Draft Safety Guide DS427 "A general framework for prospective radiological environmental impact assessment and protection of the public" (Draft Version Status: STEP 8 – Submission to the Member States for comments 6 dated March 2015)

TABLE OF RESOLUTIONS BY SECRETARIAT (TO THE COMMENTS RECEIVED BY 20 JULY 2015)

			COMMENTS BY MEMBER STATES			RESOLU	JTION	
Rele- vance (where provid- ed by MS)	Member State/Org anization	Para/Line No.	Proposed new text	Reason	Accepted	Accepted, but modi- fied as follows	Rejected	Reason for modi- fication/rejection
2	Germa- ny	General	Germany appreciates the IAEA secretariat's commitment regarding the further develop- ment of the Safety Guide DS427 on prospec- tive radiological environmental impact assess- ment. The current draft version of DS427 has been significantly improved and aligned with the related Safety Guides DS442 and DS432. Guidance on protection of humans and protec- tion of flora and fauna is now presented in a more balanced way. The remaining need for further improvements and corrections in the draft text is addressed in our comments below.	Comment only.	Х			
2	Germa- ny	General	It is proposed to submit each new draft version of this Safety Guide in two different formats: one as 'clean' version, and another one as 'track changes' version.	This approach would considerably facilitate the work of the reviewers when tracking whether the number or sequence of paragraphs has changed, or the text of a certain paragraph was modified. Otherwise, it can be diffi- cult to correlate the IAEA comment resolution table to the revised draft text.	Х			
-	Swit-	General	It is assumed, that the entire text of the		Х			

zerland		draft will be reviewed with regard to the English language. Some issues, which are mostly of editorial matter, are mentioned below.			
ENISS	General	The current version is a significant improvement of the former drafts and a well- balanced presentation of the protection of humans and animals and plants.	X		
		The ICRP concept of reference animals and plants and the new system of ICRP 124 was put into context in a well- balanced way on the basic line of argu- mentation, that if man is protected also environment is protected adequately. We appreciate that. So, it is not to be expected that any non-human biota are endangered from the release of radioactivity if this re- lease is governed by the protection of hu- mans.	Х		
		The graded approach is now better ex- plained, so the "small users" are more guided than before.	Х		
		DS 427 is closely connected with DS 432 and DS 442. All three standards have been presented now and it could be seen that they are aligned, especially DS 427 and DS 442. There are still some points where the same text should be used when the same issues are addressed. For more details see our comments below.	Х		

			As mentioned in our former comments, it is not correct to quote chapter 1 of the BSS. Chapter 1 is an introduction only and has no requirement character. To quote chapter 1 of the BSS gives the misleading impression that requirements are quoted. A guide needs to start from the requirement and should give advice how to fulfil this requirement. It must not define new re- quirements. The proposed detailed changes are the fol- lowing (marked in red) (Note: refers to ENISS comments).		Х	Text was modified. Deleting text from the introduction in BSS in some parts and noting in others that these considera- tion on protection of the environment in the BSS are not re- quirements	
-	Sweden	General	In general the collected response to the draft guide is positive. It is noted that sub- stantial improvements have been made on the draft version of the safety guide.		Х		
			Suggestions for further changes are made. Suggestions for change of language and style (in Sections 1-3) are made. The flow of the text is occasionally not good due to many references, parentheses & footnotes. Please consider a reduction. The text of Section 5 is well written, easily understood and informative.		Х	Some of this issues (e.g. too many refer- ences, parenthesis, footnotes which are not essential) were considered and it will be improved more in the final editorial revision.	
			Consider to further clarify differences be- tween a "stand-alone" REIA and a REIA that is part of a broader EIA-process. What about the connection between a safety re- port and the REAI (EIA).	However, it also raises questions whether the REIA should be seen as part of the broader EIA process or not. The EIA	X	Some text was changed in relation with EIA. Comments to previous versions of the draft indicated the need to keep EIA	

Figure 1 is a good illustration of that issue with many stages in the lifetime of nuclear installations where a prospective REIA would be a relevant/required input without being part of a broader EIA process.	process includes other formal (or international- ly recognized) require- ments than "just" as- sessments, for example specific requirements on public consultation, cumulative impacts, etc.		as vague as possible in this Safety Guide because EIA is de- fined by the govern- ment or other regula- tors than nuclear and there are different forms for an EIA in different countries.
Several facilities planned to be located or being located at the same site or close to one another is not much addressed (e.g. in para 5.36). Consider the issues of potential, cumulative impacts and the difficulties this could present, for instance with several licensees on one site.		X	The comment is not- ed, but is difficult to address without a specific recommen- dation from the re- viewer. Some text was changed in para. 5.36. The Safety Guide is not intended to give specific guidance on multiple facilities at the same location, because, being a very site specific issue, is difficult to provide general guidance and it is preferred that the regulatory body tack- le that issue on a case-by-case basis.
The direct exposures are little addressed in this safety guide, some is written in para 5.25. It could merit some more attention and discussion. Radiation doses to the pub- lic from waste storages are much often discussed.		X	Direct expo- sure/irradiation is now more explicitly and clearly ad- dressed. Paragraphs were added.
A suggestion is to remove the second part of title: <i>and protection of the public</i> in order to make it shorter.	The pertinent require- ment 3.9(e) of GSR3 reads: <i>Shall, as re-</i>	X	The title was pro- posed by WASSC and endorsed by

				quired by the regulato- ry body, have an ap- propriate prospective assessment made for radiological environ- mental impacts, com- mensurate with the ra- diation risks associated with the facility or ac- tivity. Hence the formu- lation of GSR Part 3 is meant to fully cover the needs of the protection of the public. No need to add and the protec- tion of the public since this is probably anyhow the primary objective (see also 1.21 of the draft).		NUSSC and RASSC. It is still under dis- cussion, and a short- ening is proposed. The title will be dis- cussed during final review and this comment will be noted. This issue will be discussed in next WASSC/RASSC/NU SSC sessions.	
-	Austral- ia	General	Overall, we believe DS427 is a very useful document with information on dose assessment methodology and application to Planned, Ex- isting and Emergency (or potential exposure) situations. It gives good guidance for perform- ing assessments to the public and environment, particularly with regard to ICRP methodolo- gies.		X		
			In particular, DS427 gives regulatory bodies of MS sufficient freedom with how they apply the environmental protection framework. Consideration of specific effects on Flora and Fauna are listed as 'optional' or 'rare' in some places, including Paragraphs 1.21, 2.8, 2.13, I-		X X	The comment is not- ed and some text was modified. The fact	

		 2 and I-3. Conversely, Paragraph 2.14 states that assessments should be commensurate with potential risk, which is followed up in Para- graphs 5.73 to 5.76 for Environmental As- sessment. This is consistent with a graded approach and should be encouraged. Information provided in Annex I is consistent with the methodologies applied in the Austral- ian Safety Guide for Radiation Protection of the Environment. We particularly appreciated the section on comparison of dose with reference levels for protection of the environment - Section I-32. This applies a reasonable approach to dealing with the use of DCRLs in demonstrating pro- tection, and how refinements can be made while considering that these are not dose lim- its. 	X	that explicit assess- ment of the level of protection of flora and fauna is not a requirement in the BSS was noted by WASSC/NUSSC/RA SSC. The advice to the Secretariat was to include in the main text in the Safety Guide only what is a requirement in the BSS (e.g. protect people and the envi- ronment by assessing radiological impact to humans) and bring to an Annex some ex- ample guidance on assessment of radio- logical impact to flora and fauna, as a complement, for those countries which so decide.	
Austral- ia	Specific, through- out	The em-dash is used through the docu- ment to emphasise certain points. The spacing around this should be consistent in the document. There are several in- stances where a space is applied, and oth-	Х		

			ers where space is not applied (e.g. see Sections 4.6 & 4.7). We suggest that spac- es are applied either side of the em-dash, as for the first two dashes in Section 5.11.				
3	Germa- ny	1.1	1 st and 3 rd sentence: "In 2011, the IAEA published the interim ver- sion of the Safety Requirements: Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, General Safety Requirements Part 3 (GSR Part 3) [1]. <u>GRS GSR</u> Part 3 was reissued in 2014 [1] with the cosponsoring of"	 1st sentence: Ref. [1] refers to the final version of GSR Part 3 issued in 2014, not to the 2011 interim version. 3rd sentence: Typo. 	X		
	Japan	1.1/5 (p.5)	GRS GSR Part 3 was reissued	Туро.	Х		
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 1.1, line 5	"GRS" should read "GSR".		х		
-	Sweden	Page 5, para 1.2	Consider changing the order of the ele- ments to read:principles of justification, optimization, and dose limitation	The three RP principles of are listed in this or- der: 1 Justification 2 Optimisation of pro- tection 3 Application of dose limits	X		
	Japan	1.2/2-3 (p.5)	the principles of justification, <u>optimization</u> and dose limitation and optimization,	Sequence of the princi- ples described here should be aligned with ICRP Publication 103.	Х		
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 1.3	Propose new paragraph following 1.3: "The aim of a prospective radiological im- pact assessment is to determine whether	There is no clear statement of the pur- pose of carrying out a	Х	New Paragraph was added, using the propsed text.	

			there is a reasonable likelihood that the planned/proposed operation(s) will com- ply with current legislative and regulatory requirements under all reasonably fore- seeable circumstances. The assessment should be as simple as possible, but as complex as necessary to achieve this aim."	prospective assess- ment.			
-	Sweden	Page 5, para 1.3, 1 st sen- tence	Suggest removal of footnote 1	The definition is so general so a specifica- tion is not necessary. As stated in the foot- note, the present set of facilities and activities is anyhow given in the Scope (1.11)	Х	¹ Facilities and activi- ties are defined in the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles and the Safety Glossary [2, 4]. It is a general term encompassing all nuclear facilities and uses of all sources of ionizing radiation. The present guidance is pertinent to certain facilities and activities which are described under Scope.	We deleted the general definition in the footnote but we still think the term 'facilities and activities' are new for some of the target audi- ence. We prefer to keep reference to Safety Fundamen- tals and Safety Glossary and the idea that DS427 applies only to some facilities and activities.
		Page 5, para 1.3, 2 nd sen- tence	Remove second footnote and simplify the text to read: This assessment includes the consideration of expected exposures during normal op- eration and conceivable potential expo- sures.	Avoid excessive use of parentheses and foot- notes when not needed. The second footnote, if needed: "conceivable means that the incidents to be considered are the result of a safety analy- sis, which includes	X X	Text in the para. was amended. The foot- note was deleted. Some parenthesis and footnotes were delet- ed but improvement on this issue will be done during the final editorial revision.	
				characteristic of the incident and the proba-			

				bility.", is better ex-			
				plained in the text.			
2	Germa- ny	1.4	"The present Safety Guide interprets and elab- orates on the requirements in GSR Part 3 for performing such assessments for certain facili- ties and activities and, in particular, on Re- quirement 7 for notification and authorization, which states in the subordinated Para 3.9 (e) that "Any person or organization applying for authorization: [] shall, as required by the regulatory body, have an appropriate prospec- tive assessment made for radiological envi- ronmental impacts, commensurate with the radiation risks associated with the facility or activity" [1]."	Clarification. The citation is taken from Para 3.9 (e), not from Requirement 7 as such.	Х	Text modified	
-	ENISS	1.4	The present Safety Guide interprets and elaborates on the requirements in GSR Part 3 for performing such assessments for cer- tain facilities and activities and, in particu- lar, on Requirement 7 for notification and authorization, which states that "Any per- son or organization applying for authoriza- tion: [] shall, as <u>if</u> required by the regu- latory body, have an appropriate prospec- tive assessment made for radiological envi- ronmental impacts, commensurate with the radiation risks associated with the facility or activity" [1].	As stated in the (new) §1.11, this Safety Guide only covers the facili- ties for which a radio- logical environmental impact assessment is mandatory. Thus, using the conditional 'if' seems more suitable.	Х	Text modified	
	Japan	1.4/2-3 (p.5)	in particular, <u>paragraph 3.9 (e) under on</u> Requirement 7 for notification and authori- zation,	Clarifying the descrip- tion.	Х		
-	Swit- zerland	1.5 / 10	presented in this Safety Guide may be used <u>for informed</u> judgments on the ac- ceptability of the risk	Editorial: meaning of current text is not clear	X		
-	Sweden	Page 5,	Consider changing last part of sentence as	Editorial	Х		

		para 1.5,	to read: referred to as 'environmental				
		2 nd sen-	impact assessment', <i>(known by its acronym</i>				
		tence	EIA and defined later). EIA covers not				
			only				
2	Germa- ny	1.6	"This Safety Guide is related to other IAEA Safety Standards Series: These are the Safety Requirements for safety assessment of activi- ties and facilities [5] and the Safety Guides for <u>radiation</u> protection of the public and protec- tion of the environment against radiation expo- sure [6], on criteria for use <u>in on emergency</u> preparedness and response <u>for a nuclear or</u> <u>radiological emergency</u> [7], and on regulatory control of radioactive releases <u>discharges</u> to	To address the related Safety Guides with their corresponding titles.	Х		
			the environment [8]."				
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 1.7	" with less level of details" is awkward. Recommend "in less detail".		х		
-	Sweden	Page 6, para 1.8	Suggest change to: <i>IAEA has issued Safety</i> <i>Reports on methods and models that can</i> <i>be used to assess the impact of releases to</i> <i>the environment [11, 12] and Technical</i> <i>Report(s) relevant to environmental trans-</i> <i>fer parameters [13-15].</i>	These reports are of another nature than the IAEA Safety Standards.	X	Text was modified and para. was con- verted to footnote.	
	Sweden	Page 6, para 1.9, 1 st sen- tence	Change to: This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance on a gen- eral framework for performing prospective radiological impact assessments for facili- ties and activities <u>as identified under</u> <u>Scope</u> , to estimate and control, <u>using cri- teria</u> , the radiological effects on the public and the environment.	Unnecessary	Х		
-	Swit- zerland	1.9/3	to estimate and control , using criteria, the radiological effects	Editorial: deleted text doesn't contribute to	X		

				clarity			
-	Sweden	Page 6, para 1.9, 2 nd and 3 rd sen- tence	Suggests: This radiological assessment is intended for planned exposure situations as part of the (regulatory)-authorization process and, when applicable, the governmental deci- sion-making process for facilities and ac- tivities. The situations covered include both ex- pected exposures-and potential exposures (this is explained in more details in as ex- plained in Section 2).	The definition of au- thorization in GSR Part 3 (BSS) makes it clear that au- thorization is always by a regulatory body or other governmental body.	Х		
	Japan	General (e. g. 1.3/1, 1.9/5, and many.)	(regulatory) authorization process	As "authorization" has several aspects, it is important for users of this guide to understand what kind of "authori- zation" is written in a given section so the object of "authoriza- tion" should be clari- fied.	Х	The comment is not- ed. The text "(regula- tory)" was deleted (see previous com- ment). Authorization is discussed in more detail in Section 2	
-	Sweden	Page 6, para 1.10, footnote	Suggest shortening the footnote to read: GSR Part 3 [1] defines an <i>interested party</i> to mean, in a broad sense, a person or group having an interest in the perfor- mance of an organization, business, system etc. It could also include other States, e.g. neighbouring States concerned with possi- ble transboundary impacts.	Editorial	Х	Text modified	
	Sweden	Page 7, para 1.11	Suggest removing the parenthesis and in- stead write: a radiological impact assessment is	Editorial	Х		

			<i>mandatory</i> . Guidance on how to determine the need and complexity of a radiological environmental impact assessment is given in Section 4 (for guidance on how to de- termine the need and complexity of a radi- ological environmental impact assessment see Section 4).				
-	USA	1.11/line 1	according to their characteristic	Grammatical	Х		
-	Austral- ia	Para- graph 1.11	Replace "accordingly" with "according".		Х		
-	Sweden	Page 7, para 1.12	Consider changing the order so the latter part of the sentence reads:from facilities which are projected for a specific or ge- neric site or located at a site	In order to underline that the guide is appli- cable to new facilities before mentioning that it also can used for ex- isting facilities.	Х		
		Page 7, para 1.12	Footnote 4 seems to be placed in the wrong place and is far too long. Either remove it completely or, alternatively, make a para- graph in the text – should it be in Section 4?	Paragraph 1.11 tells that 1) the Safety Guide is primarily for those fa- cilities for which a REIA is required. 2) Further guidance is given in Section 4 on need and complexity of REIA. Footnote 4 of para 1.12 seems more coupled to para 1.11 or perhaps in Section 4 if it is seen as guidance on how to	Х	Some modifications and deletions were done. Issues with footnotes will be revised during final editorial revision.	

