evaluating radiation exposure (external and internal). This shall also include arrangements for
24 consultation on treatment following any exposure that could result in severe deterministic effects with
25 medical practitioners experienced in dealing with such injuries¹³.

26 5.88. Arrangements shall be made for the identification of individuals in those groups that are at
27 risk of sustaining detectable increases in the incidence of cancers as a result of radiation exposure due
28 to a nuclear or radiological emergency. Arrangements shall be made to take longer term actions to
29 detect radiation induced health effects among such people in time to allow for their effective
30 treatment.

31 5.89. National generic criteria shall be established for initiating appropriate medical actions in a
32 nuclear or radiological emergency consistent with the generic criteria in Appendix II. On the basis of
33 the generic criteria, predetermined operational intervention levels shall be developed for initiating

¹³ Such arrangements for consultation on treatment include international assistance to be provided or coordinated by the IAEA and by WHO, for example, under the Assistance Convention [9].

1 appropriate medical actions. Arrangements shall be made for revision of these operational intervention
2 levels, as appropriate, in a nuclear or radiological emergency, with account taken of the prevailing
3 conditions as they evolve.

4 **Requirement 11: Keeping the public informed**

5 **The government shall ensure that arrangements are put in place to keep the public informed**
6 **throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency in order for people to be able to take**
7 **appropriate protective actions and other response actions.**

8 **Response**

9 5.90. The public shall be provided with useful, timely, truthful, consistent, clear and appropriate
10 information throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency, in plain and understandable language.

11 5.91. Information provided by the response organizations, operating organization and others (e.g.
12 international organizations) shall be coordinated and put into perspective, to the extent possible, in
13 terms of associated health hazards (see Appendix II).

14 5.92. Practicable steps shall be taken throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency to address any
15 misconceptions, rumours, and incorrect and misleading information that are circulated.

16 5.93. Response organizations and operating organizations shall respond in due time to any enquiries
17 from the public and from news and information media.

18 **Preparedness**

19 5.94. Arrangements shall be made for providing useful, timely, truthful, consistent, clear and
20 appropriate information to the public in a nuclear or radiological emergency, with account taken that
21 the usual capabilities for communication might have been damaged as consequence of the emergency
22 or its initiating event (e.g. by an earthquake, flooding, etc.) or overburdened by public use. These
23 arrangements shall include arrangements for keeping the international community informed, as
24 appropriate.

25 5.95. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that information communicated to the public in a
26 nuclear or radiological emergency is coordinated and consistent (see para. 4.9(i)) with recognition of
27 the evolutionary nature of the emergency.

28 5.96. Arrangements shall be made for putting information provided by any response organization,
29 the operating organization or others (e.g. information on calculated doses or measured quantities) into
30 perspective to the extent possible in terms of associated health hazards (see Appendix II), with account
31 duly taken of pregnant women and children as the most vulnerable to radiation exposure.

32 5.97. Arrangements shall be put in place to explain to the public, in terms of associated health
33 hazards (see Appendix II), any changes in the protective actions and other response actions being

1 recommended in the State and any differences from those being recommended in other States (see
2 paras 6.13–6.15).

3 5.98. Arrangements shall be made to identify and address any misconceptions, rumours, and
4 incorrect and misleading information that might be circulated and which might result in the public
5 taking inappropriate actions¹⁴.

6 5.99. Arrangements shall be made to respond to enquiries (including enquiries received through the
7 IAEA) from the public and from news and information media, both national and international.

8 **Requirement 12: Taking early protective actions and other response actions**

9 **The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to take early protective actions and**
10 **other response actions in a nuclear or radiological emergency, with account taken of**
11 **international standards.**

12 **Response**

13 5.100. Early protective actions and other response actions shall be taken effectively in a nuclear or
14 radiological emergency, in accordance with national generic criteria (see para. 5.103) and with due
15 consideration of the conditions specific to the emergency.

16 5.101. Contamination shall be appropriately managed.

17 5.102. An early protective action or other response action shall be discontinued when further
18 assessment shows that continuation of the action is no longer justified.

19 **Preparedness**

20 5.103. National generic criteria for taking early protective actions and other response actions shall be
21 established in accordance with the generic criteria in Appendix II and shall be justified and optimized
22 with account taken of local and national conditions and conditions specific to the emergency. On the
23 basis of these generic criteria, predetermined operational intervention levels shall be developed for
24 triggering early protective actions and other response actions. Arrangements shall be made for revision
25 of these operational intervention levels, as appropriate, in a nuclear or radiological emergency, with
26 account taken of the prevailing conditions as they evolve.

27 5.104. Arrangements shall be made for adjusting early protective actions and other response actions
28 as the emergency evolves, when appropriate, with involvement of interested parties.

29 5.105. Within the ingestion and commodities planning distance (see para. 5.53), arrangements shall
30 be made for prompt protection in relation to, and for restriction of, non-essential local produce, forest

¹⁴ Inappropriate actions in this context are actions that are not supported scientifically (e.g. stigmatizing of people or shunning of products from the area affected by a nuclear or radiological emergency).

1 products (e.g. mushrooms), milk from grazing animals, rainwater, animal feed and commodities that
2 may have contamination following a radioactive release. These arrangements shall include: the use of
3 (a) use of reliable technical/radiological assessments and/or projections provided their limitations are
4 recognized and that they can be used promptly (see 6.23) and (b) predetermined operational
5 intervention levels, the means for their revision, prompt monitoring for ground contamination,
6 sampling and analysis of food, milk, drinking water and other commodities; the means to enforce the
7 restrictions; and provisions to expand the monitoring and restriction beyond this distance if needed.

8 5.106. Within the extended planning distance (see para. 5.53), arrangements shall be made for
9 effective relocation that may be required following a radioactive release. These shall include: use of
10 (a) use of reliable technical/radiological assessments and/or projections provided their limitations are
11 recognized and that they can be used promptly (see 6.23) and (b) predetermined operational
12 intervention levels and the means for their revision; arrangements for the prompt monitoring of ground
13 deposition; the means for accomplishing relocation; arrangements for assisting those persons who
14 have been relocated; and provision to extend monitoring and relocation beyond the extended planning
15 distance if necessary.

16 5.107. Within the emergency planning zones and inner cordoned off area, arrangements shall be
17 made for monitoring the contamination levels of vehicles, personnel and goods moving into and out of
18 contaminated areas in order to control the spread of contamination. These shall include: the use of
19 predetermined operational intervention levels and the means for their revision; and arrangements for
20 appropriate monitoring and decontamination, as applicable.

21 5.108. Arrangements shall be made for access control and restriction control for areas in which
22 evacuations and relocations are carried out within emergency planning zones, the extended planning
23 distance and the inner cordoned off area. Returns to these areas for short periods of time shall be
24 permitted if justified (e.g. to feed animals left behind) and provided that those individuals entering the
25 area are (1) subject to controls while in the area, (2) instructed on how to protect themselves and (3)
26 briefed on the associated risks.

27 5.109. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that decontamination does more good than harm, with
28 account also taken of the exposure of those persons performing the decontamination. These
29 arrangements shall include testing of decontamination methods before their general use, and
30 measurable criteria, in terms of dose reduction, for use in assessing the effectiveness of the
31 decontamination.

32 5.110. Arrangements shall be made for taking early protective actions and other response actions as
33 appropriate beyond areas in category V, including: (a) use of reliable technical/radiological
34 assessments and/or projections provided their limitations are recognized and that they can be used
35 promptly (see 6.23) and (b) promptly conducting environmental monitoring and monitoring for
36 contamination of commodities, sampling and assessments, even if such monitoring and assessments

1 have the aim of reassuring the public or mitigating the non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or
2 radiological emergency. These arrangements shall include use of predetermined operational
3 intervention levels and the means for their revision.

4 5.111. Arrangements shall be made to assess exposures incurred by members of the public as a
5 consequence of a nuclear or radiological emergency, and the results of the assessments shall be made
6 publicly available. The assessments shall be based on the best available information, shall be put into
7 perspective in terms of associated health hazards (see paras 5.91 and 5.96) and shall be promptly
8 updated in the light of any information that would produce substantially more accurate results.

9 **Requirement 13: Managing radioactive waste during a nuclear or radiological emergency**

10 **The government shall ensure the safe and effective management of radioactive waste during a**
11 **nuclear or radiological emergency.**

12 **Response**

13 5.112. Radioactive waste arising from a nuclear or radiological emergency, and associated protective
14 actions and other response actions, shall be identified, characterized and categorized in due time.

15 5.113. Radioactive waste shall be managed with account taken of the characteristics of the waste in
16 manner that does not compromise the protection strategy.

17 5.114. Mixing of radioactive waste of different categories shall be avoided to the extent practicable.

18 **Preparedness**

19 5.115. The national policy and strategy for radioactive waste management [12] shall cover
20 radioactive waste generated in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

21 5.116. The protection strategy (see para. 4.17) shall take into account radioactive waste that might
22 arise from protective actions and other response actions that are to be taken.

23 5.117. Arrangements shall be made for the safe and effective management of radioactive waste.
24 These arrangements shall include:

- 25 (a) a plan to characterize waste, including in situ measurements and analysis of samples;
- 26 (b) criteria for categorization of waste;
- 27 (c) avoiding the mixing of waste of different categories;
- 28 (d) minimizing the amount of material declared as radioactive waste;
- 29 (e) a method of determining appropriate predisposal management options (including processing,
30 storage and transport), with account taken of the interdependences between all steps as well as
31 impacts on the anticipated end points (clearance, authorized discharge, reuse, recycling,
32 disposal) [12, 13];

1 (f) a method of identifying appropriate storage options and sites;

2 (g) consideration of non-radiological aspects of waste (e.g. toxicity, biological properties).

3 5.118. Consideration shall be given to the management of human remains and animal remains,
4 contaminated as a result of a nuclear or radiological emergency, with due account taken of religious
5 and cultural practices.

6 **Requirement 14: Mitigating non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological**
7 **emergency and response**

8 **The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for mitigating non-radiological**
9 **consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and the response.**

10 **Response**

11 5.119. All practicable steps shall be taken to mitigate non-radiological consequences of the
12 emergency and the response and to ensure that the response actions do more good than harm.

13 5.120. Inappropriate actions taken by the members of the public and by others (e.g. commercial,
14 industrial, infrastructural or other non-governmental bodies) shall be promptly identified and
15 appropriately addressed.

16 5.121. Non-radiological consequences of the emergency and the response shall be considered when
17 deciding on the protective actions and other response actions to be taken.

18 **Preparedness**

19 5.122. Arrangements shall be made for mitigating the non-radiological consequences of an
20 emergency and response and for responding to public concern in a nuclear or radiological emergency
21 (i.e. both actual and perceived). These arrangements shall include providing the public with:
22 information on any associated health hazards and clear instructions on the actions to be taken (see
23 paras 5.59–5.64 and 5.90–5.99); medical and psychological counselling; and appropriate social
24 support.