	Japan	Foot- note4/7 (p.7)	predisposal <u>waste management</u> processing of radioactive waste facilities	determine the need and complexity of a REIA? Perhaps it is not needed at all? Amendment to make the wording consistent with DS447 and DS447	X		
	China	Page 7 Para 1.12 Line 4-5	Revising to be " <u>and from which public may be</u> exposed and the expironment may be contaminated by radioactive materials".	Common usage.	X	Text modified	
3	Germa- ny	1.13	" and also those which can be conceived, by means of a safety analysis,"	Editorial.	Х		
	Sweden	Page 7, para 1.13	Suggest re-writing and shortening: The radiation exposures considered in- clude those which are expected to occur as a result of normal operation, i.e. due to authorized discharges and direct external radiation, and also potential exposures identified after performing a safety analy- sis of events and accidents as defined in GSR Part 3 [1].	Editorial and In GSR Part 3, page 381, it is stated: <i>The</i> <i>following definitions</i> <i>apply for the purposes</i> <i>of these Standards</i> . (Further definitions are provided in the IAEA Safety Glossary etc)	Х		
-	Sweden	Page 7, para 1.14	Suggests to delete the second sentence of 1.14 or to make it shorter: <i>These types of</i> <i>facilities and activities have very specific</i> <i>aspects which are not considered in the</i> <i>present guidance.</i> (Should first sentence of 1.14 use recom- mend or only guide?)	Editorial	х		

	Ianan	Page 7	Insert the sentence below to the appropri-	Adding explanation to			
	Japan	Para	ate place of 1 14	clarify the scope of this			
		1 14	"This Safety Guide covers the facilities and	Safety Guide			
		Lino	activities related to the pre-disposal of radio-	The lifetime of the dis			
		Line	active waste during the operational period "	ne include of the dis-			
			active waste during the operational period.	three namic day the new			
				three periods: the pre-			
				operational period, the	Х		
				operational period and			
				the post-closure period.			
				Our understanding is			
				that, disposal during the			
				post-closure period is			
				only beyond the scope			
				of this Safety Guide.			
	Sweden	Page 8,	Delete paragraph 1.17.	The statement of 1.17 is			The paragraph is
		para		unclear and not related			considered neces-
		1.16-		to this safety guide.			sary. The com-
		1.17		This guide shall not			is difficult to
				decide on what assess-			address without a
				ments are required, pre-		Х	specific recom-
				cluded or done? That is			mendation from
				an issue for Safety Re-			the reviewer.
				quirements to recom-			
				mend and Member			
				States to decide on.			
-	USA	1.18/line	exposures to the public	Grammatical			
		3	····· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Х		

Turkey	1.18	Though it is stated in this para. that this safety guide doesn't cover the methodology for selection and analysis of accidents, only for EIA Report this safety guide is proposed to give methods for selecting the accidents and to give information at which detail these accidents are presented (DBA and severe accidents). For impacts of severe accidents, generic activity released to the environment, any INES-6 scale accident for radiological impact assessment in EIA may be proposed in this guide. The impacts of which design basis accident or accidents, and at which detail should be given in EIAR should also be clarified. For impacts of DBA, should many DBAs be presented briefly, or only INES-4 scale accident be sufficient to be analyzed in terms of radiological impacts? Whether the impacts of anticipated operational occurrences are included in EIAR and at which details they should be presented in EIAR should also be clarified.	How the accidents are chosen for EIAR purpose is missing in any of IAEA documents. The referred IAEA document [5] which is GSR Part 4 discusses them only for licensing purpose. According to the EIA content described in IAEA No. NG-T-3.11 "Managing Environmental Impact Assessment for Construction and Operation in New Nuclear Power Programmes" impacts of design basis accidents, severe accidents, and beyond design basis accidents should be included in EIAR. But again there is no any methodology or prescription given. For impacts of accidents, generic source term or release (i.e. 100 TBq Cs-137 for severe accidents), are better to be used for the impact analysis. Since in most of the countries EIA Report is prepared at very early stage, even before technology of the reactor is chosen.		X	This Safety Guide has no the inten- tion to discuss in detail the types of accidents (this was advised by NUSSC, WASSC because the as- sessment of the types of accidents is done in the framework of safety assessment, considered in other relevant IAEA Safety Guides. The pre- sented in DS427 guidance just mention that acci- dents that should be considered should result from a safety assess- ment. This Safety Guide focuses on what should be done in a radio- logical environ- mental impact assessment once the accidents and their characteris- tics are provided.
Austral- ia	Para- graph	" to verify that the models and assump- tions used in the prospective assessments	Prefer not to suggest that models and as-			
	1.19	are correct appropriate."	sumptions are "cor- rect" - "appropriate" may be better, simply	Х		
			because models and			

				assumptions in the con- text of this document are almost always ap- proximations to the real situation.			
-	Swit- zerland	1.19 / 7	that monitoring programmes exist (or will exist) and provided (or will pro- vide)	Editorial to increase clarity of text	Х		
-	Swit- zerland	1.19 / 10	described in this Safety Guide should also be used to inform <u>underpin</u> the defini- tion or upgrade		Х		
	Finland	1.20	The Safety Guide does not cover occupa- tional exposures (e.g. of workers) or medical exposures (ergr of patients). These catego- ries	Definition for medical exposure includes also other groups than pa- tients. Clarifications are not needed here.	Х		
	USA	1.21/line 2	risk of radiological impacts to the health of individual members of the pub- lic	Grammatical	Х		
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 1.21	Replace " health of individuals in the members of the public" with " health of individual members of the public".		X		
	USA	1.21/line 4	can be assumed, in most instances, suf- ficient to provide adequate protection of the ecosystems in the environment.	Grammatical	Х		
	Sweden	Page 9, para 1.21	The second sentence (although in a strict sense true) has somehow the wrong focus and should be left out. In any case, the assessment does not pro- tect anything by itself; it is the protective	It could also be written more positively: In most instances it can be assumed that the eco- systems are protected if	Х	Text modified	

			measures which are of importance.	the members of the pub- lic are protected [1], however a REIA as part of an EIA is an oppor- tunity to decide wheth- er the siting of a facility or activity is less suita- ble.			
-	Swit- zerland	1.21 / 4 - 8	can be assumed, in most <u>cases</u> , sufficient to provide for an adequate protection of the ecosystems in <u>the</u> environment. For situa- tions where the national or international regulatory frameworks <u>deem</u> necessary in an Annex I.	Editorial	Х		
	Japan	1.21/7 (p.9)	on the exposed flora and fauna, <u>an ex-</u> <u>ample of methodology</u> guidance is pre- sented in an Annex I.	See comment No.19. (Note: comment No 19 refers to comment on paragrpah 5.76 by Ja- pan)	Х		
-	Swit- zerland	1.22 / 4	can serve <mark>s</mark>	Editorial	Х		
-	Austral- ia	Para- graph 1.22	Replace "serves to" with "serve for".		Х		
-	Sweden	Page 9, para 1.22	There is something wrong with the last sentence: as described in this Safety Guide can serve as an input serves to that process.	Editorial	Х		
	USA	1.22 line 4	Editorial. "serve" rather than "serves"	Clarity	X		
-	USA	1.22/line 3	; however, radiological environmental assessments as described in this Safety Guide may contribute to that process.	Syntax	Х		

-	Swit-	1.23 / 4	the scope of the present Safety Guide	Editorial	v		
	zerland				Λ		
		1.23 / 6	is discussed in <u>an</u> other		Х		
	Sweden	Page 9, para 1.23	 Change the full paragraph: 1) It should first be stated that optimization of the protection of the public is required. 2) Then it could be mentioned that overall optimization of the protection must address all exposed, both workers and the public, and must take account of economic and social factors. 3) Finally explain that the optimization process is guided in other documents but that the REIA gives a necessary input to the optimization process as for example to the establishment of discharge limits 	The logic is not clear. It was understood by some readers that opti- mization would not apply – it should be made clearer. The pa- renthesis and the foot- note 9 can be taken out since it is anyhow not addressed in this guide. It is enough to say that optimisation of safety and protection of the public, as defined in GSR Part 3, is required.	X	Text modified	
-	Swit- zerland	1.24 / 4	impacts on features peculiar properties of the environment such as	Editorial	Х		
	Sweden	Page 9, para 1.24	Delete the last two sentences: <i>States are subject to the nationally and internationally relevant treatiesetc.</i>	These two sentences have nothing to do with how to perform a REIA or the scope of the pre- sent document.	Х		
-	Swit- zerland	1.25 / 2	Section 3 describes the safety requirements for governments, national regulatory bod- ies and licensees related to the prospective radiological environmental assessment of the public and protection of the environ- ment based on stemming from other IAEA standards.	Editorial to increase clarity	X	Text modified	

		1					
		1.25 / 8	Appendix I presents risk criteria discussed by relevant international organizations		Х		
		1.25 / 12	considerations <u>on risk</u> for the assessment	Editorial to be con- sistent with the title of Annex II	Х		
	Sweden	Page 10, para 2.1, second sentence	Change the sentence to read Unless oth- erwise mentioned, concepts or terms are defined in the GSR Part 3 [1] or, if miss- ing, as in the IAEA Safety Glossary [4].	It has been agreed by the co-sponsoring part- ners and the IAEA member states that the GSR Part 3 definitions have precedence over any other glossary and that the meaning of requirements shall not be changed retrospec- tively. (See 13 above) (Note: 13 refers to comment from Sweden on Paragraph 1.13).	Х		
	Swit- zerland	2.1/3	While approaches may be in principle con- sistent with these concepts and terminolo- gy, the use of the terms defined in this sec- tion could differ from those used in States.	This seems to be trivial and could be deleted without any loss of in- formation	х		
2	Germa- ny	2.2	Last sentence: "Both exposures <u>expected to occur</u> and poten- tial exposures can and should be taken into account at the planning or design stage [6]."	Clarification that <i>expected</i> <i>exposures</i> and <i>potential</i> <i>exposures</i> are to be con- sidered in the design of the facility, in order to be consistent with the title of the associated subsection	X		

				"PLANNED EXPOSURE SITUATIONS: EXPECTED EXPOSURES AND PO- TENTIAL EXPOSURES". With our proposed amendment, the statement corresponds to the last sentence in Para 2.4 of DS432 (latest draft ver- sion dated March 2015).			
-	Canada	2.2/7	"Both expected exposures and potential exposures can and should be taken into account at the plan- ning or design stage [6]."	"Expected" is missing from sentence.	Х		
	USA	2.3/line 1	In the context of this Safety Guide the term 'governmental decision-making process' refers to the procedures carried out at all planning, pre-operational, operational, and decommissioning stages by the government or governmental agencies, including the rel- evant regulatory body, to decide whether a project for a facility or an activity may be undertaken, continued, changed or stopped. It could also apply to areas of national policy such as whether to embark on a nuclear power program [23].	The governmental deci- sion-making process is not limited solely to the planning phase, and should include all plan- ning, pre-operational, operational, and de- commissioning phases.	Х		
	Sweden	Page 11	Take out the parenthesis of the Title and write: AUTHORIZATION PROCESS	Editorial	Х		
	Japan	p.11/4	(REGULATORY) AUTHORIZATION PROCESS (OR LICENSING PROCESS)	See Comment No.1.	Х	The text "REGULA- TORY" was deleted because is implicit in the definition of Au- thorization. The last parenthesis will be revised noting this comment, during the final editorial review	
	Sweden	Page 11, Para 2.5	The statement is not fully correct.	The definition of GSR Part 3 does not refer	Х		

			to,at different stages of the lifetime of the facility or the develop- ment of a facility it simply states: "The granting by a reg- ulatory body or other governmental body of written permission for a person or organization to conduct specified activities"			
Sweden	Page 11	Remove the footnotes 11 and 12. The information in footnote 12 could pos- sibly go to paragraph 1.8 where safety re- ports and technical documents are men- tioned.	Footnote 11 does not bring any further clarity to this document.		X	Footnote 11: We think that we need to explain what we meant by "governmental decision making process" (as differ- ent to authorization process). Examples come from some MS.
			Footnote 12 is improper in this place since it refers to IAEA Nuclear Energy Series and is not reviewed by the CSS or it subcommittees.		X	It is truth that the reference in foot- note 12 is not a Standard, but some Member States asked to include it. The informative reference material which is not a Standard is only included as foot- notes (para. 1.8 was cionverted to a footnote now too).
Swit- zerland	2.7 / 5	of <u>a</u> particular proposed activity or fa- cility	Editorial	Х		

	Austral- ia Sweden Swit-	Para- graph 2.7 Page 11, para 2.8	Insert an "a" into final sentence, to read " risk of effects of a particular proposed activity". Delete or rephrase to: <i>Non-radiological</i> <i>impacts are included in an EIA subject to</i> <i>nationally and internationally applicable</i> <i>regulations</i> the involvement of the organizer appli-	Last sentence of para 2.8 is repeating what have been said in para 1.24. Redundant Editorial	X			
	zerland		<u>cant</u> of the proposed activity or facility		Х			
2	Germa- ny	2.9	"In general, an EIA requires the involvement of the organizer of the proposed activity or facility, relevant governmental agencies, the regulatory body and a number of interested parties, including the public [24, 27– <u>32</u> 31]."	To emphasize the impor- tance of the involvement of the public in the EIA process. The phrase was contained in the equivalent Para 2.8 of the previous draft ver- sion 5 dated September 2014. It is not clear why it has been removed. Nuclear Energy Series publication NG-T-3.11 [32] provides useful in- formation on EIA in the framework of develop- ment of a new nuclear power programme. For the sake of completeness, please add a reference to this publication.	X	It was noted from a comment from NUSSC that in some countries the in- volvement of the public is only done at some stages of the EIA processes. This is the reason to re- move "public". But it is truth that some EIA legislation include explicit 'public' con- sultation. Now the text was modified as follows: "including, in some States, the public".		
	USA	2.9/line 1	2.9. In general, an EIA requires the involve- ment of the organizer of the proposed activi- ty or facility, relevant governmental agen- cies, the regulatory body and a number of interested parties to consider radiological effects on human health and, in some cases,	The statement is too broad and does not ade- quately describe the lev- el of involvement be- tween the organizer of the proposed activity, the			X	The comment is noted and valid. However, we were required to keep EIA as general as possible. This is because EIA is regulated not only

Sweden	Page 12,	radiological effects on flora and fauna relat- ed to radioactive releases from activities and facilities to the environment. [24, 27–31]. Change to reflect the wording in GSR Part	governmental agencies, the regulatory body, and interested parties in con- sidering the radiological effects on human health and the environment. Why change the origi-				by the nuclear regulator but also (and mainly) by other governmental agencies legislations and different MS could have different approaches to EIA.
	para 2.12, last line	3:recreational activities; media, such as soil, water and air; and natural process, such as carbon, nitrogen and water cycles.	nal formulation – it does not strengthen credibility?	Х			
ENISS	2.12	GSR Part 3 [1] specifies that the protection of the environment means protection and conservation of non-human species, both animal and plant, and their biodiversity; environmental goods and services such as the production of food and feed; resources used in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and tourism; amenities used in spiritual, cultur- al and recreational activities; media such as soil, sediments, water and air; and natural processes.	To be deleted as the quotation gives the false impression that this text is a require- ment. The quoted part is from BSS chapter 1 which has an introduc- tory character only. See also comment above (Note: "above" refers to comment from ENISS to Para. 1.4).	Х	Text modified to denote is a definition in the BSS (and not a requirement)		
Sweden	Page 12, para 2.13	Suggests change in first line: described in the introduction of GSR Part 3, paras 1.32-1.35 [1] defines a framework	Perhaps a direct refer- ence paras 1.32-1.35 of the introduction of the GSR Part 3 is warrant- ed?	Х			
Swit- zerland	2.13 / 6 2.14 / 1	GSR Part 3 [1] introduction also mentions or alternatively <u>The introduction of</u> GSR Part 3 [1] also mentions	Editorial, same point in 2.14, Line 1	Х	Text modified		
ENISS	2.13	However, the introduction in GSR Part 3	See above (Note:			Х	Now we are