25 5.123. Arrangements shall be made to mitigate impacts of a nuclear or radiological emergency and
26 associated protective actions and other response actions taken on international trade, with account
27 taken of the generic criteria in Appendix II. These arrangements shall provide for reassurance of the
28 public and interested parties (such as importing States) on health hazards in relation to tradable
29 commodities and on any revision of national standards.

1 5.124. Arrangements shall be put in place for ensuring that inappropriate actions¹⁵ taken by members
2 of the public and others (e.g. unjustified voluntary terminations of pregnancy, stigmatization of people
3 from affected areas, cancellation of commercial flights, closing of airports etc.) are promptly identified
4 and appropriately addressed. This shall include the designation of organization(s) with the
5 responsibility for monitoring, identifying and addressing inappropriate actions taken by the public
6 (including unnecessarily burdening the health care system) and others (e.g. commercial, industrial,
7 infrastructural or other non-governmental bodies) (see para. 4.9(i)).

8 **Requirement 15: Requesting, providing and receiving international assistance**

9 **The government shall ensure that adequate arrangements are in place to benefit from, and to**
10 **contribute to, international assistance in preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological**
11 **emergency.**

12 **Response**

13 5.125. Governments and international organizations shall respond in a timely manner, in accordance
14 with established mechanisms and respective mandates, to any request made by a State for assistance in
15 responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency.

16 5.126. When making a request to international organizations or to other governments for
17 international assistance in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency, the request shall be made
18 on the basis of international instruments (e.g. the Assistance Convention [9]), bilateral agreements or
19 other international mechanisms.

20 **Preparedness**

21 5.127. Governments and international organizations shall respond to any request made by a State, in
22 accordance with established mechanisms and respective mandates, for assistance in preparedness for a
23 nuclear or radiological emergency.

24 5.128. Arrangements shall be put in place and maintained for requesting, providing and obtaining
25 international assistance by other governments or international organizations in both preparedness for
26 and in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency on the basis of international instruments (e.g.
27 the Assistance Convention [9]), bilateral agreements or other mechanisms. These arrangements shall
28 take due account of compatibility requirements for the capabilities to be rendered and obtained among
29 different States so as to ensure the usefulness of these capabilities.

30 5.129. Arrangements shall be put in place and maintained for a timely response to requests for
31 international assistance.

32 **Requirement 16: Deciding on the transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing**

¹⁵ Inappropriate actions in this context are actions that are not supported scientifically.

1 **exposure situation**

2 **The government shall ensure that arrangements are put in place and are implemented, as**
3 **appropriate, for the transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure**
4 **situation, with account taken of the need for the resumption of accustomed social and economic**
5 **activities.**

6 **Response**

7 5.130. The transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation shall be
8 based on an administrative decision, made public, by the authority responsible for the overall
9 response.

10 5.131. Both radiological consequences and non-radiological consequences shall be considered in
11 deciding on termination of the emergency phase, in justifying the introduction of protective actions
12 and other response actions, and in optimizing the protection strategy, including selection of protective
13 actions and other response actions to be taken.

14 5.132. The transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation shall be
15 made in a coordinated and orderly manner, by making any necessary transfer of responsibilities
16 between response organizations, with the involvement of relevant authorities and interested parties,
17 and the rationale for the transition shall be explained to all parties involved.

18 5.133. Decisions to adjust protective actions and other response actions and other arrangements that
19 affect the public and that are aimed at enabling the termination of emergency phase shall be made by a
20 formal process that includes consultation with interested parties.

21 5.134. The basis for adjusting protective actions and other response actions and other arrangements
22 that affect the public aimed at enabling the termination of emergency phase shall be explained and
23 shall be put into perspective in terms of associated health hazards (see Appendix II). This shall include
24 providing the public with information on the need for any on-going protective actions following the
25 termination of the emergency phase and any necessary modifications to their personal behaviour.
26 During this period of the emergency phase, public opinion and the response of news and information
27 media shall be closely monitored in order to ensure that any concerns can be addressed promptly.

28 5.135. Following the termination of the emergency phase and the concurrent transition to an existing
29 exposure situation, all workers undertaking relevant work (e.g. workers undertaking repairs to plant
30 and buildings, recovery of sources, work for the management of radioactive waste, or remedial work
31 for decontamination of the site and surrounding areas) shall be subject to the relevant requirements for
32 occupational exposure in planned exposure situations [14].

33 **Preparedness**

1 5.136. The government shall ensure that, as part of its emergency preparedness, arrangements are in
2 place for the transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation. These
3 arrangements shall involve interested parties. The arrangements shall take into account that the
4 administrative decision for the transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing
5 exposure situation might be taken at different times in different geographical areas. The planning
6 process shall include: the roles and functions of organizations; methods of transferring information;
7 methods for assessing radiological consequences and non-radiological consequences; ensuring
8 consistent system of national generic criteria to be applied from the start of the emergency until the
9 emergency phase is terminated (see Appendix II); review of the hazard assessment; establishment of
10 national guidelines for termination of an emergency phase by returning to a planned exposure situation
11 or by transition to an existing exposure situation, as appropriate, e.g. by adjusting protective actions
12 and other response actions; and arrangements for on-going public communications, monitoring public
13 opinion and the response of the news and information media.

14 5.137. After a decision has been made on the termination of the emergency phase by either returning
15 to a planned exposure situation or by transition to an existing exposure situation, individual
16 monitoring, environmental monitoring and health surveillance shall be conducted subject to the
17 requirements for planned exposure situation or existing exposure situation, as appropriate [14].

18 5.138. Arrangements shall be made to communicate with the public the basis for the termination of
19 the emergency phase and for any adjustment of protective actions and other response actions,
20 including any necessary modifications to their personal behaviour, aimed at enabling the termination
21 of the emergency phase and the concurrent transition to an existing exposure situation, as appropriate.
22 Any information provided to the public shall be put into perspective in terms of associated health
23 hazards (see Appendix II).

24 **Requirement 17: Analysing the emergency and the emergency response**

25 **The government shall ensure that the nuclear or radiological emergency and the emergency**
26 **response are analysed in order to identify actions to be taken to prevent the occurrence of other**
27 **emergencies and to improve emergency arrangements.**

28 **Response**

29 5.139. An analysis shall be performed after a nuclear or radiological emergency in order to identify
30 actions to be taken to prevent the occurrence of other emergencies, either similar or not, and further
31 actions to be taken to improve emergency arrangements. This review shall consider:

- 32 (a) Reconstruction of the scenario for the emergency;
- 33 (b) Root causes of the emergency;
- 34 (c) Regulatory controls;

- 1 (d) The possible involvement of other sources or devices (including those in other States);
2 (e) General implications for safety;
3 (f) General implications for nuclear security, as appropriate;
4 (g) Necessary improvements to emergency arrangements.

5 5.140. Data and information important for such an analysis shall be protected and preserved, to the
6 extent practicable, during the emergency response.

7 **Preparedness**

8 5.141. Arrangements shall be made to undertake a timely and comprehensive analysis of the nuclear
9 or radiological emergency and the emergency response with involvement of relevant interested parties.
10 These arrangements shall consider the need for contribution to relevant internationally coordinated
11 analysis.

12 5.142. Arrangements shall be made to protect and preserve data and information important for an
13 analysis after a nuclear or radiological emergency.

14 5.143. Arrangements shall be made to enable comprehensive interviews on the causes of the nuclear
15 or radiological emergency to be conducted with those involved.

16 5.144. Arrangements shall be made to acquire the expertise needed to perform an analysis of the
17 nuclear or radiological emergency (e.g. from the IAEA or from the manufacturer of equipment).

18 5.145. Arrangements shall be made to take actions promptly on the basis of an analysis to prevent the
19 occurrence of other emergencies, including notification of other operating organizations as relevant or
20 of other States through the IAEA.

21

1

6. REQUIREMENTS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE

2 GENERAL

3 6.1. This section establishes the requirements for infrastructural elements essential to providing the
4 capability for fulfilling the requirements established in Section 5.

5 **Requirement 18: Authorities**

6 **The government shall ensure that authorities for preparedness and response for a nuclear or**
7 **radiological emergency are clearly established.**

8 6.2. The authority for developing, maintaining and regulating arrangements, both on-site and off-
9 site, for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be established by
10 means of acts, legal codes or statutes.

11 6.3. All of the functions specified in Section 5 shall be assigned to the appropriate operating
12 organizations and to local, regional and national organizations, whose involvement in the performance
13 of these functions, or in support of their performance, shall be documented¹⁶. The documentation shall
14 specify their roles, functions, authorities and responsibilities in an emergency response and shall
15 assent to the authorities, roles and responsibilities of other response organizations. Potential or actual
16 conflicting and overlapping roles and responsibilities shall be identified and resolved as part of the
17 preparedness process through the national coordinating mechanism (see para. 4.9). The authorities and
18 responsibilities for making decisions concerning protective actions and other response actions on and
19 off the site and for communication with the public shall be clearly assigned for each phase of the
20 response.

21 6.4. The authority and responsibility for directing the emergency response shall be assigned to the
22 appropriate emergency response commander in each phase of the response. When different emergency
23 response commanders are given authority and responsibility for directing the on-site and off-site
24 response, their effective coordination shall be ensured.

25 6.5. The emergency arrangements shall include the clear allocation of responsibilities, authorities
26 and arrangements for coordination and communication in all phases of the response. These
27 arrangements shall include: ensuring that for each response organization a single position in the
28 response hierarchy has the authority and responsibility to direct its response actions; clearly assigning
29 the responsibility for the coordination of the entire response and for the resolution of conflicts between
30 response organizations; assigning to an on-site position the authority and responsibility for notifying
31 the appropriate organization(s) of an emergency and taking immediate on-site actions; and assigning
32 to an on-site position the responsibility for directing the entire on-site response (see paras 5.8, 5.9,

¹⁶ Typically this is documented as part of the appropriate national, regional and local emergency response plans.

1 5.12 and 5.13). These arrangements shall be such as to ensure that those persons with authority and
2 responsibility to perform critical functions in an emergency response are not assigned any other
3 responsibilities in an emergency that would interfere with the prompt execution of the specified
4 functions.

5 6.6. The arrangements for the delegation and/or transfer of authority shall be clearly specified in
6 the relevant emergency plans, together with arrangements for notifying all appropriate parties of the
7 transfer.

8 **Requirement 19: Organization and staffing**

9 **The government shall ensure that the overall organization of the emergency preparedness and**
10 **response is clearly specified and staffed with sufficient personnel who are adequately qualified**
11 **and fit for their intended duty.**

12 6.7. The organizational relationships and interfaces between all the major response organizations
13 shall be established.

14 6.8. The positions responsible within each operating organization and response organization for
15 the performance of the response functions specified in Section 5 shall be assigned in the emergency
16 plans and procedures.

17 6.9. Personnel who are adequately qualified and fit for the intended duty shall be assigned to
18 appropriate positions in all operating organizations and response organizations in order to perform the
19 functions necessary to meet the requirements established in Section 5.

20 6.10. Appropriate number of adequately qualified personnel shall be available at all times (including
21 during 24 hour operations) in order that appropriate positions can be promptly staffed as necessary
22 following the declaration and notification of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Appropriate number
23 of adequately qualified personnel shall be available in the long term to staff the various positions
24 necessary to take the mitigatory actions, protective actions, and other response actions.

25 6.11. For a site with multiple facilities in category I or II are collocated, an appropriate number of
26 adequately qualified personnel shall be available to manage all the facilities if each of them is under
27 emergency conditions simultaneously (see para. 5.10).

28 **Requirement 20: Coordination of emergency preparedness and response**

29 **The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for coordinating an emergency**
30 **response between the operating organization and local, regional, and national authorities, and,**
31 **where appropriate, at the international level.**

32 6.12. Arrangements for the coordination of emergency response and protocols for operational
33 interfaces among operating organizations and authorities at the local, regional and national levels, to

1 include those responsible for the response to conventional emergencies and to emergencies initiated by
2 nuclear security events, shall be developed, as applicable (see para. 6.4). The arrangements shall be
3 clearly documented and this documentation shall be made available to all relevant parties.
4 Arrangements shall be put in place to ensure effective working relationships among these
5 organizations.

6 6.13. When several different organizations or other States are expected to have or to develop tools,
7 procedures or criteria for use in responding to the same emergency, coordination arrangements shall
8 be put in place to harmonize the results of assessments of contamination, doses and radiation induced
9 health effects and of any other appropriate assessments made in a nuclear or radiological emergency in
10 order not to give rise to inconsistency and confusion.

11 6.14. Arrangements shall be made in the event of a transnational emergency to coordinate with
12 other States any protective actions and other response actions that are being recommended to their
13 citizens or embassies in order either to ensure that they are consistent with those being recommended
14 in these States or to provide an opportunity for those States to explain to the public the basis for the
15 differences (see para. 5.97).

16 6.15. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that States with areas in category V are provided with
17 appropriate information for developing their own preparedness to respond to a transboundary
18 emergency and that arrangements shall be made for appropriate transboundary coordination. These
19 arrangements shall include: agreements and protocols to provide information necessary to develop a
20 coordinated means for notification, classification schemes, generic criteria and operational criteria for
21 taking and adjusting protective actions and other response actions; arrangements for public
22 information; and arrangements for the exchange of information between decision making authorities.
23 The language and physical units to be used as well as the system for putting health hazards into
24 perspective shall be determined and agreed in advance.

25 **Requirement 21: Plans and procedures**

26 **The government shall ensure that plans and procedures necessary for effective emergency**
27 **response are established.**

28 6.16. Plans for emergency response shall be based on a hazard assessment as described in Section 4.
29 A single national emergency response plan shall be developed that integrates all relevant plans for
30 emergency responses in a coordinated manner and consistently with the all hazards approach.

31 6.17. Plans, procedures and other arrangements, to include coordinating bodies, letters of agreement
32 or legal instruments, shall be made for coordinating a national emergency response. These
33 arrangements for a coordinated national emergency response shall specify the organization responsible
34 for the development and maintenance of the arrangements; shall describe the responsibilities of
35 operating organizations and other response organizations; and shall describe the coordination effected

1 between these arrangements and the arrangements for response to a conventional emergency and to
2 emergencies initiated by nuclear security events. Consideration shall also be given to parts of these
3 plans, procedures and other arrangements that are confidential. The arrangements shall include
4 provisions that can be used to formulate in detail a response to situations such as: a serious exposure or
5 contamination resulting from contact with a source by a member of the public or resulting from the
6 use of sources in medical applications in patients; the notification of a potential significant
7 transboundary release of radioactive material; dangerous source in the public domain; the notification
8 of the potential re-entry of a satellite; and other unanticipated situations warranting protective actions
9 and other response actions.

10 6.18. Each response organization shall prepare a general plan or plans for coordinating and
11 performing their assigned functions as specified in Section 5. Emergency plans shall be prepared
12 which specify how responsibilities for managing emergency response operations will be discharged on
13 the site, off the site and across national borders, as appropriate, in separate but coordinated and
14 consistent plans. The plans for emergency response shall be coordinated with any other plans (such as
15 emergency plans for areas in category V, plans for response to nuclear security events including
16 management of crime scenes [8], security plans and contingency plans [6-8], plans for firefighting)
17 that may be implemented in a nuclear or radiological emergency in order to ensure that the
18 simultaneous implementation of the plans would not seriously reduce their effectiveness or cause
19 conflicts.

20 6.19. The appropriate responsible authorities shall ensure that:

- 21 (a) a 'concept of operations'¹⁷ for emergency response is developed at the beginning of the
22 preparedness stage;
- 23 (b) emergency plans are prepared and, as appropriate, approved for any facility or activity that could
24 give rise to a need for taking protective actions and other response actions;
- 25 (c) response organizations are involved in the preparation of emergency plans, as appropriate;
- 26 (d) the content, features and extent of emergency plans take into account the results of any hazard
27 assessment and any lessons learned from operating experience and from emergencies that have
28 occurred, including non-radiological emergencies (see paras 4.15–4.23);
- 29 (e) emergency plans are periodically reviewed and updated (see paras 6.34 and 6.36).

30 6.20. The operating organization of a facility or for an activity in category I, II, III or IV shall prepare
31 an emergency plan. This emergency plan shall be coordinated with those of all other bodies having

¹⁷ A concept of operations is a brief description of the ideal response to a postulated nuclear or radiological emergency, used to ensure that all those involved in the development of a capability for emergency response share a common understanding.

1 responsibilities in a nuclear or radiological emergency, including public authorities, and shall be
2 submitted to the regulatory body.

3 6.21. Emergency plans shall cover the following as appropriate:

- 4 (a) A description of the organization used to perform the functions specified in Section 5;
- 5 (b) The conditions under which the plan is applicable;
- 6 (c) The chain of command and communication;
- 7 (d) The inventory of equipment and other resources needed for implementation;
- 8 (e) The actions to be taken by persons and organizations involved in the implementation of the plan
9 for each emergency class or any conditions;
- 10 (f) Preparedness arrangements.

11 6.22. The operating organization and response organizations shall develop the necessary procedures,
12 analytical tools and computer programs in order to be able to perform the functions specified to meet
13 the requirements for emergency response established in Section 5.

14 6.23. Procedures, analytical tools and computer models to be used in performing functions to meet the
15 requirements for emergency response shall be tested under simulated emergency conditions and shall
16 be validated as correct prior to use. Any arrangements that are made to use dose projection models
17 early in the emergency response for supporting decision making on the protective actions and other
18 response actions to be taken shall be made in recognition of the limitations of such models to include
19 that the timing and magnitude of releases warranting taking precautionary urgent protective actions
20 and urgent protective actions before, or shortly after, a release off the site may not be predictable and
21 such a release could occur over several days resulting in very complex deposition patterns off the site.
22 These limitations shall be made clear to, and understood by, those responsible for decision making.
23 Tools used as a basis for precautionary urgent protective actions and urgent protective actions shall be
24 integrated into decision-making systems in such a way that their use will not delay the implementation
25 of these actions, especially for making decisions concerning those that need to be taken before or
26 shortly after release to be most effective.

27 **Requirement 22: Logistical support and facilities**

28 **The government shall ensure that sufficient logistical support and facilities are provided to**
29 **enable response functions to be performed effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.**

30 6.24. Adequate tools, instruments, supplies, equipment, communication systems, facilities and
31 documentation (such as procedures, checklists, telephone numbers, email addresses and manuals) shall
32 be provided for performing the functions specified in Section 5. These items and facilities shall be
33 selected or designed to be operational under the postulated conditions (such as radiological, working
34 and environmental conditions) that may be encountered in the emergency response, and to be

1 compatible with other procedures and equipment for the response (such as the communication
2 frequencies of other response organizations), as appropriate. These support items shall be located or
3 provided in a manner that allows their effective use under postulated emergency conditions.

4 6.25. For facilities in category I, alternative supplies as contingency measures, such as the supply of
5 water, compressed air and mobile electrical power, including any necessary equipment, that are
6 necessary for mitigating severe emergency conditions shall be located and maintained in such a way
7 that they can withstand and will be readily accessible in postulated emergency conditions.

8 6.26. Emergency response facilities or locations to support the emergency response shall be
9 designated that are operational under the full range of postulated hazardous conditions with the
10 following functions, as appropriate: receiving notifications and initiating the response; coordination
11 and direction of on-site response actions; providing technical and operational support to those
12 personnel performing tasks within a facility and those responding off-site; coordination and direction
13 of off-site response actions with on-site response actions; coordination of national response actions;
14 coordination of public information; coordination of radiological monitoring, sampling and assessment;
15 managing those evacuated (including reception, registration, monitoring and decontamination as well
16 as for meeting the personal needs of those staffing them such as housing, feeding, sanitation etc.); safe
17 storage of necessary resources; and appropriate medical attention to and treatment of individuals who
18 have undergone exposure or contamination.

19 6.27. For facilities in category I, emergency response facilities¹⁸ separate from the control room and
20 supplementary control room shall be provided so that: technical support can be given to the control
21 room operating personnel in emergency conditions (technical support centre); operational control by
22 the personnel performing tasks within or near the facility can be maintained (operational support
23 centre); and the on-site emergency response is managed (emergency centre). These emergency
24 response facilities shall operate as an integrated system in support of the control room, without
25 interfering in each other's functions. For facilities in category I, the emergency response facilities or
26 locations to be used in an emergency response shall provide reasonable assurance of being able to be
27 operable and habitable under a range of hazardous conditions, including those not considered in the
28 design basis.

29 **Requirement 23: Training, drills and exercises**

30 **The government shall ensure that relevant response staff shall take part in regular training,**
31 **drills and exercises to ensure that they are able to perform their assigned response functions in a**
32 **nuclear or radiological emergency effectively.**

¹⁸ Such emergency response facilities may be collocated (i.e. these functions may be performed from a single emergency response facility or location) as long as it is ensured that they do not interfere with each other in performing their specified functions and that they are separated from the control rooms.

1 6.28. The operating organization and response organizations shall identify the knowledge, skills and
2 abilities necessary to be able to perform the functions specified in Section 5. The operating
3 organization and response organizations shall make arrangements for the selection of personnel and
4 for training to ensure that the personnel have the requisite knowledge, skills, abilities, equipment, and
5 procedures and other arrangements to perform their assigned response functions. The arrangements
6 shall include ongoing refresher training on an appropriate schedule and arrangements for ensuring that
7 personnel assigned to positions with responsibilities for emergency response undergo the specified
8 training.