		[1] acknowledges that some national regu-	"above" refers to com-			clearer in the text
		lations may require the explicit demonstra-	ment from ENISS to			that this is only an
		tion (rather than the assumption) of the	Para. 1.4).			introduction in
		protection of the environment. GSR Part 3				requirement
		[1] introduction also mentions that the as-				requirement.
		sessment of impacts on the environment				
		needs to be viewed in an integrated manner				
		with other features of the system of protec-				
		tion and safety and that the approach to the				
		protection of people and protection of the				
		environment is not limited to the preven-				
		tion of radiological effects on humans and				
		on other species [1].				
ENISS	2.14	Finally, GSR Part 3 introduction states	See above (Note:			See previous
		that, the protection of the environment is	"above" refers to com-			
		an issue necessitating assessment, allowing	ment from ENISS to			
		for flexibility in incorporating into deci-	Para. 1.4).		Х	
		sion making processes the results of envi-				
		ronmental assessments that are commensu-				
		rate with the radiation risks [1].				
Sweden	Page 12,	Change toWith "radiological impact" is	This safety guide can-			
	para	taken to mean the estimated detrimental	not have its own defini-			
	2.15	health effects of exposure to radiation,	tion of "radiological			
		including the likelihood of such effects	impact". The suggested	v		
		occurring, and any other safety related	formulation is more or	Λ		
		risks, including those to the environment,	less taken from the def-			
		that might arise by releases or by direct	inition of 'radiation			
		exposure from a facility or an activity.	risks' in GSR Part 3.			
ENISS	2.15	The requirement to assess radiological	A complete quotation			
		environmental impacts is identified in GSR	should be used here as			
		Part 3 [1], " <u>xxxxx</u> "	it was done in the ma-	v		
			jority of paras in the	Л		
			guide. Otherwise there			
			is the risk of misunder-			

				standings and wrong interpretations.				
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 2.15	Propose footnote to clarify that the defini- tion of "nuclear facilities" includes "facili- ties for the mining or processing of urani- um ores or thorium ores and radioactive waste disposal facilities."	Need to emphasise that mining and processing activities, for example, can lead to exposures that can potentially exceed recommended dose limits.			X	This is explained in Scope in Sec- tion 1
	Turkey	2.15./ sixth line	"Within this Safety Guide, 'radiological impact' is taken to mean the estimated planned and potential exposures and risk of effects of radiation dose that may be caused by releases from a proposed facility or activity on human health and, if deemed necessary, other elements in the environment, for example flora and fauna."	The aim of radiological impact assessment is estimate doses and risks, for both normal operating conditions and accidental situations.	X	Text modified		
	Swit- zerland	2.15 / 7	that may be caused by releases and di- rect radiation from a proposed facility or activity	Beside of the releases, also direct radiation plays a role for the ex- posure, cp. 1.12	x			
	China	Page 13 Para 3 Line 1-2	Revising to be " <u>THE PUBLIC</u> SAFETY REQUIREMENTS RELEVANT TO PROSPECTIVE RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT".	Add "the public" in the title is more clear as defined about this safety standard for the public, not occupational exposure.	X			
3	Germa- ny	3.1	Last sentence: "The requirements are addressed in in Sections 4 and 5 of this Safety Guide."	Editorial (redundant word).	Х			
-	Swit- zerland	3.1/4	addressed in in Section 4	Editorial	Х			
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 3.1	Remove one instance of "in" from "are addressed in in Section 4".		Х			

	ENISS	3.2	The GSR Part 3 [1] states that there is a need to control and minimize the radiolog- ical impact to members of the public and the environment: " <u>xxxx</u> "	See above (Note: "above" refers to com- ment from ENISS to Para. 2.15).	Х		
-	Sweden	Page 13, para 3.2	Change to "that there is a need to con- trol the radiological impact and optimise the protection of the public and, as appro- priate, the protection of the environment"	The GSR Part 3 does not talk of minimizing <u>unless it refers to de-</u> <u>terministic effects</u> (but in medical exposure and at accidents this might not be possible, hence the use of mini- mize in this context).	Х	Text modified	
-	Sweden	Page 13, para 3.4	It is 3.9 (e) of GSR Part 3 and not 3.8 (a) which is referred to. Consistency.	Editorial	Х		
	Japan	3.4/1 (p.13)	Requirement 7 of GSR Part 3 [1] (para- graph 3.89)	Туро.	Х		
	Sweden	Page 14, para 3.5	Consider changing (a) and (b) to (d) and (e)	Editorial - the quotes are from GSR Part 3, paragraph 3.15 (d) & (e).			
	USA	3.5/line 1	 (a) shall, for the sources for which they are authorized and for which the regulatory body requires a prospective assessment to be made for radiological environmental impacts, conduct such an assessment and keep it up to date. (b) shall assess the likelihood and magnitude of potential exposures, their likely consequences and the number of persons who may be affected by them." 	Grammar	X		
	Japan	3.6/3 (p.14)	Paragraph 5.34 and 5.35 of Section 5 ad- dresses this requirement.	Clarifying the descrip- tion.	Х		

	Sweden	Page 14,	To make the quote complete change it to	Editorial				
		para 3.7	readapprove constraints on dose and					
			constraints on risk to be usedincluding		v			
			authorized limits for discharge <u>s</u> .		л			
			Consider changing (a) to (e) as to reflect					
			on 3.123 (e).	Consistency				
	Japan	3.7/7	(e) Shall take into account the results of the	Citing the description				
	-	(p.14)	prospective assessment for radiological	precisely from 3.123 (e)				
			environmental impacts that is undertaken	in GSR Part 3.	Х			
			in accordance with requirements of the					
			regulatory body".					
	Sweden	Page 14	Remove the footnote – this is not the place	It is already stated in				
			to discuss this and it is anyhow already	the paragraph 1.23	Х			
			stated under Scope.					
-	France	3.9 a)	Shall determine the " <u>characteristics</u> " () and	The word "characteristics"				This is BSS quot-
				need to be precise to under-			Х	ing
		2.0 b)	Chall determine by an appropriate pro operational	line what is expected.	 		<u> </u>	This is DSS quot
	France	3.90)	Shall determine by an appropriate pre operational study all significant exposure pathways by which	inese painways are usis- mined through studies. No				1015 15 555 quoi-
			discharged radionuclides	need to do "pre operational			Х	ing
				studies"				
	Swit-	3.9/4	as appropriate <u>adequate</u> :	Editorial to avoid du-				This is BSS quot-
	zerland			plication in lit. b			Х	ing
				-				
		3.9, lit.	in an integrated manner based on with	Editorial				This is BSS quot-
		d	features of the system of protection and				v	ing
			safety				Λ	
		!						
	USA	3.9	Editorial. Second sentence needs to	Clarity		To be considered at		
		Foot-	be edited. Not a sentence.		Х	the final editorial		
		note 14				review.		
	Sweden	Page 15,	This is already quoted in 3.5 so it is redun-	Duplication				This para. 3.11
		para	dant and can be deleted.	-			37	refers to the re-
		3.11					Х	quirement of an
								potential expo-
		1						potential expo

							sures and 3.10 refers to the re- quirement to ensure that pro- tection and safety is optimized, including the consideration of the potential ex- posures. 3.5 is kept and moved up.
2	Germa- ny	3.13	" The assessment and control of potential exposure is addressed in Section 5 and discussed in Appendix H I of this Safety Guide."	Appendix II does not exist. The text should refer to Appendix I.	Х		
	Sweden	Page 15, para 3.13	Indicate that it is 3.31 (a) and 3.31 (b) that are referred to.	Consistency	Х		
	Sweden	Page 16, para 3.18	Please add "When a source within a practice could cause public exposure out- side the territory or the area under the jurisdiction or control of the State in which the source is located, the government or regulatory body shall" Furthermore the second bullet is 3.124 (c) and not (b).	Completeness	х		
-	Sweden	Page 17, para 4.1	Include in a form and at a scale that impact	Editorial	Х		
-	Austral- ia	Para- graph 4.1	Insert comma in " where radiation sources are used, processed and stored"		Х		
-	Japan	4.1/4 (p.17/1)	medical application medicine departments	Wording.	Х	Text modified	
-	Japan	4.1/6 (p.17/3)	are used, processed or stored in a form and scale that impact to <u>the</u> public and the envi-	Editorial.	Х		

			ronment is				
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 4.2	Insert text: "Activities and facilities which are unconditionally exempted ¹⁶ from regulatory control should not require a radiological environmental impact as- sessment for authorization, even if a ge- neric assessment of the impact to public and environment may have been per- formed to support the conclusion on ex- emption. Where exemption is subject to conditions (for example on land use fol- lowing the closure of a facility), future radiological impact assessment may be		X	Text modified	
	Japan	Footnote	necessary." is established in <u>Schedule I of</u> GSR Part 3	Clarifying the descrip-			
	1	16/2 (p.17)	[1].	tion.	Х		
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 4.3		Good. Clear.	Х		
3	Germa- ny	4.4	1 st sentence: "Factors which are important to define the need and complexity of the <u>environmental</u> radiological <u>environmental</u> impact assessment within a (regulatory) authorization process are: the source term, the level of expected doses, the safety characteristics of the activity or fa- cility, the characteristics of the location, the national licen <u>s</u> eing regulations for each type of facility and activity and the stage in the author- ization process <u>(see Table 1)</u> ."	 Wording. This sentence provides a direct link to Table 1. Therefore, this table should be referred to here. 	Х		
	Austral-	Para-	The section and table seem to be missing	There are other factors	Х	Additional text added	

ia	graph 4.4 & Table 1	"Mechanisms of transport, e.g. wind, riv- er/ocean." This (or similar) could be add- ed under "Local Characteristics".	that should also be considered, such as demographics.				
Austral- ia	Figure 1	Modify FIG 1, to include "Conceptual de- sign" as the first step, prior to "Siting and site evaluation". The third step could then become "Developed design". Or "Mature design".	The logic is not correct. The proponent should have a clear design in mind before the site evaluation process be- gins. There is no point is selecting sites other- wise. After site selec- tion, the design can then be modified if required.			X	This comment has been reviewed, and it is consid- ered that the exist- ing Figure is appropriate. The figure is illustrative and not intended to define a proce- dure. Each MS can use something similar but differ- ent, as far the elements are con- sidered.
Turkey	4.5	To be guiding, there may be some concrete criteria, such as type of facilities or activ- ites, i.e. NPPs and reprocession plants, research reactors with some power levels, or public doses incurred from normal operation of these facilities or activities, etc., for determining radiological environmental impact assessment to be complex or simple.	How radiological envi- ronmental impact as- sessment is determined as complex or simple is unlcear in the draft document. There are some factors considered by applicant to decide whether the impact assessment should be complex or simple, and given in Table 1. However how are these factor used for determination?			X	The safety guide cover a wide range of facilities and activities and the idea is to mention the im- portant factors but not to apply them case by case. Developing a TECDOC for different instala- tions) is planned.
China	Page 16 Para 4.5 Table1	Presence of receptor: people <u>(the habits</u> <u>and career)</u> , flora and fauna	People's habits and career are very important location characteristics affecting the level of complexity.	Х	Text on habits was added. "Career" is not clear for the re- viewer.		

Sweden	Page 18,	It is suggested to add other examples than	Industrial activities			
	Table 1	agriculture for land use or to write: Land	such as food processing			
		use and other activities	may not fit under the	Х		
			other selection of ele-			
			ments.			
Finland	4.6-4.12		It is good that the rather		A new paragraph for	
			complicated authoriza-		simple installations	
			tion process for nuclear		was added	
			installations has been	x		
			taken as an example. It	21		
			would be nice to have			
			also an example of an-			
-			other, more simple case.			
Sweden	Page 18,	Suggest adding the word formal:There	An authorization pro-		"(regulatory)" was	
	para 4.6	are likely to be a number of formal stages	cess is regulatory by		not considered neces-	
		in the (regulatory) authorization process	default – remove this in		sary.	
		[35].	the full document – it	Х		
			repeated several times			
			in the text and is unnec-			
			essary.			
т	4 7/1	$\Gamma' = 1 (1 + 1 + 1 + 1) (C + C + C + 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2$				
Japan	4.//1 (n 19)	Figure 1 (adapted <u>and modified</u> from [35])	Adding word for the			
	(p.17)	presents	(The set of structure of			
			(The actual structure of			
			Figure 1 from SSG-12			
			is as below.)			
			Siting and site evaluation	Х		
			Design Construction			
			Commissioning Operat			
Austral-	Para-	Suggested re-wording: "A screening as-		v	Text modified con-	
ia	graph	sessment by use of regional or generic		Λ	siderin the proposal	

	4.8	data should be conducted during the stage of siting and site evaluation to identify potential regions or sites for the facility (based on the conceptual design) or activi- ty. Screening criteria should include site and regional characteristics that could obviously compromise safety, current and anticipated land use, cultural significance, economic significance, and demographic considerations. During this stage, different designs could also be still under scrutiny."				
Sweden	Page 19. paras 4.9-4.10	In this context, the complication of placing an installation at a site where other facili- ties with authorized releases are already placed is important (cumulative effects etc. It could be worth addressing this issue.	Both the existing levels of radionuclides in the environment and the comparison with crite- ria will be complicated by having several facili- ties, perhaps even with different licensees, at the same site.	Х		
Austral- ia	Para- graph 4.9	Remove spurious comma, viz. " obtain site-specific data,."		Х		
Austral- ia	Para- graph 4.9	Suggested re-wording: "Once a site or a reduced number of sites has been select- ed (by use of the screening criteria for site selection), a more detailed assessment for each particular location should be done using information on the proposed design together with site-specific data from the	The preliminary as- sessment for each site has already been done (as per para. 4.8). In addition, the aim of doing an assessment during site evaluation	Х	Some text was modi- fied but the concepts of "initial, prelimi- nary and final" are kept.	