9 6.29. For facilities in category I, II or III all staff and all other persons on the site shall be instructed in
10 the arrangements for them to be notified of an emergency and of their actions when notified of an
11 emergency.

12 6.30. Exercise programmes shall be conducted to ensure that all specified functions required to be
13 performed for emergency response and all organizational interfaces for facilities in category I, II or III
14 and the national level programmes for category IV or V are tested at suitable intervals. These
15 programmes shall include the participation in some exercises of, as feasible, all of the organizations
16 concerned. The exercises shall be systematically evaluated (see para. 4.9(h)) and some exercises shall
17 be evaluated by the regulatory body. The programme shall be subject to review and updating in the
18 light of experience gained (see paras 4.19 and 6.34).

19 6.31. The staff responsible for critical response functions¹⁹ for a facility in category I or II and within
20 the emergency planning zones and extended planning distance (to include areas in category V) shall
21 participate in drills and training exercises at least once every year. For facilities in category III and
22 activities in category IV the staff responsible for critical response functions shall participate in training
23 exercises or drills on an appropriate schedule.

24 6.32. The officials off the site responsible for making decisions on protective actions and other
25 response actions for the population within the emergency planning zones and extended planning
26 distance (see para. 5.53) shall be trained in the protection strategy and shall regularly participate in
27 exercises. The officials off the site responsible for public communications in a nuclear or radiological
28 emergency shall also regularly participate in exercises.

29 6.33. The conduct of exercises shall be evaluated against established response objectives that
30 demonstrate that identification, notification, activation and other response actions can be performed in
31 time to achieve the practical goals of emergency response (see para. 3.1).

32 **Requirement 24: Quality management programme**

¹⁹ Critical response functions are functions that must be performed promptly and correctly in order to classify, declare and notify an emergency effectively, to activate the emergency response, to manage the response, to take mitigatory actions, to protect emergency workers and to take urgent protective actions on and off the site in accordance with international safety standards.

1 **The government shall ensure that a quality management programme is established to ensure a**
2 **high degree of availability and reliability of all supplies, equipment, communication systems and**
3 **facilities, plans, procedures and other arrangements necessary for effective emergency response.**

4 6.34. The operating organization, as part of its management system, and response organizations, as
5 part of its emergency management system, shall establish a quality management programme to ensure
6 a high degree of availability and reliability of all supplies, equipment, communication systems and
7 facilities, plans, procedures and other arrangements necessary to perform the functions specified in
8 Section 5 in a nuclear or radiological emergency (see para. 6.24). This programme shall include
9 arrangements for inventories, resupply, tests and calibrations, made to ensure that these items and
10 facilities are continuously available and functional for use in a nuclear or radiological emergency.
11 Arrangements shall be made to maintain, review and update emergency plans, procedures and other
12 arrangements and to incorporate lessons learned from research, operating experience (such as the
13 response to emergencies) and emergency exercises (see paras 4.19, 6.30 and 6.36). The quality
14 management programme shall also include periodic and independent audits against the functions
15 specified under Section 5 including participation in international audits such as those organized
16 through the IAEA (e.g. Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) missions).

17 6.35. The operating organization and response organizations shall establish and maintain adequate
18 records in relation to both the emergency arrangements and the response to a nuclear or radiological
19 emergency, to include dose assessments, monitoring results and inventory of radioactive waste
20 managed, in order to allow for their review and evaluation. These records shall also provide for the
21 identification of those persons requiring long term health monitoring and follow-up, as necessary, as
22 well as for the long term management of radioactive waste.

23 6.36. The operating organization and response organizations shall make arrangements to review and
24 evaluate responses in real events and in exercises, to record the areas in which improvements are
25 necessary and to ensure that the necessary improvements are made.

26 6.37. Relevant international organizations shall review and update their applicable standards,
27 guidelines and relevant arrangements in emergency preparedness and response on the basis of research
28 and lessons learned from the response to real emergencies and emergency exercises.

29

Appendix I**GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY WORKERS
AND HELPERS IN AN EMERGENCY**

I.1. This Appendix provides guidance values to be the basis for operational guidance for restricting exposure to emergency workers and helpers in an emergency.

I.2. In almost all emergencies, at most only the dose from external penetrating radiation can be measured or estimated continuously. In view of this and assuming that every effort has been made for protection against non-penetrating external radiation and from intake or skin contamination (see para. 4.71), Table I.1 provides guidance values for restricting exposure for emergency workers and helpers in an emergency in terms of personal dose equivalent $H_p(10)$ from external penetrating radiation.

I.3. As soon as possible, the total dose (i.e. effective dose or equivalent dose to an organ or tissue) via all exposure pathways (i.e. both external dose and committed dose from intake) needs to be estimated and further potential exposure restricted as appropriate (see para. 5.76). Table II.1 also provides guidance for the effective dose and equivalent dose to an organ or tissue via all exposure pathways (including committed dose from intake) for restricting further exposure in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency once the total dose has been estimated.

I.4. The guidance levels for external penetrating radiation ($H_p(10)$) do not consider the possible severe deterministic effects to a fetus which can occur at any dose greater than 100 mSv. Consequently female workers who are aware that they are pregnant or who might be pregnant shall be informed of this risk and would typically be excluded from taking actions in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency that might result in doses exceeding the guidance values in Table I.1 for actions to avert a large collective dose.

1 TABLE I.1. GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY
2 WORKERS AND HELPERS IN AN EMERGENCY

Tasks	Guidance value ^a
Life saving actions	<p>- $H_p(10)^b < 500$ mSv</p> <p>or</p> <p>- $E^c < 500$ mSv, $H_{fetus}^d < 100$ mSv</p> <p>or</p> <p>- <i>Total dose less than the generic criteria in Table II.1 for which protective actions and other response actions are expected to be undertaken under any circumstances to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects.</i></p> <p>This value may be exceeded under circumstances in which the expected benefits to others clearly outweigh the emergency worker's own health risks, and the emergency worker volunteers to take the action and understands and accepts this health risk.</p>
Actions to prevent severe deterministic effects and actions to prevent the development of catastrophic conditions that could significantly affect people and the environment	<p>- $H_p(10) < 500$ mSv</p> <p>or</p> <p>- $E < 500$ mSv, $H_{fetus} < 100$ mSv</p>
Actions to avert a large collective dose	<p>- $H_p(10) < 100$ mSv</p> <p>or</p> <p>- $E < 100$ mSv, $H_{fetus} < 100$ mSv</p>

3 ^{a.} These values apply for: (a) the dose from exposure to external penetrating radiation. Doses from
4 exposure to non-penetrating external radiation and from intake or skin contamination need to be
5 prevented by all possible means. If this is not feasible, the effective dose and the equivalent dose to an
6 organ or tissue that are received have to be limited to minimize the health risk to the individual in line
7 with the risk associated with the guidance values given here; and (b) the total dose (effective dose or
8 equivalent dose to an organ or tissue) via all exposure pathways (i.e. both external dose and committed
9 dose from intake) which is to be estimated as soon as possible in order to enable restricting further
10 potential exposure as appropriate.

11 ^{b.} $H_p(10)$ is the personal dose equivalent $H_p(d)$ where $d = 10$ mm. $H_p(10)$ also represents $H_p(3)$ (i.e.
12 personal dose equivalent $H_p(d)$ where $d = 3$ mm), except in case of exposure to beta radiation with a
13 maximum energy above about 0.7 MeV or to photon radiation with a mean energy below about 40 keV.
14 In these cases, a restriction on $H_p(10)$ is not sufficient for protecting the lens of the eye. Therefore, in
15 these cases, all practicable means needs to be taken for ensuring protection of the lens of the eye (see
16 para. 5.71).

17 ^{c.} Effective dose.

18 ^{d.} Equivalent dose to the fetus.

19

Appendix II
GENERIC CRITERIA

II.1. This Appendix provides generic criteria:

- (a) at which protective actions and other response actions are expected to be undertaken under any circumstances to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects;
- (b) at which protective actions and other response actions are expected to be taken, if they can be taken safely, to reasonably reduce the risk of stochastic effects;
- (c) at which restriction of trade is warranted in consideration of the non-radiological consequences of the emergency; and
- (d) for use as a target dose for the transition to an existing exposure situation,

including examples of associated protective actions and other response actions expected to be taken.

II.2. These generic criteria are generically optimized for taking appropriate protective actions and other response actions in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

II.3. For each exposure scenario that could result in doses that exceed the generic criteria, operational criteria (e.g. operational intervention levels), shall be predetermined for these generic criteria to be used immediately and directly (without further assessment) to determine the appropriate protective actions and other response actions.

II.4. The operational criteria shall be established for the representative person with account duly taken of pregnant women and children as the most vulnerable to radiation exposure.

II.5. The basis for the protective actions and other response actions (e.g. operational criteria and calculated doses) shall be explained to the public and decision makers in terms of the associated health hazards, according to the following system:

- (a) 'Possibly dangerous to health' when the generic criteria in Table II.1 are projected or received, since there is a possibility of severe deterministic effects (i.e. radiation induced health effects that are life threatening or can result in a permanent injury that reduces the quality of life);
- (b) 'Health concerns' when the generic criteria in Table II.2 are projected or received, since the risk of radiation induced health effects warrants a medical screening;
- (c) 'Safe' when the generic criteria both in Table II.1 and Table II.2 are not projected or received, since no protective actions and other response actions are justified from the radiological point of view to reduce the risk of stochastic effects or to minimize severe deterministic effects as there will be neither observable increase in incidence of cancer nor any severe deterministic effect.

1 GENERIC CRITERIA FOR ACUTE DOSES FOR WHICH PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER
 2 RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE UNDERTAKEN UNDER ANY
 3 CIRCUMSTANCES TO AVOID OR TO MINIMIZE SEVERE DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS

4 II.6. Table II.1 provides generic criteria for use in developing a protection strategy and operational
 5 criteria for effective implementation of protective actions and other response actions to avoid or to
 6 minimize severe deterministic effects.