1	1							
			results of local measurements and sur-	(for the sites that pass				
			veys. The aim of this assessment should be	the screening assess-				
			to demonstrate (as early as possible) that	ment criteria) should				
			there is a reasonable likelihood that all	be to demonstrate that				
			stages of the proposed operation will	there is a reasonable				
			comply with relevant legislative and regu-	likelihood that all stag-				
			latory requirements under reasonably	es of the proposed op-				
			foreseeable circumstances. If this cannot	eration should be able				
			be demonstrated, the proposed design	to comply with all rele-				
			can be modified, more site-specific data	vant legislative and				
			can be collected, and the assessment can	regulatory require-				
			be modified. This process can be contin-	ments under reasona-				
			ued until a clear conclusion is reached.	bly foreseeable circum-				
			The assessment process should be refined	stances. For such an				
			as the project evolves and more infor-	assessment, a clear				
			mation becomes available; this allows for	design plan should be				
			any decision to stop further development	available. A further				
			of the project to be made as early as pos-	benefit of doing such				
			sible, and helps to build confidence as the	an assessment is that				
			project evolves."	potential problems				
				show up early in the				
				overall process and				
				plans, designs, etc., can				
				be modified. This is also				
				part of the process of				
				developing an evolving				
				safety case.				
							37	
	Swit-	4.9/7	Replace "able" by "suitable"	Editorial	v		Х	
	zerland	5.14/6 5.15/1			л Х			
		5.15/1 5.10/6			X			
		5 20 / 3			Х			
	1	5.4015		1		1		

		5.27 / 3 5.53 / 1 I-18 / 5			X X		X	
	Sweden	Page 19, para 4.10	Suggest changing toan activity should be used as one of the inputs to determine	It might be an issue for reference [8] but opti- mization and the use of BAT "Best Available Technique" should also be included in deriving operational magnitudes.	Х			
	China	Page 19 Para 4.11 Line 3-4	Revising to be "this review should include the consideration of the possible changes in the assumptions used to perform the prospective radiological environmental impact assessment and <u>the monitoring data of the source and environment.</u> "	Monitoring data of the source and environment might be helpful in the re-evaluation if available.	х			
1	Germa- ny	4.12	"At the end of a decommissioning stage or before release of a site from regulatory control Prior to the conduct of decommissioning ac- tions, a radiological environmental impact assessment is also expected. Before release of a site from regulatory control, a review of the radiological environmental impact assessment could be necessary, considering the final radio- logical status of the former facility. However, for most of the activities and facilities, typical- ly no releases or potential exposures are in- volved after decommissioning and the methods for exposure estimation and criteria could be different"	A REIA should already be performed prior to start- ing decommissioning, not only at the end. This is in line with Figure 1, which refers to a 'Pre-decom- missioning assessment', as well as with the Safety Requirements GSR Part 6 "Decommissioning of Fa- cilities". In this context, Requirement 11 of GSR Part 6 states: "Prior to the conduct of decommissioning actions, a final decommissioning plan shall be prepared and shall be submitted to the regulatory body for approval."	X	Text modified		

	with regard to the final		
	decommissioning plan,		
	the subordinated Draft		
	Safety Guide DS452 "De-		
	commissioning of Nuclear	r la	
	Power Plants, Research		
	Reactors and Other Nu-		
	clear Fuel Cycle Facili-		
	ties" (revision of Safety		
	Guides WS-G-2.1 and		
	WS-G-2.4; latest version		
	dated 3 December 2014)		
	recommends:		
	• "An environmental im-		
	pact assessment should		
	be developed concur-		
	rently with the final de-		
	commissioning plan		
	consistent with national		
	requirements" (Para		
	2 8)		
	• "The licensee should		
	indicate in the anyiron		
	mantal impact assess		
	mentul impact assess-		
	ing which supports the		
	ing, which supports the		
	jindi decommissioning		
	plan, now compliance		
	with applicable require-		
	the antipermeter will be		
	ine environmeni will be		
	ensured, including re-		
	sponsibilities and meas-		
	ures for monitoring,		
	control and surveillance		
	during decommission-		
	ing and after its comple-	-	

				tion, if needed." (Para			
				2.9)			
				• "The impact of updates			
				to the final decommis-			
				sioning plan on the en-			
				vironmental impact as-			
				sessment should also be			
				considered. The envi-			
				ronmental impact as-			
				sessment should be up-			
				dated when a previously			
				unconsidered potential			
				environmental impact is			
				identified." (Para 7.44)			
				• "The final decommis-			
				sioning report should			
				summarize the final sta-			
				tus of the former facili-			
				ty A review of the			
				environmental impact			
				assessment may be nec-			
				essary considering the			
				final radiological status			
				of the former facility, as			
				required by national re-			
				quirements." (Para 9.2)			
-	ENISS	4.12	At the end of a Before decommissioning	A prospective radiolog-			
			stage or before release of a site from regu-	ical environmental im-			
			latory control a prospective radiological	pact as-sessment is			
			environmental impact assessment is also	needed before decom-			
			expected.	missioning, not at the	v		
				end. This is in agree-	Λ		
				ment with FIG. 1 where			
				it is men-tioned a 'Pre-			
				decommissioning as-			
				sess-ment'.			
-	France	4.12	However, for most of the activities and facilities, typically no releases or potential exposures are involved after decommission and the methods for exposure estimation and criteria could be different (for example, the estimation of the doses should be based mainly on environmental monitoring data and the dose criteria could be below dose limits and constraints used for the operational stage).	Could lead to too much conservatism if results are below the detection limits. Sometimes such calculation based on monitoring data has no sense.	Х		
---	--------	----------------------------------	---	--	---	---	--
	Sweden	Page 20, para 4.12	Add the letter g to decommissioning in line 4. Consider deleting the parenthesis could be different (for example, the esti- mation of doses should be based mainly on environmental monitoring data and the dose criteria should be below dose limits and constraints used for the operational stage). A particular situation	The estimation of doses would not be based on data from environmen- tal monitoring, at least not at nuclear installa- tions. Perhaps true at mining or other activi- ties?	Х		
	USA	4.12 Line 4	"Decommissioning" rather than "de- commission?	Clarity	Х		
	China	Page 20 Para 4.12 Line 1-2	Revising to be "At the end of a decommissioning stage or before release of a site from regulatory control a radiological environmental impact assessment <u>should be carried out depending on certain situation</u> ."	At the end of a decommissioning stage or before release of a site from regulatory control, the radiological EIA is very necessary under certain situation. So "should" is more appropriate than "expected".	Х		
	ENISS	4.12 a	However, For most of the activities and facilities, typically no releases or potential exposures are involved after decommission and the methods for exposure estimation and criteria could be different (for example, the estimation of the doses should be based mainly on environmental monitoring data and the dose criteria could be below dose limits and constraints used for the	For clarification old para 4.12 should be divided. The example is not very suitable as after de- commissioning, there will be no dose criteria and constraints.	Х	4.12 was re-written using the inputs	

			operational stage) etc.			
-	Swit- zerland	4.12 / 7	A particular situation <u>may arise after de-</u> <u>commissioning of some activities and fa-</u> <u>cilities involving large areas – like uranium</u> <u>mining and milling – where source terms</u> <u>are not negligible and impacts to the envi-</u> <u>ronment have still to be expected.</u>	Rephrasing to add clari- ty	X	
	Austral- ia	Para's 4.13 & 4.14	Suggested replacement text for 4.14: "The government or the regulatory body may establish thresholds and/or criteria at a level such that all projects of a certain type of facilities or activities would be ex- empted in advance from the requirement of an EIA, considering that impact is not expected either for normal operation or conceivable accidental scenarios. Alterna- tively, if an environmental assessment is required in all cases, the process should start with a very simple assessment fol- lowed by an increasing level of complexity until a clear, defensible conclusion is reached (a tiered approach). This ap- proach is efficient and consistent with the graded approach, and ensures a high level of transparency and consistency across all types of facilities and activities."	The approach outlined here may work, but it is open to criticism on the grounds of lack of transparency. The same result can be achieved by requiring an assess- ment in all cases, but allowing the process to start with a very simple assessment and in- crease the level of complexity until a clear, defensible conclusion is reached (a tiered ap- proach). This approach is efficient, and con- sistent with the graded approach, and ensures a high level of trans- parency and consisten- cy across all types of activities.	Х	
	Sweden	Page 20,	The word <i>body</i> should be inserted after	Editorial	Х	

	para 4.14	the regulatory				
Japan	4.14/1 (p.20)	The government or the regulatory should established thresholds	Grammatical error.	Х		
Japan	4.14/3 (p.20)	Regarding phrase "impact is not expected" other word "foreseeable" is also used in para.4.1. What is the intent of the usage of these words differently?	This is not comment but just for a confirmation.	X	Was changed to "ex- pected". In some places in the Safety uide though, "fore- seeable" is kept.	
Turkey	4.14./las t line	Footnote ¹⁹ should also be placed after the sentence of "The government or the regulatory should established thresholds and/or criteria at a level such that all projects of a certain type of facilities or activities would be exempted in advance from the requirement of an EIA, considering that impact is not expected either for normal operation or conceivable accidental scenarios".	Footnote ¹⁹ is EU Directive on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment which establishes thresholds levels for facilities requiring EIA. Hence this directive should be cited after that sentence.	Х		
ENISS	4.15	A radiological environmental impact as- sessment done within an EIA process gov- ernmental decision-making process is normally done at early stages of the devel- opment and, typically, has a lower level of details and uses less specific data than an assessment conducted for a (regulatory) authorization process; however it should be consistent.	An EIA is one possible process amongst the governmental decision- making processes. This part of the Standard is related to an Assess- ment as part of a gov- ernmental decision- making process (be- sides an Assessment for the (regulatory) author- ization process) and not as part of an EIA.	Х		
USA	4.15, line 4	Add at end of sentence: ", and may be specified by legislation or by the regu-	Added thought for consistency with	X		

		latory body."	standards.			
ENISS	4.16	Unless defined in the applicable national or international regulations, the level of com- plexity for the radiological environmental impact assessment for an EIA governmen- tal decision-making process should be pro- posed by the applicant and agreed by the nuclear regulatory body(s) in the country in discussion with other governmental au- thorities or agencies. ()	See previous comment.	Х		
USA	4.16	Unless defined in the applicable national or international regulations, the The level of complexity for the radiological environ- mental impact assessment for an EIA should be in line with the complexity of the radiological safety assessment for the proposed nuclear facility. Thus, the level of complexity should be defined in the ap- plicable national regulations or guidance proposed by the applicant and agreed by the nuclear regulatory body(s) in the coun- try in discussion with other governmental authorities or agencies. To this end, the radiological environmental impact as- sessment is as an extension of the radio- logical safety assessment since the meth- odology for determine radiological expo- sures in both assessments should the same.	The level of complexity for the radiological en- vironmental impact as- sessment for an EIA should <u>absolutely</u> <u>not</u> be proposed by the applicant. They have an inherent financial conflict to complete the assessment with a min- imum of expenditures. Rather, the nuclear regulatory body(s) should set clear expec- tations as an integral part of their regulatory structure through ap- propriate regulatory guides or designate technical guidance documents that specifi- cally outlines the level of complexity for the type of nuclear facility being considered. It is also inherent in any	Х	Text modified	

				radiological environ- mental impact assess- ment that the criteria for determining whether the project or nuclear facility is environmen- tally sound would be heavily dependent on what is followed for the accompanying radio- logical safety assess- ment.			
2	Germa- ny	4.18	Delete this paragraph and the corresponding headline "ASSESSMENTS FOR OTHER PURPOSES".	The subsection "ASSESS- MENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES" with its as- sociated Para 4.18 should be deleted since it is out of the scope of this Safety Guide. Para 4.18 is related to a safety assessment of sub- stantial improvements in the safety systems of a facility or an activity. Such kind of assessment is dealt with in another Safety Guide, where the REIA is at most marginal, taking into account that the modification of safety systems would result in a lower impact to the envi- ronment.		X	This para. is con- sidered useful.
	Japan	COM- MUNI- CATION OF RE- SULTS	A good practice about communication with interested parties along with DS460 should be added.	This is a proposal to make this Safety Guide better.		Х	The comment is noted but it is difficult to ad- dress without a more specific

	(p.21)						recommendation.
China	Page 21 Para 4.19 Line 7-9	Revising to be "Depending on the importance of the enterprise, the regulatory body <u>should</u> <u>request the governmental authorities to lead in</u> <u>the communication</u> when such communication is considered necessary for effectively performing the public informational functions of the regulatory body.	Governmental authorities are more qualified to be in the leading position of such communication, rather than be involved.	Х	Text modified		
Austral- ia	Para- graph 4.21	Remove the first instance of "the" in "specific results the in the reports pro- duced."		Х			
Turkey	4.21./ last line	In the second sentence, (last line) "the" is surplus. It should be deleted.	Grammar correction	Х			
Austral- ia	Para- graph 4.23	Add text at end of 4,23: "In general, the aim should be to encourage as much transparency as possible in these matters, as this builds confidence and trust."		х	Text modified		
USA	4.52 Line 8	Add "usually" after "measurements are"	Clarity	Х	(refers to para 5.24)		
Austral- ia	Section 5		This entire section does not clearly distinguish between exposures due to routine dis- charges and (potential) accidental discharges, and the methodologies for assessing these dif- ferent types of expo- sure. In particular the discussion on limiting risk is largely irrelevant			X	

				when discussing (po- tential) accidental ex- posures, because in most accident situa- tions, particularly in the early stages, there are higher priorities for emergency responders, such as bringing the discharges under con-			
				discharges under con- trol. The main reasons for looking at exposures due to routine and ac- cidental discharges are quite different. For rou- tine discharges the is- sue is usually compli- ance with legislative and regulatory re- quirements; however, for accidental discharg- es the main reason for estimating potential exposures is for plan- ning responses. The document needs to more clearly differenti-			
				ate between these approaches.			
-	Lithua- nia	p. No 22	5.2. Since an assessment for protection of the public and protection of the environment	Only tested and approved by countries	Х	Text was modified to incorporate 'verifica-tion'.	

	5.2	within this Safety Guide is prospective in	mathematical modelling			
		nature, reliance will have to be placed on	software's should be used			
		mathematical modelling for evaluating, for				
		example, the dispersion of radionuclides in the				
		environment, the transfer through				
		environmental compartments, the transfer to				
		humans and to the human food-chain and,				
		finally, the radiation doses resulting from the				
		associated external radiation or from the				
		uptake of radionuclides. The models should be				
		appropriate for the situation in which they are				
		being applied, ensuring reasonable accuracy.				
		Model assumptions and parameter choices				
		should be sufficiently described and referenced				
		to be transparent and allow independent				
		verification. General models already used in				
		practises by at least some countries and				
		proposed by the IAEA in the technical				
		documentation should be used that are				
		validated at international level. Validation				
		should be listed.			 	
Sweden	Page 22,	The models should be appropriate for the	Validation and verifica-			
	para 5.2,	situation in which they are applied, ensur-	tion of the used model			
	3 rd sen-	ing reasonable accuracy. Perhaps a better	should be important in	Х		
	tence	statement would be: The models should be	this context.			
		appropriate for the situation in which they				
		are applied, validated and verified.			 	
Sweden	Page 22,	Remove the parenthesis (i.e. over	In order to be protective			
	para 5.3	protective)	calculations should be			
			conservative but that	Х		
			does not mean that they			
			are over-protective.			
Swit-	5.4 / 5	The national regulatory body needs to be	The requirement of			
zerland		satisfied has to agree that	satisfaction of the regu-	Х		
			latory body is to weak	1		

France	5.5	Add at the end of the § "Especially when annual dose to reference group is lower than the exemption criteria of 10 μ Sv, a specific assessment of the protection of fauna and flora is not required"	To prevent small projects from unnecessary studies			X	This is discussed in Section 4.
Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.5	protection of fauna and flora is not required" Suggested re-wording: "One consideration when deciding on the methods for a radio- logical environmental impact assessment is the balance between the amount of effort and the level of detail required. For example, for an installation with low levels of discharges and/or low potential for ac- cidents with consequences to the public and the environment, the use of detailed methods would not generally be neces- sary. For these types of installations, regu- latory bodies, vendors or professional as- sociations may develop generic guidance with simple and cautious calculation methods that can be used for the assess- ments by the applicants. However, in mak- ing such decisions, all relevant information should be considered; for example, even in cases involving low levels of discharges, bio-accumulation may be an issue."		X	Text modified		
Sweden	Page 23, para 5.7	Delete or rephrase the paragraph as: In order to control exposures and protect the public in accordance with the require- ments of GSR Part 3 [1] there is a need to conduct assessments that include prospec- tive estimations of doses to members of the public and compare results to defined cri- teria.	The safety guides should use terms as: prevent or minimise releases, very low amounts, negligible to very low doses. The releases cannot be zero with any reasona-	Х	Text modified		

	Austral-	Para-	Possibly the text of footnote 20 could be added to the paragraph as well: <i>Due to the</i> <i>low activity concentrationsetc</i> Correct: "very low amounts of radionu-	ble technique and doses to workers in waste management etc. are to be considered. Such factors would be more interesting to address in this guidance.			
	ia	graph 5.7	clide s residues can be found".		Х		
	Austral- ia	Foot- note 20	Suggested re-wording: "Due to the low activity concentrations and high large vol- umes involved, it would be technically difficult to retain all this residues or mate- rial on-site and the cost of doing so would likely be may have an excessive and unjus- tified cost from the radiological protection perspective."		х		
3	Germa- ny	Footnote No. 21 to 5.8	"The Safety Guide is intended to provide a general framework for radiological <u>environ-</u> <u>mental</u> impact assessment Important steps which are not discussed but should be consid- ered when performing the assessments are, i.e., selection of computer codes, uncertainty anal- ysis, verification and QA/QC <u>control</u> ."	Wording.	X		
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.8	Proposed text to add at end of para 5.8: "In assessments of this type, it is often more efficient to start with a simple as- sessment (for example, assuming continu- ous exposure and default site data) and to increase the complexity of the assessment (by use of site-specific data and more de-			Х	This is discussed in other parts of the document.

		tailed exposure scenarios) until a clear and defensible conclusion is reached."					
Japan	Page 23 Para 5.8. Line 9	The definition of occupational factor in Para 5.58 line 4 should be moved to this para as below. "relevant habit data time-occupation factors (i.e. different occupation during day and night, existence of summer campsites and schools, presence of work- ers near the facility) to calculate intakes of"	This is the first time of the term "occupational factor" described in this document, so its defini- tion should be de- scribed here.	Х	Text was modified		
USA	5.9	The source term selected for a radiological environmental impact assessment should be appropriate for the type of facility or activity being considered. All relevant radi- onuclides, from a radiological point of view, should be identified along with the discharge route and the physical and chemical properties relevant for environ- mental transfers of these radionuclides. Releases to the atmosphere, releases to the aquatic environment, and direct radia- tion should be considered, as appropriate.	Add text to clarify that for receptors at a nu- clear facility's fence or boundary, direct radia- tion exposure from sources within the fa- cility could be notewor- thy and should be con- sidered. Also, please note that this is men- tioned in ¶ 5.25 on page 28, items (o) through (q).	Х			
Sweden	Page 23, Footnote 21	This statement should be put in the main text and not hidden in the footnote. Could be made into a paragraph in GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS (5.6bis)		Х			
France	Fig 2	In the second box, replace by "Disper- sion/Environmental transfer/Direct Irradiation"	Mention proposed to warn the assessors not to forget direct exposure which can be THE relevant exposure way in some cases.	Х	Figure was modified		
Austral- ia	Figure 2	A proposed replacement for FIG. 2 is supplied in the covering email, for considera-	FIG. 2 is confusing and could be considerably			X	The figure pro- posed has similar

	tion	aimanalificad it doos wat	elements and it is
	tion.	simplified. It does not	considered not
		reflect the process very	necessary to
		well; e.g.:	change the exist-
		• Use of the ter-	ing figure, taking
	Form of material (e.g. solid waste) Characterisation of material	minology "environmen-	into account that
	Release rates Source modelling	tal transfer" and "expo-	it is an illustrative
		sure pathways" – the	ngure and not a
	Transfer pathways	exposure is not trans-	The discussion on
	ENVIRONMENT Transfer parameters Transport (dispersion) modelling	ferred through the en-	what is indenti-
		vironmont which is	fied first, if the
	Type of exposure	what the term "even	'pathway' or the
	Representative person Exposure scenarios	what the term expo-	representative
	Dose/risk calculations Comparison of dose/risk with Comparison of dose/risk with	sure pathway implies,	on the approach
	Constraints and Limits	but depends on the	and the method by
		location of the exposed	the analyst or the
		person(s) – it is the	requirements in
		radionuclides that are	the regulations.
		transferred from	
		source to receptor, and	
		the transfer processes	
		by which this takes	
		place depend only on	
		the environment and	
		the physical/chemical	
		form of the contami-	
		nants (transfor paramo	
		ters).	
		• Putting the ex-	
		posure path-	
		ways/scenarios first -	
		the exposure scenario	
		depends on the identi-	
		fication of the repre-	

				sentative person(s).				
	Sweden	Paras 5.8 – 5.76	The drafter should be commended for this section.	Section 5 is very well written and is of high quality.	X			
	Canada	5.9/2	"5.9. The source term selected for a radiological environmental impact assessment should be appro- priate for the type of facility or activity being con- sidered. The composition and amount of All -rele- vant radionuclides, from a radiological point of view, should be identified along with the discharge route and the physical (gas or aerosol) and chemi- cal properties relevant for environmental transfers of these radionuclides. Releases to the atmosphere and to the aquatic environment should be consid- ered, as appropriate."	Paragraph 5.9 is the first time that elements of the source term are presented in full text in the document. The information in para- graph 5.9 should align with the information in paragraph 5.49 as paragraph 5.9 to provide more clarity for the reader.	Х			
-	Swit- zerland	5.9/3	the discharge route path	Editorial	Х			
	China	Page 24 Para 5.10 Line 7-9	To add a new paragraph after Para 5.10: <u>The characteristics of the radioactive waste</u> <u>management systems or process on which the</u> <u>calculation of the release source terms is</u> <u>depended should be specified.</u>	The calculation of the release source terms depends on the design of the radioactive waste management systems or process, and the justification has been made by the applicants could also be specified through these specifications.			X	The document assumes that the source term are the result from previous safety assessments (not a result of the radio- logical impact assessment which just 'use' the provided source term as an input)
	Canada	5.10/1	"5.10. The selection of radionuclides for the ra- diological environmental impact assessment should be adequately representative of the type of facility being assessed. In some cases, for in- stance at the governmental decision-making process or initial stages of a (regulatory) authorization pro- cess, generic source terms for the postulated facility or activity could be used, based on preliminary estimations, published data or on the experience from similar installations. Information on generic	The source term section should provide some guid- ance on the selection of the radionuclides used in the assessment. Selection of radionuclides used in the assessment should be repre- sentative of the facility being assessed. It is recommended that a brief sentence to this	X	Text modified		

			source terms for normal operation of nuclear reac- tors can be found in [37, 38]"	end be added.				
-	Swit- zerland	5.11 / 7	then the effects due to short-term re- leases will need have to be considered.	Editorial	Х			
	Canada	5.11/7	"Where this assumption may not be valid, because significant variation in the discharges over a time period are expected — e.g. during refuelling of reactors, or for typical iodine-131 discharges to sewer from thyroid treatment departments at a hos- pital, or pulsed releases from processing facili- ties- then the effects due to these types of releases will need to be considered."	The effects due to short-term releases will also need to be considered for non- continuous releases from certain types of nuclear facilities (i.e., processing facilities). Radiological environmental impact assessments typically assume that discharges are continuous and constant over a year. The text in paragraph 5.11 provides some discussion regarding periods when there might be variation in discharges in the short term. However, there is no discussion regarding non-continuous releases (or pulsed) releases from certain facilities like some pro- cessing facilities. The re- leases from these facilities are different from the shut- down periods for nuclear power plants. Recommend that text be added indicating that these non-continuous releases should also be assessed differently.	Х	Text modified		
	France	5.11	Where this assumption may not be valid, because significant variation in the <i>discharges over a short time period</i> are expected	I that case (short time period discharge), calcula- tion methods should be			Х	The Safety Guide identifies the issue of short term

				precise . Which meteorolog- ical data? (the same for each release?). How to evaluate deposition accumulation for short time period discharges ?			increased releas- es, but does not provide a detailed methodology for these particular and very variable cases. This more detailed method- ology is planned for a TECDOC or Safety Report considering some specific facilities
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.11	Add text to end pf para: "It should also be considered that releases to the environ- ment can continue after operations cease, due to the presence of residual contami- nation."		Х		
-	Swit- zerland	5.13 / 6	The regulatory body should confirm if <u>agree that</u>	Editorial	Х		
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.15	Suggested wording: "(b) Deposition (and subsequent resus- pension) of radionuclides from the atmos- phere on the ground or other surfaces; (d) Accumulation (and subsequent remo- bilization) in aquatic sediments;"	Points (b) and (d) should include resus- pension & remobiliza- tion.	Х		
	Canada	5.17/3	"5.17. For facilities or activities needing simple assessments the meteorological and hydrological conditions could be of a generic character based on bibliography or national records (based on at least one year of data). The meteorological and hydro- logical conditions used for the more complex as- sessments should be appropriate and specific for the	Paragraph 5.17 provides guidance regarding the amount of data (i.e., condi- tions) required for complex assessments. Similarly, the appropriate amount of data for conducting simple as-	х		

		site in question and should preferably be averaged from several years of data (at least, 3–5 years). Such data may be available for the site itself or from nearby meteorological or hydrological sta- tions."	sessments should be provid- ed. According to the US EPA's Guideline on Air Quality at least one year of site-specific data is required for regulatory dispersion modeling. Or At least one year of mete- orological or hydrological data should be used for sim- ple assessments.				
Turkey	5.17. /fith line	"The meteorological and hydrological conditions used for the more complex assessments should be appropriate and specific for the site in question and should preferably be averaged from several years of data (at least one year, preferably 3-5 years)."	The term in the parenthesis is proposed to be corrected. Since at least 3-5 years of meteorological data collection will be too long for dispersion analysis, and contradictory to para.5.51 of this draft and IAEA N\$.G-3.2 para.2.11.	X	Text modified		This issue (num- ber of years for the data) will be discussed at WASSC/NUSSC
Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.17	Remove comma within brackets, viz. "(at least 3-5 years)".		Х			
Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.18	Suggested text to add after first sentence (i.e. after "release point." Delete "Howev- er," and start next sentence after inserted text with "For more complex"): "While Gaussian dispersion models are simple to use, they need to be carefully validated, as they make a number of as- sumptions to simplify the mathematical solution of the equations and each as- sumption introduces potential loss of ac- curacy."				X	This is considered a too detailed discussion for the Safety Guide. Validation and uncertainty in general is dis- cussed in the document.

-	Swit- zerland	5.18 / 6	or in cases, where greatest larger dis- tances need to be considered	Editorial	Х			
		5.18/9	<u>on</u> pessimistic assumptions when uncertainties or variability in the data prevent those realistic assumptions to be considered.		х			
	France	5.18	However, for more complex dispersion conditions, for example for installations located close to moun- tainous regions or places where complex local at- mospheric circulations are expected, or in cases where greatest distances need to be considered, more complex dispersion models may be necessary for accidental releases calculations.	These methods should be used only for accidental releases			Х	Complex disper- sion models could be necessary for routine discharges (in particular scenarios), not only for acci- dental releases.
	Swit- zerland	5.19/4	of the receiving <u>aqueous</u> environment, 	Editorial	Х			
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.19	Remove comma, " processes like water movement"		х			
-	Swit- zerland	5.20 / 2	being carried to sewage treatment works plants.	Editorial	Х	Text modified		
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.20	Add text at end of para: "It may also be necessary to assess doses to workers in- volved in routine inspection and mainte- nance of sewerage systems."		X			
	Finland	5.20		It is noted that when assessing discharges to	X	It is indicated the possible type of mod-		

			sewers, the models should be able to esti- mate the transfer of the radionuclides to the sew- age works and their sub- sequent releases into the environment. Are such models commercially available? If not, this Suggestion is rather strong.		els to be used (e.g. compartimental mod- els with transfer fac- tors).	
France	5.20	Appropriate models should be available for the transfer of radionuclides through terrestrial food chains and for <u>atmospheric releases</u> .	Which kind of atmospheric release is expected after use of sludge?	Х	Text modified.	
Swit- zerland	5.21 / 4	of the conditions when <u>equilibrium can</u> <u>be assumed</u> .	Rephrasing for simpli- fy-cation	Х		
Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.21	Add text to end of para: "For facilities that discharge long-lived radionuclides (e.g. the naturally occurring uranium and thorium chain nuclides) the maximum exposures can occur well after operations cease, for example as a result of dispersion of re- leased radionuclides in ground water. The assessment should take this type of possi- bility into account."		Х		
Swit- zerland	5.25 / 2	An indicative exemplary list of exposure pathways	Editorial	Х		
Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.25	Suggest rephrasing to "could contribute to doses to members of the public".	The phrase "could con- tribute to doses to the member of the public" implies that a single	Х		

Image: Sweden Page 28, para Suggest changing the bullet (q) to read: direct irradiation from the facility (i.e. from components, of the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems) It is important to emphasise that the exposure pathways are dependent. Image: Sweden Page 28, para Suggest changing the bullet (q) to read: direct irradiation from the facility (i.e. from components, of the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems) It is important to emphasise that the exposure pathways are dependent. Image: Sweden Page 28, para Suggest changing the bullet (q) to read: direct irradiation from the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems) It is important to emphasise thurbine hall in boiling water reactors. Image: China Page 28, france To add"(r) External or inhalation from natural radionuclides in consumer products withich are considered read users from and the source products ways can be excluded without calculations Text modified Image: France 5.25 Doses should be calculated resulting from a number ways can be excluded without calculations Text modified X	Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.26	Suggested text to add to end of para: "If particular exposure pathways are not in- cluded, the decision should be justified (transparency)."		Х	I ext modified			
A label{eq:alphabet}A label{eq:alphabet}assessed, rather than a representative person based on an average of a most effected group (or representative of the most exposed group).It is important to emphasise that the exposure pathways are strongly site dependent.SwedenPage 28, para direct irradiation from the facility like nuclear strongly correlation from the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems)ChinaPage 28, To add"(r) External or inhalation from the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems)ChinaPage 28, To add"(r) External or inhalation from the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems)The consumer products row of the part of the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems)The part form the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems)ChinaPage 28, rather than a representation from the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems)The consumer products row of the part of the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems)The part form the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems)The part form the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems)The part form the facility like nuclear reactors or coolant or steam systems)The part form the facility like nuclear to the part of the facility like nuclear to the part of the steam part of the facility like nuclear to the facility like nuclear to the part of the steam part of the facility like nuclear to the facility like	France	5.25 (+5.26)	Doses should be calculated resulting from a number of <u>exposure pathways which are considered rele-</u> <u>vant</u> for releases to the environment in particular scenarios.	It is needed to precise when and how some path- ways can be excluded without calculations	Х	Text modified			
SwedenPage 28, para 5.25Suggest changing the bullet (q) to read: direct irradiation from the facility (i.e. from components, of the facility like nucle- ar reactors or coolant or steam systems)A typical example is high-energy γ -radiation from N-16 in the steam passing the turbine hall in boiling water reac- tors.X	China	Page 28 Para 5.25	To add <u>"(r) External or inhalation from</u> natural radionuclides in consumer prod- ucts"	The consumer products potential exposure from NORM and TENMORM to the public, which should be considered.			X	Too detailed di cussion for the Safety Guide	÷-
assessed, rather than a representative person based on an average of a most effected group (or representative of the most exposed group). It is important to em- phasise that the expo- sure pathways are strongly site- dependent.	Sweden	Page 28, para 5.25	Suggest changing the bullet (q) to read: direct irradiation from the facility (i.e. from components, of the facility like nucle- ar reactors or coolant or steam systems)	A typical example is high-energy γ -radiation from N-16 in the steam passing the turbine hall in boiling water reac- tors.	Х				
member of the public is				member of the public is assessed, rather than a representative person based on an average of a most effected group (or representative of the most exposed group). It is important to em- phasise that the expo- sure pathways are strongly site- dependent.					