7 TABLE II.1. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR ACUTE DOSES FOR WHICH PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
 8 AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE UNDERTAKEN UNDER ANY
 9 CIRCUMSTANCES TO AVOID OR TO MINIMIZE SEVERE DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS [14]

External acute exposure (< 10 h)		If the dose is projected: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Take precautionary urgent protective actions immediately (even under difficult conditions) to keep doses below the generic criteria – Provide public information and warnings – Carry out urgent decontamination
$AD_{Red\ marrow}^a$	1 Gy	
AD_{Fetus}	0.1 ^b Gy	
AD_{Tissue}^c	25 Gy at 0.5 cm	
AD_{Skin}^d	10 Gy to 100 cm ²	
Internal exposure from acute intake ($\Delta = 30$ d^e)		If the dose has been received: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Perform immediate medical examination, consultation and indicated medical treatment – Carry out contamination control – Carry out immediate decorporation^g (if applicable) – Conduct registration for long term health monitoring – Provide comprehensive psychological counselling
$AD(\Delta)_{Red\ marrow}$	0.2 Gy for radionuclides with atomic number $Z \geq 90^f$	
	2 Gy for radionuclides with atomic number $Z \leq 89^f$	
$AD(\Delta)_{Thyroid}$	2 Gy	
$AD(\Delta)_{Lung}^h$	30 Gy	
$AD(\Delta)_{Colon}$	20 Gy	
$AD(\Delta')_{Fetus}^i$	0.1 ^b Gy	

10 ^{a.} $AD_{Red\ marrow}$ represents the average RBE weighted absorbed dose to internal tissues or organs (e.g. red
 11 marrow, lung, small intestine, gonads, thyroid) and to the lens of the eye from exposure in a uniform field of
 12 strongly penetrating radiation.

13 ^{b.} At 0.1 Gy there would only be a very small probability of severe deterministic effects to the fetus and only
 14 during certain periods post conception (e.g. between 8 and 15 weeks of gestation age) and only if the dose
 15 received is from high dose rates. During other periods post conception and for lower dose rates, the fetus is
 16 less sensitive. There is a high probability of severe deterministic effects at 1 Gy. Therefore, 1 Gy is used as
 17 the generic criteria for acute doses to the fetus: (i) in the hazard assessment (see para. 4.22) to identify
 18 facilities and activities, on-site areas, off-site areas and locations for which a nuclear or radiological
 19 emergency could warrant precautionary urgent protective actions to avoid or to minimize severe
 20 deterministic effects; (ii) for identifying exposure situations (see para. II.5) that are 'possibly dangerous to
 21 health'; and (iii) for making arrangements (see para. 5.53) for effective implementation of decisions on

- 1 urgent protective actions and other response actions to be taken off the site to avoid or minimize the
2 occurrence of severe deterministic effects (e.g. establishing a precautionary action zone (PAZ)).
- 3 ^{c.} Dose delivered to 100 cm² at a depth of 0.5 cm under the body surface in tissue due to close contact with a
4 radioactive source (e.g. source carried in the hand or pocket).
- 5 ^{d.} The dose is to the 100 cm² dermis (skin structures at a depth of 40 mg/cm² (or 0.4 mm) below the surface).
- 6 ^{e.} $AD(\Delta)$ is the RBE weighted absorbed dose delivered over the period of time Δ by the intake (I_{05}) that will
7 result in a severe deterministic effect in 5% of exposed individuals. It is calculated as described in Ref. [16].
- 8 ^{f.} Different criteria are used to take account of the significant difference in the radionuclide specific intake
9 threshold values for the radionuclides in these groups.
- 10 ^{g.} Decorporation is the action of the biological processes, facilitated by chemical or biological agents, by means
11 of which incorporated radionuclides are removed from the human body. The generic criterion for
12 decorporation is based on the projected dose without decorporation.
- 13 ^{h.} For the purposes of these generic criteria 'lung' means the alveolar-interstitial region of the respiratory tract.
- 14 ^{i.} For this particular case, Δ' means the period of in utero development.
- 15

1 GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS TO
2 REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS IN AN EMERGENCY

3 II.7. Table II.2 provides generic criteria for use in developing a protection strategy and operational
4 criteria for effective implementation of protective actions and other response actions to reduce the risk
5 of stochastic effects in a nuclear or radiological emergency as elaborated in Ref. [3].

6 II.8. These actions shall be taken only for those affected for which they can be taken safely without
7 endangering their lives (e.g. evacuation of patients requiring specialized medical treatment) or causing
8 more detriment than they avert.

9 II.9. Arrangements shall be made to revise the predetermined operational criteria based on these
10 generic criteria, as appropriate, to be adapted to the prevailing conditions.

11 TABLE II.2. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE
12 ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS [14]

Generic criteria		Examples of protective actions and other response actions ^a
Projected dose that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take urgent protective actions and other response actions		
$H_{Thyroid}$	50 mSv ^b in the first 7 days	Iodine thyroid blocking ^c
E	100 mSv in the first 7 days	Sheltering; evacuation; decontamination; restriction of consumption of food, milk and water; contamination control; public reassurance
H_{Fetus}	100 mSv in the first 7 days	
Projected dose that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take early protective actions and other response actions		
E	100 mSv per annum	Temporary relocation; decontamination; replacement of food, milk and water; public reassurance
H_{Fetus}	100 mSv for the full period of in utero development	
Dose that has been received and that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take longer term medical actions to detect and to effectively treat radiation induced health effects		
E	100 mSv in a month	Screening based on equivalent doses to specific radiosensitive organs (as a basis for medical follow-up), counselling
H_{Fetus}	100 mSv for the full period of in utero development	Counselling to allow informed decisions to be made in individual circumstances

13 ^{a.} These examples are neither exhaustive nor are they grouped in a mutually exclusive way.

14 ^{b.} For the thyroid, iodine thyroid blocking is an urgent protective action that is prescribed: (a) if exposure
15 due to radioactive iodine is involved, (b) before or shortly after a release of radioactive iodine, and (c)
16 only within a short period before or after the intake of radioactive iodine.

- 1
 - c. The equivalent dose to the thyroid ($H_{Thyroid}$) only due to exposure to radioiodine.

DRAFT

1 GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND OTHER
2 COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS IN AN EMERGENCY

3 II.10. Table II.3 provides generic criteria for use in developing a protection strategy and operational
4 criteria for effective implementation of protective actions and other response actions to reasonably
5 reduce the risk of stochastic effects from ingestion of food, milk and drinking water and from used of
6 other commodities in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

7 II.11. Generic criteria of 1/10 of the generic criteria for early protective actions and other response
8 actions given in Table II.2 is established for food, milk and drinking water and other commodities
9 restrictions to ensure that the dose from all exposure pathways, including ingestion, will not exceed
10 the generic criteria for early protective actions and other response actions given in Table II.2.

11 II.12. If restriction of consumption of food, milk and drinking water will result in severe
12 malnutrition or dehydration because replacements are not available, food, milk and drinking water
13 with concentration levels projected to result in a dose above the generic criteria in Table II.3 may be
14 consumed until replacements are available, or the affected people can be relocated, provided this will
15 not result in doses above the generic criteria in Table II.1.

16 II.13. Arrangements shall be made to revise the predetermined operational criteria (e.g. operational
17 intervention levels) for food, milk and drinking water and other commodities, as appropriate, to adapt
18 to the conditions prevailing during the emergency to ensure that those people in the areas affected will
19 not receive a dose from all exposure pathways greater than the generic criteria for early protective
20 actions and other response actions given in Table II.2.

21

1 TABLE II.3. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND
 2 OTHER COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS IN AN
 3 EMERGENCY

Generic criteria		Examples of protective actions and other response actions
Projected dose from ingestion of food, milk and drinking water that exceeds the following generic criteria: Take protective actions and other response actions as justified ^a .		
<i>E</i>	10 mSv per annum	Stop consumption and distribution of non-essential ^a food, milk and drinking water and restrict use and distribution of other commodities. Replace essential ^b food, milk and drinking water as soon as possible or relocate the people if replacements are not available. Estimate the dose of those who may have consumed food, milk and drinking water or used other commodities that may result in a dose exceeding the generic criteria to determine if medical counselling and follow-up is warranted in accordance with Table II.2.
<i>H_{Fetus}</i>	10 mSv for the full period of in utero development	

4 ^{a.} Justified actions yield sufficient benefits to outweigh the detriments associated with taking
 5 them. This shall include consideration of those detriments not associated with the radiation
 6 exposure to include the detrimental impact on health (e.g. possible reduced life expectancy due
 7 to resettlement), economy, society, and culture.

8 ^{b.} Restricting essential food, milk or drinking water could result in dehydration, severe
 9 malnutrition or other health consequences; therefore, essential food, milk and drinking water
 10 shall be restricted only if alternatives are available.

11

1 GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO REDUCE THE
2 RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS IN AN EMERGENCY

3 II.14. Table II.4 provides generic criteria for use in determining a protection strategy and operational
4 criteria for effective implementation of protective actions and other response actions to reduce the risk
5 of stochastic effects from the use of vehicles, equipment and other items from an area affected by a
6 nuclear or radiological emergency.

7 II.15. Generic criteria of 1/10 of the generic criteria for early protective actions and other response
8 actions given in Table II.2 is established for vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area
9 to ensure that the dose from all exposure pathways, including use of such vehicles, equipment and
10 other items, will not exceed the generic criteria for early actions given in Table II.2 for a member of
11 the public.

12 II.16. Restricting the use of vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area could
13 interfere with taking urgent protective actions and other response actions or with providing services
14 essential for public health or well-being (e.g. transfer of patients requiring continuous specialized
15 medical treatment, reaching a final destination only once the ship or aircraft has left the affected area).
16 Such vehicles, equipment and other items whose use is projected to result in a dose above the generic
17 criteria given in Table II.4 may be used until replacements are available, provided that: (a) their use
18 will not result in doses that exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.1 for a member of the public
19 or the guidance values for restricting exposure of emergency workers and helpers in an emergency
20 given in Appendix I, and (b) actions are taken to control the dose to the user as an emergency worker,
21 a helper in an emergency or a member of the public, as appropriate.

22 II.17. Arrangements shall be made to revise the predetermined operational criteria (e.g. operational
23 intervention levels) for the use of vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area, as
24 appropriate, to adapt to the conditions prevailing during the emergency, to ensure that those people in
25 the areas affected will not receive a dose from all exposure pathways greater than the generic criteria
26 for early protective actions and other response actions given in Table II.2.

27

1 TABLE II.4. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO
 2 REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS IN AN EMERGENCY

Generic criteria		Examples of protective actions and other response actions
Projected dose from the use of vehicles, equipment or other items from an affected area that exceed the following generic criteria: Take protective actions and other response actions as justified ^a .		
<i>E</i>	10 mSv per annum	Stop non-essential ^b use.
<i>H_{Fetus}</i>	10 mSv for the full period of in utero development	<p>Use essential vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area until replacements are available if: (a) use will not result in doses exceeding the generic criteria in Table II.2 for a member of the public or the guidance values in Appendix I for the emergency workers and helpers in an emergency, and (b) actions are taken to reduce the dose to the user as an emergency worker, helper in an emergency or a member of the public, as appropriate.</p> <p>Estimate the dose of those emergency workers, helpers in an emergency and members of the public who may have used a vehicle, equipment and other item from an affected area that may result in a dose exceeding the generic criteria for which medical counselling and follow-up is warranted in accordance with Table II.2.</p>

3 ^a. Justified actions yield sufficient benefits to outweigh the detriments associated with taking
 4 them. This shall include consideration of those detriments not associated with the radiation
 5 exposure to include the detrimental impact on health, economy, society, and culture.