		Correct " certain pathway are negligible" to " certain pathways are negligible".		Х			
Germa- ny	5.28	"Dose should be calculated to a representative person using characteristics selected from a group of individuals representative of those more highly exposed in the population. Ref. [42] gives guidance on the characteristics of the representative person, taking into account several age groups."	In general, dose effects show a dependency on the age of the exposed per- son. For different age groups, doses per unit intake (i.e. dose coefficients) for the estimation of the com- mitted effective dose for ingestion and inhalation of radionuclides are given in ICRP Publication 119 and GSR Part 3, Schedule III.			X	Age groups is discussed later in the Safety Guide
Sweden	Footnote 24	Suggest deleting the footnote and instead write:to a representative person as de- fined in GSR Part 3	The reference to ICRP is made in the definition in GSR Part 3. No need to bring in the critical group in this context – it only confuses.			X	Many comments suggest to keep definition of rep- resentative person in this Safety Guide, specially taking into ac- count the wide expected target audience.
Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.30	Amend final sentence: "Important charac- teristics when assessing doses to the rep- resentative person is are the assumed location (e.g. distance and direction from the point of release), where the repre- sentative person lives they live, obtains their food, and the fraction of the food consumed that is of local origin, occupan- cy times (time spent at different locations)		X	Text modified. All the inputs were cap- tured		

			and time spent outdoors and indoors."					
	USA	5.30	, obtain their food (e.g., whether from regional agricultural production or nearby subsistence hunting or gathering),	How a representative person obtains their food is important, whether from regional agricultural production or by subsistence hunt- ing or gathering and the later needs to be men- tioned in the text be- cause it could be inad- vertently not evaluated.	X	Text modified		
	France	5.31	Add a § after 5.31 "It should also be noted that unexpected exposure pathways may contribute significantly to the dose received by individual in particular circumstances, for example consumption of seasonal or atypical foods, use of algae as organ- ics in orchards	To warn the assessors about the potential importance of such exposure pathways.			X	It is noted. How- ever extreme doses in one or few individuals should not be considered for the definition of rep- resentative per- sons. We are afraid of giving the wrong mes- sage (i.e that representative person represent extremes).
	China	Page 29 Para 5.33 Line 6-8	Revising to be "Uncertainties in estimates of dose, particularly for prospective calculations, are generally not reduced significantly by increasing the number of age categories for which dose coefficients have been provided [42], and four age groups should be sufficient for dose assessment under most circumstances."	Though this guideline is for the generic assessment purpose, the recommendation of age categories will be very helpful for the states which do not have the related standards or guidelines.	X			
3	Germa- ny	5.34	2 nd sentence: "IAEA provides guidance for the definition and use of dose constraint for protection of	Grammar.	Х			

			members of the public in planned exposures situations in [6]."				
	Austral-	Para-	Replace "planned exposures situations"				
	ia	graph 5.34	with "planned exposure situations".		Х		
	USA	5.34 Line 2	Revise to replace "define" with "define, or approve a proposal for"	Consistency with re- quirements.	Х		
	Sweden	Page 29, para 5.35	Change the sentence to read: GSR Part 3 lays down, in general, an ef- fective dose limit of 1 mSv per year for members of the public.	A dose limit is not de- fined, it is stipulated or laid down. The formu- lation of para 5.35 in the draft is strictly speaking not true since, in special circumstanc- es, a higher value in a single year can be ac- cepted if the average during five consecutive years does not exceed 1 mSv.	Х		
3	Germa- ny	5.35	2 nd sentence: "Dose constraints should fall within the range of ~0.1–1 mSv [6] and could be different for different facilities and activities or exposures scenarios."	To align the text with the guidance provided in Para 3.39 of the Draft Safety Guide DS432 "Radiation Protection of the Public and Protection of the En- vironment" (latest version dated March 2015) which says: "The value of a dose constraint for public ex- posure in a planned expo- sure situation should be below the pertinent dose limit, namely 1 mSv for the effective dose. On the	Х		

				other hand, a dose con- straint should be higher than the level of dose which could be consid- ered for exemption. There- fore, dose constraints should be within the range of $\sim 0.1 - 1 \text{ mSy.}$ "			
	Japan	Page 30 Para 5.35. Line 5-7	"the period for calculating the commit- ted dose should be defined as 50 years for intakes by adults and up to age 70 years for intakes by children."	Clarifying the descrip- tion. It is necessary to define the period clearly for calculating the commit- ted dose- but the word- ing "considering life expectancies" is not in line with this perspec- tive.		X	Some of the text was modified in the paragraph. However the number of years for the commited dose is related to life expectancies.
-	ENISS	5.35	Dose constraints should fall within the range of 0.1–1 mSv [6] and could be different for different facilities and activities or exposures scenarios	In DS 442 the text is "~ 0.1-1 mSv". This should be harmonized either way.	Х		
	Czech Rep.	5.36	Drop all the text.	"dose constraints" are already applied with regard to another instal- lation located close by or in the same site, so another lowering would be unnecessarily.	Х		

	China	Page 30 Para 5.37 Line 6-8	Once the radioactive discharge limits for a facility or activity are set by the regulatory body, a dose corresponding to the authorized discharge limit could be used for comparison to the results of the assessment. (This sentence should be removed.)	Normally the authorized discharge limit will be given a flexible margin due to the operational fluctuation, and the dose corresponding to the authorized discharge limit will not be exceeded if the actual or design source term did not exceed the discharge limit.	X		
1	Germa- ny	5.39	"Facilities and activities are designed, con- structed, commissioned, operated or conduct- ed, maintained and decommissioned – and regulated throughout all these stages, in such a way to prevent and mitigate accidents that, in the vast majority of cases, result in no radio- logical consequences for the public [1, 2, 45, 46]."	 The statement "in the vast majority of cases, results in no radiological consequences for the public" doesn't serve as guidance. Moreover, it is not covered by the references. The expectation is that for accidents without core melting, only minor radiological impact would be acceptable; for accidents with core melting, only protective actions that are limited in terms of times and areas of application would be necessary. 	X	Text modified	
	Swit- zerland	5.39 / 3	<u>in order</u> to prevent and mitigate accidents and, <u>thereby</u> , to avoid in the vast majority of cases <u>significant</u> radiological consequences for the public.	Rephrasing, for im- proved clarity	Х		
	Sweden	Page 29, para 5.40, 2 nd sentence	Consider changing the second sentence to start: <i>These safety assessments enables to analyse</i>	Change singular to plu- ral in the full sentence.	х		

	Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.40	Rewording of sentence two required. Suggest "These safety assessments enable analysis of whether adequate".		Х		
-	Swit- zerland	5.42 / 8	to make the input to environmental dispersion and transport models.	Editorial: The input is to the models and not to the dispersion or transport itself.	Х		
	Austral- ia	Figure 3		 FIG. 3 has the same problems as FIG. 2, and some additional problems: Putting the exposure scenario first - the exposure scenario depends on the identification of the representative person(s). Use of the terminology "environmental transfer" and "exposure pathways" – the exposure is not transferred through the environment, which is what the term "exposure pathway" implies, but depends on the location of the exposed person(s) – it is the radionuclides that are transferred from 		X	See answer to comments to Figure 2.

				source to receptor, and			
				the transfer processes			
				by which this takes			
				place depend only on			
				the environment and			
				the physical chemical			
				form of the contami-			
				nants (transfer parame-			
				ters).			
				• Identification of			
				exposed persons is not			
				relevant – it is the iden-			
				tification of the repre-			
				sentative person(s) that			
				is important.			
				Since both FIG. 2 and			
				FIG. 3 refer to prospec-			
				tive assessments, the			
				same figure will apply			
				in both cases, because			
				prospective exposures			
				are (in practice) poten-			
				tial exposures.			
-	Swit-	5.47 / 3	and the behavior and movement	Editorial: the common			
	zerland		transport of any radioactive material	term is "transport of	Х		
				radioactive material"			
	LICA	5 47	Suggest considering a cross reference	Consistancy with ro			Cross reference
	USA	5.47	to state that the assumptions used	duirements			with emergency is
			should be the same as those being	qui ornorno.		х	done in the intro-
			used for Emergency Preparedness				duction
			considerations.				
-	Swit-	5.48	In general, the source term should include	Editorial	Х		

	zerland		the composition and amounts of radionu- clides, the physical (e.g. gas or aerosol) and chemical form, the release point and its height (for an aerial release) or depth below the surface (for an aquatic release). The releases flow speed and the thermal energy associated with the release may also be necessary to assess the effective height <u>of</u> the radioactive plume could reach .				
-	Lithua- nia	p. No 33 5.49	5.49. For activities and facilities needing simple assessments, conservative assumptions for the meteorological and hydrological data may be made. For example, a uniform wind direction for atmospheric dispersion and low atmospheric dilution conditions, precipitation by raining at the time of the postulated accident may be assumed. Such assumptions would give conservative results and avoid the need to obtain site specific data. However, conservative assumptions are not straightforward, e.g. assumptions conservative for inhalation (i.e. that all the releases go to the atmosphere instead of to any aquatic media) may be not conservative for ingestion of food produced with irrigation. When different pathways are involved, it might be not so easy to identify the most conservative assumption and a careful compromise should be evaluated	All conservative assumptions should be taken into account	X		
2	Germa- ny	5.50	1 st sentence: "If due to over conservatism, because of the use of assumptions which tend to largely over- estimate the doses, the results are <u>above close</u> to the selected criteria, more realistic values	As long as the selected criteria are met, no further considerations are needed.	Х	Text modified (com- ments to the same paragraph were com- bined)	

			for the applicable meteorological and hydro- logical parameters at the location of the facility or activity should be considered to reduce the level of uncertainty."				
-	ENISS	5.50	If due to over conservatism, because of the use of assumptions which tend to largely overestimate the doses, the results are elose to above the selected criteria, more realistic values for the applicable meteorological and hydrological parameters at the location of the facility or activity should be considered to reduce the level of uncertainty.	If the criteria are met, no further assessments are needed. This is the logic of a criterion. It would only be a waste of resources to proceed further.	Х		
	Swit- zerland	5.50 / 1	If due to over conservatism the results are close to the selected criteria, because of the use of assumptions which tend to largely overestimate the doses,	Rearrangement of the sentence to add clarity	Х		
3	Germa- ny	5.51	2 nd sentence: "Site specific meteorological and hydrological data for nuclear facilities is are generally col- lected during the programme for site evalua- tion; detailed guidance on the type and charac- teristics of this these data is presented in [41]."	Grammar.	Х		
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.51	Typographical error. Remove space be- fore comma, "complex assessments , meteorological"		Х		
	Czech Rep.	5.51/1-4	For nuclear facilities or activities needing complex assessments, meteorological and hydrological data locally collected – over at least a year for the initial assessments, but preferable over 3–10 years – should be used to specify characteristic accident dis- persion conditions [40, 41].	Hydrological and mete- orological data shall be known for more than 3- 5 years, at least 10 years, if possible even more.	Х		

Turkey	5.51	The sentence of "Meteorological data re- quired by numerical (complex) models can aslo be acquired by meteorological data centers" may be added to this para.	Meteorological data required by numerical (complex) models can also be acquired by meteorological data centers such as NCAR, FNL etc. These centers create detailed meteorological data files for different countries.	Х		
Swit- zerland	5.52 / 1&2	For nuclear facilities and other facilities in order to reduce the calculation efforts, the hours time of occurrence of the acci- dent	Editorial	Х		
Swit- zerland	5.53 / 7	the dispersion and distribution of radio- nuclides in the environment.	Editorial	х		
Turkey	5.53. last line	The reference [11] is mistakenly cited, correct one should be referred.	The cited reference [11] is IAEA SRS-19 which is applicable for routine releases and equilibrium conditions. For short term and lond range transport, citation of this reference s inappropriate.	Х		
Swit- zerland	5.55 / 1	An indicative exemplary list		Х		
Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.55	Suggest reword opening sentence: "An indicative list of exposure pathways relevant for / potential exposure scenarios which should be considered in the assessment is given below:"	One of the problems in separating exposure pathways and exposure scenarios is that, in many cases, the expo- sure pathway/s is/are	Х		

				part of an exposure scenario. This is the case for almost all the exposure pathways listed in this paragraph.			
2	Germa- ny	5.55	 "An indicative list of exposure pathways relevant for potential exposure scenarios which should be considered in the assessment is given below: (a) External irradiation due to deposition of radionuclides on skin; (b) External irradiation from the source; (c) External irradiation from the source; (d) External irradiation due to deposition of radionuclides on the ground ("ground shine") or other surfaces; (e)(d) Inhalation of radionuclides from the atmospheric plume; (f) External irradiation due to deposition on the ground or other surfaces; (g) Intakes of radionuclides due to the inadvertent ingestion of radioactive material deposited on ground or other surfaces; and (h) Intakes of radionuclides due to the consumption of fresh and processed food and water." 	 Please move bullet (f) behind (c), in order to arrange the possibly relevant exposure pathways in a more logical order (external irradiation – inhalation – ingestion). The Safety Guide GS- G-2.1 "Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiologi- cal Emergency" uses the terms "cloud shine" and "ground shine", see Para 2.16 therein. It is proposed to introduce the same terminology in bullets (c) and (d). 	Х		
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.56	The ideas presented here might be more clearly stated as: "When considering accident situations, the simplest way to proceed is to consider all the major exposure scenarios that are			х	The concept is correct but this Safety Guide is not to provide indications to emergency plan-

			likely to occur for the situation under con- sideration and establish which of these make the major contributions to the po- tential doses. This will provide a clear indi- cation to emergency planners as to which protective measures are most likely to avert doses to members of the public."					ners. The relation with emergency planning and potential expo- sures is discussed in the Section Introduction of the Safety Guide.
-	France	5.58	Different exposed population-groups may be identi- fied, depending on the characteristics of the acci- dent or event <u>and the time of day or year</u> of the postulated release,	It is very complex to evalu- ate (time of day !). That increase significantly the number of results in studies with a lot of hypothesis with a limited interest	X	Text modified		
	Japan	Page 35 Para 5.59. Line 6	"(for example, 10 mSv or 50 mSv per year – if such)"	Clarifying the descrip- tion. Duration of dose as- sessment should be mentioned here.	Х			
	USA	5.61 Line 5	Suggest adding a last sentence: "Such indications of risk should be used only in comparing options, and should not be used for attributing individual risk."	Clarity. A needed warning to not use risk incorrectly.	Х			
3	Germa- ny	Footnote No. 31 to 5.64	" but this safety guide limits the scope to individual effects."	Grammar.	Х			
	Japan	Page 36 Para 5.63. Line 4	over a three month period [reference]	Reference is necessary to justify the three month period.			X	3 months is a period suggested as an example for prospective as- sessments of potential expo- sures like in this Safety Guide. It is related to, for example, summer season, where

							more green vege- tables contami- nated by deposit may be expected.
-	Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.65	Remove one instance of "activities" in first line.		Х		
-	Swit- zerland	5.66 / 8	Ref. [50] illustrates with a range of probabilities	Editorial	Х		
	USA	5.67	This paragraph would seem to be du- plicative of the previous paragraph.	Clarity	Х	 	
-	Swit- zerland	5.67 / 4	The definition and use of risk con- straints are more discussed more exten- sively in [6].	Editorial	Х		
-	Austral- ia	Para- graph 5.68	Final sentence. Suggest replacing with "This is further discussed in Annex III."		Х		
1	Germa- ny	5.69	"Another option may be to express the criteria qualitatively, in terms of 'a consequence to the public that would be unacceptable'. For in- stance, a criterion <u>could should</u> be that very disruptive countermeasures – like large evacu- ation or relocation – as a result of the potential accident scenarios specified for the facility or activity <u>would are</u> not be acceptable. <u>The safe- ty objective in the case of an accident with significant off-site consequences is that only protective measures that are limited in terms of times and areas of application would be neces- sary and that off-site contamination or high radiation levels would be avoided or mini- mized. Although this is in principle a qualita- tive criterion, the need of these countermeas-</u>	Ensuring consistency with Para 2.13, bullet (4) each of the Safety Require- ments SSR-2/1 Rev. 1 and DS478 (revision of NS-R- 5 Rev. 1, latest version dated 19 April 2015). According to them, " only protective ac- tions that are limited in terms of times and areas of application" are acceptable. Thus, the given example needs to be formulated in a generally applicable criterion.	Х		

	Swit- zerland	5.69 / 7	ures should be determined using estimations of projected doses (or related operational magni- tudes) and comparing these estimations against emergency response decision numerical crite- ria" comparing these estimations against emergency response decision numerical criteria.	Editorial	X		
	France	5.69	Another option may be to express the criteria quali- tatively, in terms of 'a consequence to the public that would be unacceptable'. For instance, a crite- rion could be that very disruptive countermeasures -like large evacuation or relocation- as a result of the potential accident scenarios specified for the facility or activity would not be acceptable. Alt- hough this is in principle a qualitative criterion, the need of these countermeasures should be deter- mined using estimations of projected doses (or related operational magnitudes) and comparing these estimations against emergency response deci- sion numerical criteria. If this approach is used, the regulatory body should define the decision criteria for countermeasures to be used for the assessment of the potential exposures in line with the require- ments in [18]. Examples of use of those decision criteria for countermeasures are available in [7].	All the article 5.69 is diffi- cult to understand. Should be reviewed	Х	Text modified	
2	Germa- ny	5.70	"Different criteria may be set for facilities and activities with varying levels of inventory and technological complexity. For instance, the regulatory body may specify one set of criteria for the nuclear fuel cycle and another set of eriteria for hospitals or small laboratories."	It is proposed to delete this paragraph. For the protection of the public it is irrelevant what type of facility causes an expo- sure leading to a certain dose. The protection of the public should be based on the potential doses but should not rely on the type of facility. In case of a lower inventory, also the resulting dose in case	Х		

				of a release would likely be lower. In addition, for all potential releases not only dose limits or inter- vention levels have to be considered, but also the principle of minimizing radiological impacts has to be applied.			
	ENISS	5.70	Different criteria may be set for facilities and activities with varying levels of inven- tory and technological complexity. For instance, the regulatory body may specify one set of criteria for the nuclear fuel cycle <u>facilities</u> and another set of criteria for hospitals or small laboratories.	For clarity.	Х	Para. was deleted	
2	Germa- ny	5.75	2 nd sentence: "ICRP [39, 52, 56] provides a practical approach to assess and manage the effects on flora and fauna due to releases to the environment;"	Wrong reference is cited here. The IAEA Safety Guide SSG-18 [39] must be replaced by the ICRP Publication 124 [56]. Compare with Para 5.76 of DS427.	Х		
	France	5.75. 2 nd sen- tence last line	this approach by ICRP is consistent with other equivalent approaches developed by different or- ganizations [53-55].	Mentioning "States" is mis- leading as the references given page 46 are outside government decision- making process as they referred to [53] a DOE standard and DOE is Gov- ernmental department whose mission is to advance energy technology and promote related innovation and that standard is for its internal use for its own installations, to [54] the European ERICA project that is a Research &	Х	The inclusion of these equivalent approaches was sug- gested during previ- ous revisions of the Safety Guide. However, now refer- ences to other ap- proaches used in MS are kept just in the Annex.	

Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex 1, impact-to on flora and fauna for normat by the change of the and a subtraction of final disation change of the and power of the and subtraction of final change of the and subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction of the add subtraction							
Image:				Development Programme			
Image:				and to [55] a CSA document			
by the Canadian Standards Association. Canada by the way made it clear with the "Publication of final deci- sion on the assessment of a substance — Releases of radionucides from nuclear hadilities (impact on non- humm biota) — specified on the Priority Substances List (subsection 77(6) of the Canadian Environment and of the Environment and File Publication of final the properties of the Environment and the Environment and and the environment and and the environment and operation,Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact-4 on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. The Safety Safety Environment and vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- limes of the national competent authorit				that is a standard promoted			
Japan 5.76 (p.38) , this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, operation, c, this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, operation, c, this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, day, September 2, 2006. Japan 5.76 (p.38) , this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, operation, c, this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, day, September 2, 2006. x Key Lapan 5.76 (p.38) , this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, operation, c, this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, day, September 2, 2006. x Key Lapan 5.76 (p.38) , this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, operation, c, this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, day, September 2, 2006. x Key Lapan 5.76 (p.38) , this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, operation, c, this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, day, September 2, 2006. x Key Lapan 5.76 (p.38) , this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, day, September 2, 2006. X Key Lapan 5.76 (p.38) , this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, day, September 2, 2006. X				by the Canadian Standards			
way made i clear with the "Publication of final deci- sion on the assessment of a substance from nuclear facilities (inpact on non- human biota) — specified on the Prioriny Substances Lis (subsection?) Substances Lis (subsection?) Substances Notice therefore is hereby given that her Ministers of the Environmental of Health propose to take no further action under CEPA 1999 in regretor the Said versetor Vol 140, No. 35 Part I Otawa, Satur- day, September 2, 2006.Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex 1, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Oras Said Said Said Said Said Said Said Said Said Said Said Said Said Said Said				Association. Canada by the			
Publication of final deci- sion on the assessment of a substance — Releases of radioucidas from nuclear facilities (impact on non- human biola) — specified on the Priority Substances List (subsection 77(6) of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999) that "Notice therefore is hereby given that the Ministers of the Environment and of Helath propose to take no further action under CEPA 1999 in respect of the said substance." See the official reference : Canada Gazette Vol. 140, No. 35 Part I Otawa, Satur- day, September 2, 2006.Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—the on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the exitorment may vary between States and subal be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				way made it clear with the			
sion on the assessment of a substance				"Publication of final deci-			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the image of the conviount of the one of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the conviount of the convioun				sion on the assessment of a			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, impact-to on for and fauna for normal protection,Clarification. Para 5.72 radiouclides from unclear facilities (impact on non- human biola) — specified on the Priority Substances List (subsection 77(6) of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999) that "Notice therefore is hereby given that the Ministers of the Environment and of Health propose to take no further action under CEPA 1999 in respect of the said substances." See the official reference: Canada Gazette Vol. 140, No.3 59 art 10 thuwas, Satur- day, September 2, 2006.Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, impact-to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				substance — Releases of			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the ist quark of the environment may operation,Clarification. Part Oftawa, Satur- data Spart Oftawa, Satur				radionuclides from nuclear			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, impact-te on flora and fauna for normal operation,character vol. 140, Para 5.72 mentions vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,x				facilities (impact on non-			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, impact—to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 canada for normal of the environment and of the substance.Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, Para 5.72 canada for normal of the environment and of the substance.Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 canad for normal of the environment and for normal operation,Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				human biota) — specified			
List (subsection 77(6) of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999) that "Notice therefore is hereby given that the Ministers of the Environment and of Health propose to take no further action under CEPA 1999 in respect of the said substance." See the official reference : Canada Gazette Vol. 140, No. 35 Part 1 Ottawa, Satur- day, September 2, 2006.Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, impact—te on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				on the Priority Substances			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, impact-to on flor and fauna for normal operation,Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999) that "Notice therefore is hereby given that the Ministers of the Environment and of Health propose to take no further action under CEPA 1999 in respect of the said substance." See the official reference : Canada Gazette Vol. 140, No. 35 Part I Ottawa, Satur- day, September 2, 2006.Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact-to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				List (subsection 77(6) of the			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				Canadian Environmental			
Image: Solution of the state				Protection Act, 1999) that			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—teo on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,				"Notice therefore is hereby			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact-to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				given that the Ministers of			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, impact-to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				the Environment and of			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—to on peration,Clarification. ParaPara 5.72 radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				Health propose to take no			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—te on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				further action under CEPA			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				1999 in respect of the said			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				substance." See the official			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. ParaPara5.72 radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				reference :			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				Canada Gazette Vol. 140,			
Japan5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—to on flora and fauna for normal operation,Clarification. Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,X				No. 35 Part I Ottawa, Satur-			
Japan 5.76 (p.38), this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I, an example of a methodology to assess the impact—to on flora and fauna for normal operation, Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,	 -			day, September 2, 2006.			
(p.38) an example of a methodology to assess the impact—to on flora and fauna for normal operation, Para 5.72 mentions "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,	Japan	5.76	, this Safety Guide presents, in Annex I,	Clarification.			
impact—to on flora and fauna for normal operation, "Considerations for radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,		(p.38)	an example of a methodology to assess the	Para 5.72 mentions			
operation, radiological protection of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide-lines of the national competent authorities, X			impact-to on flora and fauna for normal	"Considerations for			
of the environment may vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,			operation,	radiological protection			
vary between States and should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,				of the environment may			
should be subject to the regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,				vary between States and			
regulations and guide- lines of the national competent authorities,				should be subject to the	Х		
lines of the national competent authorities,				should be subject to the			
lines of the national competent authorities,				regulations and guide-			
competent authorities,				lines of the national			
				competent authorities,			
including regulatory				including regulatory			
bodies". Hence the				bodies". Hence the			

			methodology provided in Annex I is one of the option which should be used.					
France	5.76	The methodology to assess the radiological impact to flora and fauna for normal operation will be found in ICRP publications for different ecosystems [52, 56].	They are many national and international frameworks which require the explicit consideration of the protec- tion of flora and fauna but at the exception of UK there is no explicit legal requirement to assess the radiological impact approach to fauna recommended by IAEA or in the pub 124 of ICRP as the States usually follow §5.73. The note 33 to the Conven- tion on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dump- ing of Wastes and Other Matter is misleading as this convention does not require this approach as it simply forbids the dumping of radi- oactive material into the sea. In fact this approach was applied in 1988 by the Agency for the LDC, to redefine annual release rate limits for the purposes of the London Convention.		X	Currently London Convention re- quires explicit consideration of marine flora and fauna. The IAEA was requested to provide the meth- odology for flora and fauna impact assement. A re- cent IAEA refer- ence related to London Conven- tion (TECDOC) was added in a footnote.		
			The Annex I is useless as it repeats the methodology detailed in ICRP publication 124.		X	The IAEA pro- poses a practical methodology to assess impact to flora and fauna in the Annex based on the ICRP but it		
								is not a repetition of ICRP 124.
---	--------------	-----------	---	---	---	---	---	---
	France	6	"variability and uncertainty in the radiological environmental impact assessment"	We consider that all the chapter regarding the uncer- tainties has to be deleted. Presentation of uncertainties will lead to complex studies. The benefit is very low ac- cording the hypothesis and the methods used.			X	The chapter was re-drafted consid- ering several comments, in- cluding those from France, Canada, ENISS, Germany, Turkey and Australia.
	Canada	Section 6	Suggest section be re-organized to group similar ideas together and reduce repetition.	This section is very im- portant but the key points are difficult to follow and seem to repeat themselves (e.g. 6.2 and 6.10 both seem to make similar points about sensitivity analyses).	X	Section was modified considering this comment		
	France	6.1	Uncertainty reflects the state of knowledge about the system being investigated and relates to how accurately the doses or the risk can be estimated.	Presentation of uncertainties will lead to very complex studies with very low bene- fit.	Х	Section was modified considering this comment		
	France	6.3	Add at the end of the § "It should also be noted that in cases where assessors lack of data about the variability of transfer parameters, the use of pdf distributions should not be systematically recom- mended and doesn't always lead to conservative results. Alternative methods such as fuzzy numbers or belief functions could be more relevant to repre- sent expert judgment and to propagate such kind of uncertainties.	Warn the assessor about some traps of Bayesians approaches	Х	Section was modified considering this comment		
	ENISS	6.4	When the doses estimated conservatively are eloser to above- the criteria	See above (Note: "above" refers to com- ment from ENISS to Para. 5.50).	Х	Section was modified considering this comment		
2	Germa- ny	6.4	3 rd sentence: "When the doses estimated conservatively are <u>equal to or above</u> closer to the criteria, or the decisions to be made with respect to the tech- nology could have a high impact on the level	As long as the dose crite- ria are met, no further assessments are required.	Х	Section was modified considering this comment		

		of investment, the regulatory body should de- cide whether more detailed methodologies, including, for instance, the use of site specific data, are necessary to increase the realism in the assessment."					
Turkey	6.4	"If the doses calculated are close to 10% of the dose constraint, simple conservative method- ologies could be considered sufficient"	The term of "smaller fractions" should be clarified. To be consistent with IAEA SRS-19, "10% of" may be used instead of "smaller fractions". "criteria" in the next sentence should also be changed accordingly.			X	10% is also argu- able. We prefer to leave this to the discretion of the national regula- tors on a case-by- case basis.
Turkey	6.5 /third line	In the sentence "public do not exceed the dose limits set by the national regulatory body." The meant term whether or not it is "dose limits" or "dose constraint" is proposed to be checked.	Public doses shall not exceed the dose constraints which are estbalished criteria. Why should probabilistic analysis of the doses and uncertainties in the results change the final dose criteria that shall be complied with?	X	Section was modified considering this comment		
Canada	6.6	Include specific guidance for this scenario. "6.6. For assessments using single values of habit data, high percentiles in some of the habit data distribution could be used (for instance, in particu- lar food consumption rates); for assessments con- sidering the distribution of the habit data, the result- ing dose in the 95% percentile could be used, where appropriate, should be used to be com- pared with the established criteria."	In terms of uncertainty, the draft Guide suggests that an average measured value should be used for environ- mental parameters when available; however, for habit data (e.g. food consumption rates) a high percentile should be used if a single value is selected. The draft Guide then suggests that if a distribution of the habit data is used, the 95th percentile dose should be used for	X	Section was modified considering this comment		

			comparison to established criteria. However, if distri- butions are used in an as- sessment it is likely that they would be specified for other parameters than just habit data. There is no guidance for this scenario and this could lead to the application of the 95th percentile to the dose limit in all circum- stances. More specific guid- ance should be provided and the wording changed from "should be".			
France	6.7	The establishment of environmental monitoring programmes, once the installation is operating, would provide confidence that the predicted doses are reasonable and do not underestimate real doses.	If routine measurements are below the detection limits, as usually, they can't be used for assessment studies	Х	Section was modified considering this comment	
Austral- ia	Para- graph6. 8	Suggested amendment: "If insufficient information or data is are available then a conservative estimate should be used. However, it should be avoided to combine many conservative assumptions and arrive at a result for the impact that is grossly pessimistic because this may result in un- realistic consequences use of a large num- ber of conservative assumptions can result in unrealistic overestimation of doses and this should be avoided. One way of avoid- ing this is to look for a dominating expo- sure scenario that can be used to generate upper limit estimates of doses, or a sce- nario that can be used to represent a group of similar scenarios. Conservative assessment is also greatly facilitated by		Х	Section was modified considering this comment	

			use of limiting values where possible (e.g. continuous exposures), or prescribed lim- its (e.g. nuisance dust limits, limits on ra- dionuclide concentrations in food and drinking water) for appropriate exposure scenarios as a first step."				
3	Germa- ny	6.9 (a)	"Selection of potential exposures scenarios: "	Grammar.	Х	Section was modified considering this comment	
	Austral- ia	Para- graph 6.9(b)	Typographical error. Remove space be- fore full-stop.		Х	Section was modified considering this comment	
	ENISS	6.10	For assessments with very realistic data in order to assess which source(s) of uncer- tainty is (are) dominating the global uncer- tainty and to identify which parameter(s) could need more realistic values, sensitivi- ty studies could be carried out to determine how sensitive the overall result is to any source of uncertainty etc.	A sensitivity study for assessments with con- servative assumptions is not needed and would not give better results as the assumptions are still conservative and will still tend to overesti- mate the resulting dose. Sensitivity studies make only sense for assess- ments with very realis- tic assumptions. Sensi- tivity studies cannot be made without a clear and constructive objec- tive: de-creasing the uncertainty, in this case.	X	Section was modified considering this comment	
	Austral- ia	Para- graph	Suggest adding text to end of para 6.10 (perhaps new paragraph 6.11):		Х	Section was modified considering this comment	

		6.10	"An issue with estimating prospective ra- diation exposures is that most of the un- certainty may be associated with the <i>choice</i> of exposure scenarios. This is very difficult to quantify, but it means that it is very important to choose exposure sce- narios that are appropriate to the particu- lar situation being assessed. For prospec- tive assessments this means relying on past experience with similar situations (if available). If this past experience is not available, discussion with interested par- ties (including members of the public) is important in determining a set of reason- able (not realistic) possible exposure situa- tions."				
	Austral- ia	Section 6	 Perhaps add an additional paragraph (i.e. 6.12): "Other sources of uncertainty in any prospective assessment may include: changes in the source term due to degradation of barriers; and demographic changes." 	Other sources of uncer- tainty in any prospec- tive assessment are: • Changes in the source term due to degrada- tion of barriers; and • Demographic chang- es.	Х	Section was modified considering this comment	
3	Germa- ny	Ref. [5]	"INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities, General Safety Requirements Part 4, No. GSR Part 4 <u>Rev. 1</u> , IAEA, Vienna (2009) (2015)."	In the frame of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, GSR Part 4 was revised by amendment (DS462). The final ver- sion of DS462 has been endorsed by the CSS (November 2014) and the	X		

				Board of Governors (March 2015). Rev. 1 will be published this year.			
3	Germa- ny	Ref. [6]	"INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection of the Public and <u>Protection of</u> the Environment, IAEA, Vienna (Draft DS 432)."	Citation of the correct working title of DS432.	Х		
3	Germa- ny	Ref. [33]	"INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Governmental, Legal and Regula- tory Framework for Safety, General Safety Requirements Part 1, No. GSR Part 1 <u>Rev. 1</u> , IAEA, Vienna (2010) (2015)."	In the frame of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, GSR Part 1 was revised by amendment (DS462). Rev. 1 will be published this year.	Х		
3	Germa- ny	Ref. [40]	"INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Site Evaluation for Nuclear In- stallations, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-3 <u>Rev. 1</u> , IAEA, Vienna (2003) (2015)."	In the frame of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, NS-R-3 was re- vised by amendment (DS462). Rev. 1 will be published this year.	X		
3	Germa- ny	Ref. [45]	"INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants Design, Specific Safety Requirements Series No. SSR-2/1 <u>Rev. 1</u> , IAEA, Vienna (2012) (2015)."	In the frame of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, SSR-2/1 was re- vised by amendment (DS462). Rev. 1 will be published this year.	Х		
3	Germa- ny	Ref. [46]	"INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation, Specific Safety Requirements Series No. SSR-2/2 <u>Rev. 1</u> , IAEA, Vienna (2011) (2015)."	In the frame of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, SSR-2/2 was re- vised by amendment (DS462). Rev. 1 will be published this year.	Х		
	Japan	Annex I Title (p.47)	AN EXAMPLE OF CONSIDERATIONS ON PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRON- MENT FOR NORMAL OPERATION OF FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES	Amendment to make the title of the docu- ment consistent with its official name.	Х	An example was added to I-1	
	Austral- ia	Annex I,	Replace " is based in ICRP approach"		X		