6 ^b. Restricting use of essential vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area could
 7 interfere with taking urgent protective actions and other response actions or with providing
 8 services essential for public health or well-being (e.g. transfer of patients requiring continuous
 9 specialized medical treatment, reaching a final destination only once the ship or aircraft has
 10 left the affected area).

11

1 GENERIC CRITERIA FOR RESPONSE ACTIONS FOR COMMODITIES AND FOOD TRADED
2 INTERNATIONALLY

3 II.18. Table II.5 provides generic criteria for use in determining the strategy and operational criteria
4 for effective implementation of response actions to reduce the non-radiological consequences of the
5 emergency by providing a basis for the resumption of international trade.

6 II.19. Exceeding the generic criteria in Table II.5 does not mean that the commodities and food are
7 unsafe in terms of the radiation induced health effects (see para. II.4). Commodities and food are to be
8 considered unsafe in terms of the radiation induced health effects (see para. II.5) only if the generic
9 criteria in Table II.1 or II.2 are projected to be exceeded.

10 II.20. The generic criteria for commodities and food traded internationally that could contain
11 radioactive material as a result of a nuclear or radiological emergency are established at 1/100 of the
12 generic criteria given in Table II.2 for early protective actions and other response actions to ensure that
13 the dose to the public will be a small fraction for which actions are warranted to reduce the risk of
14 stochastic effects, since these commodities and food may not be controlled following export.

15 II.21. Arrangements shall be made to revise the predetermined operational criteria based on these
16 generic criteria, as appropriate, to adapt to the prevailing conditions.

17 II.22. For food traded internationally that could contain radionuclides as a result of a nuclear or
18 radiological emergency, the operational criteria (guideline levels) as published by the Joint
19 FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission [15] shall be used (see para. 5.23 of Ref [14])
20 ultimately.

21 II.23. If restricting trade in commodities and food could result in severe health effects or other
22 detrimental effects in another State, than the commodities and food that are projected to result in a
23 dose above the generic criteria may be traded if justified until replacements are available, provided
24 that: (a) trade is approved with the receiving State; (b) trade will not result in doses that exceed the
25 generic criteria in Table II.2 for the public; (c) actions are taken to control the dose during transport,
26 and (d) actions are taken to control the use and reduce the dose to the member of the public.

27

1 TABLE II.5. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR RESPONSE ACTIONS FOR COMMODITIES AND
 2 FOOD TRADED INTERNATIONALLY

Generic criteria		Examples of other response actions
Projected dose from commodities and food that exceed the generic criteria: Take response actions to restrict international trade.		
<i>E</i>	1 mSv per annum	Restrict non-essential ^a international trade.
<i>H_{Fetus}</i>	1 mSv for the full period of in utero development	Trade essential commodities and food until replacements are available if: (a) trade is approved with the receiving State; (b) trade will not result in doses that exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for the public; (c) actions are taken to control the dose during transport; and (d) actions are taken to control the use and reduce the dose to the member of the public.

3 ^{a.} Restricting the trade of essential commodities and food could result in severe health effects or
 4 other detrimental conditions in another State.

1 GENERIC CRITERIA AS A TARGET DOSE FOR THE TRANSITION TO AN EXISTING
2 EXPOSURE SITUATION

3 II.24. Generic criteria shall be established for use as a target dose for the implementation of
4 protective actions and other actions aimed at enabling the transition to an existing exposure situation
5 with due consideration and verification of the fulfilment of conditions set in para. II.25. These criteria
6 shall be established to $1/5^1$ of the generic criteria for the early protective actions and other response
7 actions given in Table II.2 and are provided below:

- 8 a) an effective dose of 20 mSv per annum; and
9 b) an equivalent dose to a fetus of 20 mSv for the full period of utero development.

10 II.25. The decision to terminate the emergency phase and the concurrent transition to an existing
11 exposure situation shall be taken after: (a) justified² actions have been taken to reach the target dose³
12 and it has been confirmed that further implementation of actions to reach the target dose will do more
13 harm than good; (b) confirmation that the source of exposure is fully characterized for all members of
14 the public living normally in the area; (c) the exposure situation is understood and remains stable; (d)
15 any restrictions on normal living conditions are limited and provisions are in place to confirm
16 compliance with such restrictions; and (e) ensuring that interested parties including members of the
17 public are consulted and kept informed about the basis for the adjustment and transition placing the
18 associated health hazards in perspective (see para. II.5).

19 II.26. Any further reduction of the dose to a member of the public below the target dose used for
20 deciding on the transition to an existing exposure situation (see para. II.25) shall be carefully
21 considered taking into account that actions to be taken to achieve such reduction may do more harm
22 than good.

23

24

¹ This is of the order of the dose above which the government is required to ensure that an action plan is established comprising coordinated actions to reduce natural occurring source of exposure (e.g. Rn-222) [14]. This is also consistent with reference levels established in Ref. [14] for both emergency exposure situation and existing exposure situation.

² Justified actions yield sufficient benefits to outweigh the detriments associated with taking them. This shall include consideration of those detriments not associated with the radiation exposure to include the detrimental impact on health (e.g. possible reduced life expectancy due to resettlement), economy, society, and culture.

³ This does not necessarily mean that the target dose is to be reached considering that no radiation induced health effects are to be observed for exposures below the generic criteria for early protective actions and other response actions given in Table II.2.

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- 27

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Annex

REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE BY CATEGORY

A-1. Table A-1 in this Annex lists the paragraphs applicable for each category.

TABLE A-1. PARAGRAPHS APPLICABLE FOR EACH CATEGORY

Category	Paragraphs applicable for each category				
I	1.1-1.16			5.53 6.11	5.10 6.26, 6.28
II	2.1-2.8 3.1-3.2 4.1-4.9, 4.11, 4.14-4.17, 4.19, 4.21	4.10, 4.12-4.13, 4.18, 4.20, 4.23 5.11, 5.16, 5.18, 5.25-5.28, 5.32, 5.34, 5.36, 5.143- 5.145 6.21-6.22	5.2-5.3, 5.8- 5.9, 5.41-5.42, 5.48, 5.56- 5.57, 5.85 6.30	5.7, 5.15, 5.22, 5.29, 5.33, 5.54- 5.55, 5.60-5.61, 5.86, 5.105- 5.106 6.33	
III	5.1, 5.4-5.6, 5.12-5.14, 5.21, 5.30-5.31, 5.43- 5.47, 5.50-5.51, 5.59, 5.65-5.84, 5.87-5.104, 5.107-5.109, 5.111-5.142			5.62 4.22	
IV			5.19, 5.20	5.17, 5.23-5.24, 5.35, 5.37-5.40, 5.49, 5.52, 5.58, 5.62-5.64, 5.110	-
V	6.1-6.10, 6.12- 6.14, 6.16-6.20, 6.23-6.25, 6.27. 6.29, 6.31-6.32, 6.34-6.38	6.15		5.7, 5.15, 5.22, 5.29, 5.33, 5.54- 5.55, 5.60-5.61, 5.86, 5.105- 5.106 6.33	

5

DEFINITIONS

The following definitions apply for the purposes of these Standards.

Further definitions are provided in the IAEA Safety Glossary: Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (2007 Edition), IAEA, Vienna (2007):

<http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/safety-glossary.asp>

The symbol 'Θ' denotes an information note; this note is not part of the definition.

*Those terms that are consistent with terms defined in the IAEA Safety Standard No. GSR Part 3 have been indicated with a *. New definitions have been indicated with a **.*

arrangements

See (emergency) arrangements.

authorization*

The granting by a regulatory body or other governmental body of written permission for a person or organization to conduct specified activities.

control*

The function or power or (usually as controls) means of directing, regulating or restraining.

- ① It should be noted that the usual meaning of the English word control in safety related contexts is somewhat 'stronger' (more active) than that of its usual translations and other similar words in some other languages. For example, 'control' typically implies not only checking or monitoring something but also ensuring that corrective or enforcement measures are taken if the results of the checking or monitoring indicate such a need. This is in contrast, for example, to the more limited usage of the equivalent word in French and Spanish.

regulatory control. Any form of control or regulation applied to facilities and activities by a regulatory body for reasons relating to nuclear safety and radiation protection or to nuclear security.

- ① In nuclear security series [8], the phrase 'out of regulatory control' is used to describe a situation in which nuclear material or other radioactive material is present without an appropriate authorization, either because controls have failed for some reason, or because they never existed.

dangerous source

See source.

deterministic effect*

1 A health effect of radiation for which generally a threshold level of dose exists above which
2 the severity of the effect is greater for a higher dose.

3 ① The level of the threshold dose is characteristic of the particular health effect but may also
4 depend, to a limited extent, on the exposed individual. Examples of deterministic effects include
5 erythema and acute radiation syndrome (radiation sickness).

6 ① Such an effect is described as a severe deterministic effect if it is fatal or life threatening or
7 results in a permanent injury that reduces quality of life.

8 ① Deterministic effects are also referred to as 'harmful tissue reactions'.

9 **early protective actions****

10 See protective actions.

11 **emergency***

12 A non-routine situation or event that necessitates prompt action, primarily to mitigate a hazard
13 or adverse consequences for human health and safety, quality of life, property or the environment.
14 This includes nuclear and radiological emergencies and conventional emergencies such as fires,
15 release of hazardous chemicals, storms or earthquakes. It includes situations for which prompt action
16 is warranted to mitigate the effects of a perceived hazard.

17 **nuclear or radiological emergency.** An emergency in which there is, or is perceived to be, a
18 hazard due to:

- 19 1) The energy resulting from a nuclear chain reaction or from the decay of the products of a
20 chain reaction; or
21 2) Radiation exposure.

22 **emergency action level (EAL)***

23 A specific, predetermined, observable criterion used to detect, recognize and determine the
24 emergency class.

25 **(emergency) arrangements***

26 The integrated set of infrastructural elements necessary to provide the capability for
27 performing a specified function or task required in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency.
28 These elements may include authorities and responsibilities, organization, coordination, personnel,
29 plans, procedures, facilities, equipment or training.

30 **emergency class***

31 A set of conditions that warrant a similar immediate emergency response.

32 ① This is the term used for communicating to the response organizations and to members of the
33 public the level of response needed. The events that belong to a given emergency class are
34 defined by criteria specific to the installation, source or practice, which, if exceeded, indicate

1 classification at the prescribed level. For each emergency class, the initial actions of the
2 response organizations are predefined.

3 **emergency classification**

4 The process whereby an authorized official classifies an emergency in order to declare the
5 applicable emergency class.