		Para. I-1	with " is based on the ICRP approach "					
-	Sweden	Annex I, Para I-2	Delete the assessment of	It is not the assessment of the level of protec- tion which provides protection – change the sentence	X			
	Austral- ia	Annex I, Para. I-4	Replace "foresee" with "foreseen". The sentence beginning "The IAEA recom- mends…" does not make sense. Revision recommended.		Х			
-	Austral- ia	Annex I, Para. I-6	Final sentence. Suggest two revisions to read " sources in planned exposure situations, could be extrapolated from the assessment of the exposures of a reduced number of individual organisms of a species and used as a reference [I-6]."				Х	
	Canada	I-8/3	"I-8. ICRP defined criteria to assess and manage the radiological impact to flora and fauna in the form of derived consideration reference levels [I-1]. The derived consideration reference levels are a set of dose rate bands within which there is <i>evidence</i> some very low probability of deleterious effects of ionizing radiation to individuals of flora and fauna, which may have implications in the structures or populations"	The phrase is incorrect. The DCRL's are evidence-based (mostly laboratory studies based on exposure to gamma radiation) and involve only some interpretation of the experimental results on the part of the ICRP. They rep- resent actual effects of rele- vance to individual biota in terms of survival, reproduc- tion, etc. and are not in any way "very low probability" outcomes.	Х			
	Canada	Pg 48,	"Radiation quality factors, like those used for the	This recommendation is not	Х	Footnote was modi-		

		Footnote 37 (under I-10)	assessment of exposure to humans (resulting in effective doses expressed in Sv) <i>need to be applied</i> <i>to assess exposure to biota even though the key</i> <i>quantity</i> -are not applied to assess exposure to biota; the key quantity for the exposure assess- ment of biota is the absorbed dose, which is defined as the amount of energy that is absorbed by a unit mass of tissue of an organ or organism, given in units of Joules per kilogram or Gray (Gy) [I-1]."	logical. It is contrary to current assessment practices which consider both ab- sorbed dose and a "weighted dose", essentially taking into account the relative biologi- cal effectiveness of different types of radiation for mean- ingful biological endpoints for biota. This is an abso- lutely critical issue for esti- mating the effects of alpha emitters. Even though ICRP recommendations for weighting factors to be used for biota versus humans has yet to be published, it is entirely conventional to use suggested weighting factors readily-available from the scientific literature I [3-5]. ICRP itself acknowledges the importance of weighting factors in Publication No. 108 [I-1].		fied		
-	USA	1-11 Line 3.	Add sentence after 1 st sentence: "However, such a result would likely warrant a closer examination of the possible impacts."	Completeness	Х			
-	Austral- ia	Annex I, Para. I- 18	Remove spurious "the" in " environmen- tal transfer parameters should be the rel- evant for flora and fauna"		Х			
	Canada	I-20/Table I-1 & through- out docu- ment	Other sources of information should be added to the table as well as throughout the document (e.g. UN-SCEAR 2008).	The dose DCRLs for non- human biota were adopted directly from ICRP. It is recommended that discus- sion of other sources of in- formation, such as UN-			Х	

				SCEAR (2008) be added to			
				the document.			
				In addition, a discussion on radiation weighting factors (specifically relevant for α -emitters) for non-human			
				biota should be included.			
2	Germa- ny	Annex I, Table I-1	Terrestrial, Annelid, Reference earthworm: DCRL 0,1-1 10-100 mGy/d	Correction to be in line with ICRP Publication 108.	Х		
-	ENISS	Table I- 1	DCRL earth worm: 0,1-1 10-100 mGy/d	To be in line with ICRP 124	Х		
-	Austral- ia	TABLE I- 1		The DCRLs presented here show clearly that protecting humans will also protect the major species listed in this table.	Х		
-	Austral- ia	FIG. 1-2		Again the logic appears to be faulty. The expo- sure pathways cannot be determined until the reference animals and plants have been se- lected. (Note: "again" refers to similar com- ment to Figure 2 by Australia)		Х	See answer to comments to Figure 1
-	Austral- ia	Annex I, Para. I- 22	Terminology changes from "Reference" animals and plants to "Representative". While this is reasonable in environmental		х		

			protection methodologies (e.g. the ERICA integrated approach), the latter term does not seem to have been defined in this document.				
-	ENISS	1-23	In a generic assessment as presented in this Annex, if the dose rates to the selected representative animals and plants are be- low the lower upper_boundary of the rele- vant derived consideration reference level band, impact on population of flora and fauna could be considered negligible and the level of protection of environment can be considered adequate. In the case where the estimated dose rates are within the bands the situation can still be acceptable, but the regulatory body could decide whether additional considerations (i.e. im- provement in the level of details of the assessment) or practical mitigation measures would be needed, bearing in mind that derived consideration reference levels are reference points, not limits.	The corrections pro- posed are necessary because the choice of the bands are very con- servative and define a protection objective towards an individual. To differentiate be- tween the lower and upper boundary indi- cates a level of preci- sion which not exists. Because of the uncer- tainty ICRP had pro- posed a band instead of a single value. Thus the protection aim is achieved when the as- sessed dose meets the band or is below.		X	As the methodol- ogy is very genric it is reasonable to use conservatively the criteria, e.g. the lower end of the band. Never- theless, it is ex- plained that the results could be within the band and the regulator could still decide it is acceptable.
-	France	I-24	The explicit consideration of the radiation expo- sures to flora and fauna in the prospective radio- logical environmental impact assessments, as de- scribed in this Annex, should be considered by States as an option to complement the environmen- tal protection approach considering only human protection aspects which, ultimately, would rein- force the system of radiation protection consider- ing the requirement of graded approach, i.e. that the efforts in this additional assessment should be commensurate to the expected level of risk.	In case the Annex I is kept then the context (prospec- tive) must be specified and the graded approach remind to the reader. As mentioned before in the text this ap- proach is not needed in the large majority of cases (as also demonstrated by calcu- lation made in normal opera- tion) and thus does not rein-	X		

				force the system of radiation protection.				
-	France	I.25	However, a generic approach may not be appropri- ate for the assessment of the impact to flora and fauna in particular circumstances, for example when dealing with protected or endangered species or when very sensitive ecological niches are identi- fied.	The word "very sensitive ecological niches" should be precise. At that time, we propose to delete this detail.	х			
	Canada	1-25	Add the text: "Caution in applying the existing framework may also be advisable in sensitive environments. There is an emerging weight of evidence from the field for a need to update dose-effect relationships for ecologically-relevant exposure time scales, species and endpoints [I- 12]." Add the new reference quoted above [I-12] Garnier-Laplace, J., Alonzo, F., Adam- Guillermin, C., 2015. Establishing relationships between environmental exposures to radionu- clides and the consequences for wildlife: infer- ences and weight of evidence. Annals of the ICRP 44, 295-303.	This recent ICRP Annals publication by an authorita- tive source should be quoted with appropriate caution provided, e.g. in the Discus- sion of this section. The evidence from Cherno- byl for low-level radiation effects represents the most relevant data ever collected. These insights currently provide us with the only comprehensive data from the field to truly test whether the laboratory data (on which the DCRLs are almost en- tirely based) can be extrapo- lated to field conditions. The mismatch between field and laboratory studies has yet to be resolved, and hence cau- tion is warranted in simply following ICRP DCRLs for any "sensitive environ- ments".			X	ICRP Publications 108 and 124 are considered the current applicable references. IAEA discussed with representa- tives from ICRP, IUR, EC, UNEP and it was agreed that the current approach by ICRP is conceptually and scientifically sound enough to be adopted in international safety guidance, particularly for planned exposures (see <u>http://gnssn.iaea.o</u> rg/RTWS/cgrpe/S <u>hared%20Docum</u> <u>ents/Meeting%20</u> <u>Fii- nal%20Reports/Fii nal%20Report%2</u> <u>05th%20Meeting</u> <u>%20(2013).pdf</u>)
-	Canada	Pg 53, Footnote	Replace "which are compatible" with "which pro- vide more explicit criteria and decision-making	To say that these approaches are "compatible" is an over-	Х	Text modified		

		42 (under I-26)	tools relative to the use of" ⁽⁴² Some States have defined and used their own radiological criteria to assess radiological impact to flora and fauna which provide more explicit crite- ria and decision-making tools relative to the use of which are compatible with the ICRP derived consideration reference levels [I-3 – I-5]."	simplification of fundamen- tally different approaches to biota dose assessment. The ICRP system is qualitative with very broad bands and great latitude for interpreta- tion. The other systems are more quantitative and clear- er in terms of risk estimation and hence decision-making.			
-	Canada	II-5/title and through- out docu- ment (4.13, 4.14, 5.42, footnote 26)	Replace the term" conceivable accident" using terminology consistent with other jurisdictions (e.g. probable accident).	The draft Guide uses the term conceivable accidents. This is not a well-defined term and more discussion about the term conceivable accidents would be useful	X		
-	Japan	Annex II II-6/1 (p.57)	<u>GSR Part3</u> BSS	Туро.	Х		
-	ENISS	II-8	Since the consequence of a radiation dose can be expressed as the increased probabil- ity of health effects (for example death from early cancer) ⁴⁶ , an indication of the risk can be evaluated by combining the probability p of <u>the end state of</u> scenario i occurring (pi) and the probability of the health effects if it occurs (Ci).	For clarification that not the scenario is meant but the end state of the scenario.	Х		
-	ENISS	II-15	The dose to the most more exposed indi- vidual or individuals are then calculated by using a set of meteorological conditions and other environmental transfer condi- tions along with the probabilities of these conditions applying along with factors that affect the dose and their probabilities.	To be in line with foot- note 24 where "the more highly exposed individuals" are men- tioned.	X		
-	Finland	ANNEX	r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r	It would be better to		Х	This will be dis-

	III		leave this annex out and add references into the paragraph 5.67. It's not clear what is the purpose of these examples. Should they be regarded as guidance or not.			cussed at WASSC/NUSSC/ RASSC
Japan	Page 67 III-29.	In addition, short term doses to thyroid are compared to 50 mSv thyroid equivalent dose (dose level for stable iodine admin- istration).	Clarifying the descrip- tion. It is necessary to identi- fy whether 50 mSv is the effective dose or the thyroid equivalent dose.	X		
India	1.17	NOTE: comments from India in pfd ar- rived 28/08/2015. It is mentioned "The prospective assess- ment of potential exposures for facilities and activities, as described in this Safety Guide, may require that accidents with very low probabilities of occurrence lead- ing to radiological consequences for the public and the environment are considered and criteria for potential exposures are fulfilled." The low probability of occurrence may be specified as a cut off value.	Necessary in the framework of techno- logically neutral guide- lines		Х	A cut off proba- bility for the acci- dents to be taken into account for the consideration of potential expo- sures was pro- posed in the initial drafts and it was rejected by NUSSC on the basis that a gen- eral approach is preferred.
India	2.2	Both planned exposures and potential expo- sures caiL and should be _taken Jnto ac- count-at -the-planning or design stage [6].	Planned is missing	Х		
India	2.14	Finally, GSR Part 3 introduction states that, the protection of the environment is an issue necessitating assessment, while allowing for flexibility in incorporating into decision ma- king processes, the results of environmental	Corrected as per GSR Part 3(1.35)	Х		

		assessments that are commensurate with the radiation risks.				
India	3.6	Requirement 12 of GSR Part 3 states that "the government or the regulatory body shall establish dose limits for occupational expo- sure and public exposure, and registrants and licensees shall apply these limits".	Occupational exposure is missing which is also important.		х	There is a refer- ence to other Safety Guide covering occupa- tional exposure in the Scope.
India	Table 1	TABLE 1: EXAMPLES OF FACTORS AF- FECTING THE REQUIRED LEVEL OF COMPLEXITY OF A RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESS- MENT Time as a factor with/without limits may be mentioned.	During an accident con- dition, the time, for which the release of ra- dionuclide from the con- tainment is significant and then tapers down (depending on the pres- sure in containment) would be required to be considered for analysis of dose.		X	This (delay of the release) is includ- ed in "types of safety barriers and engineering fea- tures".
India	4.9	Once a site or a reduced number of sites are selected, shortlisted and the technology is more specified (e.g. the type of nuclear power plant is defined) a preliminary as- sessment for that particular location(s) is normally done using the available infor- mation.	For clarity	Х		
India	4.11	this review should include the consid- eration of the type of facility and activity- and possible-changes in the assumptions	For clarity		Х	It is implicit in the text
India	4.14 (old 4.15)	thresholds and/or criteria say in the form of effective dose to 'representative person' and/or absorbed dose rate to 'reference animals and plants*, 'representative organ- ism" at a level of —j mSv and — mGy/h respectively.;	It will be of great help to member states if Agency suggests these thresholds and/or crite- ria.		x	It is preferred to keep general, particularly for EIA

India	5.2	The models should be appropriate [référence] for the situation in which they are being applied, ensuring reasonable accuracy.	Reference to docu- ments, containing ex- amples of appropriate models, may be given here	X		
India	5.5	For example, for an installation with low levels of discharges [reference] and/or low potential for accidents [reference] with consequences to the public and the envi- ronment, the use of detailed methods would not be necessary.	Reference to documents with quantified exam- ples of low level dis- charges and low poten- tial for accidents should be given here.		х	The Safety Guide is intended to ve more general. The 'exemtion' crite- rion is mentioned as an indication of low levels of discharges.
India	5.5	"For these types of installations, regulatory bodies, vendors or professional associa- tions may develop generic guidance with simple and conservative calculation meth- ods that can be used for the assessments by the applicants."	We normally practice an approach which is inherently conservative in nature and hence is a better term to use in lieu of cautious.	X		
India	5.8	Jbe activity concentrations estimated-in a number of environmental media are then combined with relevant habit data and time-occupation factors to calculate intakes of radionuclides (internal exposure) or ex- ternal radiation (external exposure) to a representative person22.	The- 'representative person' should be de- fined as a new footnote 22 and be linked. The numbers of the subse- quent footnotes should be changed suitably.	X		
India	5.24	"For installations requiring complex as- sessment, when at the initial stages of an authorization process, a preliminary esti- mation of the dispersion and transfer to the environment can be done using simple Conservative models and meteorologi-	We normally practice an approach which is inherently conservative in nature and hence is a better term to use in lieu of	X		

		cal/hydrological data generic to the region"	cautious.			
India	5.57	"A representative person ²⁹ or persons, based on data from actual or postulated persons likely to be exposed in accident conditions should be identified for the con- sideration of potential exposures {49] •	The reference no. [49] only talks about light water reactors and emergency due to se- vere conditions at a LWR. It may be limited in scope for a PHWR.	X		
India	5.65	For activities or facilities and activities needing a simple assessment and using a conservatively defined potential exposure scenario (i.e. installations with small in- ventories and sources with low capacity for accidental releases), a dose due to the de- fined conservative potential scenario is normally estimated and doses of 1 to a few mSv should be used as the decision crite- ria. For example, doses in the range of 1-5 mSv could be adopted as the range for es- tablishing the criterion.	Examples (and/or lim- its) of small inventory, sources and low capaci- ty, for accidental re- leases should be given here as footnotes for guidance to analysts and regulators		Х	The Safety Guide is intended to be general. A TECDOC is planned to include this details.
India	5.9	The source term inventories in addition to the normal operation inventories should also include ihe radionuclide inventory during low probability scenarios^	For full coverage		х	It is considered not necessary.
India	1.13		Editorial	Х		
India	1.19		Editorial	Х		
India	1.21		Editorial	Х		
 India	1.22		Editorial	X		
 India	1.23		Editorial	X		
 India	3.1		Editorial	X		
India	3.13		Editorial	Х		

India	4.1	Editorial	Х		
India	4.14	Editorial	Х		
India	4.21	Editorial	Х		
India	5.15	Editorial	Х		
India	AI, I-1	Editorial	Х		
India	AI, I-5	Editorial	Х		
India	AI, I-14	Editorial	Х		
India	AII, II-2	Editorial	Х		