6 ① Upon declaration of the emergency class, the response organizations initiate the predefined
7 response actions for that emergency class.

8 **emergency exposure situation***

9 An emergency exposure situation is a situation of exposure that arises as a result of an
10 accident, a malicious act, or any other unexpected event, and requires prompt action in order to avoid
11 or reduce adverse consequences.

12 ① Emergency exposures can be reduced only by protective actions and other response actions.

13 **emergency plan***

14 A description of the objectives, policy and concept of operations for the response to an
15 emergency and of the structure, authorities and responsibilities for a systematic, coordinated and
16 effective response. The emergency plan serves as the basis for the development of other plans,
17 procedures and checklists.

18 ① A *concept of operations* is a brief description of the ideal response to a postulated nuclear or
19 radiological emergency, used to ensure that all those involved in the development of a capability
20 for emergency response share a common understanding.

21 **emergency planning distance****

22 See extended planning distance (EPD) and ingestion and commodities planning distance
23 (ICPD).

24 **emergency planning zone**

25 See precautionary action zone (PAZ) and urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ).

26 **emergency planning zones and distances****

27 See precautionary action zone (PAZ), urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ), extended
28 planning distance (EPD) and ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD).

29 **emergency preparedness***

30 The capability to take actions that will effectively mitigate the consequences of an emergency
31 for human health and safety, quality of life, property and the environment.

32 **emergency procedures***

1 A set of instructions describing in detail the actions to be taken by emergency workers in an
2 emergency.

3 **emergency response***

4 The performance of actions to mitigate the consequences of an emergency for human health
5 and safety, quality of life, property and the environment. It may also provide a basis for the resumption
6 of normal social and economic activity.

7 **emergency response commander****

8 The person responsible for directing the response of all the organizations responding to an
9 emergency (including the response for radiological hazards, the response for conventional hazards and
10 the response for law enforcement); referred to in some States as the incident commander.

11 **emergency response facility or location****

12 Facility or location needed for supporting an emergency response, to which specific functions
13 are assigned at the preparedness stage and which need to be usable under emergency conditions.

14 ① There are two different types of emergency response facilities or locations: those established in
15 advance (e.g. technical support centre for nuclear power plants) and those established at the time
16 of an emergency (e.g. triage area).

17 ① Depending on the emergency preparedness category and on the nature of an emergency, an
18 emergency response facility may be an emergency response location.

19 **emergency services**

20 The local off-site response organizations that are generally available and that perform
21 emergency response functions. These may include police, fire fighters and rescue brigades, ambulance
22 services and control teams for hazardous materials.

23 **emergency worker***

24 A person having specified duties as a worker in response to an emergency.

25 ① Emergency workers may include workers employed, both directly and indirectly, by registrants
26 and licensees as well as personnel of responding organizations, such as police officers,
27 firefighters, medical personnel, and drivers and crews of evacuation vehicles.

28 ① Emergency workers may or may not be designated as such in advance to an emergency.
29 Emergency workers not designated as such in advance to an emergency, are not necessarily
30 *workers* prior to the emergency.

31 **existing exposure situation***

32 An existing exposure situation is a situation of exposure that already exists when a decision on
33 the need for control needs to be taken.

- 1 ① Existing exposure situations include exposure to natural background radiation that is amenable
2 to control; exposure due to residual radioactive material that arose from past practices that were
3 never subject to regulatory control or exposure due to residual radioactive material arising from
4 a nuclear or radiation emergency after an emergency exposure situation has been declared to be
5 ended.

6 **extended planning distance (EPD)****

7 Distance around a nuclear power plant within which arrangements are made to conduct
8 monitoring in order to identify, within a period that would be effective in reducing the risk of
9 stochastic effects, areas warranting (1) evacuation within a day following a release or (2) relocation
10 within a week to a month following a release.

11 **facilities and activities***

12 A general term encompassing nuclear facilities, uses of all sources of ionizing radiation, all
13 radioactive waste management activities, transport of radioactive material and any other practice or
14 circumstances in which people may be subject to exposure to radiation from naturally occurring or
15 artificial sources.

- 16 ① Facilities includes: nuclear facilities; irradiation installations; some mining and raw material
17 processing facilities such as uranium mines; radioactive waste management facilities; and any
18 other places where radioactive material is produced, processed, used, handled, stored or disposed
19 of — or where radiation generators are installed — on such a scale that consideration of
20 protection and safety is required.

- 21 ① Activities includes: the production, use, import and export of radiation sources for industrial,
22 research and medical purposes; the transport of radioactive material; the decommissioning of
23 facilities; radioactive waste management activities such as the discharge of effluents; and some
24 aspects of the remediation of sites affected by residues from past activities.

- 25 ① This term is intended to provide an alternative to the terminology of sources and practices (or
26 intervention) to refer to general categories of situations. For example, a practice may involve
27 many different facilities and/or activities, whereas the general definition (1) of source is too
28 broad in some cases: a facility or activity might constitute a source, or might involve the use of
29 many sources, depending upon the interpretation used.

- 30 ① The term facilities and activities is very general, and includes those for which little or no
31 regulatory control may be necessary or achievable: the more specific terms authorized facility
32 and authorized activity should be used to distinguish those facilities and activities for which any
33 form of authorization has been given.

- 34 ① In the Fundamental Safety Principles (Safety Fundamentals), the term ‘facilities and activities —
35 existing and new — utilized for peaceful purposes’ is abbreviated for convenience to facilities
36 and activities as a general term encompassing any human activity that may cause people to be
37 exposed to radiation risks arising from naturally occurring or artificial sources (see Ref. [1],
38 para. 1.9).

1 first responders

2 The first members of an emergency service to respond at the scene of an emergency.

3 generic criteria**

4 Levels for the projected dose, the dose that has been received or the residual dose at which
5 protective actions and other response actions are to be taken.

6 graded approach*

7 1) For a system of control, such as a regulatory system or a safety system, a process or method in
8 which the stringency of the control measures and conditions to be applied is commensurate, to
9 the extent practicable, with the likelihood and possible consequences of, and the level of risk
10 associated with, a loss of control.

11 2) An application of safety requirements that is commensurate with the characteristics of the
12 practice or source and with the magnitude and likelihood of the exposures.

13 ⓘ In the Nuclear Security Fundamentals [2], a ‘graded approach’ means the application of nuclear
14 security measures proportionate to the potential consequences of criminal or intentional
15 unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated
16 facilities or associated activities, or other acts determined by the State to have an adverse impact
17 on nuclear security.

18 hazard assessment*

19 Assessment of hazards associated with facilities, activities or sources within or beyond the
20 borders of a State in order to identify:

21 (a) Those events and the associated areas for which protective actions may be required
22 within the State;

23 (b) The actions that would be effective in mitigating the consequences of such events.

24 helpers in an emergency**

25 Members of the public who willingly and voluntarily help in response to a nuclear or
26 radiological emergency.

27 ⓘ Helpers in an emergency are aware that they may be exposed to radiation and that their exposure
28 could exceed the generic criteria at which protective actions and other response actions are to be
29 taken to protect the public.

30 ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD)**

31 The distance around a nuclear power plant for the area within which arrangements are made,
32 following the declaration of a General Emergency, to take effective response actions in reducing the
33 risk for stochastic effects by protecting the public from food, milk, water and commodities that may be
34 contaminated by the release.

1 **inner cordoned off area****

2 An area established by the first responders around a potential radiation hazard within which
3 protective actions and other response actions are recommended to be taken to protect the first
4 responders and the public from possible external exposure and contamination.

5 **interested party***

6 A person, company, etc., with a concern or interest in the activities and performance of an
7 organization, business, system, etc.

8 ① The term interested party is used in a broad sense to mean a person or group having an interest in
9 the performance of an organization. Those who can influence events may effectively become
10 interested parties — whether their ‘interest’ is regarded as ‘genuine’ or not — in the sense that
11 their views need to be considered. Interested parties have typically included the following:
12 customers, owners, operators, employees, suppliers, partners, trade unions; the regulated
13 industry or professionals; scientific bodies; governmental agencies or regulatory bodies
14 (national, regional and local) whose responsibilities may cover nuclear energy; the media;
15 members of the public (individuals, community groups and interest groups); and other States,
16 especially neighbouring States that have entered into agreements providing for an exchange of
17 information concerning possible transboundary impacts, or States involved in the export or
18 import of certain technologies or materials.

19 **management system***

20 A set of interrelated or interacting elements (the system) for establishing policies and
21 objectives and enabling the objectives to be achieved in an efficient and effective manner.

22 ① The component parts of the management system include the organizational structure, resources
23 and organizational processes. Management is defined (in ISO 9000) as coordinated activities to
24 direct and control an organization.

25 ① The management system integrates all elements of an organization into one coherent system to
26 enable all of the organization’s objectives to be achieved. These elements include the
27 organizational structure, resources and processes. Personnel, equipment and organizational
28 culture as well as the documented policies and processes are parts of the management system.
29 The organization’s processes have to address the totality of the requirements on the
30 organization as established in, for example, IAEA safety standards and other international
31 codes and standards.

32 **non-radiological consequences****

33 Adverse psychological, social or economic consequences of a nuclear or radiological
34 emergency or of the response to an emergency that have effects on human health and safety, quality of
35 life, property or the environment.

36 **notification**

1 (1) A report submitted promptly to a national or international authority providing details of an
2 emergency or a possible emergency; for example, as required by the Convention of Early
3 Notification of a Nuclear Accident [9].

4 (2) A set of actions taken upon detection of emergency conditions with the purpose of alerting
5 all organizations with responsibility for emergency response in the event of such conditions.

6 **notification point**

7 A designated organization with which arrangements have been made to receive notification
8 (meaning (2)) and to initiate promptly predetermined actions to activate a part of the emergency
9 response.

10 **notifying State**

11 The State that is responsible for notifying (see notification (1)) potentially affected States and
12 the IAEA of an event of actual, potential or perceived radiological significance for other States. This
13 includes:

14 (1) The State Party that has jurisdiction or control over the facility or activity (including space
15 objects) in accordance with Article 1 of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
16 Accident [9]; or

17 (2) The State that initially detects, or discovers evidence of, a transnational emergency, for
18 example by: detecting significant increases in atmospheric radiation levels of unknown origin;
19 detecting contamination in transboundary shipments; discovering a dangerous source that may
20 have originated in another State; or diagnosing medical symptoms that may have resulted from
21 exposure outside the State.

22 **nuclear or radiological emergency**

23 See emergency.

24 **nuclear security***

25 The prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal
26 transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive material or their
27 associated facilities.

28 **nuclear security event****

29 An event that has potential or actual implications for nuclear security that must be addressed
30 [2].

31 ① Nuclear security event includes events that are criminal or intentional unauthorized act and
32 unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated
33 facilities and associated activities. Examples of such events include a sabotage, a radiological
34 dispersal device or radiological exposure device etc. and threat thereof.

1 off-site (area)

2 See site (area).

3 off-site decision maker**

4 A person off the site with the authority and the responsibility to take actions immediately,
5 without consultation, to protect the public within the PAZ, UPZ, EPD, and ICPD.

6 on-site (area)

7 See site (area).

8 operational criteria**

9 Values of measurable quantities or observables to be used in the early phase of the response in
10 a nuclear or radiological emergency in order to determine the need for appropriate protective actions
11 and other response actions.

12 ① These include operational intervention levels (OILs), emergency action levels (EALs), specific
13 observables and other indicators of conditions on the site.

14 operational intervention level (OIL)*

15 A set level of a measurable quantity that corresponds to a generic criterion.

16 ① OILs are typically expressed in terms of dose rates or of activity of radioactive material
17 released, time integrated air concentrations, ground or surface concentrations, or activity
18 concentrations of radionuclides in environmental, food or water samples. An OIL is a type of
19 action level that is used immediately and directly (without further assessment) to determine the
20 appropriate protective actions on the basis of an environmental measurement.

21 operating organization

22 Any organization or person applying for authorization or authorized and/or responsible for
23 nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste or transport safety when undertaking activities or in relation to
24 any nuclear facilities or sources of ionizing radiation. This includes, inter alia, private individuals,
25 governmental bodies, consignors or carriers, licensees, hospitals, self-employed persons, etc.

26 ① Operator includes either those who are directly in control of a facility or an activity during use
27 of a source (such as radiographers or carriers) or, in the case of a source not under control
28 (such as a lost or illicitly removed source or a re-entering satellite), those who were responsible
29 for the source before control over it was lost.

30 operating personnel

31 Individual workers engaged in operation of an authorized facility or conduct of an authorized
32 activity.

33 planned exposure situation*

1 A planned exposure situation is a situation of exposure that arises from the planned operation
2 of a source or from a planned activity that results in an exposure from a source.

3 ① Since provision for protection and safety can be made before embarking on the activity
4 concerned, associated exposures and their probabilities of occurrence can be restricted from
5 the outset. The primary means of controlling exposure in planned exposure situations is by
6 good design of installations, equipment and operating procedures. In planned exposure
7 situations, a certain level of exposure is expected to occur.

8 **precautionary action zone (PAZ)**

9 An area around a facility for which arrangements have been made to take urgent protective
10 actions in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency to reduce the risk of severe deterministic
11 effects off the site. Protective actions within this area are to be taken before or shortly after a release of
12 radioactive material or exposure on the basis of the prevailing conditions at the facility.

13 **preparedness stage****

14 The stage prior to a nuclear or radiological emergency at which arrangements for an effective
15 emergency response are established.

16 **projected dose***

17 The dose that would be expected to be received if planned protective actions were not taken.

18 **protective action***

19 An action for the purposes of avoiding or reducing doses that might otherwise be received in
20 an emergency exposure situation or an existing exposure situation.

21 *early protective action***. A protective action in the event of a nuclear or radiological
22 emergency that can be implemented within days to weeks and still be effective.

23 ① The most common early protective actions are relocation and longer term
24 restrictions on consuming contaminated food.

25 *mitigatory action**. Immediate action by the operator or other party:

26 (a) To reduce the potential for conditions to develop that would result in exposure or a
27 release of radioactive material requiring emergency actions on or off the site; or

28 (b) To mitigate source conditions that may result in *exposure* or a release of radioactive
29 material requiring emergency actions on or off the site.

30 *precautionary urgent protective action**. A protective action in the event of a nuclear or
31 radiation emergency which must be taken before or shortly after a release of radioactive
32 material, or before an exposure, on the basis of the prevailing conditions to prevent or to reduce
33 the risk of severe deterministic effects.

1 **urgent protective action***. A protective action in the event of an emergency which must be
2 taken promptly (usually within hours) in order to be effective, and the effectiveness of which
3 will be markedly reduced if it is delayed.

- 4 ① Urgent protective actions include iodine thyroid blocking, evacuation, short term
5 sheltering, actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion, decontamination of individuals
6 and prevention of ingestion of potentially contaminated food, milk or water.

7 **radiological assessor****

8 A person who in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency assists the operator or off-
9 site response organizations by performing radiation surveys, performing dose assessments, controlling
10 contamination, ensuring the radiation protection of emergency workers and formulating
11 recommendations on protective actions and other response actions.

12 **regulatory body***

13 An authority or a system of authorities designated by the government of a State as having
14 legal authority for conducting the regulatory process, including issuing authorizations, and thereby
15 regulating nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety.

- 16 ① The national competent authority for the regulation of radioactive material transport safety is
17 included in this description.

18 **representative person***

19 An individual receiving a dose that is representative of the doses to the more highly exposed
20 individuals in the population.

- 21 ① ICRP Publication 101 indicates that the dose to the representative person “is the equivalent of,
22 and replaces, the mean dose in the ‘critical group’”, and provides guidance on assessing doses
23 to the representative person. The concept of critical group remains valid.

24 **residual dose***

25 The dose expected to be incurred in the future after protective actions have been terminated
26 (or a decision has been taken not to implement protective actions).

- 27 ① This applies in an existing exposure situation or an emergency exposure situation.

28 **response action****

29 An action to be taken in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency.

- 30 ① Response actions comprise protective actions and other response actions.

31 **Other response action.** An action to be taken in response to a nuclear or radiological
32 emergency that is not a protective action.

1 ① The most common other response actions are: medical examination, consultation and
2 treatment; registration and long term health monitoring; providing comprehensive
3 psychological counselling; public information and other actions to mitigate non-radiological
4 consequences and for public reassurance.

5 **response organization***

6 An organization designated or otherwise recognized by a State as being responsible for
7 managing or implementing any aspect of an emergency response.

8 ① This also includes those organizations necessary to support the management and/or
9 implementation of an emergency response, such as meteorological services.

10 **sabotage****

11 Any deliberate act directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear material in use, storage or
12 transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the health and safety of personnel, the public or
13 the environment by exposure to radiation or release of radioactive substances.

14 **significant transboundary release**

15 A release of radioactive material to the environment that may result in doses or levels of
16 contamination beyond national borders from the release which exceed generic criteria for protective
17 actions and other response actions, including food restrictions and restrictions on commerce.

18 **site (area)****

19 A geographical area that contains an authorized facility, authorized activity or source within
20 which the management of the authorized facility or authorized activity or first responders may directly
21 initiate emergency actions.

22 ① This is typically the area within the security perimeter fence or other designated property
23 marker. It may also be the controlled area around a radiography source or an inner cordoned
24 off area established by first responders around a suspected hazard.

25 ***On-site (area).*** (Area) within the site area.

26 ***Off-site (area).*** (Area) outside the site area.

27 **source***

28 1. Anything that may cause *radiation exposure* - such as by emitting *ionizing radiation* or by
29 releasing *radioactive material* - and can be treated as a single entity for *protection and safety*
30 purposes.

31 ① For example, a sterilization gamma irradiation unit is a source for the practice of radiation
32 preservation of food and sterilization of other products; an X ray unit may be a source for the
33 practice of radiodiagnosis; a nuclear power plant is part of the practice of generating electricity
34 by nuclear fission, and may be regarded as a source (e.g. with respect to discharges to the

environment) or as a collection of sources (e.g. for occupational radiation protection purposes).
 A complex or multiple installation situated at one location or site may, as appropriate, be
 considered a single source for the purposes of application of international safety standards.

2. *Radioactive material used as a source of radiation.*

- ① Such as those sources used for medical applications or in industrial instruments. These are, of course, *sources* as defined in (1), but this usage is less general.

dangerous source. A *source* that could, if not under *control*, give rise to *exposure* sufficient to cause *severe deterministic effects*. This categorization is used for determining the need for *emergency response arrangements* and is not to be confused with categorizations of *sources* for other purposes.

- ① The term *dangerous source* relates to dangerous quantities of radioactive material (D-values) recommended in Ref. [16].

radioactive source. A *source* containing *radioactive material* that is used as a source of radiation.

special facility

A facility for which predetermined facility specific actions need to be taken if urgent protective actions are ordered in its locality in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Examples include chemical plants that cannot be evacuated until certain actions have been taken to prevent fire or explosions and telecommunications centres that must be staffed in order to maintain local telephone services.

special population groups

Members of the public for whom special arrangements are necessary in order for effective protective actions to be taken in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Examples include disabled persons, hospital patients and prisoners.

stochastic effect*

A radiation induced health effect, the probability of occurrence of which is greater for a higher radiation dose and the severity of which (if it occurs) is independent of dose.

- ① Stochastic effects may be somatic effects or hereditary effects, and generally occur without a threshold level of dose. Examples include solid cancer and leukaemia.

transient population groups

Those members of the public who are residing for a short period of time (days to weeks) in a location (such as a camping ground) that can be identified in advance. This does not include members of the public who may be travelling through an area.

transnational emergency

1 A nuclear or radiological emergency of actual, potential or perceived radiological significance
2 for more than one State.

3 ① This may include:

4 (1) A significant transboundary release of radioactive material (however, a transnational
5 emergency does not necessarily imply a significant transboundary release of radioactive material);

6 (2) A general emergency at a facility or other event that could result in a significant transboundary
7 release (atmospheric or aquatic) of radioactive material;

8 (3) A discovery of the loss or illicit removal of a dangerous source that has been transported
9 across or is suspected of having been transported across a national border;

10 (4) An emergency resulting in significant disruption to international trade or travel;

11 (5) An emergency warranting the taking of protective actions for foreign nationals or embassies in
12 the State in which it occurs;

13 (6) An emergency resulting in or potentially resulting in severe deterministic effects and involving
14 a fault and/or problem (such as in equipment or software) that could have serious implications for safety
15 internationally;

16 (7) An emergency resulting in or potentially resulting in great concern among the population of
17 more than one State owing to the actual or perceived radiological hazard.

18 **urgent protective action**

19 See protective action.

20 **urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ)**

21 An area around a facility for which arrangements have been made to take urgent protective
22 actions in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency to avert doses off the site in accordance
23 with international safety standards. Protective actions within this area are to be taken on the basis of
24 environmental monitoring — or, as appropriate, prevailing conditions at the facility.

25 **warning point****

26 A designated organization to act as a point of contact that is staffed or able to be alerted at all
27 times for promptly responding to, or initiating a response to, an incoming notification (meaning (1))
28 warning message, request for assistance or request for verification of a message, as appropriate, from
29 the IAEA.

30 **worker***

31 Any person who works, whether full time, part time or temporarily, for an employer and who
32 has recognized rights and duties in relation to occupational radiation protection.

33 ① A self-employed person is regarded as having the duties of both an employer and a worker.

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CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW

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